Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds real value by disclosing which algorithms are reported, that deprecated ones (RSA/SHA-1, DSA) are flagged, and that results are independent of chain validation success.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and reporting scope, then usage and placement. The 'Use when asked what algorithm is used for DNSSEC signing keys' clause mildly restates the opening sentence, a small redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With annotations covering the safety profile and an output schema covering return values, the description supplies what the agent needs: scope, what is reported, and what is flagged. Nothing critical is missing; only minor alternative routing detail is implied rather than stated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and all three parameters (domain, format, force_refresh) are documented in the schema, so the baseline is 3. The description adds no extra meaning about parameter behavior beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Audit') and resource ('cryptographic strength of DNSKEY signing algorithms'), and explicitly scopes the tool as assessing algorithm choice 'independent of whether the DNSSEC chain validates', which separates it from check_dnssec and check_dnssec_chain.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit trigger conditions ('Use when asked what algorithm is used for DNSSEC signing keys, or if deprecated DNSKEY algorithms are in use') and positions it within the scan_domain audit. It implies but does not directly name the chain-validation siblings as the alternative to use for validation results.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.