402Signal
Server Details
Fail-closed live-endpoint x402 router. POST /route, $0.01 USDC on Base, Solana, Algorand.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 99.4% over 22 days
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-06-18
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 3 tools
Each tool targets a distinct phase: preview discovers candidates without contacting sellers, validate does a free readiness probe of a listed URL, and check performs a paid preflight with rules and signed evidence. The descriptions explicitly cross-reference when to use each tool, so there is no real boundary ambiguity.
All three names are lowercase single-word verbs, so the style is consistent and predictable. The names are somewhat generic, especially 'check,' but the pattern itself is uniform across the set.
Three tools map cleanly onto the discovery-validate-check workflow. Each tool has a distinct read-only, free-probe, or paid-preflight role, and none is redundant for the server's narrow purpose.
The tool set covers the full pre-payment flow: finding candidates, validating one without cost, and obtaining a signed quote before paying. Payment and settlement are explicitly out of scope, so the surface has no dead ends within its stated purpose.
Available Tools
3 toolscheckAInspect
Runs the paid pre-flight check on a live paid API endpoint: probes one exact HTTPS url, or the candidates discovered for a need, applies the buyer's price, network and readiness rules, and returns the selected offer with signed evidence of what the seller quoted (price, recipient, asset, network, expiry) before the agent pays the seller. Does not buy the seller's service, hold keys or pay anything for the agent; the agent keeps its wallet and pays the seller separately.
Use preview to discover candidates without paying, validate for a free readiness check of one listed URL, and check when a fresh live observation or a signed receipt is needed before a seller payment. Never call check to pay a seller. After billing.settlement_state=unknown, stop and reconcile; never create another authorization. route is the former name of this tool and is still accepted.
Cost and outcomes: the first unsigned call answers HTTP 402 with the $0.003 USDC checking-fee terms (Base, Solana or Algorand), which an x402-capable HTTP client pays. The fee settles only when a qualifying live offer is found; a completed miss (HTTP 200, live=false, typed miss_reason) is free; a settled fee is not reversed if the offer later changes. HTTP 503 with binding_error=route_binding_unavailable means the seller answered but no probed candidate could be bound to a signed receipt: a completed unpaid answer, not an outage (the reference wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true).
Parameter interactions: need or url is required; with both, url is probed directly and no discovery runs. policy is plain English compiled into the structured fields; an explicit structured field wins over the compiled value, and phrases that do not compile are echoed in unresolved_constraints, never guessed. networks is a hard allowlist judged on the current 402; prefer_network only orders results and never filters. Three independent price bounds: max_price_usd (seller price in USD), max_amount_atomic (atomic units of the seller's asset) and max_total_cost_usd (seller price plus known fees); every bound fails closed when its value is unknown. require_route_binding=true implies require_transparency and may select the next bindable candidate. Defaults: objective best, search_depth standard (up to 7 probes; thorough up to 15; hard ceiling 20), accept_payTo_change false, require_route_binding false. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | No | Optional https URL to probe instead of discovery. need or url (or both) is required. | |
| need | No | What the caller wants routed (plain English). | |
| policy | No | Natural-language constraints compiled into structured values. Unresolved phrases are returned, never guessed. | |
| networks | No | Hard policy lock. Restricts discovery and selection to this set. A HTTP 200 winner must have selected_payment.network in this set from the CURRENT observed 402, never a catalog claim. Unlike prefer_network, this is not a ranking preference. | |
| objective | No | Best-of-N among currently probed eligible candidates, not every discovered endpoint. cheapest, fastest, and most_reliable rank that probed survivor set. fastest is this-request probe RTT, not settlement latency. fastest_settlement is a separate settlement/finality objective. lowest_total_cost fails closed when a fee is unknown. | |
| search_depth | No | standard: first 3 then expand 2-4 (typical cap 7). thorough may expand further. Hard server ceiling is 20. | |
| max_price_usd | No | Drop live hits whose known normalized USD exceeds this bound. Unknown USD fails closed. | |
| max_latency_ms | No | Compatibility alias for max_probe_latency_ms (this request's probe RTT). Unknown latency fails closed. | |
