Skip to main content
Glama

BlackVeil DNS & Email Security Scanner

check_dane_https

Read-onlyIdempotent

Verify DANE/TLSA pinning for HTTPS (port 443): looks up TLSA records at _443._tcp. and validates fields and DNSSEC backing. Reported present but UNVERIFIED in every deployment: comparison with the served certificate is withdrawn (the probe cannot observe the origin certificate), so a stale pin is NOT detected. Use check_dane for SMTP. Part of the scan_domain audit.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "domain": "<domain>"
    },
    "name": "check_dane_https"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
domainYesDomain, e.g. example.com
formatNoOutput verbosity.
force_refreshNoBypass the cache.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scoreYes
passedYes
partialNo
categoryYes
findingsYes
checkStatusNo
verdictWithheldNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / domain / description
      Previous value: -"Domain to check (e.g., example.com)"New value: +"Domain, e.g. example.com"
    • changedInput schema / properties / force_refresh / description
      Previous value: -"Bypass cache and run a fresh check. Useful after DNS changes."New value: +"Bypass the cache."
    • changedInput schema / properties / format / description
      Previous value: -"Output verbosity. Auto-detected if omitted."New value: +"Output verbosity."
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
  3. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / verdictWithheld
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  4. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • addedOutput schema / properties / checkStatus
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedOutput schema / properties / partial
      Added value: +{
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  5. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / force_refresh
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Bypass cache and run a fresh check. Useful after DNS changes.",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  6. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
      +  "additionalProperties": {},
      +  "properties": {
      +    "category": {
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    "findings": {
      +      "items": {
      +        "additionalProperties": {},
      +        "properties": {},
      +        "type": "object"
      +      },
      +      "type": "array"
      +    },
      +    "passed": {
      +      "type": "boolean"
      +    },
      +    "score": {
      +      "type": "number"
      +    }
      +  },
      +  "required": [
      +    "category",
      +    "score",
      +    "passed",
      +    "findings"
      +  ],
      +  "type": "object"
      +}
  7. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive); the description adds the far more consequential caveat that certificate comparison is withdrawn, results are always 'present but UNVERIFIED', and a stale pin will NOT be detected. That is exactly the kind of limitation an agent needs to avoid over-reporting a finding.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action and the port/record lookup are front-loaded, and the withdrawn-verification caveat follows immediately. It is dense but every clause carries information; the trailing 'Part of the scan_domain audit' is the only weakly load-bearing sentence.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, return structure need not be explained, and the description still flags the notable output state (UNVERIFIED). Safety, scope, alternative, and the key limitation are all covered; only the interplay with adjacent HTTPS/TLS checkers is left implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% with all three parameters documented (domain, format enum, force_refresh), so the schema carries parameter semantics. The description adds nothing about parameter behavior, such as what force_refresh bypasses in practice, which is the expected baseline here.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Verify DANE/TLSA pinning for HTTPS (port 443)') and even names the exact DNS lookup performed ('_443._tcp.<domain>'). It explicitly separates itself from the sibling check_dane ('Use check_dane for SMTP'), so an agent can route correctly without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Names the alternative (check_dane) and the condition that selects it (SMTP), and places the tool within the scan_domain audit. It does not, however, address when to prefer check_ssl or check_svcb_https, so the guidance is clear but not exhaustive.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.