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699,027 tools. Updated 2026-10-24 16:45

"etcd" matching MCP tools:

  • Inspect the etcd cluster membership of an Ankra-provisioned cluster (Hetzner, OVH, UpCloud, DigitalOcean, or Scaleway) by running a read-only inspection on one control-plane node over SSH-via-bastion: the member list (hex and decimal ids, names, peer/client URLs, learner flag), each member's health, any active etcd alarms, and a quorum summary (voting members, healthy voters, quorum size, has_quorum plus the quorum_evidence it rests on, and failure_tolerance - healthy voters minus quorum size, floored at 0). failure_tolerance counts only voters observed serving, so it is a conservative lower bound: a voter whose health is unknown does not count towards it (health_unknown_voting_members says how many), and 0 can mean either no margin left or quorum already lost. Member health is three-valued: 'health' is 'serving', 'not_serving', or 'unknown' when no signal was readable at all, in which case 'healthy' is null rather than false - report unknown as unknown, never as down - and 'health_source' names the signal that decided it: 'client_endpoint' (the member's own client endpoint), 'local_health' (this node's own /health, for the member of the node the inspection runs on), 'raft_peer_link' (the local etcd's raft peer link to that member), 'member_list' (the member has no client endpoint because it never started), or 'unavailable' (no signal was readable at all). Use it BEFORE touching a degraded control-plane node, to know the quorum margin; and before remove_etcd_member, to get the member id. Identify the node to run on with node_id (preferred, from list_cluster_nodes) or node_name - it must be a control-plane node, and when one control-plane node is down, pick a HEALTHY peer (the inspection talks to the local etcd of the node it runs on). Runs nothing that changes the cluster. Not available for imported or managed-Kubernetes clusters, nor (yet) Proxmox/HPE Morpheus.
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  • Remove one member from the etcd cluster of an Ankra-provisioned cluster (Hetzner, OVH, UpCloud, DigitalOcean, or Scaleway) - the cleanup step when a dead control-plane node is being replaced: its stale etcd member must be removed before a replacement joins, or quorum math breaks. Executes on a HEALTHY control-plane peer (node_id/node_name - never the node whose member is being removed) over SSH-via-bastion; a node that is not control-plane is refused before any removal is attempted. The scheduler re-reads live membership immediately before acting and REFUSES to remove: a member still observed serving (by any health source, not only its own endpoint), a member whose health could not be read at all (unknown is not dead), the member of the node the command runs on, an id that does not uniquely match, or any non-learner voter whose removal would leave fewer healthy voters than the post-removal quorum - a refusal comes back as a structured result explaining why, with the live member list as evidence. This is an irreversible control-plane change: a removed member cannot rejoin with its old identity. Call get_etcd_members first and pass the member_id it listed (hex or decimal). Not available for imported or managed-Kubernetes clusters, nor (yet) Proxmox/HPE Morpheus.
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  • Change the control plane of an Ankra-provisioned self-managed cluster. Provide exactly ONE of: count (1 or 3; additionally 5 on Proxmox VE - etcd quorum needs an odd number) or instance_type (resizes every control plane node). GROWING the count (1 -> 3, 3 -> 5) happens LIVE on a running cluster: the new control planes provision and join etcd without downtime, and the answer carries the operation to follow. REDUCING the count is applied offline: stop the cluster (the stop preserves its state and the start restores it), apply the change, then start_cluster. instance_type changes roll one controller at a time on a running cluster with 3 or more controllers; a single-controller cluster must grow to 3 first or apply the change offline. Call list_node_groups first - its control_plane section reports the current count/instance type, whether a change is possible right now, and in which mode.
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  • Start a stopped Ankra-provisioned self-managed cluster: re-provisions its VMs from the configuration preserved at stop time (on Scaleway and AWS, powers the preserved servers back on instead of rebuilding them) and brings Kubernetes and the installed stacks back up. Refused unless the cluster is stopped, a retry of a start whose control plane never came up, or a full start bringing parked workers back. When the stop deleted the VMs and a cluster state snapshot was captured after the cluster's last start (the stop's own capture, otherwise the newest scheduled etcd backup), the first control plane restores it (etcd reset from the snapshot, stale Node and VolumeAttachment objects cleared) instead of bootstrapping an empty cluster, so workloads come back with their Secrets, ConfigMaps, custom resources and persistent volumes; a snapshot from before the last start is restored only when named with restore_snapshot_id (the refusal names it), and a restore already requested is always kept. A paused cluster keeps its etcd and gets no new restore. The result names the snapshot (state_snapshot_id, state_snapshot_trigger, state_snapshot_captured_at) and says in its message what happens to the cluster state. restore_state=false starts fresh instead. Optional scope: 'all' (default) restores the full cluster; 'control_plane' restores only the control plane and bastion (e.g. to verify a change_control_plane result cheaply). Provisioning runs in the background as tracked operations.
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  • Create a power schedule on an Ankra-provisioned self-managed cluster: a scheduled stop or start that fires once at run_at (schedule_kind 'once') or repeatedly per a standard 5-field cron_expression evaluated in an IANA timezone (schedule_kind 'cron'), executed within a minute of falling due. By default (stop_mode 'delete_resources') a fired stop behaves exactly like stop_cluster - it TERMINATES every VM of the cluster at the provider and preserves only the configuration for a later start (except on Scaleway, where servers are powered off and kept, with retained storage, gateway, and flexible IP still billable) - so state the schedule's action, stop mode, and timing to the user before creating it. stop_mode 'scale_to_zero' instead DELETES the worker servers at the provider (workloads stop) and keeps the control plane (with etcd), networks, SSH keys, and cloud volumes, which keep billing; the matching start creates new workers with the previous configuration. Anything on a worker's own disk - local-path, hostPath or other node-local persistent volumes, emptyDir - is lost at every stop, so tell the user this before creating a scale_to_zero schedule, and the result's node_local_storage names the claims at risk when the cluster inventory shows any (or says it could not tell). An enabled scale_to_zero stop on a cluster whose inventory shows such claims is refused unless accept_node_local_data_loss is true: the refusal names the claims, so show them to the user, ask whether they accept losing that data at every stop, and call create_power_schedule again with accept_node_local_data_loss true only after the user has explicitly agreed. The classic cost-saving pair is a weekday-evening stop ('0 19 * * 1-5') plus a weekday-morning start ('0 7 * * 1-5'). A stop fired while the cluster is already stopped is skipped, a start fires on a stopped cluster (full re-provision) or on a running cluster whose workers a scale-to-zero stop removed (worker restore), and a busy cluster defers the action (retried every 5 minutes for up to 24 hours). At most 20 schedules per cluster. The schedule itself is reversible: delete_power_schedule removes it before it fires.
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  • Stop an Ankra-provisioned self-managed cluster (Hetzner, OVH, UpCloud, DigitalOcean, Scaleway, AWS, Proxmox VE, or HPE Morpheus). On Hetzner, OVH, UpCloud, DigitalOcean, Proxmox VE and Morpheus a stop TERMINATES every VM of the cluster at the provider (control planes, workers, bastion/gateway); on Scaleway and AWS the servers are instead powered off and kept with their volumes (etcd and the cluster's state survive; retained storage, gateway and IPs remain billable). On the terminating providers the platform first captures the cluster's state - an encrypted etcd snapshot uploaded to the organisation's backup vault - and tears the VMs down only once it is stored (k3s and kubeadm clusters on Hetzner, OVH, UpCloud, DigitalOcean, Proxmox VE and Morpheus); start_cluster then restores it so Secrets, ConfigMaps, custom resources and PersistentVolume/Claim bindings come back and StatefulSets reattach their existing cloud disks. preserve_state=false skips the capture (data on the VMs' disks is then destroyed; only the cluster's Ankra configuration is preserved and start_cluster re-provisions from it); preserve_state=true refuses a stop whose state cannot be captured. Cloud block volumes are never deleted by a stop. mode 'pause' (k3s on Hetzner, UpCloud and DigitalOcean) instead powers the servers off and keeps them with their disks, exactly like a Scaleway or AWS stop: etcd, local data and the nodes' identities survive and start_cluster powers them back on, at the price of compute and storage still billing while paused - offer it when the user wants a short stop with everything intact, and the default teardown when they want to stop paying for the VMs. Use before change_control_plane on a single-controller cluster (a 3-controller cluster resizes live without stopping). Confirm with the user before calling.
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Matching MCP Servers

