Agent Trust Firewall
Server Details
Free pre-action policy checks and data cleaning for autonomous AI agents.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-06-18
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 5 tools
The three check tools overlap because trust_check_action subsumes spend and data checks, but descriptions explicitly route budget-only work to trust_check_spend and structure-only work to trust_validate_data. trust_clean_data and trust_get_capabilities are clearly distinct, leaving only minor risk when choosing composite versus focused checks.
All five names follow the same trust_ prefix plus verb_noun pattern in snake_case: check_action, check_spend, clean_data, get_capabilities, validate_data. There are no mixed conventions or vague standalone verbs.
Five tools are well-scoped for a stateless pre-execution firewall. Each tool has a clear role: composite gate, spend check, data validation, data cleaning, and capability discovery.
The surface covers the core lifecycle: discover capabilities, validate structure, clean data, check spend, and run the composite action gate. Minor gaps are that evidence/source checks exist only inside trust_check_action and there is no standalone policy/history tool, though those limitations are explicitly by design for this stateless pilot.
Available Tools
5 toolstrust_check_actionCheck an action against inline policyARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Evaluate a proposed action against evidence, source allowlists, data constraints and payment limits, returning ALLOW/BLOCK with reason codes. All enabled checks must pass: evidence cannot override an over-budget payment. Set action.type to payment to activate spending checks and pass its amount with remaining_budget; contract applies to data, not action. Use this gate before execution, trust_check_spend for budget alone, or trust_validate_data for structure alone. Enforce BLOCK and fail closed on errors. Source labels are unauthenticated; instruction scanning is a limited phrase heuristic. No action execution, wallet access, policy storage or decision history. Free, unauthenticated, stateless pilot: rules apply only to this call. Usage metadata is recorded; request bodies are not stored.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | No | JSON object to inspect; do not submit secrets or personal data. | |
| action | Yes | Proposed action; payment additionally requires amount and remaining_budget. | |
| contract | No | Map of dot-separated field paths to constraints, e.g. {"order.total":{"type":"number","min":0,"required":true}}. Inline rules apply only to this request. | |
| evidence | No | Caller-supplied evidence labels. Presence is required by default; content and authenticity are not verified. | |
| allow_extra | No | With a contract, false rejects top-level data keys not present in the contract. For nested dot paths keep true and enumerate leaf constraints. | |
| trusted_sources | No | Optional exact source allowlist. Every evidence source must be listed. | |
| remaining_budget | No | Caller-supplied remaining budget; never read from a wallet or persisted by this service. | |
| require_evidence | No | Require at least one evidence item. Setting false intentionally skips the presence check. | |
| allowed_merchants | No | Optional exact, case-sensitive merchant allowlist. An empty list blocks every merchant. | |
| detect_instructions | No | Scan JSON-serialized data for a small fixed phrase heuristic, with possible false positives and negatives. | |
| per_transaction_limit | No | Optional inclusive maximum amount per transaction. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | Yes | The operation completed; does not imply the verdict is ALLOW. |
| checks | Yes | Names of the check families supported by this gate; optional checks run only when their inputs are present. |
| reasons | Yes | All failed checks; empty when ALLOW. |
| service | Yes | Service that evaluated the request. |
| verdict | Yes | Advisory verdict. The integrator must prevent execution on BLOCK or any error. |
| version | Yes | Deployed implementation version. |
| warning | Yes | Security and enforcement limitations. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already cover readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive, and the description adds substantial context beyond them: no action execution, wallet access, policy storage or decision history; stateless per-call rules; unauthenticated source labels; a limited phrase heuristic with false positives/negatives; and that usage metadata but not request bodies is recorded. These are exactly the caveats an agent needs before relying on an ALLOW result.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core behavior and return values, then routing, then limits — a sensible order. It is a dense single paragraph, though, and a couple of points (contract scope, payment activation) could be split for scanability rather than compressed into the same block.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For an 11-parameter, nested-object tool with an output schema, the definition covers activation conditions, precedence, failure mode, trust boundaries and statelessness. Nothing an agent needs in order to call it correctly or interpret the verdict is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With 100% schema coverage the baseline is 3, but the description adds cross-parameter semantics the schema states only locally: action.type=payment activates spending checks and requires amount with remaining_budget, and contract governs data rather than action. It doesn't restate the merchant/allowlist coupling, which is already in the schema, so this sits just above baseline.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: evaluate a proposed action against evidence, source allowlists, data constraints and payment limits, returning ALLOW/BLOCK with reason codes. The enumerated inputs and the return contract make it unmistakable against the sibling validation/spend tools without opening the schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives an explicit routing rule set: 'Use this gate before execution, trust_check_spend for budget alone, or trust_validate_data for structure alone', plus the operational directive to enforce BLOCK and fail closed. It also states a precedence constraint (evidence cannot override an over-budget payment), so the agent knows how the checks combine rather than just which tool to pick.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