| prefer_network | No | Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche, tempo, sei, celo, robinhood (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand. | |
| min_observations | No | Require history n_7d at least this large. Unknown or smaller fails closed. | |
| max_amount_atomic | No | Drop live hits whose known atomic amount exceeds this bound. Unknown or cross-asset amount fails closed. | |
| require_invocable | No | If true, drop live hits without an input schema. An explicit empty-object schema (type object, no properties or required fields) advertises no required inputs and counts as present. A bazaar HTTP GET with empty queryParams and no required body is the same signal. It does not guarantee the seller call succeeds. Absent or refused schema is not invocable. | |
| max_total_cost_usd | No | Merchant price plus known fees. Unknown fee fails closed. | |
| accept_payTo_change | No | If true, allow selecting a destination whose payTo just changed for the first time. Default false: the first unexpected payTo change is not selectable; a second later independent observation of the same destination can establish it. | |
| max_probe_latency_ms | No | Drop live hits whose known probe RTT exceeds this bound. Not historical service/p50 latency. | |
| min_observed_success | No | Require observed success_7d when n_7d >= 3. Unknown fails closed. | |
| min_reputation_score | No | Require V1 reputation_score. Unknown fails closed. Never guessed from vague NL. | |
| require_transparency | No | If true, a settled /route winner fails when a signed checkpoint receipt cannot be produced. This requires delivery of verifiable evidence on HTTP 200, not server-side recovery. To verify the routing decision later, securely retain the complete paid /route response, especially pq_trust.transparency.receipt and pq_trust.transparency.reveal. Private replay outcomes support bounded recovery of the original response; they are not long-term evidence storage. Keep your own copy. Modified evidence fails verification against the public log. Default false (SEC-ROUTER-004 / A-14): a settled winner does not require a durable signed leaf. A free typed miss creates no route-decision leaf. Routing continues if append, signing, or anchoring is down after settlement (logged_uncheckpointed or unavailable). logged_uncheckpointed is never success when this flag is true. require_route_binding=true also requires transparency, even if this flag is false. A required receipt failure after settlement still reports billing.settled=true; unavailable does not prove no append occurred. | |
| require_route_binding | No | Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true; that is policy working, not a crash. Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding | |
| max_service_latency_ms | No | Drop live hits whose historical p50 latency exceeds this bound. Unknown p50 fails closed. | |
| max_candidates_to_probe | No | Requested probe cap, hard-capped at 20. | |
| max_settlement_latency_ms | No | Settlement/finality bound. Not probe RTT. Unknown fails closed. | |
| min_reputation_confidence | No | Require reputation_confidence. n_7d < 10 is low confidence. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| url | No | |
| live | No | |
| risk | No | Omitted or empty when none. ["payTo_changed"] whenever payTo_changed is true. |
| payTo | No | Recipient of the selected offer as observed in the live challenge. |
| tried | No | |
| target | No | |
| billing | Yes | 402Signal checking-fee outcome. Seller payment is separate. |
| changes | No | |
| claimed | No | Seller need/label/description values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. |
| payable | No | |
| compared | No | Slim probe rows. selectable, payTo_pending, payTo_changed, risk and excluded_reason show why a live row was not eligible. excluded_reason binding_unavailable marks a skipped binding failure. |
| observed | No | What 402Signal itself observed in the seller's live 402 challenge at verified_at (402signal_observed rows, trusted classes only). This side, not the catalog claim, is what a buyer pays. |
| pq_trust | No | To verify the routing decision later, securely retain the complete paid /route response, especially pq_trust.transparency.receipt and pq_trust.transparency.reveal. Private replay outcomes support bounded recovery of the original response; they are not long-term evidence storage. Keep your own copy. Modified evidence fails verification against the public log. |
| invocable | No | |
| objective | No | |
| readiness | No | |
| latency_ms | No | |
| reputation | No | Transparent components first (observed, usage, tenure, stability, source_count), then V2 reputation_score, reputation_confidence, and scoring_model_id/hash. Score is never returned without components. No public 0-100 catalog badge. Unique payer addresses are never listed. |
| miss_reason | No | |
| payTo_age_s | No | Seconds since the last observed recipient change for this URL, when one is recorded. |
