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vulnerability_attack

Read-onlyIdempotent

Get the weaknesses (CWE), attack patterns (CAPEC) and MITRE ATT&CK techniques linked to a specific CVE.

What this tool does

Follows the chain CVE → CWE → CAPEC → ATT&CK: returns the weaknesses of the CVE, the CAPEC attack patterns that exploit them, the ATT&CK techniques mapped to those attack patterns (active techniques only), and a summary of the ATT&CK tactics involved.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user asks:

  • "Which ATT&CK techniques are related to CVE-XYZ?"

  • "Which tactics could an attacker use with this vulnerability?"

  • "Which attack patterns exploit the weaknesses of this CVE?"

Inputs

  • cve_id: valid CVE identifier (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN).

Outputs

  • cve_id, url: link to the CVE on SecDB

  • cwe: weaknesses, each with id, name and url

  • capec: attack patterns, each with id, name, via (the CWE it comes from) and url

  • attack: ATT&CK techniques, each with id, name, tactics (id and name), via (the CAPEC it comes from), url and mitre_url

  • tactics: ATT&CK tactics, each with id, name and technique_count

LLM usage guidelines

  • The link is derived from the weaknesses of the CVE: it does not mean that the vulnerability is exploited with these techniques. Say "related to" or "could be linked to", never "exploited via".

  • Empty lists are normal: many weaknesses have no CAPEC attack pattern and many attack patterns have no ATT&CK technique.

  • For real-world exploitation use kev_check, vulnerability_exploits and sightings_search.

  • For the details of a technique or a weakness use attack_info or cwe_info.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "cve_id": "<cve_id>"
    },
    "name": "vulnerability_attack"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idYesCVE identification (CVE-YYYY-NNNNN)

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cweYes
urlYesLink to the CVE on SecDB
capecYes
attackYes
cve_idYesCVE identification
tacticsYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare read-only/idempotent safety; the description goes further by warning that empty lists are normal and that derived links do not imply exploitation, which directly shapes how results should be reported. It also constrains interpretation to 'related to' rather than 'exploited via', which no annotation conveys.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Headers, bullet lists and front-loaded chain description make it easy to scan. The Outputs section largely duplicates the existing output schema, which costs some space, and the usage-guidelines block repeats the same caution twice.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter read tool with an output schema and full annotations, the description covers interpretation caveats, empty-result handling, and escape hatches to related tools. Nothing needed to call it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single required parameter at 100% schema coverage, so the schema already carries the format and regex. The description restates the CVE-YYYY-NNNNN shape but adds no new semantics such as case handling or lookup-failure behavior.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb chain (CVE → CWE → CAPEC → ATT&CK) and the exact resources returned, which no sibling covers. An agent can distinguish it from vulnerability_info, attack_info, or cwe_info on the basis of the path traversal alone.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit user-question triggers and explicitly routes elsewhere for adjacent needs: kev_check / vulnerability_exploits / sightings_search for real-world exploitation, attack_info / cwe_info for entity details. Exclusions and alternatives are both present.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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