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attack_info

Read-onlyIdempotent

Get information about a MITRE ATT&CK technique and the weaknesses and vulnerabilities linked to it through CAPEC.

What this tool does

Returns the name, description, tactics and platforms of an ATT&CK technique (Enterprise, Mobile or ICS), its parent technique or sub-techniques, the CAPEC attack patterns mapped to it, the weaknesses (CWE) exploited by those attack patterns, and the number of CVEs with those weaknesses. A parent technique also includes what is mapped to its sub-techniques.

When to use this tool

Use this tool when the user asks:

  • "What is T1574?"

  • "Which weaknesses or attack patterns are related to this technique?"

  • "How many vulnerabilities could be linked to this technique?"

Inputs

  • technique_id: ATT&CK technique identifier (T1574, T1574.010, 1574.010 or T1574/010).

Outputs

  • id, name (with the parent technique name for a sub-technique), domain, description

  • tactics: each with id and name

  • platforms: list of platforms

  • parent_id, subtechniques (each with id and name)

  • deprecated, revoked, revoked_by (the technique that replaces a revoked one)

  • capec: attack patterns, each with id, name, direct and via

  • weaknesses: CWE, each with id, name, direct and via

  • cve_count: number of CVEs with these weaknesses

  • url: link to the technique on SecDB, mitre_url: link to the technique on attack.mitre.org

LLM usage guidelines

  • direct is true when CAPEC maps the attack pattern to this technique; via lists the sub-techniques it comes from.

  • The link to CVEs is derived from the weaknesses: a CVE in cve_count is not known to be exploited with this technique. Say so when you report it.

  • If revoked is true and revoked_by is set, call this tool again with revoked_by for the current technique.

  • For the CVEs themselves, search on SecDB from url (Vulnerabilities tab), or use cwe_info and vulnerability_search with the weaknesses.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "technique_id": "<technique_id>"
    },
    "name": "attack_info"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
technique_idYesATT&CK technique identifier (T1574, T1574.010, 1574.010 or T1574/010)

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesATT&CK technique identifier
urlYesLink to the technique on SecDB
nameYesTechnique name
capecYes
domainYesenterprise-attack, mobile-attack or ics-attack
revokedYesRevoked by MITRE
tacticsYes
cve_countYesCVEs with the weaknesses of this technique
mitre_urlNoLink to the technique on attack.mitre.org
parent_idNoParent technique of a sub-technique
platformsYes
deprecatedYesDeprecated by MITRE
revoked_byNoTechnique that replaces a revoked one
weaknessesYes
descriptionNoDescription
subtechniquesYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world), so the description's job is semantic transparency, and it delivers: it explains `direct` vs `via`, the inheritance of mappings to sub-techniques, and — critically — warns that `cve_count` is derived from weaknesses and does not mean the CVEs are exploited with the technique. It adds no note on response size or latency for large sub-technique trees, which keeps it just short of a 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Well front-loaded with bolded section headers and scannable bullets; the one-line purpose, usage examples, and LLM caveats each earn their place. The "Outputs" field enumeration is partly redundant given a declared output schema exists, though it does double as an index for the `direct`/`via` guidance later.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a read-only lookup with a single well-typed parameter, the description covers purpose, invocation examples, return semantics, the counterintuitive caveat about CVE linkage, and next-step routing to sibling tools. Nothing an agent needs in order to call it correctly or interpret the result is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only one parameter with 100% schema description coverage, and the regex pattern already constrains the accepted formats. The description's "Inputs" section restates the same four example forms verbatim from the schema, adding no meaning beyond it (e.g., case sensitivity or sub-technique resolution behavior). Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Get information about a MITRE ATT&CK technique") and immediately delimits scope: technique metadata plus CAPEC patterns, CWE weaknesses, and CVE counts. This is clearly distinguishable from siblings like cwe_info or vulnerability_search, which operate on the downstream entities rather than the technique.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides an explicit "When to use this tool" block with concrete user phrasings ("What is T1574?"), and names alternatives for adjacent needs: use cwe_info and vulnerability_search with the returned weaknesses, or browse SecDB from `url` for the CVEs themselves. It also gives a re-invocation rule for revoked techniques, which is precise conditional guidance rather than a generic blurb.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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