| stop_reason | No | |
| verified_at | No | When the observed live challenge was taken. |
| probed_count | No | |
| binding_error | No | HTTP 503 when require_route_binding is true and no remaining already-probed selectable candidate could bind. Policy working, not a crash; wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true. |
| payTo_changed | No | True when the observed payTo (the live challenge at verified_at) differs from the catalog claim (claimed.payTo at claimed_at) or from the last trusted destination 402Signal itself observed for this URL. Compare claimed.payTo with observed.payTo; the observed side is the one a buyer would pay. |
| payTo_pending | No | First unexpected rotation of the observed payTo against 402Signal's own previous trusted observation of this URL, judged on that history alone (an updated catalog claim does not clear it). Not selectable unless accept_payTo_change is true; a second independent observation of the same destination establishes it. |
| probe_ceiling | No | |
| schema_source | No | |
| observed_age_s | No | Seconds since observed.observed_at. |
| unprobed_count | No | |
| decision_binding | No | Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true; that is policy working, not a crash. Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding |
| discovered_count | No | |
| selected_payment | No | |
| candidates_probed | No | |
| discovery_matches | No | |
| unmet_constraints | No | |
| challenge_observed | No | |
| applied_constraints | No | |
| claimed_payTo_match | No | Whether observed.payTo equals claimed.payTo, compared per rail (case-insensitive on EVM). False on a mismatch; null when either side is unknown. Independent of payTo_pending, which judges against 402Signal's own observation history. |
| evaluation_complete | No | |
| candidates_considered | No | |
| candidates_discovered | No | |
| probe_budget_exhausted | No | |
| unresolved_constraints | No | |
| interpreted_constraints | No | |
| candidate_evaluation_complete | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Despite the annotations being minimal (readOnlyHint=false, idempotentHint=false), the description adds detailed behavioral context: it explains the $0.003 USDC fee, the HTTP 402, 503, and 200 responses, and the binding failure semantics. It also clarifies that a settled fee is not reversed, which is critical for an agent's decision-making.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is long but highly information-dense, covering critical operational details. It is well-structured with distinct paragraphs for cost outcomes, parameter interactions, and defaults. While it could be trimmed, the length is justified by the complexity of the tool and the need to prevent misuse.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with 23 parameters, zero required, and no output schema (though has one), the description is remarkably complete. It covers required parameter interactions, fail-closed behaviors, defaults, and safety warnings about payment. The agent has everything it needs to select and invoke this tool correctly, including edge cases like route_binding_unavailable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents each parameter. However, the description adds valuable context beyond the schema, such as the interplay between parameters ('need or url is required; with both, url is probed directly'), the distinction between 'networks' (hard filter) and 'prefer_network' (ranking only), and the fail-closed behavior of price bounds. This goes beyond what the schema alone provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's function: it runs a paid pre-flight check on a live endpoint, probes URLs or discovered candidates, applies the buyer's rules, and returns a selected offer with signed evidence. It explicitly distinguishes itself from siblings by stating 'it does not buy the seller's service' and contrasts with 'preview' (discover without paying) and 'validate' (free readiness check).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides explicit guidance on when to use this tool: 'Use preview... validate... and check when a fresh live observation or a signed receipt is needed before a seller payment. Never call check to pay a seller.' It also gives a clear stop condition: 'After billing.settlement_state=unknown, stop and reconcile; never create another authorization.'
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
previewARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Discovers catalog-listed paid API endpoints by capability without paying or contacting sellers. Returns claimed listings and earlier observations; not_probed=true means no new live check. Results may be incomplete.
Free and read-only: no fee, no seller contact, nothing recorded; safe to repeat. It queries the current upstream catalogs and the local shadow catalog. Use validate for a free readiness check of one listed URL, and check for a fresh paid observation or a signed receipt before paying.