trust_check_spendCheck a proposed spend against limitsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Compare a proposed spend with a remaining budget, transaction ceiling and merchant allowlist, returning ALLOW/BLOCK with reasons. Budget and ceiling are independent: amount=4, remaining_budget=10, per_transaction_limit=3 returns BLOCK; equality passes. Use one currency/unit, and update remaining_budget in your application after each actual purchase: this tool neither tracks cumulative spending nor converts currencies. Omitting allowed_merchants skips merchant checks; supplying it requires an exact merchant match, and [] blocks all merchants. Use trust_check_action to include evidence or data checks. Enforce BLOCK before paying; this tool never accesses a wallet or executes payment. Free, unauthenticated, stateless pilot: rules apply only to this call. Usage metadata is recorded; request bodies are not stored.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| amount | Yes | Proposed non-negative amount. Use the same currency/unit as both limits. | |
| merchant | No | Merchant identifier; required when allowed_merchants is supplied. | |
| remaining_budget | Yes | Caller-supplied remaining budget; never read from a wallet or persisted by this service. | |
| allowed_merchants | No | Optional exact, case-sensitive merchant allowlist. An empty list blocks every merchant. | |
| per_transaction_limit | No | Optional inclusive maximum amount per transaction. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | Yes | The operation completed; does not imply the verdict is ALLOW. |
| reasons | Yes | All failed checks; empty when ALLOW. |
| service | Yes | Service that evaluated the request. |
| verdict | Yes | Advisory verdict. The integrator must prevent execution on BLOCK or any error. |
| version | Yes | Deployed implementation version. |
| warning | Yes | Advisory-only payment limitation. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world), yet the description adds substantial context beyond them: no wallet access, no payment execution, no cumulative tracking, no currency conversion, free/unauthenticated/stateless with per-call-only rules, and a data-handling note (usage metadata recorded, bodies not stored). This is exactly the kind of disclosure annotations cannot carry.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Dense but front-loaded: the ALLOW/BLOCK contract and the budget/ceiling independence rule come first, with operational caveats after. Nearly every clause carries information, though the passage is long enough that a few points (currency-unit advice) are stated twice across description and schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Output schema exists, so return values need not be spelled out, yet the description still names the ALLOW/BLOCK verdict and reasons. Combined with the statelessness warning, the caller-must-update-budget note, and the sibling pointer, an agent has everything needed to call this correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds cross-parameter semantics the schema cannot express: budget and ceiling are independent checks with a worked example (amount=4, budget=10, limit=3 → BLOCK), and equality passes. It also clarifies single-currency/unit usage and the omit-versus-empty distinction for allowed_merchants. Slight overlap with schema text on the empty-list case keeps it from a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb+resource ('Compare a proposed spend with a remaining budget, transaction ceiling and merchant allowlist') and states the outcome shape (ALLOW/BLOCK with reasons). It also distinguishes itself from the sibling trust_check_action, so an agent can route without opening either schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicit routing is given: 'Use trust_check_action to include evidence or data checks,' plus an enforcement instruction ('Enforce BLOCK before paying'). It also states when merchant checks apply versus when they are skipped, and warns that the caller must decrement remaining_budget itself.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
trust_clean_dataAudit and clean JSON rowsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Audit and optionally clean up to 500 JSON rows, returning cleaned_rows, original zero-based issues and counts. Processing order is trim, primary-key deduplication, then required/range checks: keys " a " and "a" collide after trimming. Duplicate removal keeps the first row and skips later-row field checks; missing keys are retained and flagged. REVIEW persists even after repair, so inspect issues before use; [] returns ALLOW. Numeric strings are not converted or range-checked; use trust_validate_data for type enforcement. Only top-level strings are trimmed; inputs are not mutated. Free, unauthenticated, stateless pilot: rules apply only to this call. Usage metadata is recorded; request bodies are not stored.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| rows | Yes | JSON object rows; at most 500. An empty array is valid. | |
