Start an async OSINT investigation for an email address (breach exposure, account correlation). Owner/enterprise tier only — people-centric OSINT is restricted to prevent misuse. Returns an investigationId immediately — poll with osint_investigation_status and retrieve results with osint_investigation_report.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| query | Yes |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations indicate readOnlyHint=false and openWorldHint=true. The description adds that the tool is async, returns an investigationId immediately, and requires polling. This explains the non-immediate behavior beyond the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three concise sentences: purpose and scope, access restriction, and async pattern with follow-up instructions. No redundant information; every sentence adds value.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Covers what the tool does, the async nature, the return of an investigationId, and the recommended polling/retrieval tools. Missing only minor details like error behavior for invalid emails, but overall sufficient given the context signals.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema has 0% parameter description coverage; the description clarifies that 'query' should be an email address and explains the semantic context (breach exposure, account correlation). This adds meaning beyond the raw schema constraints of min/max length.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states it starts an async OSINT investigation for an email address, specifying breach exposure and account correlation. It distinguishes from sibling tools by identifying the input type (email) and the tier restriction.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states 'Owner/enterprise tier only — people-centric OSINT is restricted to prevent misuse.' Also tells the agent to poll with osint_investigation_status and retrieve results with osint_investigation_report, providing a clear follow-up workflow.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, with detailed descriptions that help differentiate overlapping areas (e.g., check_dane vs check_dane_https). However, there are sets of similar tools (brand audit, OSINT, polling) that could cause confusion if descriptions are not carefully read.
The naming is mostly readable but inconsistent: many check_* tools follow a verb_noun pattern, but there are also noun_verb names (scan_domain, cymru_asn), bare verbs (generate), and varied patterns for async operations (discover_brand_domains_start vs discover_brand_domains).
With 80 tools, the server feels overstuffed. It covers multiple domains (DNS, email, brand, OSINT, M365) that could benefit from separation. The high number includes many polling/status tools that add overhead.
The server covers core DNS and email security checks thoroughly, including many edge cases (e.g., BIMI, MTA-STS, subdomain takeover). However, there are gaps like lack of direct DNS record management and some OSINT tools are restricted to operator deployment, leaving agents with dead ends.
