Quiver Risk Brain
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Verifiable, deterministic risk math for autonomous agents; re-runnable proof on every answer.
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Tool Definition Quality
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Available Tools
9 toolsevent_volEvent Implied-MoveRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Options-implied expected move around a scheduled event (FOMC/CPI/earnings/etc.). Given spot, ATM implied vol, and days-to-event, returns the 1σ move, the straddle-implied expected ABSOLUTE move (risk-neutral E|ΔS|), and the probability of exceeding move thresholds. Given the vol term structure across the event (ATM IV of the expiry before vs after), it ISOLATES the event's own priced-in move (the Wright event-day technique). Self-checked: the straddle equals a numerical integral of |S_T−S₀|. This is the magnitude that macro calendars (which give only date + impact label) leave out.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| T | No | years (or daysToEvent) | |
| spot | Yes | current spot price | |
| atmIv | No | ATM IV as a decimal (alternative to atmIvPct) | |
| atmIvPct | No | ATM IV in % (or atmIv decimal) | |
| daysAfter | No | days to the after-event expiry | |
| daysBefore | No | days to the before-event expiry | |
| ivAfterPct | No | ATM IV (%) of the expiry just AFTER the event | |
| daysToEvent | No | days until the event | |
| ivBeforePct | No | ATM IV (%) of the expiry just BEFORE the event | |
| thresholdsPct | No | move thresholds (%) for probability-of-exceeding |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | No | false when the engine rejected the input |
| spot | No | spot the computation is anchored on |
| proof | No | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-for-byte. |
| checks | No | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| method | No | technique + assumptions used |
| atmIvPct | No | ATM IV used (%) |
| horizonDays | No | horizon in days |
| expectedMove | No | 1σ move + straddle-implied expected |ΔS| (risk-neutral) |
| eventIsolation | No | the event's own priced-in move, isolated from the term structure (when before/after IVs are given) |
| probabilityMoveBeyond | No | probability of exceeding each move threshold |
exec_verifyExecution-Quality VerifierRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Deterministic execution-quality / fair-fill verification. Given a completed swap (amountIn, amountOutRealized) plus either the pre-trade pool reserves+fee (constant-product) or a fair reference price, returns how many basis points the fill lost to ADVERSE execution (sandwich/MEV/stale) beyond the unavoidable fee + own price impact. Proves that a fill "within slippage tolerance" can still have been robbed. Call after a swap to detect being sandwiched.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| feeTier | No | pool fee as fraction, e.g. 0.003 | |
| amountIn | Yes | input amount actually sent | |
| fairPrice | No | reference mode: fair out-per-in price at submit time | |
| reserveIn | No | pool reserve of input token, pre-trade (constant-product mode) | |
| reserveOut | No | pool reserve of output token, pre-trade | |
| amountOutRealized | Yes | output amount actually received | |
| slippageTolerancePct | No | the slippage setting used, to demonstrate within-tolerance-yet-robbed |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | No | false when the engine rejected the input |
| mode | No | constant-product or reference-price mode |
| note | No | interpretation guidance |
| proof | No | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-for-byte. |
| checks | No | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| verdict | No | plain-language verdict |
| midPrice | No | pre-trade mid price |
| honestOut | No | output an honest execution would have delivered |
| adverseValueOut | No | value lost to adverse execution, in output-token units |
| honestFillPrice | No | the fill price an honest execution would have produced |
| realizedFillPrice | No | the fill price actually received |
| unavoidableCostBps | No | fee + own price impact — the honest, unavoidable cost (bps) |
| adverseExecutionBps | No | bps lost to ADVERSE execution beyond the honest cost |
lp_riskLP Divergence-Loss GateRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Forward-looking liquidity-provision risk. Given a realized price ratio (for impermanent loss) and/or a volatility + horizon (for expected divergence / LVR), returns the closed-form IL, the expected −σ²T/8 divergence, and — with a fee APR — the net forecast and breakeven volatility (the vol above which fees no longer cover the bleed). Self-checked: the IL closed form is verified at the token level against explicit constant-product amounts. Call before providing liquidity to see whether the fee yield can plausibly beat the divergence loss.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| feeAprPct | No | annualized fee yield estimate | |
| capitalUsd | No | position capital in USD — losses are also reported in USD | |
| priceRatio | No | realized P1/P0 for realized IL | |
| volatility | No | per-period vol (decimal) for expected divergence | |
| horizonPeriods | No | periods (default 1) | |
| periodsPerYear | No | default 365 | |
| concentrationFactor | No | V3 amplifier ≥1 (default 1) |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | No | false when the engine rejected the input |
| model | No | model assumptions used |
| proof | No | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-for-byte. |
| checks | No | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| realizedIL | No | closed-form impermanent loss at the realized price ratio |
| feeVsDivergence | No | net forecast and breakeven volatility vs the fee APR |
| expectedDivergence | No | expected divergence loss / LVR over the horizon (−σ²T/8 law) |
| concentrationFactor | No | V3 concentration amplifier applied |
