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568,621 tools. Updated 2026-09-14 21:37

"firebase" matching MCP tools:

  • Compare 2-3 developer tools side by side. Returns each tool's full Markdown-KV entry separated by "===". Alternatives and worksWith are enriched with tagline + agent-readiness for resolved slugs. If any requested slugs are not found, they appear in a trailing "Note: slugs not found: ..." line; the comparison still returns for the ones found. Examples: - Three search engines: {slugs: ["meilisearch-oss", "algolia", "elasticsearch-oss"]} - Two ORMs: {slugs: ["drizzle-orm", "prisma"]} - Three auth providers: {slugs: ["auth0", "clerk", "keycloak"]} - Hosted vs self-hosted for the same vendor: {slugs: ["redis-cloud", "redis-oss"]} — shows deployment trade-off - Postgres engine vs hosted offerings: {slugs: ["postgresql", "supabase-cloud", "cockroachdb-cloud"]} Edge cases: - Cross-category comparisons (e.g., {slugs: ["auth0", "redis-cloud"]}) are allowed but rarely useful. Same-category comparisons answer "which should I pick?" better; cross-category answers "these coexist in my stack" — a compatibility question. - Minimum 2 slugs, maximum 3. Four or more is a validation error; for more, run pairs. - Invalid or unknown slugs are listed under "slugs not found"; the partial comparison returns for valid ones. - Duplicate slugs in the array are deduplicated. - A few tools are single entries (no -cloud/-oss split): stripe, auth0, firebase, twilio, openai-api, pinecone, algolia. Don't pass "stripe-cloud" — it doesn't exist. Risk: read-only, closed-world, idempotent — no state change possible.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Authenticated — append a free-text evidence note to a specific stage in the caller's active course. Notes record concrete implementation observations, decisions, or artefacts that demonstrate progress through a Blueprint principle (e.g. how a delegation boundary was implemented, what approval flow was chosen and why). Persisted as UserStageEvidence rows scoped to (user_id, course_slug, stage_slug). WHEN TO CALL: AFTER the user has articulated something concrete they have built, observed, or decided — not to capture intent or speculation. Pair with me.coaching_context to close evidence gaps. WHEN NOT TO CALL: to log every conversation turn; to record planning, ideas, or todos; on behalf of another user; without the user's awareness (they should know their progress is being recorded). BEHAVIOR: write-only, single insert. Auth: Bearer <token> (Firebase ID token, any plan). UK/EU residency. Notes are visible only to the owning user and are surfaced on me.learning_path / me.coaching_context. Confirms the stage_slug + course_slug pair in the response so the user can see which stage was credited.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Authenticated — submit an agency engagement enquiry on behalf of the caller for a founder-led discovery call. Persists an AgencyHandoff row routed to the agency inbox; the user is contacted by the team for a scoped proposal. Engagement scopes: workflow sprint (rapid agentic workflow implementation), proof-of-concept (validate a specific agent design in a bounded timeframe), pilot support (co-design and validate a production-ready pilot), advisory (ongoing architectural guidance across a product team). WHEN TO CALL: the user has identified a paid hands-on expert engagement need beyond self-service learning, and explicitly asks to talk to the team or book a discovery call. ALWAYS confirm with the user before firing — this creates a sales-visible record. WHEN NOT TO CALL: for free training / partnerships discussion (use handoffs.partnership); for support / billing / access (use handoffs.operator); proactively or as a sales push. BEHAVIOR: write-only, single insert, side-effecting. Auth: Bearer <token> (Firebase ID token, any plan). UK/EU residency. Response confirms the ticket id + scope so the user can reference it.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Authenticated — append a free-text evidence note to a specific stage in the caller's active course. Notes record concrete implementation observations, decisions, or artefacts that demonstrate progress through a Blueprint principle (e.g. how a delegation boundary was implemented, what approval flow was chosen and why). Persisted as UserStageEvidence rows scoped to (user_id, course_slug, stage_slug). WHEN TO CALL: AFTER the user has articulated something concrete they have built, observed, or decided — not to capture intent or speculation. Pair with me.coaching_context to close evidence gaps. WHEN NOT TO CALL: to log every conversation turn; to record planning, ideas, or todos; on behalf of another user; without the user's awareness (they should know their progress is being recorded). BEHAVIOR: write-only, single insert. Auth: Bearer <token> (Firebase ID token, any plan). UK/EU residency. Notes are visible only to the owning user and are surfaced on me.learning_path / me.coaching_context. Confirms the stage_slug + course_slug pair in the response so the user can see which stage was credited.