Pass a nonblank need (capability), not a URL; a URL in need finds nothing. networks is a hard allowlist and prefer_network only orders the results within it; an empty or unrecognized networks value restricts to nothing rather than widening to every network. Seller-written fields in hits are catalog claims, not observations.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| need | Yes | Nonblank capability to search for, such as weather or web search. Searches catalogs; does not probe a URL. | |
| networks | No | Hard policy lock. Restricts searchable rails to this set. Unlike prefer_network, this is not a ranking preference. | |
| prefer_network | No | Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche, tempo, sei, celo, robinhood (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| hits | No | Seller need/label/description values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. |
| need | No | |
| total | No | |
| cached_s | No | |
| displayed | No | |
| freshness | No | |
| truncated | No | |
| not_probed | No | |
| miss_reason | No | |
| discovery_via | No | |
| discovery_matches | No | |
| discovery_exhaustive | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare read-only, idempotent, and non-destructive; the description adds meaningful context by stating no fee, no seller contact, nothing recorded, safe to repeat, and that seller-written fields are claims rather than observations. It also discloses not_probed=true means no new live check.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but every sentence carries operational weight: core action, safety profile, sibling routing, and parameter warnings. It is front-loaded with the most important facts and avoids filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the annotations, full schema coverage, and output schema, the description fully covers what an agent needs: when to call, what it does, what to expect in results, safety/repeatability, and how to avoid misusing parameters. The explicit caveat about incompleteness and catalog claims closes the remaining gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, and the description still adds non-obvious semantics: a URL in need finds nothing, networks is a hard allowlist where empty/unrecognized values restrict rather than widen, and prefer_network only orders results. This goes well beyond the schema field descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: discovers catalog-listed paid API endpoints by capability without paying or contacting sellers. It also clarifies that results are claimed listings and earlier observations, not live probes, which distinguishes it from the sibling check and validate tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly routes to alternatives: use validate for a readiness check of one listed URL, and check for a fresh paid observation or signed receipt before paying. It also gives concrete pitfalls to avoid, such as passing a URL in need or misusing networks vs prefer_network.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
validateARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Checks unpaid readiness for one concrete HTTPS seller URL already listed in the local catalog (for example a URL from preview). Compares claimed against observed payment and readiness flags without buying the service.
Free: one unpaid probe of the seller, no fee, nothing paid, and the public numbers do not change; safe to repeat. Use preview to find listed URLs; use check instead when the URL is not listed, when price or network rules must apply, or when a signed receipt is needed before paying.
Supply the exact listed URL including its query string. Unlisted or modified URLs return miss_reason=unlisted without a probe (not listed, not proven offline). Inspect live, readiness, observed and miss_reason; HTTP 200 alone is not success. No price or network filter and no signed receipt.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes | Exact concrete HTTPS URL already listed in the local catalog, including its query string. Unlisted URLs are not probed. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| url | No | |
| live | No | |
| n_7d | No | |
| flags | No | |
| claimed | No | Seller need/label/description values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. |
| payable | No | |
| observed | No | |
| invocable | No | |
| readiness | No | |
| miss_reason | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description adds meaningful behavior beyond the annotations: no fee, public numbers do not change, unlisted or modified URLs return miss_reason=unlisted without a probe, and HTTP 200 alone is not success. These are non-obvious behavioral details that help an agent interpret results correctly.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is divided into clear, purposeful paragraphs: purpose, usage guidance, and critical operational semantics. Every sentence adds value, with the core operation front-loaded and no filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers purpose, safety, sibling routing, URL requirements, failure modes, and how to interpret results ('Inspect live, readiness, observed and miss_reason; HTTP 200 alone is not success'). Given the output schema exists, the description is complete enough for an agent to call and understand the result.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already documents the url parameter thoroughly, and the description reinforces it with additional semantics: 'Supply the exact listed URL including its query string' and warns that modified URLs are not probed. This exceeds the baseline for 100% schema coverage by clarifying failure behavior.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Checks unpaid readiness for one concrete HTTPS seller URL already listed in the local catalog.' It clearly distinguishes this from the siblings by stating it compares claimed versus observed flags without buying and by explicitly mentioning preview and check in the routing sentence.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Guidance is explicit and actionable: 'Use preview to find listed URLs; use check instead when the URL is not listed, when price or network rules must apply, or when a signed receipt is needed before paying.' This fully tells an agent when to choose this tool versus its siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
