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510,481 tools. Updated 2026-09-04 01:55

"Secret scanning and credential detection tools" matching MCP tools:

  • Rename a credential and/or rotate its secret, publishing the change immediately so every target that uses this credential picks it up right away. Omit a secret field (or the whole `auth` object) to keep the existing value — the vault can never show a secret back to confirm it, so leaving it out means "unchanged," not "cleared." The destination host cannot be changed here: create a new credential for a new destination.
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  • List the authenticated user's CRM people. Each person includes avatar_url, photo_count, and has_photos; use get_person_photos(person_id) for the full gallery. Notes omitted by default (has_notes flag); pass include_notes=true for progressive fetch (credential/secret spans are redacted server-side). Supports limit (default 100, max 500) and offset; returns total and truncated. Requires OAuth or a supported scoped credential. ($0.10; API key required)
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  • Get the exact commands for running the local crypto plane (the `@seekrit/mcp` npm server, the `@seekrit/cli` CLI, seekrit-run, seekrit-proxy), including a copy-paste .mcp.json that reuses this session's credential. Takes no arguments and returns prose plus config. Call this the moment you need to SET or READ a secret value — no tool on this server will ever return one. Use local_tool_for instead when you want the single command for one named operation.
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  • Rotate an existing secret with a new value. The old value is permanently replaced and cannot be recovered. Requires secrets:write or full permission. Use store_secret to create a name that does not exist yet, and delete_secret to remove the secret entirely. Pass playbook_id as the UUID or GUID of the playbook this call should target.
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  • Persist a DRAFT marketplace listing you wrote (from import_repo grounding). Creates a status=draft agent owned by you; then call findagent_submit_for_review IN THIS MCP CLIENT to set price + confirm originality/prohibited + submit it — the web is only an optional preview, not where you finish. Prefer findagent_submission_wizard to collect all of these fields step-by-step (one selectable question at a time) before calling this. Before calling: use findagent_check_slug to confirm the slug is free, and findagent_list_categories to pick the primary (top-level) category + a discipline. NEVER send secret credential VALUES — credential_slots declare the shape (ref/label/allowed_hosts/type) only.
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  • Generate a new internal API key credential for the current user. Returns `data` containing the issued key — store it securely and pass it to `tronsave_login` (`apiKey` mode) for internal-tool access. Side effect: issues secret material; not idempotent — each call mints a fresh key. If a previous key existed, treat it as rotated and stop using the old key once the new one is wired up. Requires a signature session and `mcp-session-id`. Sensitive output — never log raw keys; unauthorized sessions or policy checks may reject issuance.
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Matching MCP Servers

  • A
    license
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    quality
    C
    maintenance
    Machine-readable detection lookups for SIEM enrichment and AI agents. Query 800+ LOLBAS and GTFOBins binaries plus process parent-child baselines — get risk levels, abuse categories, and MITRE ATT\&CK mappings without embedding data in prompts.
    6
    Apache 2.0
  • A
    license
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    quality
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    maintenance
    Enables scanning diffs or code blobs for leaked secrets, returning a verdict with severity and masked findings, all processed locally with no data sent externally.
    1
    MIT

Matching MCP Connectors

  • Scan configs, files, or text for leaked secrets and obvious misconfigurations. Nothing stored.

  • Pay-per-call AI tools over x402: web research, summarization, structured extraction (USDC, Base).