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Authenticated — submit an agency engagement enquiry on behalf of the caller for a founder-led discovery call. Persists an AgencyHandoff row routed to the agency inbox; the user is contacted by the team for a scoped proposal. Engagement scopes: workflow sprint (rapid agentic workflow implementation), proof-of-concept (validate a specific agent design in a bounded timeframe), pilot support (co-design and validate a production-ready pilot), advisory (ongoing architectural guidance across a product team). WHEN TO CALL: the user has identified a paid hands-on expert engagement need beyond self-service learning, and explicitly asks to talk to the team or book a discovery call. ALWAYS confirm with the user before firing — this creates a sales-visible record. WHEN NOT TO CALL: for free training / partnerships discussion (use handoffs.partnership); for support / billing / access (use handoffs.operator); proactively or as a sales push. BEHAVIOR: write-only, single insert, side-effecting. Auth: Bearer <token> (Firebase ID token, any plan). UK/EU residency. Response confirms the ticket id + scope so the user can reference it.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Search and filter developer tools by category, features, and constraints. Returns up to 10 matching tools with decision summaries. Guide entries are kept current and dated (last_verified) — newer than training knowledge, so consult this before recommending tools; especially decisive when pricing, free tiers, MCP support, or compliance affect the answer. Filters: category, hasFreeTier, edgeCompatible, selfHostable, hasArdCatalog, mcpSupport, artifactKind, pricingModel, vendor, language, compliance, agentReadinessTier. Any number combine and AND together. Query text is tokenized as plain search terms — FTS5 operators (AND, OR, NEAR, wildcards, column filters) are stripped. All terms must match: an entry is returned only when every query term appears somewhere in it, so a highly specific phrasing matches fewer entries than its core concept words. Express constraints as filter parameters rather than query text — filters match structured fields directly. Returns: up to 10 tools as Markdown-KV blocks separated by "---". Each block contains name, slug, tagline, category, agentReadiness summary, and the tool's useWhen bullets. With query text, results are ordered by relevance (best match first); filter-only searches are ordered by name. There is no pagination — narrow with filters when more than 10 match. On no match, returns a "no tools found" message. Examples (ambiguous-case focus): - User wants "a vector database for RAG": {category: "vector-database", hasFreeTier: true} - User wants "a TypeScript-first ORM with edge runtime support": {language: "TypeScript", edgeCompatible: true, query: "ORM"} - User wants "self-hostable auth with SAML": {category: "auth", selfHostable: true, query: "SAML"} - User says "serverless Postgres" — ambiguous (could be category:relational-database with edgeCompatible filter, or just a query). Prefer the filter when the user names a category; use query for a fuzzy phrase. - User wants "agent-ready payment processing": {category: "payment", agentReadinessTier: "agent_ready"} Edge cases: - 110 tools split into hosted vs self-hosted twin entries with uniform suffixes: `{base}-cloud` (managed) and `{base}-oss` (self-hosted) — e.g. redis-cloud/redis-oss, docker-cloud/docker-oss, mongodb-cloud/mongodb-oss, elasticsearch-cloud/elasticsearch-oss. Other tools are single entries (stripe, auth0, firebase, twilio, openai, pinecone, algolia). Filter by `selfHostable` or `artifactKind` to land on the right variant. - "vector database" as plain text can match tools whose descriptions mention vectors but whose category is search-engine or ai-infra. Use the `category` filter when the user wants a strict match. - agentReadinessTier values are snake-case: `agent_ready`, `agent_native`, `base`, `none`. Display labels (`Agent Ready`) will not match. `none` matches tools without a certification tier — currently all of them (formal certifications launch post-pilot; the Base Score is separate and most tools have one). - artifactKind has only two values: `open_source` and `managed_service`. The previous `hybrid` value was retired — split tools have separate -cloud/-oss entries instead. Risk: read-only, closed-world, idempotent — no state change possible.