3 tool updates
- Changed
check1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "binding_unavailable", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "authorization_used", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "binding_unavailable", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + "mandate_mismatch", + "unsupported_hop_field", + null +]
- Changed
preview1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "binding_unavailable", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "authorization_used", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "binding_unavailable", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + "mandate_mismatch", + "unsupported_hop_field", + null +]
- Changed
validate1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "binding_unavailable", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "authorization_used", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "binding_unavailable", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + "mandate_mismatch", + "unsupported_hop_field", + null +]
2 tool updates
- Changed
check3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / networks / items / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche", - "tempo" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo", + "sei", + "celo", + "robinhood" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / descriptionPrevious value: -"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand."New value: +"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche, tempo, sei, celo, robinhood (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand." - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche", - "tempo" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo", + "sei", + "celo", + "robinhood" +]
- Changed
preview3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / networks / items / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche", - "tempo" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo", + "sei", + "celo", + "robinhood" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / descriptionPrevious value: -"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand."New value: +"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche, tempo, sei, celo, robinhood (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand." - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche", - "tempo" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo", + "sei", + "celo", + "robinhood" +]
2 tool updates
- Changed
check16 fields changed- added
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / amount / descriptionAdded value: +"The price the catalog listing claimed, as of claimed_at." - added
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / claimed_atAdded value: +{ + "description": "When the discovery feed last presented these claimed values for this URL.", + "type": [ + "string", + "integer", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / facilitatorAdded value: +{ + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / payTo / descriptionAdded value: +"The recipient the catalog listing claimed, as of claimed_at. Compare with observed.payTo." - added
Output schema / properties / claimed_payTo_matchAdded value: +{ + "description": "Whether observed.payTo equals claimed.payTo, compared per rail (case-insensitive on EVM). False on a mismatch; null when either side is unknown. Independent of payTo_pending, which judges against 402Signal's own observation history.", + "type": [ + "boolean", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / observedAdded value: +{ + "description": "What 402Signal itself observed in the seller's live 402 challenge at verified_at (402signal_observed rows, trusted classes only). This side, not the catalog claim, is what a buyer pays.", + "properties": { + "amount": { + "description": "Price in the observed challenge at verified_at.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "http_status": { + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] + }, + "invocable": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "integer", + "null" + ] + }, + "latency_ms": { + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] + }, + "observed_at": { + "description": "When that observation was made.", + "type": [ + "string", + "integer", + "null" + ] + }, + "payTo": { + "description": "Recipient in the observed challenge at verified_at.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "payable": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "integer", + "null" + ] + }, + "schema_present": { + "type": [ + "boolean", + "integer", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" +} - added
Output schema / properties / observed_age_sAdded value: +{ + "description": "Seconds since observed.observed_at.", + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / payToAdded value: +{ + "description": "Recipient of the selected offer as observed in the live challenge.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / payTo_age_sAdded value: +{ + "description": "Seconds since the last observed recipient change for this URL, when one is recorded.", + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / payTo_changedAdded value: +{ + "description": "True when the observed payTo (the live challenge at verified_at) differs from the catalog claim (claimed.payTo at claimed_at) or from the last trusted destination 402Signal itself observed for this URL. Compare claimed.payTo with observed.payTo; the observed side is the one a buyer would pay.", + "type": "boolean" +} - added
