"Otto" matching MCP tools:

• otto_delegation_capA

  Otto IntelA

  TWO PHASES, both header authed, both resolving the end user from the access token. { phase: "reserve", accessToken, perSwapCapUsd, requestedDays, mintKey } takes a generation-bound unified mint claim, picks a whole-second expiry instant at or BEFORE the requested duration that no durable row for this user already occupies, writes the chosen cap (whole USD, 1…5000) against it, and answers { expires_at, mint_expires_at, per_swap_cap_usd, recorded }. Call createDelegation with mint_expires_at EXACTLY as given — it is the reserved instant plus a one-millisecond filler, because CDP refuses an expiry ending .000 and truncates the filler away — and with mintKey as the idempotencyKey. Then { phase: "confirm", accessToken, mintKey } re-reads the grant from CDP and promotes only the exact still-current claim whose reported instant IS the reserved one. A mismatch, Stop overlap, or stale claim remains unconfirmed and authorises nothing; no confirm path issues CDP's user-wide revoke because that could delete a newer permission, so use a fresh explicit Stop to revoke whichever permission is current. Why this shape: Coinbase issues no grant id and a send can learn nothing about a live grant except its expiry, so the expiry is made an identity BY CONSTRUCTION — reserved server-side, recorded before the mint, asserted after it. Until a reservation is successfully confirmed active, otto_submit_under_delegation refuses that delegation (DELEGATION_CAP_UNCONFIRMED) rather than falling back to the 5000 USD ceiling. A reservation is IMMUTABLE per mint key — pressing again returns the same instant and cap, and an older revoke generation cannot be revived. Coinbase's engine cannot hold this number: end-user accounts are fenced by ONE project-scope policy shared by every delegated user, so a lower per-user cap is enforced by Otto's server alone. Server-to-server only: the caller presents Otto's delegation secret in the `x-otto-delegation-auth` request header (never in arguments); a call without it is refused before anything is read. The listed input schema is intentionally permissive — the strict schema is validated after the caller is authenticated.

  ConnectorNo auth

• hood_sector_rotationA

  Otto Data — Robinhood ChainA

  Sector rotation context for Hood tokenized stocks (API-only tracker refreshed every 3h): market regime (risk_on|risk_off|mixed), an 11-SPDR sector score/label/flow board and a per-ticker join — sector score (0-100), label (inflow|interest|neutral|outflow_leaning|outflow), flow trend, theme matches + live basis. Answers where money is rotating and whether your token's sector is in inflow or outflow. tickers: CSV filter (empty = full Hood universe).

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_submit_under_delegationA

  Otto IntelA

  Submit a verified otto_prepare_swap envelope on Base under the end user's CDP delegation. Arguments: { userId, envelope (the otto_prepare_swap result), prepareInput (the exact otto_prepare_swap request, with slippage.minAmountOut) } — validated strictly AFTER the caller is authenticated, so the listed input schema is intentionally permissive. Server-to-server only: the caller presents Otto's delegation secret in the `x-otto-delegation-auth` request header (never in arguments); a call without it is refused before anything is read. Before any send the server confirms, in this order: the Model-B project policy is installed and reads back by name and rules digest; the user's grant is active past the envelope's valid_until; the account is one of that end user's own CDP accounts as CDP reports them; the envelope passes the 13-check verifier for exactly the request that produced it; the plan is inside the fence (allow-listed input token, reviewed spender, gross at or below the 5000 USD engine ceiling); and the plan is at or below the per-swap cap THIS user chose when they minted, which is recorded against their grant on this server. A delegation with no recorded cap is REFUSED (DELEGATION_CAP_UNRECORDED) rather than defaulted to the ceiling — mint the permission again to set one. Then the three steps (allowance reset, approval, swap) are submitted in order under the delegation, each waited to a sealed canonical block; a halt clears the allowance and reports the read-back. One delegated plan at a time per user. Coinbase's engine bounds the delegated key to Model-B swap shapes through LI.FI up to the 5000 USD ceiling, which is shared by every delegated user and cannot be narrowed per user by the engine; the user's own lower cap and the receiver binding are Otto's server-side checks, and the user can revoke at any time.