  • Open a Secure Courier channel for credential delivery. This is the CREDENTIAL-DELIVERY flow — use it to hand over a service secret (API keys, tokens). To merely prove you control an npub (the usual answer to a ``proof_required`` error), use ``request_npub_proof`` instead. Note: dynamic/OAuth2 services (e.g. Schwab) need NO couriered secret — check ``service_status`` first. Sends a welcome DM with a credential template. The recipient must read the DM in their Nostr client, fill in the fields, and reply manually. **This is a human-in-the-loop flow.** After calling this tool, STOP and tell the user what to do. Wait for the user to confirm they have replied before calling ``receive_credentials``. Do NOT poll or retry — each ``receive_credentials`` call destructively drains the relay mailbox.
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  • List an EXTERNAL remote MCP server you run as a marketplace LISTING — for an MCP server hosted on YOUR OWN infrastructure that buyers connect their client straight to (FindAgent never proxies or runs it). Pass the listing basics (title/slug/tagline/description/category_slug + example_prompts: 1–5 required) and the remote endpoint as `server_url` (https) OR a parsed `server.json` object in `server_json`. The server's tools are auto-detected (a sandbox-gated live scan when available) — you can override with `tools` (name+description), `transport` (streamable-http|sse), and `auth_note` (what credential the server needs — NEVER a secret value). Creates a status=draft agent you own; then call findagent_submit_for_review IN THIS MCP CLIENT to submit it. The server URL is stored + displayed only; nothing executes on FindAgent. Before calling: findagent_check_slug + findagent_list_categories.
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  • Return the connected organization, the credential in use, and the granted workspace + environment ("TEST" or "PRODUCTION") targets — exactly the values the required workspaceId/environment arguments on targeted tools accept. Always available; call this first, and again whenever a tool returns UNAUTHORIZED or NOT_FOUND unexpectedly, or after this connection's access changes — resources live per-workspace.
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  • Open a Secure Courier channel for credential delivery. This is the CREDENTIAL-DELIVERY flow — use it to hand over a service secret (API keys, tokens). To merely prove you control an npub (the usual answer to a ``proof_required`` error), use ``request_npub_proof`` instead. Note: dynamic/OAuth2 services (e.g. Schwab) need NO couriered secret — check ``service_status`` first. Sends a welcome DM with a credential template. The recipient must read the DM in their Nostr client, fill in the fields, and reply manually. **This is a human-in-the-loop flow.** After calling this tool, STOP and tell the user what to do. Wait for the user to confirm they have replied before calling ``receive_credentials``. Do NOT poll or retry — each ``receive_credentials`` call destructively drains the relay mailbox.
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  • A v2 app's inbound catch-hooks (inbound-webhooks). A catch-hook lets an external system such as Stripe, Zapier, Make, Home Assistant or an email router POST JSON to a secret URL that writes into a declared collection, so the app receives data with no agent online. Hooks are declared in the manifest (x-homespun-manifest.ingest) and materialized at deploy, so this tool has no create or delete: it reads back the URL, rotates a leaked one, and manages the opt-in signing secret. After deploying a manifest that declares a hook, list is what yields the exact URL to paste into the external system. Actions: list returns the app's hooks, each with its full secret URL, current rule collection, mode, wake and handshake settings, per-status delivery counts and signing-secret state; rotate mints a fresh URL secret for one hook by name and returns the new url once, after which the old url stops working immediately with no redeploy needed; set_signing_secret provisions or rotates a hook's signing secret, which is a different secret from the URL and is what a provider HMACs the body with, minting one returned once when `secret` is omitted or storing a provider value verbatim when it is passed, and never echoing it back; clear_signing_secret removes it. Signature verification currently ships dark: nothing verifies a signature yet.
