Find hidden Unicode (zero-width, bidi, tag payloads), homoglyphs and lookalike names in text.
Scored across 3 tools
The three tools have distinct actions: clean_text mutates, scan_text reports findings, compare_names compares against a protected list. clean_text and scan_text target the same character domain and share terminology, but the descriptions clearly separate remediation from detection, leaving little real ambiguity.
All three tools follow a clean verb_noun snake_case pattern (clean_text, compare_names, scan_text) with no mixed conventions or vague verbs.
Three tools is well within the appropriate range for a focused Unicode-safety utility, and each tool covers a distinct operation (detect, remediate, compare) without redundancy.
The surface covers the core lifecycle: scanning for hidden characters, cleaning them, and comparing confusables against protected names. Minor gaps exist, such as no batch/multi-input endpoints or a standalone normalisation/skeleton preview, but agents can work around these.
Return the text with invisible characters, bidi controls, tag characters and control characters removed and unusual spaces turned into normal spaces. By default ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 are kept inside emoji sequences, between letters of joining scripts (Arabic, Persian) and after an Indic virama (keep_joiners=true); strict=true removes them everywhere. Optional: map lookalike letters to Latin (lookalikes) and apply NFKC normalisation (nfkc). Read-only. Same engine as GET /api/clean.
Inputs: text (required), nfkc, spaces, strict, +2 more. Returns: text, notes, length, changed, +5 more
Check whether a name, username, domain label or brand looks the same as any of up to 50 protected names (for example "pаypal" with a Cyrillic а vs "paypal"), using a UTS #39-style confusable skeleton (curated subset, case and accents ignored). Read-only. Same engine as GET /api/compare.
Inputs: name (required), targets (required). Returns: name, notes, results, version, +4 more
Find invisible characters, bidi controls (Trojan Source), hidden Unicode tag payloads (decoded), variation-selector runs, control characters, unusual spaces, mixed-script words and lookalike letters. ZWJ/ZWNJ/VS16 in legitimate context (emoji sequences, Persian/Arabic joining, Indic virama) are reported as info joiner_in_context and do not raise risk; elsewhere they stay medium. Lone surrogates are flagged. Returns a risk level (none/low/medium/high), counts, and findings with UTF-16 offsets and code points. Read-only. Same engine as GET /api/scan.
Inputs: text (required). Returns: risk, notes, total, counts, +7 more
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