options_riskOptions Book Risk (Greeks + SPAN)Read-onlyIdempotentInspect
Portfolio greeks (delta/gamma/vega/theta/vanna/volga) + SPAN-style scenario margin for an options book on Black-76. Given a list of legs {type, strike, expiryDays, iv, quantity(signed)} and a forward, returns aggregate greeks, first-order P&L per underlying move, and the worst-case loss over a price×vol grid. Self-checked: analytic greeks are verified against finite-difference derivatives of the repriced book. Call to size an options book's true net risk and margin — not the sum of per-leg notionals.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| r | No | discount rate, default 0 | |
| forward | No | shared forward price (or set per position) | |
| positions | Yes | option legs of the book | |
| scanRangePct | No | SPAN price scan range, default 0.15 | |
| volShiftVolPts | No | SPAN vol shift in vol-points, default 10 |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | No | false when the engine rejected the input |
| model | No | Black-76 assumptions used |
| proof | No | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-for-byte. |
| checks | No | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| greeks | No | aggregate delta/gamma/vega/theta/vanna/volga — each verified vs finite differences |
| positions | No | per-leg pricing breakdown |
| spanMargin | No | worst-case loss over the price×vol scenario grid (SPAN-style margin) |
| portfolioValue | No | mark-to-model value of the book |
| positionsCount | No | number of legs priced |
| pnlPerUnderlyingPctMove | No | first-order P&L per % move of the underlying |
perp_gatePerp Liquidation GateRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Deterministic perpetual-futures risk. Given a position (entry, size, margin/leverage, maint-margin/maxLeverage), returns the exact liquidation price, the % adverse move to liquidation, effective leverage, and (if a funding rate is given) the funding drag. Pass a Hyperliquid symbol (e.g. BTC) to auto-fill live mark price, funding, and max leverage. Includes a self-check proving the liquidation invariant. Call this BEFORE opening or sizing any leveraged perp position — an agent that knows its true liquidation distance does not get surprise-liquidated.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| side | No | default long | |
| size | No | position size in base units (or pass notional) | |
| venue | No | live-data venue (default hyperliquid) | |
| margin | No | isolated margin posted (or pass leverage) | |
| symbol | No | perp symbol (e.g. BTC) — auto-fills live markPrice, fundingRateHourly, and the margin source (Hyperliquid notional tiers or dYdX maintenance rate); also defaults entryPrice to the live mark | |
| leverage | No | position leverage (alternative to margin) | |
| notional | No | position notional in quote/USD | |
| markPrice | No | current mark; distance-to-liq measured from here | |
| entryPrice | No | defaults to live mark if a symbol is given | |
| maxLeverage | No | venue max leverage for the asset | |
| horizonHours | No | horizon for the funding-drag estimate, in hours | |
| maintMarginRate | No | e.g. 0.0125; or pass maxLeverage (mmr = 0.5/maxLeverage) | |
| fundingRateHourly | No | hourly funding rate (Hyperliquid funds hourly) |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | No | false when the engine rejected the input |
| model | No | model assumptions used |
| proof | No | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-for-byte. |
| checks | No | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| funding | No | funding drag over the horizon (when a funding rate is given) |
| marginTier | No | venue margin tier the notional falls into |
| liquidationPrice | No | exact price at which the position liquidates |
| effectiveLeverage | No | notional / margin actually run |
| initialMarginRatePct | No | initial margin rate applied (%) |
| moveToLiquidationPct | No | adverse % move (from mark) that triggers liquidation |
| maintenanceMarginRatePct | No | maintenance margin rate applied (%) |
portfolio_gateCross-Venue Portfolio GateRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Cross-venue portfolio risk. Given positions across venues [{venue, asset|symbol, side, size, entryPrice, margin|leverage, maxLeverage|marginTiers}] — OR just account: a Hyperliquid 0x address, whose FULL live book (positions, margins, account equity, the venue's own liquidation prices) is pulled keylessly — returns TRUE net exposure per underlying, the leg that liquidates FIRST (the binding constraint), concentration (HHI / effective independent bets), and a correlated-crash stress counting how many legs liquidate SIMULTANEOUSLY when the market moves ±X% (correlation→1, the Oct-10-2025 crash regime). Pass Hyperliquid symbols to auto-fill live mark/leverage/margin-tiers. Self-checked (exposure reconciliation, per-leg liquidation invariant, nearest=min, monotone stress, venue-liquidation cross-check). Call to see whether independently-sized bets are secretly ONE bet that blows up together.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| account | No | OR: a Hyperliquid account address (0x…) — the full live book (positions, margins, equity, venue liquidation prices) is pulled keylessly; explicit positions take precedence. | |
| betaTier | No | beta regime for the factor stress: mild | moderate | severe — cross-event validated tiers (pre-registered). Default = worst-case single-event table; explicit betas override. | |
| positions | No | legs: {venue, asset|symbol, side long|short, size, entryPrice, markPrice?, margin|leverage, maxLeverage|maintMarginRate|marginTiers}. A Hyperliquid symbol auto-fills live mark/leverage/tiers. | |
| shockScenariosPct | No | correlated market moves (%) to stress; default [5,10,20,30] |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | No | false when the engine rejected the input |
| model | No | model assumptions used |
| proof | No | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-for-byte. |
