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This connector has been deprecated

Superseded by the io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg/horizon-shield listing at https://mcp.horizonshield.dev, which is the URL published in the official MCP registry. The endpoint behind this listing is the same server and stays reachable.

Verify Integrity Claim

verify_integrity_claim
Read-only

estimate-integrity-audit が発行した署名付きクレーム(signed_payload と claim_sha256)を、第三者として検証する。発行側 (verify_fair_price はPTKA価格の発行) とは責務が正反対で、デフォルト姿勢は不信・fail closed。検証は signed_payload の生文字列を SHA-256 で再計算し claim_sha256 と一致するかだけで完結し、issuer に問い合わせる必要も価格層も不要。判定は契約 0.3 の failure_reasons 準拠で、result(verified / partial / unverified)・failure_reason(stale_data / changed_scope / missing_evidence)・trigger(expired_declaration / changed_estimate_version / missing_receipt / unverifiable_chain)・recomputed_sha256・scope_check・audit_ruleset_recheck を返す。重要: verified は『この宣言が改ざんされていない』ことの証明であって『監査ルールが今も有効』である保証ではない(audit_ruleset_recheck は常に not_performed)。estimate_version を渡すと scope(見積もり内容が発行時から変わっていないか)も照合し、渡さない場合は scope_check:skipped を明示する。 / Verifies a signed integrity claim (signed_payload and claim_sha256) issued by estimate-integrity-audit, as an independent third party. Opposite posture to the issuing side: distrust by default, fail closed. Recomputes SHA-256 over the raw signed_payload string and checks it equals claim_sha256; no issuer contact and no price layer needed. Follows contract 0.3 failure_reasons. IMPORTANT: verified means the declaration is untampered, NOT that the audit ruleset is still valid (audit_ruleset_recheck is always not_performed). Pass estimate_version to also check scope (whether the estimate changed since issuance); if omitted, scope_check is skipped and stated explicitly.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
claim_sha256Yesそのレスポンスの claim_sha256 (64桁16進)。 / The claim_sha256 (64-char hex) from the same response.
signed_payloadYes検証対象の署名付きペイロード(estimate-integrity-audit のレスポンスの signed_payload を生文字列のまま)。改変するとハッシュ不一致で unverified になる。 / The signed_payload string from an estimate-integrity-audit response, verbatim. Any change makes the hash mismatch and the result unverified.
estimate_versionNo(任意) 呼び出し側が現在の見積もりテキストから算出した estimate_version (input_text の SHA-256 先頭8桁hex)。渡すと発行時の版と一致するか照合する。省略可。 / (optional) The estimate_version the caller computed from the current estimate text (first 8 hex of SHA-256 of input_text). If provided, scope is checked against the issued version.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
countNoHow many records matched. 0 means the source was read and nothing matched. It never means the source could not be read, that returns isError: true.
lookupNook = the source was read and something matched. absent = the source was read and nothing matched. A source that could NOT be read never appears here: that returns isError: true and makes no claim about what does or does not exist.
resultNoverified / unverified
source_readNotrue on every successful result. A failed lookup does not return a result at all, so this is never false, it is declared so a consumer can assert on it.
did_you_meanNoNear matches, when an exact match was not found.
failure_reasonNostale_data / changed_scope / missing_evidence
recomputed_sha256No再計算ハッシュ

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes beyond the readOnlyHint and openWorldHint annotations by detailing the fail-closed behavior, the SHA-256 recomputation, and the distinction between 'verified' (hash match) and 'audit ruleset still valid'. No contradictions with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is thorough but slightly redundant (e.g., 'fail closed' and 'no price layer needed' appear more than once). However, the structure is logical, covering purpose, method, and caveats, and each sentence adds useful information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite having an output schema, the description provides essential behavior context: return fields (result, failure_reason, etc.), edge cases (scope_check skipped if estimate_version omitted), and the crucial caveat that verified does not imply audit ruleset validity. This makes the tool's behavior fully understandable.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

All three parameters are described with clear semantics: claim_sha256 as expected hash, signed_payload as verbatim string (with warning about mutation causing unverified), and estimate_version as optional for scope checking. This fully complements the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description explicitly states it verifies signed integrity claims from estimate-integrity-audit and distinguishes itself from verify_fair_price by noting 'no price layer needed' and 'opposite posture'. This clearly separates it from the sibling tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides explicit guidance on when to use (when you have signed_payload and claim_sha256) and how to invoke (optionally pass estimate_version to also check scope). It also clarifies that no issuer contact is needed and that it fails closed, which helps the agent decide.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have distinct purposes: audit_estimate for detailed quote diagnosis, get_price_range for typical ranges, preview_reverse_estimate for early-stage direction, verify_fair_price for tamper-evident records. However, audit_estimate, get_price_range, and preview_reverse_estimate overlap in the price-checking domain, and verify_fair_price vs verify_integrity_claim could be confused (both involve SHA-256 verification), though descriptions clarify the opposite postures.

Naming Consistency4/5

Most tools follow a verb_noun pattern (audit_estimate, check_red_flags, get_price_range, list_cost_categories, search_cost_category, suggest_ehn, verify_fair_price). Minor deviations: create_ap2_fairness_attestation is longer and more specific, and get_agent_card/get_estimate_reading_guide/get_fair_price_sources/get_jccdb_dataset_info all start with 'get' but vary in noun phrasing. Overall consistent and predictable.

Tool Count4/5

14 tools is within the ideal 3-15 range, and each tool serves a distinct function in the domain of construction estimate auditing and fair-price verification. Slightly on the higher end but justified by the breadth of features (price lookup, audit, attestation, verification, data sources, educational guides).

Completeness4/5

The server covers the core workflow: lookup price ranges, audit specific quotes, check red flags, generate attestations, verify claims, and access data sources. Minor gaps: no tool for submitting new price data or updating categories, and no direct tool for comparing multiple quotes side-by-side, but agents can work around these with existing tools.

Resources