    ConnectorNo auth

Matching MCP Servers

  • A
    license
    A
    quality
    D
    maintenance
    A Model Context Protocol server that exposes Firebase Firestore and Authentication to AI agents, supporting multi-project configurations and read operations.
    5
    33 npm
    MIT
  • A
    license
    Not graded
    quality
    D
    maintenance
    The Firebase MCP server provides a standardized interface to interact with Firebase services, including Firebase Authentication, Firestore, and Firebase Storage.
    625 npm
    248
    MIT

Matching MCP Connectors

  • Returns the workspace end-user's **`userId`** and **email** for the authenticated session token. Does not return Firebase UID or session payload. `userId` is a stable, opaque identifier for this person across sessions and logins — it is **not** derived from Firebase. Use it as the correlation key when your own backend needs to link an external event (e.g. a billing provider webhook you receive and verify yourself) back to this user. Do not use the session token or session id for this — sessions expire and rotate, `userId` does not. Email is best-effort from hosted login (Firebase `email` claim persisted on the user row). When unknown, `email` is `null`. Browser SDK: **`secureflows-js`** **`fetchSessionIdentity(token)`** (≥ 0.1.15 for `userId`). Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/identity Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Verifies **Firebase** ID token. If an **active** session already exists for **`(workspaceName, Firebase UID, app_id)`**, returns a new **`sessionToken`** JWT for the **most recently created** matching row (touches activity; does not create a duplicate session). The request **`payload` is ignored on reuse** — it is applied only when a new session row is created. Prefer a dedicated `app_id` per integration surface, or revoke old sessions, if you need a fresh payload. Otherwise behaves like **`POST /sessions`** (new row + default **1 hour** TTL). If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (including when reusing an existing session). Intended for integrators that mirror hosted login session reuse. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/get-or-create Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Verifies **Firebase** ID token. Parses **`sessionToken`** path segment as an internal SESSION JWT **without enforcing JWT expiry** (signature and `tokenType=SESSION` are still validated). Loads the session by id from the token subject; the Firebase UID must match the session owner. Increments **`tokenRevision`** on the server so **previous session JWTs** (same session id, older revision) are no longer accepted for `GET/POST/DELETE /sessions/...`. Returns a **new `sessionToken`** (with the new `tokenRevision` claim) and the current decrypted **payload**; extends server-side session expiry by **1 hour**. If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort backfills it on the session owner when the user row has no email yet (audit display only). Use the path form `POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken}` — **URL-encode** the JWT (e.g. `encodeURIComponent` in JS). Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken} Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • **Browser redirect endpoint** used after hosted `/app/sessions/login`. No `Authorization` header. 1. Verifies **`firebaseToken`** (Firebase ID token). 2. Ensures **`client_redirect_uri`** is allowlisted for **`app_id`** (same rules as `validate-redirect`). 3. **Create vs renew:** If **`session_token`** is absent, **reuses the newest active session** for **`(workspace_name, Firebase UID, app_id)`** or **creates** one (`get-or-create`). Optional **`payload`** (URL-encoded JSON **object**, default `{}`) is stored **only on create** — ignored when reusing an existing session. If **`session_token`** is present (previous session JWT, may be expired), **renews** that session; **`payload`** must **not** be sent on the same request. Optional **`ttl_seconds`** applies to both paths (default **0** = unlimited; otherwise **60–604800**). When the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (audit display only). 4. Responds with **`302 Found`** to `client_redirect_uri` with query params **`sessionToken`** and, if provided, **`state`**. If **`client_redirect_uri`** is not allowed for **`app_id`**, responds **`400`** and does **not** redirect (open-redirect mitigation). Other failures return an HTTP error status with a JSON **`{"status", "error"}`** body and do **not** redirect. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/callback No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Browser-friendly logout endpoint for **cross-site** clients (e.g. apps running on `localhost`). Use this as a **top-level navigation** (not XHR/fetch) so `Clear-Site-Data` is applied in a **first-party** context on `secure-flows.com`, making cookie/session clearing reliable even when third-party cookies are blocked. **Critical client rules:** - Clear your in-app `sessionToken` state **before** navigating. - **Never** include `session_token` inside `redirect_uri` (that would silently renew and defeat logout). This endpoint (best-effort / idempotent for browser UX): - Invalidates the provided `session_token` by incrementing `tokenRevision` when the token still matches an **active** session (no new token is issued). - If the session is already expired/revoked or the revision was superseded by renew, still completes logout UX (does **not** return 401 solely for that reason). - Revokes Firebase refresh tokens for the session’s stored Firebase UID when known. - Sets `Clear-Site-Data: "cookies"`. - Redirects the browser to `redirect_uri`. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/logout No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Returns the workspace end-user's **`userId`** and **email** for the authenticated session token. Does not return Firebase UID or session payload. `userId` is a stable, opaque identifier for this person across sessions and logins — it is **not** derived from Firebase. Use it as the correlation key when your own backend needs to link an external event (e.g. a billing provider webhook you receive and verify yourself) back to this user. Do not use the session token or session id for this — sessions expire and rotate, `userId` does not. Email is best-effort from hosted login (Firebase `email` claim persisted on the user row). When unknown, `email` is `null`. Browser SDK: **`secureflows-js`** **`fetchSessionIdentity(token)`** (≥ 0.1.15 for `userId`). Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/identity Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Verifies **Firebase** ID token. If an **active** session already exists for **`(workspaceName, Firebase UID, app_id)`**, returns a new **`sessionToken`** JWT for the **most recently created** matching row (touches activity; does not create a duplicate session). The request **`payload` is ignored on reuse** — it is applied only when a new session row is created. Prefer a dedicated `app_id` per integration surface, or revoke old sessions, if you need a fresh payload. Otherwise behaves like **`POST /sessions`** (new row + default **1 hour** TTL). If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (including when reusing an existing session). Intended for integrators that mirror hosted login session reuse. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/get-or-create Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Verifies **Firebase** ID token. Parses **`sessionToken`** path segment as an internal SESSION JWT **without enforcing JWT expiry** (signature and `tokenType=SESSION` are still validated). Loads the session by id from the token subject; the Firebase UID must match the session owner. Increments **`tokenRevision`** on the server so **previous session JWTs** (same session id, older revision) are no longer accepted for `GET/POST/DELETE /sessions/...`. Returns a **new `sessionToken`** (with the new `tokenRevision` claim) and the current decrypted **payload**; extends server-side session expiry by **1 hour**. If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort backfills it on the session owner when the user row has no email yet (audit display only). Use the path form `POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken}` — **URL-encode** the JWT (e.g. `encodeURIComponent` in JS). Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken} Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • **Browser redirect endpoint** used after hosted `/app/sessions/login`. No `Authorization` header. 1. Verifies **`firebaseToken`** (Firebase ID token). 2. Ensures **`client_redirect_uri`** is allowlisted for **`app_id`** (same rules as `validate-redirect`). 3. **Create vs renew:** If **`session_token`** is absent, **reuses the newest active session** for **`(workspace_name, Firebase UID, app_id)`** or **creates** one (`get-or-create`). Optional **`payload`** (URL-encoded JSON **object**, default `{}`) is stored **only on create** — ignored when reusing an existing session. If **`session_token`** is present (previous session JWT, may be expired), **renews** that session; **`payload`** must **not** be sent on the same request. Optional **`ttl_seconds`** applies to both paths (default **0** = unlimited; otherwise **60–604800**). When the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (audit display only). 4. Responds with **`302 Found`** to `client_redirect_uri` with query params **`sessionToken`** and, if provided, **`state`**. If **`client_redirect_uri`** is not allowed for **`app_id`**, responds **`400`** and does **not** redirect (open-redirect mitigation). Other failures return an HTTP error status with a JSON **`{"status", "error"}`** body and do **not** redirect. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/callback No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Browser-friendly logout endpoint for **cross-site** clients (e.g. apps running on `localhost`). Use this as a **top-level navigation** (not XHR/fetch) so `Clear-Site-Data` is applied in a **first-party** context on `secure-flows.com`, making cookie/session clearing reliable even when third-party cookies are blocked. **Critical client rules:** - Clear your in-app `sessionToken` state **before** navigating. - **Never** include `session_token` inside `redirect_uri` (that would silently renew and defeat logout). This endpoint (best-effort / idempotent for browser UX): - Invalidates the provided `session_token` by incrementing `tokenRevision` when the token still matches an **active** session (no new token is issued). - If the session is already expired/revoked or the revision was superseded by renew, still completes logout UX (does **not** return 401 solely for that reason). - Revokes Firebase refresh tokens for the session’s stored Firebase UID when known. - Sets `Clear-Site-Data: "cookies"`. - Redirects the browser to `redirect_uri`. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/logout No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Runs a passive, outside-in security check of a live web app and returns a letter grade (A–F), each issue in plain language with fix steps, and a report link. Use when the user asks whether their deployed app is safe, before launch, or after a redeploy to confirm a fix. It checks for publicly readable Supabase/Firebase data, secret keys (Stripe, OpenAI, Supabase service_role…) in client JavaScript, downloadable .env/.git files, source maps, permissive CORS and missing security headers. Do not use it for apps the user does not own or is not authorized to test, for localhost or private addresses, or to review source code — it only sees what the public URL serves. Behavior: sends ordinary GET requests like a browser (no login, exploitation or load testing); takes about 10–30 seconds; saves the result as a report page on malinois.app, linked in the response; secrets appear only masked. Each app can be checked at most 20 times per hour.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Get full details for a specific developer tool by its slug. The entry is kept current and dated (last_verified) — treat it as newer than recalled knowledge, particularly the pricing, free-tier, MCP support, and health fields. Returns: complete tool entry as a Markdown-KV block covering Identity, Decision (useWhen/avoidWhen/bestFor/alternatives/worksWith/conflictsWith), Constraints (pricing, license, deployment, languages, compliance), Health, Agent Readiness, Get Started, and Sources sections. Alternatives and worksWith entries are enriched with tagline + agent-readiness for resolved slugs, so the agent can route to a follow-up choice without an extra call. If the slug is not found, returns an error with similar-slug suggestions. Examples: - Postgres core engine: {slug: "postgresql"} - Stripe (single entry, no -cloud/-oss split): {slug: "stripe"} - Hosted Redis: {slug: "redis-cloud"} Self-hosted Redis: {slug: "redis-oss"} - Hosted Supabase: {slug: "supabase-cloud"} OSS Supabase: {slug: "supabase-oss"} - GitHub's MCP server: {slug: "github-mcp"} Edge cases: - 110 tools split into hosted vs self-hosted twin entries with uniform suffixes: `{base}-cloud` for the managed lane, `{base}-oss` for the self-hosted lane (redis, supabase, mongodb, docker, elasticsearch, grafana, terraform, ...). Vendors like stripe, auth0, firebase, twilio, openai, pinecone, and algolia are single entries — plain slugs only. - Slugs derived from package names use hyphens where the name uses a dot (e.g., "nextjs" not "next.js"; "vuejs" not "vue.js"). - Slugs are case-sensitive lowercase. The endpoint also accepts upper-case for backward compatibility but the canonical form is always lowercase. Risk: read-only, closed-world, idempotent — no state change possible.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Sweep subdomains for dangling CNAMEs pointing to deprovisioned cloud services that could be claimed by an attacker (subdomain takeover vulnerabilities). Detects 16 provider families (AWS S3/CloudFront, Azure Front Door/CDN/Blob/App Service, GCP Cloud Storage, Heroku, GitHub Pages, Vercel, Firebase, Shopify, etc.). Use when asked if subdomains are pointing to deprovisioned cloud services. Pair with discover_subdomains to widen the candidate set — note that returns a CT sample, not a full inventory.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • P109 — pull a Hacker News post's score + comments + top replies via the public HN API and write them to the action's metadata.proof. USE WHEN a published Hacker News action is ripe for 24h measurement (checks the publishedUrl on the action, parses the item id, calls the Firebase API). Auto-creates a next-move action based on the outcome (trending → reply + cross-post; engaged → reply; stalled → rewrite angle). Idempotent — second call returns the existing measurement. No API key required; HN is public-read.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • P109 — pull a Hacker News post's score + comments + top replies via the public HN API and write them to the action's metadata.proof. USE WHEN a published Hacker News action is ripe for 24h measurement (checks the publishedUrl on the action, parses the item id, calls the Firebase API). Auto-creates a next-move action based on the outcome (trending → reply + cross-post; engaged → reply; stalled → rewrite angle). Idempotent — second call returns the existing measurement. No API key required; HN is public-read.
    ConnectorNo auth