Matching MCP Connectors

  • Start the rolling OS security patch of an Ankra-provisioned cluster: one host at a time, never two. Each node is checked first (nothing pending means nothing is touched), then cordoned and drained through a peer control plane with PodDisruptionBudgets honoured and never forced, upgraded with apt (the held-back systemd, udev, netplan, container-runtime and packet-filter packages included; packages are never removed and Kubernetes packages are never moved), rebooted only when the update asks for it, and returned to service only once it is Ready, its etcd member is healthy (control planes, which go one at a time and only with quorum to spare), its workloads are back and the cluster's agent has checked in. A failed drain or host stops the whole run. Nodes carrying single-replica workloads with volumes, or in a database node pool, are skipped and reported unless include_stateful_nodes is true; a cluster's only control plane is never patched live. When the cluster's OS patch policy is enabled, each host the run patches or finds up to date gets Ankra's update hold (apply_node_os_policy), and a skipped stateful node or only control plane has it removed, so every host is patched by either this lane or unattended-upgrades. The bastion goes last; on clusters where it is the NAT gateway its reboot briefly cuts the nodes' internet egress, and its NAT and SSH guard are re-asserted afterwards. The run starts only inside the cluster's maintenance window unless outside_window is true. Run plan_os_patches first to see what will happen, and follow the run with get_os_patch_status.
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  • Extended gcd of a and b. Returns g, x, and y with g = a*x + b*y and g >= 0. gcd(0, 0) is rejected. Decimals have no leading zeros. Price: $0.001 USDC per successful call (x402, Solana). Same tool over HTTPS: POST https://scorptech.it.com/api/x402/v1/egcd
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  • Extended gcd of a and b. Returns g, x, and y with g = a*x + b*y and g >= 0. gcd(0, 0) is rejected. Decimals have no leading zeros. Price: $0.001 USDC per successful call (x402, Solana). Same tool over HTTPS: POST https://scorptech.it.com/api/x402/v1/egcd
    ConnectorNo auth