Output schema / properties / payTo_pendingAdded value: +{ + "description": "First unexpected rotation of the observed payTo against 402Signal's own previous trusted observation of this URL, judged on that history alone (an updated catalog claim does not clear it). Not selectable unless accept_payTo_change is true; a second independent observation of the same destination establishes it.", + "type": "boolean" +} - added
Output schema / properties / readinessAdded value: +{ + "enum": [ + "discovered", + "payable", + "invocable", + "recently_verified" + ], + "type": "string" +} - added
Output schema / properties / reputation / descriptionAdded value: +"Transparent components first (observed, usage, tenure, stability, source_count), then V2 reputation_score, reputation_confidence, and scoring_model_id/hash. Score is never returned without components. No public 0-100 catalog badge. Unique payer addresses are never listed." - added
Output schema / properties / reputation / propertiesAdded value: +{ + "stability": { + "description": "Observed changes to this URL's terms (402signal_observed, not catalog claims): a change is a live challenge whose recipient, price, schema or rail differed from the previous trusted observation of the same URL.", + "properties": { + "payTo_changes": { + "properties": { + "changed_at": { + "description": "RFC3339 time of the last observed change, or null.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "count": { + "description": "Observed changes in the window; null when unknown.", + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + "price_changes": { + "properties": { + "changed_at": { + "description": "RFC3339 time of the last observed change, or null.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "count": { + "description": "Observed changes in the window; null when unknown.", + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + "rail_changes": { + "properties": { + "changed_at": { + "description": "RFC3339 time of the last observed change, or null.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "count": { + "description": "Observed changes in the window; null when unknown.", + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + "schema_changes": { + "properties": { + "changed_at": { + "description": "RFC3339 time of the last observed change, or null.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "count": { + "description": "Observed changes in the window; null when unknown.", + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] + } + }, + "type": "object" + } + }, + "type": "object" + } +} - added
Output schema / properties / riskAdded value: +{ + "description": "Omitted or empty when none. [\"payTo_changed\"] whenever payTo_changed is true.", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "type": "array" +} - added
Output schema / properties / verified_atAdded value: +{ + "description": "When the observed live challenge was taken.", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] +}
- Changed
validate4 fields changed- added
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / amount / descriptionAdded value: +"The price the catalog listing claimed, as of claimed_at." - added
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / claimed_atAdded value: +{ + "description": "When the discovery feed last presented these claimed values for this URL.", + "type": [ + "string", + "integer", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / facilitatorAdded value: +{ + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / payTo / descriptionAdded value: +"The recipient the catalog listing claimed, as of claimed_at. Compare with observed.payTo."
1 tool update
- Removed
route
4 tool updates
- Changed
check1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "authorization_used", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "binding_unavailable", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
- Changed
preview1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "authorization_used", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "binding_unavailable", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
- Changed
route1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "authorization_used", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "binding_unavailable", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
- Changed
validate1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "authorization_used", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "binding_unavailable", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
2 tool updates
- Changed
check1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / billing / descriptionPrevious value: -"402Signal routing-fee outcome. Seller payment is separate."New value: +"402Signal checking-fee outcome. Seller payment is separate."
- Changed
route1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / billing / descriptionPrevious value: -"402Signal routing-fee outcome. Seller payment is separate."New value: +"402Signal checking-fee outcome. Seller payment is separate."
4 tool updates
- Changed
check3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / networks / items / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo" +] - changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
- Changed
preview3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / networks / items / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo" +] - changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
- Changed
route3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / networks / items / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand", - "polygon", - "arbitrum", - "monad", - "worldchain", - "xlayer", - "bnb", - "hyperevm", - "ethereum", - "optimism", - "avalanche" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche", + "tempo" +] - changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
- Changed
validate1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - "invalid_session_shape", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "authorization_used", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