| primary_key | No | Top-level key used for duplicate detection; defaults to id. Keys compare by JSON serialization, so 1 differs from "1". | id |
| trim_strings | No | Trim leading/trailing whitespace from top-level strings; nested values are unchanged. | |
| numeric_ranges | No | Inclusive bounds for top-level fields that already contain numbers. Use validation for numeric type enforcement. | |
| required_fields | No | Top-level field names that must be present and non-null/non-empty. Checked after optional trimming. | |
| remove_duplicates | No | Drop later rows with the same primary key; missing keys are flagged and retained. Duplicate rows are skipped before required/range checks. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | Yes | The operation completed; does not imply the verdict is ALLOW. |
| issues | Yes | Audit findings with original zero-based row positions. |
| service | Yes | Service that evaluated the request. |
| verdict | Yes | ALLOW: no findings. REVIEW: inspect issues, including removed duplicates. BLOCK: invalid row input. |
| version | Yes | Deployed implementation version. |
| warning | Yes | Deterministic cleanup limitations. |
| input_count | Yes | Original row count. |
| cleaned_rows | Yes | New row objects after the selected transformations. |
| output_count | Yes | Returned row count. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Goes well beyond the readOnly/destructive/idempotent annotations: defines the deterministic processing order (trim → PK dedup → required/range checks), states dedup keeps the first row and skips later-row field checks, that missing keys are retained and flagged, that numeric strings are neither converted nor range-checked, that only top-level strings are trimmed, and that inputs are not mutated. It also discloses the operating model (free, unauthenticated, stateless, per-call rules) and the privacy posture (usage metadata recorded, bodies not stored).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded: purpose and return values land in the first clause, with behavioral caveats after. It is dense and semicolon-heavy – some sentences pack two distinct facts (e.g. the collision note) – but nearly every sentence carries decision-relevant information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a six-parameter, stateful-behaving audit tool with an output schema already covering return structure, the description covers the remaining risk surface: ordering effects, what dedup drops, what gets flagged but retained, and the REVIEW-does-not-clear warning. Nothing an agent needs to call it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the schema already carries the per-parameter burden and baseline is 3. The description still adds semantics the schema does not spell out as clearly: the 500-row ceiling, the trim-collision example ('a ' and 'a' collide), and the fact that duplicate removal short-circuits later required/range checks on skipped rows.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
First sentence gives a specific verb pair ('audit and optionally clean'), the resource ('JSON rows'), the hard scope (up to 500), and the return shape (cleaned_rows, zero-based issues, counts). It also names the sibling it is not (trust_validate_data) for type enforcement, so the agent can tell the two apart without opening either schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly routes type-enforcement work to trust_validate_data and warns to inspect issues before use because REVIEW persists after repair, plus notes that an empty array returns ALLOW. Clear usage context, but it does not say when to prefer this over the other audit-related siblings (trust_check_action, trust_check_spend).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
trust_get_capabilitiesDiscover limits and the stateless workflowARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Discover the deployed version, request/row limits, tool names, legacy call aliases and check-clean-recheck workflow before integrating. Pass {}: this inventory endpoint accepts no action, policy or filter arguments; use tools/list for callable schemas and trust_check_action for a verdict. The response explains enforcement and limitations, not stored policy or decision history: rules must accompany each check. Free and unauthenticated, with operational usage metadata recorded but no request-body storage. Re-read after a deployment to detect capability changes.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | Yes | The operation completed; does not imply the verdict is ALLOW. |
| mode | Yes | Current access mode. |
| tools | Yes | Canonical tools and backward compatible call aliases. |
| limits | Yes | Request limits. |
| service | Yes | Service that evaluated the request. |
| version | Yes | Deployed implementation version. |
| workflow | Yes | Recommended integration steps. |
| telemetry | Yes | Operational metadata handling. |
| limitations | Yes | Explicit service limitations. |
| policy_mode | Yes | Supply rules with each call. |
| authentication | Yes | No credentials required. |
| payments_enabled | Yes | No billing or payment execution. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, non-destructive, and closed-world behavior, but the description adds substantive context: free/unauthenticated access, operational metadata recording without request-body storage, response scope excluding stored policy/history, and the requirement that rules accompany each check.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose, then covers invocation, sibling alternatives, response scope, auth/metadata behavior, and re-read guidance. Every sentence carries useful information without redundant padding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a no-parameter, read-only inventory tool with an output schema, the description supplies the key context an agent needs: what it returns at a high level, what it does not return, authentication status, metadata behavior, and when to re-invoke it.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