  Connector

  Destructive

  No auth

• otto_delegation_fenceA

  Otto IntelA

  Idempotent ensure-by-digest of the ONE CDP project-scope policy that fences every delegated send, then a read-back. Writes only when no project policy exists (creates it) or when the existing one is Otto's own lineage with stale rules (updates it in place). REFUSES BY NAME if a different project-scope policy is installed — it is never overwritten or deleted. Never downgrades a newer fence. An OPS action: at most one ensure runs project-wide at a time, never during a rolling deploy, never from the dApp (the mint gate reads fence.present from otto_delegation_status). Arguments: {}. Output: the policy id, versioned name, rules digest and the per-swap cap; the tool fails unless the fence reads back present under the written id. Server-to-server only: the caller presents Otto's delegation secret in the `x-otto-delegation-auth` request header (never in arguments); a call without it is refused before anything is read. The listed input schema is intentionally permissive — the strict schema is validated after the caller is authenticated.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_delegation_statusA

  Otto IntelA

  Read back, for the end user identified by a CDP access token, their CDP accounts, whether the Model-B fence is present, and whether an active delegation reads back (with its expiry and the per-swap cap recorded for it). Arguments: { accessToken } — the server resolves the user from the token; a client-sent user id is refused. delegation.per_swap_cap_usd is the number THIS user chose at mint time; it is ABSENT when no cap is recorded for the grant, which means the delegated send will refuse it — say so rather than showing the shared ceiling. fence.per_swap_cap_usd is that shared ceiling and is never a per-user number. Output is bound to that user; nothing about any other user is returned. Server-to-server only: the caller presents Otto's delegation secret in the `x-otto-delegation-auth` request header (never in arguments); a call without it is refused before anything is read. The listed input schema is intentionally permissive — the strict schema is validated after the caller is authenticated.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_delegation_revokeA

  Otto IntelA

  Revoke the end user's delegation from Otto's side and confirm by read-back that it no longer exists; from then on this server submits nothing for that user (fail-closed, even if the read-back had failed). Arguments: EITHER { accessToken } (the user path — the server resolves the user from the token) OR { userId, support_reason } (the support path, for an operator holding the server secret; the reason is logged, the token never is). Server-to-server only: the caller presents Otto's delegation secret in the `x-otto-delegation-auth` request header (never in arguments); a call without it is refused before anything is read. The listed input schema is intentionally permissive — the strict schema is validated after the caller is authenticated.

  Connector

  Destructive

  No auth

• otto_delegation_operationsA

  Otto IntelA

  Read the durable Base delegated-operation journal for the end user resolved from { accessToken }. Optional artifactId selects one exact own-user operation; without it, the result includes a bounded recent terminal history and every unresolved operation regardless of age. The global unresolved flag is fail-closed: it is true when the store is unavailable, journal coverage is not rollout-ready, or any operation has a prepared/submitted/unknown outcome. Stored serialized transactions and CDP idempotency keys are never returned, and this tool never submits or retries anything. Server-to-server only: the caller also presents Otto's delegation secret in the x-otto-delegation-auth request header; no userId argument is accepted.

  ConnectorNo auth

• list_lotteriesA

  Quick Lotto lottery resultsA

  List every lottery this site publishes results for, with the size of each draw machine (how many numbers are picked, and from how many). Call this first if you are unsure which lotteries are covered or what code to use.

  ConnectorNo auth

• partner_swap_quoteA

  Otto Data — Robinhood ChainA

  Get an UNSIGNED Rialto swap quote for an approved partner. YOU sign and broadcast the returned transaction yourself, with your own wallet's private key, on your own infrastructure — Otto never sees or holds your key and never submits anything on your behalf. api_key: the otto_pn_ key Otto's admin issued you directly. sell_token/buy_token: Hood token contract addresses (0x...). sell_amount: human units of sell_token (e.g. "25" USDG, not wei). taker: the wallet address that will actually sign and hold the position. Returns the raw Rialto quote including tx.to, tx.data, tx.value and min_buy_amount — everything needed to build and sign the transaction. After broadcasting, call partner_report_fill so the trade shows up in Otto's records.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_prepare_perp_orderA