3 tool updates
- Changed
check5 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / networks / items / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / descriptionPrevious value: -"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this pay-in rail first but still searches and selects across all supported rails. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock."New value: +"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand." - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche" +] - changed
Output schema / properties / pq_trust / properties / transparency / properties / state / enumPrevious value: -[ - "logged_uncheckpointed", - "checkpoint_signed", - "authorized", - "submitted", - "confirmed", - "unavailable" -]New value: +[ + "outbox_queued", + "logged_uncheckpointed", + "checkpoint_signed", + "authorized", + "submitted", + "confirmed", + "unavailable" +] - changed
Output schema / properties / pq_trust / properties / transparency / properties / status / enumPrevious value: -[ - "pending", - "logged_uncheckpointed", - "unavailable" -]New value: +[ + "pending", + "queued", + "logged_uncheckpointed", + "unavailable" +]
- Changed
preview3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / networks / items / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / descriptionPrevious value: -"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this pay-in rail first but still searches and selects across all supported rails. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock."New value: +"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand." - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche" +]
- Changed
route5 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / networks / items / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche" +] - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / descriptionPrevious value: -"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this pay-in rail first but still searches and selects across all supported rails. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock."New value: +"Weak ranking preference only. Ranks this seller network first but still searches and selects across all supported networks. Not a filter. Use networks for a hard policy lock. Observed networks: base, solana, algorand and the EVM chains polygon, arbitrum, monad, worldchain, xlayer, bnb, hyperevm, ethereum, optimism, avalanche (CAIP-2 ids such as eip155:137 are accepted); the checking fee itself is paid on base, solana or algorand." - changed
Input schema / properties / prefer_network / enumPrevious value: -[ - "base", - "solana", - "algorand" -]New value: +[ + "base", + "solana", + "algorand", + "polygon", + "arbitrum", + "monad", + "worldchain", + "xlayer", + "bnb", + "hyperevm", + "ethereum", + "optimism", + "avalanche" +] - changed
Output schema / properties / pq_trust / properties / transparency / properties / state / enumPrevious value: -[ - "logged_uncheckpointed", - "checkpoint_signed", - "authorized", - "submitted", - "confirmed", - "unavailable" -]New value: +[ + "outbox_queued", + "logged_uncheckpointed", + "checkpoint_signed", + "authorized", + "submitted", + "confirmed", + "unavailable" +] - changed
Output schema / properties / pq_trust / properties / transparency / properties / status / enumPrevious value: -[ - "pending", - "logged_uncheckpointed", - "unavailable" -]New value: +[ + "pending", + "queued", + "logged_uncheckpointed", + "unavailable" +]
1 tool update
- Added
check
1 tool update
- Changed
route4 fields changed- removed
Output schema / properties / billing / properties / amount_atomic / constRemoved value: -"3000" - added
Output schema / properties / billing / properties / amount_atomic / enumAdded value: +[ + "3000", + "5000" +] - removed
Output schema / properties / billing / properties / display_amount / constRemoved value: -"$0.003" - added
Output schema / properties / billing / properties / display_amount / enumAdded value: +[ + "$0.003", + "$0.005" +]
3 tool updates
- Changed
preview1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
- Changed
route1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
- Changed
validate1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - "window_spent", - "fingerprint_miss", - "scheme_mismatch", - "network_mismatch", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + "invalid_session_shape", + null +]
3 tool updates
- Changed
preview1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + null +]
- Changed
route1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + null +]
- Changed
validate1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "unlisted", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "probe_capacity", + "window_spent", + "fingerprint_miss", + "scheme_mismatch", + "network_mismatch", + null +]
3 tool updates
- Changed
preview1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "probe_capacity", + null +]
- Changed
route1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "probe_capacity", + null +]
- Changed
validate1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / miss_reason / enumPrevious value: -[ - "no_candidates", - "no_402_envelope", - "no_payto", - "reachable_200", - "probe_timeout", - "quote_expired", - "invalid_need", - "upstream_5xx", - "ssrf", - "no_input_schema", - "constraints_unmet", - "probe_budget_exhausted", - "probe_limit_reached", - "unsafe_to_probe", - "settlement_unknown", - "probe_capacity", - null -]New value: +[ + "no_candidates", + "no_402_envelope", + "no_payto", + "reachable_200", + "probe_timeout", + "quote_expired", + "invalid_need", + "upstream_5xx", + "ssrf", + "unlisted", + "no_input_schema", + "constraints_unmet", + "probe_budget_exhausted", + "probe_limit_reached", + "unsafe_to_probe", + "settlement_unknown", + "probe_capacity", + null +]
1 tool update
- Changed
