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vulnerability_search

Perform a full-text vulnerability search in SecDB.

What this tool does

Searches across:

  • CVE entries

  • Security advisories

  • Exploit references

  • Product and vendor vulnerability data

Results are formatted in Markdown and include a search summary.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user asks:

  • to look up a CVE, advisory, exploit, or product

  • "show vulnerabilities for X"

  • "search for advisories about Y"

  • exploratory or broad vulnerability discovery

Inputs

  • query: free-text search term (CVE ID, advisory ID, product name, exploit name, vendor, keyword, etc.)

Outputs

  • results: array of Markdown-formatted search hits

  • summary: Markdown summary with counts and a link to continue searching on SecDB

LLM usage guidelines

  • Use this tool instead of assuming whether a CVE/advisory/exploit exists.

  • Present results and summary directly to the user-they are already Markdown.

  • Combine with vulnerability_score, epss_timeseries, or sightings_search for deeper analysis.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
queryYesCVE ID, vulnerability name, Advisory ID, Exploit, etc.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultsNo
summaryNoSearch summary with found records (ID) and link for continue the search on SecDB

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Since no annotations are provided, the description carries the full burden. It discloses that results are Markdown-formatted, includes a summary, and that the tool is a search (implying read-only). It provides useful behavioral context such as output format and usage, though it doesn't mention rate limits, pagination, or auth requirements, which are less critical for a search tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured with clear subheadings (What this tool does, When to use, Inputs, Outputs, LLM usage guidelines). Every sentence contributes useful information—no fluff or redundancy. Despite its length, it is organized and front-loaded with a clear opening statement.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With only one simple parameter and an output schema present, the description is remarkably complete. It covers purpose, usage, inputs, outputs, and LLM guidelines, including how to combine with sibling tools. The description fully equips an agent to invoke the tool correctly and interpret its results.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema already covers the 'query' parameter, but the description adds more semantic value by describing it as a 'free-text search term' and expanding examples to include product names, vendors, and keywords. This goes beyond the schema's brief enumeration, aiding the agent in understanding the parameter's flexibility.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool performs a full-text vulnerability search in SecDB, explicitly listing what it searches across (CVE entries, advisories, exploit references, product/vendor data). This distinguishes it from sibling tools like vulnerability_info or vulnerability_score, which target specific aspects of vulnerability data.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description includes a dedicated 'When to use this tool' section with example user queries and states to use it instead of assuming whether a CVE/advisory/exploit exists. It also mentions combining with other tools for deeper analysis, but it does not explicitly name when not to use this tool or directly contrast it with specific siblings like vulnerability_info.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes (e.g., vulnerability_search for discovery, vulnerability_info for full details, vulnerability_score for CVSS/EPSS, epss_timeseries for history). However, pairs like vulnerability_info vs. vulnerability_score and linux_audit vs. purl_audit have overlapping functionality, though detailed descriptions help differentiate them.

Naming Consistency5/5

All tool names follow a consistent lowercase snake_case pattern with a descriptor and an operation noun (e.g., vulnerability_info, linux_audit, sightings_search, ssvc_calculator). No mixed conventions or stylistic deviations are present.

Tool Count5/5

The 11 tools are well-scoped for a vulnerability intelligence server, covering search, details, scoring, trends, audits, reports, and prioritization. The count is within the expected 3-15 range and each tool contributes a distinct capability.

Completeness5/5

The tool surface covers the full vulnerability intelligence lifecycle: discovery (vulnerability_search), detailed lookup (vulnerability_info), risk scoring (vulnerability_score), EPSS history, real-world sightings, SSVC prioritization, audits for both OS packages and application dependencies, and aggregated reports. No obvious dead-end or missing critical operation is apparent.

Resources