With zero parameters, the baseline is high, and the description further clarifies that no action, policy, or filter arguments are accepted. It correctly reinforces the empty-object invocation, though little semantic detail is needed for a no-argument endpoint.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb and resource: discover deployed version, limits, tool names, aliases, and workflow. It clearly distinguishes this inventory endpoint from siblings by naming tools/list for callable schemas and trust_check_action for verdicts.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It states when to call it ('before integrating') and how to call it ('Pass {}'), and explicitly routes the agent to alternatives for schemas and action verdicts. It also says to re-read after a deployment, giving a clear lifecycle usage cue.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
trust_validate_dataValidate JSON field constraintsARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Validate JSON field presence, exact types, primitive enums and inclusive numeric bounds, returning ALLOW/BLOCK, field reasons and checked_fields. Combine required:true, type:"integer" and min:1 for a positive mandatory quantity: min alone neither requires a value nor rejects numeric strings. Missing, null or empty optional values skip the other constraints; 0 and false do not. For nested data, fields["order.total"] addresses a leaf; allow_extra:false compares top-level keys, so keep it true for dot-path rules. Use trust_clean_data for transformations or trust_check_action for evidence/spending checks. This validates structure, not facts or provenance. Free, unauthenticated, stateless pilot: rules apply only to this call. Usage metadata is recorded; request bodies are not stored.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| data | Yes | JSON object to inspect; do not submit secrets or personal data. | |
| fields | Yes | Map of dot-separated field paths to constraints, e.g. {"order.total":{"type":"number","min":0,"required":true}}. Inline rules apply only to this request. | |
| allow_extra | No | False rejects top-level keys absent from fields. With nested dot paths use true; this flag is not a recursive additional-properties check. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| ok | Yes | The operation completed; does not imply the verdict is ALLOW. |
| reasons | Yes | All failed checks; empty when ALLOW. |
| service | Yes | Service that evaluated the request. |
| verdict | Yes | Advisory verdict. The integrator must prevent execution on BLOCK or any error. |
| version | Yes | Deployed implementation version. |
| checked_fields | Yes | Number of field rules evaluated. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world behavior, and the description adds context the annotations cannot: free, unauthenticated, stateless per-call rules, usage metadata recorded but request bodies not stored. It also discloses the non-obvious emptiness rule that 0 and false are not treated as empty.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core action and return values, then constraints and routing, so the most important content comes first. It is a single dense paragraph of considerable length; a line break or two between the constraint rules and the pilot/usage disclosure would aid scanning without cutting content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so the description need not enumerate return fields, yet it still names ALLOW/BLOCK, field reasons and checked_fields for orientation. Combined with the dot-path and allow_extra guidance and the statelessness disclosure, nothing needed to invoke it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so most parameter meaning is already structured. The description still adds interaction semantics not present in the schema, notably that missing/null/empty optional values bypass other constraints while 0 and false do not, and that allow_extra is a top-level-only comparison that should stay true when using dot paths.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (validate) with an enumerated resource (field presence, exact types, primitive enums, inclusive numeric bounds) and names the return shape (ALLOW/BLOCK, field reasons, checked_fields). It also explicitly separates itself from trust_clean_data and trust_check_action, so an agent can route without opening schemas.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly names alternatives and the conditions that select them: trust_clean_data for transformations, trust_check_action for evidence/spending checks. It also includes a concrete when-to-use construction pattern (combine required:true, type:"integer", min:1) and a scope caveat that this validates structure, not facts or provenance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
9 tool updates
- Removed
data_clean - Added
trust_check_action - Added
trust_check_spend - Added
trust_clean_data - Removed
trust_firewall - Added
trust_get_capabilities - Removed
trust_spend_guard - Removed
trust_validate - Added
trust_validate_data
4 tool updates
- First observed
data_clean - First observed
trust_firewall - First observed
trust_spend_guard - First observed
trust_validate
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