BlackVeil DNS & Email Security Scanner

check_agent_discovery

Read-onlyIdempotent

Assess the security posture of IETF BANDAID agent-discovery records (draft-mozleywilliams-dnsop-dnsaid). Detects SVCB agent records under _agents/index.{protocol}._agents, reports whether the discovery zone is DNSSEC-anchored (unsigned = spoofable agent endpoints), evaluates DANE/TLSA binding trust (RFC 6698 §10.1), and checks capability-document integrity (cap / cap-sha256). Read-only; uses Private-Use SVCB param code points pending IANA assignment.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`name`	No	Resolve a single named agent ({name}.{domain}) instead of enumerating the zone.
`domain`	Yes	Domain to check for published agent-discovery records (e.g., example.com).
`format`	No	Output verbosity. Auto-detected if omitted.
`protocol`	No	Scope discovery to a single agent protocol index (_index._{protocol}._agents). Omit to sweep the zone.
`verify_cap`	No	Fetch each declared capability document (cap=) over HTTPS via safeFetch and verify it against the cap-sha256 integrity pin. Default false (declaration/existence check only).
`force_refresh`	No	Bypass cache and run a fresh check. Useful after DNS changes.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`score`	Yes
`passed`	Yes
`partial`	No
`category`	Yes
`findings`	Yes
`checkStatus`	No
`verdictWithheld`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedOct 25, 2026
- addedInput schema / additionalProperties
```
Added value: +false
```
Changed1 schema field changedOct 5, 2026
- addedOutput schema / properties / verdictWithheld
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": "boolean"
+}
```
Changed2 schema fields changedAug 18, 2026
- addedOutput schema / properties / checkStatus
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": "string"
+}
```
- addedOutput schema / properties / partial
```
Added value: +{
+  "type": "boolean"
+}
```
AddedJul 2, 2026

TDQS

A4.2/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare read-only, open-world, idempotent, and non-destructive. The description adds valuable context: DNSSEC anchoring implications (unsigned = spoofable), DANE/TLSA evaluation, capability-document integrity checks, and the use of Private-Use SVCB param code points. Missing are error behaviors or performance characteristics, but overall strong.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the main purpose and packs necessary details without excessive verbosity. It is dense but appropriate for the complexity, though some phrases could be slightly tightened.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity, the description covers the purpose, what it detects, security implications, and read-only nature. The output schema exists, so return values need not be explained. Together with full parameter descriptions, an agent has enough to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all parameters are fully documented in the schema. The description does not add any parameter-level meaning beyond what the schema provides, so it meets the baseline of 3.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Assess'), resource ('IETF BANDAID agent-discovery records'), and names the draft and record patterns. Clearly distinguishes from sibling tools like check_svcb_https or check_dane by focusing on agent-discovery rather than general SVCB/HTTPS or TLSA.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides clear context about what the tool checks and implies when to use it (for agent-discovery security posture). However, it does not explicitly name alternatives or state when not to use it, which is a minor gap given the unique resource.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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