Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint and destructiveHint=false, so safety is covered. The description adds real context beyond them: the downstream governance rule that approved causes only authorize wording through evaluate_customer_update, plus an explicit anti-invention guardrail. It adds no details on result shape, but an output schema exists.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the core read operation before the governance constraints. The closing anti-invention warning is a defensive guardrail rather than invocation-relevant content, but it is brief and does not bloat the definition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, return values need no explanation, and annotations cover the safety profile. The remaining gap is the undocumented includeRetired parameter; otherwise the definition is adequate for calling the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the full burden for two parameters. "On a board" loosely maps to the required boardId, but includeRetired is never mentioned, leaving an agent to guess whether retired causes are included by default.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

"Read approved causes on a board" gives a specific verb plus resource and scope, so the operation is unambiguous. It does not, however, differentiate itself from the near-identical sibling list_approved_statements, which an agent may confuse it with.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description constrains how the results may be used (only APPROVED causes authorize wording, and only via evaluate_customer_update) and warns against inventing causes. It never says when to pick this tool over list_approved_statements or list_statement_limits, so tool-selection guidance is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.