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  • Pre-execution content scan for skill/instruction files. Analyzes the full text of a skill (markdown, plain text, SKILL.md, etc.) for malicious patterns BEFORE the agent follows the instructions. This is the critical defense against remote skill-mediated credential exfiltration (CodeMax attack class, 2026-03-14) where model-level safety only fires AFTER the payload has already executed. Call this on any skill/instruction content fetched from the web before executing any of its steps. If should_block is True, refuse to proceed. Detection signals: - Download-and-execute chains (wget/curl → chmod +x → run) - Bootstrap file modification (.npmrc, NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD) - Encrypted credential exfiltration (GPG, openssl → HTTP POST) - Credential access patterns (process.env, keychain, .env files) - Code obfuscation (base64 decode pipe to shell) - Multi-stage kill chain correlation Args: content: Full text content of the skill file source_url: URL where the skill was fetched from (for reporting) Returns: risk: "CLEAN" | "LOW" | "SUSPICIOUS" | "MALICIOUS" risk_score: 0.0–1.0 should_block: True if the skill should NOT be executed should_warn: True if the skill warrants user confirmation kill_chain: True if a multi-stage attack chain was detected signals: List of detection signals with categories and excerpts content_hash: SHA256 of the content (for IOC submission if malicious)
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  • Assemble a cart and get a Stripe-hosted checkout URL the customer opens to pay; no card data passes through the agent. Item ids come from the search tools (`diamond:<report>`, `setting:<slug>`, `jewelry:<slug>`); a complete ring is one setting plus one diamond. Needs the shipping address (prices tax and shipping into the link). Expires after 24 hours. No credential needed. Without a production credential this tool runs in the sandbox: the link is simulated and no Stripe session is created. Pass `env: "production"` when the customer actually wants to buy — that returns a live, payable link.
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  • Save a new reusable credential, sealed with the project's encryption key at write time. Neither this call nor any later read ever returns the secret back — reference it from a target by id (see create_endpoint/update_endpoint's target.credentialVaultEntryId) instead of copying the secret around. `auth.type` selects which fields apply: bearer→token, basic→username+password, apiKeyHeader→headerName+key, apiKeyQuery→paramName+key, publicPrivateKey→secret+key. `destinationHost` is required and permanent: the credential is only ever sent to that host, over https, and no later call can re-aim it.
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  • Scan source code for injection vulnerabilities: SQL injection, command injection, path traversal via unsafe string concatenation/unsanitized input. Supports Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Java, Go, Ruby, Shell, Bash. Use to detect input-handling bugs; for secrets use check_secrets. Companion code-security tools: check_secrets (hard-coded credential detection), check_dependencies (known-CVE vulnerability audit), check_headers (live HTTP security-header validation), scan_headers (live HTTP scan via domain). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {total, by_severity, findings}. No data stored.
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  • Search the authenticated user life graph. Deterministic routing first: food + relative dates (e.g. "what did I eat yesterday?"); timeline/current-context; money+person; who-is → resolve_person. Otherwise semantic/keyword search. Event hits include event_date and food_id when mirrored from Food Diary. Browser-history titles are excluded. Credential/secret spans are redacted. Requires OAuth or a supported scoped credential. ($0.15; API key required)
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  • Begin TOTP enrolment. Returns a fresh ``secret`` + ``otpauth_uri`` + a signed ``ticket``. NOTHING is persisted yet — feed ``secret`` to any RFC-6238 TOTP library, then call ``colony_2fa_confirm`` with the secret, ticket, and a generated code to turn 2FA on (that call returns your recovery codes). Errors: ``AUTH_2FA_ALREADY_ENABLED``.
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  • Describe a risk in plain English and AxioRank's AI proposes a custom content detector (regex or keyword) and SAVES it DISABLED for your review. An LLM never arms detection unattended. Outbound content categories only (secret/pii/destructive/injection/egress). Requires the `policies:write` scope and an AI-assessments-enabled plan (Team+).
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  • Get the authenticated user's Meta Council settings — preferred model, plan tier, which credentials are saved (not live-verified), and the registry-backed tools that require, optionally use, or do not use account credentials. Names and booleans only, never secret values. Requires authentication.
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  • Manage an outbound webhook subscription. action = create (needs url + eventTypes: reply|bounce|soft_bounce|complaint|unsubscribe; optional secret/active) | update (needs id + one changed field; active:true re-enables an auto-disabled one, active:false pauses; secret rotates) | delete (needs id). create/rotate return the HMAC signing secret ONCE. URLs must be https to a public host (private/metadata IPs rejected). Deliveries are signed X-Coldrig-Signature: sha256=HMAC-SHA256(secret, raw body).
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