cloakcheck
Server Details
Scan a page for hidden prompt-injection payloads targeting AI agents.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
There is only one tool, so there is no possibility of misselection between tools. The tool's scope is crisply defined, explicitly excluding visible-body-text judgment.
The single name check_page_for_injection follows a clear verb_noun pattern in snake_case. With only one tool there is no convention to break, and the name itself is predictable and descriptive.
One tool for a narrowly scoped security scanner is defensible, but it is thin for a domain that naturally includes scanning raw text, HTML fragments, or batches of URLs. It sits at the borderline of being under-provisioned.
The tool covers the core check but leaves notable gaps: there is no way to scan raw text or an in-memory document, no batch/multi-URL scanning, and no structured reporting of which detection technique fired. Agents can work around these by looping calls, but coverage of the scanning lifecycle is partial.
Available Tools
1 toolcheck_page_for_injectionAInspect
Scan a single web page for content planted to hijack an AI agent reading it -- invisible unicode (zero-width chars, the unicode 'tag' block used for steganographic prompt injection), CSS-hidden instruction text, and instruction-shaped language in alt/title/aria-label attributes a human would never read. Does NOT judge whether visible body text is safe -- only content hidden from normal human reading flow is flagged, so a page that legitimately discusses prompt injection won't false-positive on itself. Call this before an autonomous shopping/browsing agent acts on a page's content (add to cart, follow instructions found on the page, etc).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes | The full URL (http:// or https://) of the page to scan |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must carry the behavioral burden, and it does substantially: it discloses what is flagged, what is deliberately NOT flagged (visible body text, avoiding false positives), and the intended timing of invocation. It does not describe output format or what a finding looks like, but behavioral expectations for the caller are well established.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core action and scope, then detection classes, then exclusions, then usage timing. Every clause earns its place. It is dense but not padded; slightly longer than strictly necessary for a one-parameter tool but the added detail is genuinely useful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a low-complexity, single-parameter, no-output-schema tool with no annotations, the description covers purpose, exclusions, and invocation timing. The only missing element is what a positive result looks like, but the tool's safety-scan framing makes that less critical than the when-to-call guidance it does provide.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and there is a single required 'url' parameter documented in the schema. The description adds no per-parameter detail, which is fine; baseline for a fully-described single param is high. No meaningful gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (scan) and a specific resource (a single web page) with an unusually precise scope: content planted to hijack an AI agent reading it. It even enumerates the exact detection classes (invisible unicode, zero-width chars, tag block, CSS-hidden text, instruction-shaped alt/title/aria-label). No sibling tools exist, so no differentiation is needed, but the scope is unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly instructs when to call: 'before an autonomous shopping/browsing agent acts on a page's content (add to cart, follow instructions found on the page, etc).' It also defines an important exclusion (visible body text is not judged). No named alternative tool, but with no siblings there is none to name, so the gap is minor.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
- First observed
check_page_for_injection
Related MCP Connectors
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