route3 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / require_route_binding / descriptionPrevious value: -"Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding"New value: +"Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true; that is policy working, not a crash. Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding" - changed
Output schema / properties / binding_error / descriptionPrevious value: -"HTTP 503 when require_route_binding is true and no remaining already-probed selectable candidate could bind."New value: +"HTTP 503 when require_route_binding is true and no remaining already-probed selectable candidate could bind. Policy working, not a crash; wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true." - changed
Output schema / properties / decision_binding / descriptionPrevious value: -"Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding"New value: +"Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). wrapExactAuthorize reports state=binding_unavailable with keep_calling_route true; that is policy working, not a crash. Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding"
1 tool update
- Changed
route4 fields changed- changed
Input schema / properties / require_route_binding / descriptionPrevious value: -"Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. Unprovable binding is a free typed miss. Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding"New value: +"Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding" - added
Output schema / properties / binding_error / descriptionAdded value: +"HTTP 503 when require_route_binding is true and no remaining already-probed selectable candidate could bind." - added
Output schema / properties / compared / descriptionAdded value: +"Slim probe rows. selectable, payTo_pending, payTo_changed, risk and excluded_reason show why a live row was not eligible. excluded_reason binding_unavailable marks a skipped binding failure." - changed
Output schema / properties / decision_binding / descriptionPrevious value: -"Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. Unprovable binding is a free typed miss. Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding"New value: +"Opt in to proof_carrying_route_v1 and a signed v4 receipt. Requires exact x402 v2 terms observed on the same HTTPS URL, method and probe body, without redirects or unresolved policy. If the ranked winner cannot bind, the router may fall through to the next already-probed selectable candidate that can; there is no unguarded settle. HTTP 503 route_binding_unavailable only when none remain bindable (a free typed miss). Implies require_transparency; a receipt failure after settlement still reports settled=true. Buyer must verify with a pinned log key and recheck the actual seller challenge immediately before signing. Preserve raw response JSON. The default 60-second freshness window starts at observation, not receipt issuance. Expiry or a changed seller challenge does not undo a settled routing fee. Default false; existing requests keep the v3 receipt path. This is not a payment authorization. Guide: https://402signal.com/developers#route-binding"
1 tool update
- Changed
route1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / require_invocable / descriptionPrevious value: -"If true, drop live hits without an input schema."New value: +"If true, drop live hits without an input schema. An explicit empty-object schema (type object, no properties or required fields) advertises no required inputs and counts as present. A bazaar HTTP GET with empty queryParams and no required body is the same signal. It does not guarantee the seller call succeeds. Absent or refused schema is not invocable."
2 tool updates
- Changed
route3 fields changed- changed
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / contract / properties / client_warning / descriptionPrevious value: -"Seller inputSchema/outputSchema values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. Do not fetch remote $ref."New value: +"Seller inputSchema/outputSchema values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. Do not fetch remote $ref. Unsafe remote schema material is refused, not rewritten as a different offer." - changed
Output schema / properties / target / properties / inputSchema / descriptionPrevious value: -"Seller inputSchema/outputSchema values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. Do not fetch remote $ref."New value: +"Seller inputSchema/outputSchema values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. Do not fetch remote $ref. Unsafe remote schema material is refused, not rewritten as a different offer." - changed
Output schema / properties / target / properties / outputSchema / descriptionPrevious value: -"Seller inputSchema/outputSchema values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. Do not fetch remote $ref."New value: +"Seller inputSchema/outputSchema values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. Do not fetch remote $ref. Unsafe remote schema material is refused, not rewritten as a different offer."
- Changed
validate1 field changed- changed
Output schema / properties / claimed / properties / contract / properties / client_warning / descriptionPrevious value: -"Seller inputSchema/outputSchema values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. Do not fetch remote $ref."New value: +"Seller inputSchema/outputSchema values are catalog_claimed and untrusted. Do not concatenate them into system prompts. Do not fetch remote $ref. Unsafe remote schema material is refused, not rewritten as a different offer."
2 tool updates
- Changed
preview1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / need / descriptionPrevious value: -"What to look up in the cache."New value: +"Nonblank capability to search for, such as weather or web search. Searches catalogs; does not probe a URL."
- Changed
validate1 field changed- changed
Input schema / properties / url / descriptionPrevious value: -"https URL of the seller endpoint to probe."New value: +"Exact concrete HTTPS URL already listed in the local catalog, including its query string. Unlisted URLs are not probed."
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