  Otto IntelA

  Prepare and verify an unsigned Hyperliquid perpetuals order (limit, with optional reduce-only take-profit and stop-loss triggers bundled as normalTpsl) for the caller-owned Hyperliquid account, returned as the canonical L1 action plus the exact EIP-712 Agent domain, struct, and connectionId recipe the caller's own signer needs. The asset id, size grid, and price grid come from the live perp universe: an unknown or delisted perp, a size finer than the asset's szDecimals, or a price off the venue's 5-significant-digit / (6 - szDecimals) decimal grid is refused by name rather than rounded to a different order. There is no market order — name your own aggressive limit price with 'Ioc'. Otto's builder attribution is spec'd and valueless today, so the action carries no builder field and the envelope says so. The nonce is chosen by the signer, never here; the envelope's valid_until is committed to the artifact digest AND placed inside the signed digest as expiresAfter, so the venue itself rejects a stale action, while the Hyperliquid signer nonce remains the replay boundary and this tool cannot guarantee single execution. This tool never signs or submits, holds no key, and derives no agent wallet. Every envelope from this server is valid for 300 seconds from construction (valid_until); a stale envelope is refused by the verifier — request a fresh one.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_x_recipesA

  Otto IntelA

  Return Otto X's live X Layer recipe menu — each recipe's path, price, and the X Layer (eip155:196) payment requirement decoded from its unpaid 402 challenge: token asset, issuer name/version, payTo, and a copy-paste curl. Settles in USD₮0 / USD Coin / Global Dollar on X Layer via the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header. Always free and read-only; never signs or pays and does not consume the free intelligence call.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_prepare_stock_buyA

  Otto IntelA

  Prepare the EXACT otto_prepare_swap pair (envelope + prepareInput) that buys one of the executable Coinbase B20 tokenized equities on Base with USDC, as a LI.FI route through the fenced diamond whose receiver is the signing account. The token comes from the registry row named by executableEquityId and is never an input; the caller's registryCommitment must equal the commitment recomputed over the current record. The WORST PERMISSIBLE FILL (amount over the route's own floor) is checked against the equity's own Chainlink total-return mark and refused when it exceeds the pinned tolerance, or when the feed is frozen (> 24 h). Returns the pair unchanged plus a preview; never signs or submits — submit the pair through otto_submit_under_delegation under the end user's per-swap cap. Every envelope from this server is valid for 300 seconds from construction (valid_until); a stale envelope is refused by the verifier — request a fresh one.

  ConnectorNo auth

• funding_carry_signalsA

  Otto Data — Robinhood ChainA

  Deterministic funding-carry candidates joining perp funding (Arcus/Lighter) with perp-vs-spot basis. Per ticker: funding rate + annualized funding_apr_pct, perp-vs-Chainlink gap (bps) and a label — carry_long_spot_short_perp (hold Hood spot, short the perp, collect positive funding), carry_short_spot_long_perp (inverse) or no_carry — plus the standard risk flags. min_abs_bps filters on |perp_vs_chainlink_bps|. Signals are NOT orders.

  ConnectorNo auth

• execute_onchain_swapA

  Otto Data — Robinhood ChainA

  Execute a REAL on-chain swap on Robinhood Chain via the Rialto router, signed by Otto's server-side trading wallet. side=buy spends `usd_amount` USDG to buy the ticker's Hood token; side=sell sells `qty` tokens back to USDG. The server enforces hard guardrails independently of the caller: USDG<->allowlisted-token pairs only, per-trade and daily USD caps, and a slippage cap. On success the matching order_filled/position_closed event (payload mode=onchain, with tx_hash) is written automatically — the position book, performance stats and trade chart update without a separate report_agent_status call. key: the operator's OTTO_AGENT_KEY. agent: gap-trader | narrative-trader. Returns tx_hash, fill qty/price/usd and pnl_bps (sells with a known entry).