| checks | No | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| positions | No | per-leg breakdown with each liquidation price |
| concentration | No | HHI + effective number of independent bets |
| positionsCount | No | number of legs analyzed |
| totalNetNotional | No | net notional after long/short netting |
| nearestLiquidation | No | the leg that liquidates FIRST — the binding constraint |
| netExposureByAsset | No | TRUE net exposure per underlying (longs netted against shorts) |
| totalGrossNotional | No | sum of |notional| across legs |
| correlatedShockStress | No | per-scenario: how many legs liquidate simultaneously at a correlated ±X% move |
risk_attestMerkle Batch AttestationRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Batch the content-hashes from many Quiver proof envelopes into ONE Merkle root plus per-item inclusion proofs, so a single on-chain anchor (your wallet's tx) attests all of them at once. Self-checked for completeness (every item verifies) and soundness (a non-member does not). Use to make a batch of risk computations cheaply and permanently attestable for audit/liability, without a chain write per computation.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| items | No | proof envelopes (uses proof.contentHash) or raw content-hashes (hex) | |
| contentHashes | No | alternatively, raw content-hashes |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | No | false when the engine rejected the input |
| proof | No | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-for-byte. |
| anchor | No | EIP-712 (EAS-ready) attestation payload for the single on-chain anchor |
| checks | No | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| verify | No | how to verify inclusion against the root |
| algorithm | No | hash/tree construction used |
| leafCount | No | number of items batched |
| merkleRoot | No | the single root that attests every item |
| attestations | No | per-item inclusion proofs |
| duplicateLeaves | No | duplicate content-hashes detected in the batch |
size_gateKelly Size GateRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Deterministic position sizing (fractional Kelly) + risk-of-ruin. Given an edge — discrete {winProb, winLossRatio} or continuous {expectedReturn, volatility} — and a bankroll, returns the fractional-Kelly size and the probability of ever drawing down to 50/75/90%. The direct antidote to over-betting: full Kelly rides thin edges to ruin; this defaults to quarter-Kelly. Call before sizing ANY position.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| winProb | No | discrete mode: win probability in (0,1) | |
| bankroll | No | bankroll in account units — recommended sizes are returned in the same units | |
| volatility | No | continuous mode: volatility per period (sigma) | |
| winLossRatio | No | discrete mode: net win/loss odds b | |
| kellyFraction | No | fraction of full Kelly to bet (default 0.25) | |
| expectedReturn | No | continuous mode: excess return per period (mu) |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | No | false when the engine rejected the input |
| mode | No | discrete or continuous |
| note | No | plain-language guidance |
| model | No | model assumptions used |
| proof | No | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-for-byte. |
| checks | No | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| hasEdge | No | false when the edge is non-positive (bet nothing) |
| leverage | No | implied leverage of the recommended size |
| riskOfRuin | No | probability of ever drawing down to 50/75/90% of bankroll |
| recommendedSize | No | recommended bet size in bankroll units |
| expectedLogGrowth | No | expected log-growth rate at the recommended size |
| fullKellyFraction | No | full-Kelly fraction of bankroll (the ruinous ceiling, not the recommendation) |
| kellyFractionUsed | No | fraction of full Kelly applied (default 0.25) |
| impliedPortfolioVolPct | No | portfolio volatility implied by the recommended size (%) |
| recommendedBetFraction | No | recommended bet as a fraction of bankroll |
treasury_riskTreasury Depeg & ConcentrationRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Stablecoin / on-chain treasury risk. Given a book of positions [{asset, amountUsd, apyPct, venue, chain, pegTarget, depegProbAnnual}], returns concentration (Herfindahl by asset/venue/chain + breaches over a limit), depeg stress (explicit scenarios + a worst-single-depeg scan), weighted and risk-adjusted yield. Self-checked: HHI == Σw², weights sum to 1, depeg-loss identity. Call to size a treasury's real risk — issuer/venue/chain concentration and depeg exposure — not just its headline APY.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| positions | Yes | treasury holdings | |
| depegFloor | No | worst-single-depeg stress floor (default 0.90) | |
| depegScenarios | No | [{asset, price}] explicit depeg stresses | |
| concentrationLimitPct | No | flag any single exposure above this (default 25) |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | No | false when the engine rejected the input |
| model | No | model assumptions used |
| proof | No | Verifiability envelope: echoed inputs, engine codeHash, contentHash of this exact result, self-checks, EIP-712 signature (EAS-ready). Re-run the open engine on `inputs` to reproduce the result byte-for-byte. |
| checks | No | Ground-truth self-checks; the result is untrustworthy if any fails. |
| verdict | No | plain-language verdict |
| totalUsd | No | total treasury size in USD |
| depegStress | No | explicit depeg scenarios + worst-single-depeg scan |
| concentration | No | Herfindahl (HHI) by asset/venue/chain + limit breaches |
| weightedApyPct | No | holdings-weighted headline APY (%) |
| riskAdjustedApyPct | No | yield after expected depeg loss (%) |
| expectedAnnualDepegLossUsd | No | expected annual loss from depeg probabilities (USD) |
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