Concurrent-client isolation probe
Server Details
Concurrent two-client overlap probe proving MCP servers do not cross-deliver tool results.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-03-26
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 3 tools
The three tools have mostly distinct actions: probe_isolation runs a probe, get_verdict retrieves the latest verdict, and verify_receipt verifies a signed receipt. get_verdict and verify_receipt could be confused by an agent because both involve signed verdict artifacts, but the retrieve-versus-verify distinction is clear enough.
All tool names follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern: get_verdict, probe_isolation, verify_receipt. The naming is predictable and readable across the set.
Three tools is appropriate for a narrow server focused on running isolation probes and handling signed verdicts. Each tool has a necessary role: execute the probe, retrieve the result, and verify the receipt.
The surface covers the core lifecycle of running a probe, retrieving a verdict, and verifying a receipt. Minor gaps exist, such as no tool to list endpoints, verdicts, or probe history, but the main workflow is not blocked.
Available Tools
3 toolsget_verdictCInspect
Latest signed verdict on file for an endpoint.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| endpoint | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It hints that the verdict is 'latest' and 'signed' and 'on file,' but does not state whether the operation is read-only, what happens if no verdict exists, what 'signed' entails, or any permission or rate-limit considerations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The definition is a single front-loaded sentence with no filler, which is appropriately concise. However, the terseness leaves key usage and behavioral context unstated, so it is not maximally helpful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has one parameter, no annotations, and no output schema. The description does not explain what a returned verdict contains, whether absence of a verdict is possible, or how the signed aspect affects usage, leaving meaningful gaps for an agent to infer.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% for the single required endpoint parameter. The description only repeats that the verdict is 'for an endpoint' without clarifying the expected endpoint format, identifier syntax, or examples, so it fails to compensate for the missing schema documentation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states a retrieval of the latest signed verdict associated with an endpoint, giving a specific resource and scope. It does not differentiate this tool from the sibling tools verify_receipt or probe_isolation, so it falls short of a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance on when to use get_verdict versus verify_receipt or probe_isolation, and no exclusions or prerequisites are mentioned. The endpoint parameter implies a lookup-by-endpoint use case, but that is the only hint.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
probe_isolationBInspect
Run a full concurrent-client isolation probe against an operator-authorised MCP server; returns a signed per-surface verdict.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| target | Yes | ||
| authorisation | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It does disclose that this is an active concurrent probe requiring operator authorisation and that the result is a signed verdict, which hints at intrusiveness and auth requirements. It says nothing about runtime, side effects on the target, whether the probe is disruptive, or failure modes.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with two clauses: the action and the return value. Nothing is wasted, though terms like 'per-surface' are left undefined and add density without clarity.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema exists, and the description only gestures at the return value ('signed per-surface verdict') without explaining what a surface is or how the verdict is structured. For a potentially intrusive security probe with two undocumented required parameters, more context is needed to call it safely and correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must define both parameters. It loosely maps 'target' to the MCP server and 'authorisation' to operator approval, but never states whether authorisation is a token, signed grant, or scope string, nor what form the target takes (URL, name, endpoint).
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource: runs a concurrent-client isolation probe against a target MCP server and returns a signed per-surface verdict. That is clearly distinct from get_verdict (retrieve) and verify_receipt (validate), though the description never names those siblings explicitly.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'operator-authorised' implies a precondition: the target must already be sanctioned before probing, which is real usage signal. However, it gives no guidance on when to run a probe versus calling get_verdict or verify_receipt, and no exclusions or sequencing advice.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
verify_receiptCInspect
Verify a signed verdict receipt.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full disclosure burden and delivers almost nothing. 'Signed' faintly hints at cryptographic verification, but there is no statement on whether the call is read-only, permissions required, what happens on an invalid signature, or whether failure is an error versus a returned result — critical for a verification tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One short front-loaded sentence with no filler, but the brevity is a symptom of under-specification rather than efficiency — there is nothing here for the agent to act on beyond the name.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
A tool taking a nested object, with no annotations and no output schema, and the description says nothing about the receipt shape or the return value (boolean, verdict, error). For a verification tool whose entire value is its outcome, the definition is effectively unusable as written.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% and the single parameter is an untyped nested object with no documented properties. The description only echoes the parameter name ('receipt'), giving no structure, required fields, encoding, or format an agent would need to construct a valid receipt payload.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (Verify) and resource (signed verdict receipt), so the agent knows the general action. But it doesn't distinguish this from get_verdict, and 'verify' is ambiguous — cryptographic signature check, schema validation, or verdict replay are all plausible readings.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or alternatives named. The sibling get_verdict is presumably related (it produces the verdict that a receipt would attest to), but the description never explains the relationship or routes the agent between them.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
3 tool updates
- First observed
get_verdict - First observed
probe_isolation - First observed
verify_receipt
Related MCP Connectors
Observed facts on public MCP servers: protocol checks, tool changes, signed evidence. No verdicts.
Pre-connection collision audit for merged MCP toolboxes, trust-graded, with signed routing receipts.
41Observe MCP tools, verify repeated reads, then try bounded exact reuse for free.
Independent trust scores, tool surfaces and change history for MCP servers.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceA transparent MCP proxy that independently re-verifies tool-call claims instead of trusting them, paired with devmcp — the git/CI server it's proven against.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceTwo MCP servers demonstrating tool visibility scoping and ui/update-model-context for stage magic on language models.2MIT
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceCoordination protocol for parallel coding agents, built above Git. The MCP server exposes the full 17-tool lifecycle over stdio: register agents, publish intents with semantic scopes and declared operations, claim work, check for conflicts before code is written, publish ChangeSets, run trusted named verification checks, and record accepted work. Deterministic rules raise findings when two agents'18541Apache 2.0
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceAn MCP server that checks whether the world changed after a tool call by declaring observable outcomes, verifying them with read-only verifiers, and keeping hash-chained receipts.4 npmMIT
Glama MCP Gateway
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.