  Connector

  Destructive

  No auth

• competition_paper_tradeA

  Otto Data — Robinhood ChainA

  Place a PAPER fill in Otto's trading competition on behalf of the key's owner. No real funds move — the fill is priced server-side at the latest Chainlink price (callers can never supply a price). api_key: the personal otto_pk_ key issued when the wallet joined at ottodata.app/competition. side: buy | sell. qty: token quantity (shares). Include a short `reason` — it shows up in the owner's trade history. Rules enforced server-side: $10,000 starting budget, long-only, max $2,000 notional per trade, max 10 open positions, max 40 trades/day. On a rule violation the response is {"error": "..."} — read it and adjust instead of retrying blindly.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_rh_seasonA

  Otto IntelA

  Scan rug-screened Robinhood Chain (4663) movers with honeypot filters and per-token risk flags. Market context only; not a pick, recommendation, or trade instruction. Hosted access: the first successful intelligence call is free; later calls cost $0.001 USDC through x402.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_pm_marketsA

  Otto IntelA

  Read the highest-volume open Polymarket markets with live outcome probabilities, bid/ask context, liquidity, volume, and end dates. Event-probability context only; not a recommendation. Hosted access: the first successful intelligence call is free; later calls cost $0.001 USDC through x402.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_prepare_bridgeA

  Otto IntelA

  Prepare, decode, and verify an unsigned cross-chain native-USDC bridge construction aid for the caller-owned EOA or Safe, over the enumerated v1 Circle-CCTP route set (Ethereum, Polygon, Base, Arbitrum, Avalanche); any other chain, token, or bridge route is refused by name. The envelope's valid_until bounds freshness and is committed to the artifact digest; the signer account nonce is the on-chain replay boundary, and this tool cannot guarantee single execution. Returns ordered allowance-reset, approval, and call steps on the source chain only; never signs or submits. Every envelope from this server is valid for 300 seconds from construction (valid_until); a stale envelope is refused by the verifier — request a fresh one.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_prepare_polymarket_orderA

  Otto IntelA

  Prepare and verify an unsigned Polymarket CTF Exchange V2 limit order (GTC) for the caller-owned Polygon EOA, with Otto's builder code stamped inside the EIP-712 order struct and re-asserted on the exact digest the signer will sign. The price must be an exact multiple of the market's live minimum tick size and the size at or above its published minimum. The envelope's valid_until bounds freshness and is committed to the artifact digest; the exchange's own order hash is the replay boundary, and this tool cannot guarantee single execution. Returns order args and typed data only; never signs or submits, holds no CLOB credentials, and touches no collateral or allowance. Every envelope from this server is valid for 300 seconds from construction (valid_until); a stale envelope is refused by the verifier — request a fresh one.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_delegation_fence_statusA

  Otto IntelA

  PUBLIC and read-only, no header: whether the Model-B project policy that fences every delegated send is installed and v-current on this server, with its versioned name, rules digest, the per-swap cap ceiling in USD (shared by every delegated user — a person may choose any whole-dollar cap from per_swap_cap_min_usd up to it, enforced server-side and recorded against their own grant), and Otto's PUBLIC CDP project id (a UUID — the authority an agent binds its mint to). Exposes ONLY the fence's public promise — never an end user, a grant, an address or a policy's contents. An agent about to mint a delegation (otto-execute delegate) reads this first, mints to the published project_id and no other, and refuses to mint when the fence is not present; the server enforces fence-before-authority on every delegated send regardless. Arguments: {}.

  ConnectorNo auth

• otto_prepare_yield_withdrawA

  Otto IntelA

  Prepare the EXACT otto_prepare_swap pair (envelope + prepareInput) that redeems vault shares from one of the executable Morpho vaults in the Yield Copilot registry back to USDC in the signing account, as a LI.FI route whose input token is the vault's ERC-4626 share token. The vault and the asset come from the registry row named by executableMarketId and are never inputs; the caller's registryCommitment must equal the commitment recomputed over the current record. The quoted USDC is checked against the vault's own previewRedeem and refused when it falls short by more than the pinned tolerance. Returns the pair unchanged plus a preview; never signs or submits — submit the pair through otto_submit_under_delegation, which admits a withdraw only under fence v2 and a permission minted under cap ruleset v2, values it at zero against the per-swap cap (it returns the person's own assets), and bounds it by the engine's share cap. Every envelope from this server is valid for 300 seconds from construction (valid_until); a stale envelope is refused by the verifier — request a fresh one.

  ConnectorNo auth