Harny Context
Server Details
A private memory for each person who uses an app. An agent sets it up with no account.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
- ChatGPT
- –
- Claude
- –
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
With only a single tool there is nothing to confuse it with, so selection risk is essentially zero. However, the tool name 'provision_app' only covers setup, while the server's stated purpose (context/memory) is much broader, so an agent may expect other capabilities behind the same name.
The lone name follows a clear verb_noun pattern (provision_app) and is readable. No conflicting conventions exist to evaluate against.
A single tool is too thin for a server that claims to provide long-term memory/context for an app. Provisioning alone cannot support any actual memory read/write workflow.
The surface only covers app provisioning (create app + key); there are no tools to store, retrieve, update, or delete memory entries, which is the core of the domain. Agents will hit a dead end immediately after setup.
Available Tools
1 toolprovision_appProvision AppAInspect
Set up long-term memory for an app with no account: makes a new app and its key, as POST /v1/auth/provision does. The answer carries the app key once, and the assistant is told to put it in the owner's secret store and nowhere else. Needs no key.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| app_name | Yes | ||
| customers | No | Who the app's customers are, in one or two sentences. Stored with the app's objective; the owner can change it. | |
| objective | No | What the app does, in one or two sentences, in the business's words. Stored as the app's objective; the owner can change it. | |
| model_preset | No | Optional. The model preset chosen for this app: cost_first, quality_first or regulated. It is stored with the app now, so Harny's own processing of what the app loads follows it from the first fact. The owner can change it after the claim. | |
| contact_email | No | Optional. A contact address for platform messages. Leave it out when you do not have one: the app's owner gives their sign-in address when they claim the app. | |
| assistant_name | No | Optional. Your own name: the product you run as, the way you would say who you are. The app's owner sees it on their Home as who set the app up. Leave it out if you do not know it; Harny never fills it in for you. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations only declare the safety profile (readOnlyHint false, idempotentHint false, destructiveHint false, openWorldHint false); the description adds genuinely new behavior: the response carries the app key exactly once and the assistant must place it in the owner's secret store and nowhere else. It also discloses that authentication is unnecessary, which the annotations do not cover. It does not discuss what happens if the tool is called repeatedly, which matters given idempotentHint=false.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three tight sentences, front-loaded with the core action and followed by the critical key-handling constraint. Each sentence carries information, though the 'as `POST /v1/auth/provision` does' phrasing is slightly awkward and the endpoint reference is of limited use to an agent.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a six-parameter creation tool with no output schema, the description compensates well by explaining what the response contains (the app key, delivered once) and the secret-storage obligation. Missing is any note on repeated invocation behavior or failure modes, which would round out an otherwise sufficient definition.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 83%, so the schema already explains nearly every parameter, including the model presets and the optional contact and assistant fields. The description adds no parameter-level meaning beyond that, so the baseline of 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a concrete verb and resource – setting up long-term memory for an app with no account, creating a new app and its key – and anchors it to a specific endpoint, `POST /v1/auth/provision`. It goes beyond restating the title by naming the exact outcome (a new app plus its key) and the precondition (no account exists yet).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear context for when this tool applies: provisioning memory for an app that has no account, and notes that no key is required to call it. There are no sibling tools to differentiate from and no explicit when-not-to-use clause, so it stops just short of full guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
- First observed
provision_app
Related MCP Connectors
Private, portable memory and reusable skills for AI agents.
Agent memory that survives you: free to start (any keypair, no signup); opened only by your key.
Personal AI memory — gives every AI agent shared, persistent memory of you
Cross-session, cross-device memory for your agent: remember and recall notes. No key to start.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceProvides a shared, persistent memory layer for AI agents, enabling them to recall, memorize, and review user information across different applications.8MIT
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceA personal, agent-driven memory that survives across sessions.26MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceGives AI agents a private, on-device persistent memory using semantic search over stored facts, preferences, and decisions. It enables agents to remember information, recall it by meaning even without keyword overlap, delete memories, and list them by tag.3 npm4MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents across devices and tools to share one persistent, private memory layer, saving decisions, facts, preferences, and handoffs, then retrieving them via fast BM25-ranked full-text search with large attachments stored in object storage. Responses are capped and hardened against prompt injection, so agents can recall prior context at session start instead of starting from zero.5 npmMIT
Glama MCP Gateway
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.