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458,051 tools. Updated 2026-08-14 20:18

"LLVM" matching MCP tools:

  • dcl_evaluate_batch

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    PRE-ACTION Bulk Processing ($0.10). Evaluates a list of items in one call; each item is a dict shaped {"response": str, "policy"?: str}, where policy defaults to "default" if omitted and may be any built-in policy name (default, strict, anti_jailbreak, safety, content_quality). Each item gets its own independent COMMIT/NO_COMMIT verdict via the same logic as the matching single-item evaluate_* tool; results are returned in input order under `results`, plus a shared `batch_id`. Capped at 200 items per call — oversized batches are rejected. Use this instead of multiple single-item evaluate_* calls when checking several responses — optionally against different policies — in one priced call rather than paying per item separately.
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  • estimate_cost

    LLM Abacus

    估算一段文本或指定 token 数在某个大模型上的**输入侧**调用成本，以人民币 ¥ 计价。text_or_tokens 支持两种模式：传自然语言文本时自动估算 token 数（中文按字符、英文按词分别计），传纯数字字符串时直接作为已知 token 数使用。返回：所用估算方法、token 数、按原价计的输入成本；若该模型提供缓存输入价，另给出缓存命中成本、相对原价的节省百分比与倍数差价；末尾附该模型的输入 / 输出 / 缓存输入单价（每百万 tokens）。⚠️ 本工具只计算输入成本，不含输出 token 费用——要估算完整往返成本，需另取输出单价自行相加。
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  • llm

    Vaaya

    Ask a DIFFERENT LLM a question and get its answer, billed per token from the Vaaya wallet (model cost + 3%, usually a fraction of a cent). Use it to get a second opinion from a rival model, cross-check an answer, summarize a huge blob cheaply, or query a specific model the user names (Kimi, GPT, Gemini, Claude, DeepSeek, and 300+ more). `model` accepts 'auto' (default: short prompts go cheap, long go mid), 'cheap' | 'mid' | 'best' tiers, or any exact OpenRouter slug like 'moonshotai/kimi-k3'. Typical costs: cheap tier well under 0.1 cents, best tier 1-3 cents per call. Not for the conversation you are already having — it is a one-shot ask to another model.
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  • dcl_commit

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    FINAL-STEP Leibniz Layer Crypto Commit ($0.01). Writes a trading/agent decision to the append-only Leibniz Layer audit chain and returns a Merkle-proof-style receipt: `tx_hash` (proof of this specific commit), `chain_hash` (the previous commit's hash, linking this one into the chain), and `chain_depth` (this commit's position in the chain). Unlike the evaluate_* tools, this call has no pass/fail verdict of its own — it always succeeds and simply seals the decision. Passing `prior_checks` is optional but recommended: it records which earlier pipeline steps (firewall/wallet/trade/MEV) this specific commit is downstream of, in one auditable record. Always run this LAST, after every other crypto-suite check has passed.
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  • dcl_evaluate_fast

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    FAST Pre-Action Audit ($0.01). Runs the response through the server's "default" policy: a substring check against 3 forbidden phrases ("ignore previous instructions", "jailbreak", "bypass safety") with a 0.7 minimum-confidence threshold. Each forbidden match found costs 0.4 confidence; if confidence falls below 0.7, or any match is found, the verdict is NO_COMMIT and `reason` lists which phrase triggered it. Otherwise COMMIT. Use this as the default low-cost first-pass gate before a risky agent action; switch to dcl_evaluate_strict for a broader, higher-bar check, or to dcl_evaluate_jailbreak / dcl_evaluate_safety / dcl_evaluate_quality for a narrower, single-topic check instead of the general-purpose default policy.
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  • dcl_evaluate_strict

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    STRICT Pre-Action Audit ($0.05). Runs the response against a broader, higher-bar "strict" policy: the union of all forbidden phrases from the default, anti-jailbreak, and safety policies (8 phrases total), with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold instead of the default policy's 0.7. Each matched phrase costs 0.4 confidence; if confidence falls below 0.85, or any phrase matches, the verdict is NO_COMMIT with `reason` listing every match found. Use this instead of dcl_evaluate_fast when the cost of a false COMMIT is high — e.g. before an irreversible or high-stakes agent action — since it catches jailbreak- and safety-adjacent phrasing that the plain default policy would miss.
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Matching MCP Servers

  • local-llm-mcp

    drangoht
    A
    license
    A
    quality
    C
    maintenance
    MCP server connecting Claude Code to LM Studio, delegating token-expensive tasks to a local model while keeping the cloud model in control. It reduces cloud context usage by reading files locally and returning only the processed results.
    4
    MIT

Matching MCP Connectors

  • dcl_evaluate_jailbreak

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    PRE-ACTION Instruction Adherence Check ($0.02). Runs the "anti_jailbreak" policy: a substring check against 6 forbidden phrases ("ignore previous instructions", "jailbreak", "bypass safety", "pretend you are", "act as if", "DAN") with a 0.8 minimum-confidence threshold — each match costs 0.4 confidence. Returns COMMIT if no phrase matches and confidence stays at or above 0.8, otherwise NO_COMMIT with `reason` listing the matched phrase(s). Use this as a targeted, cheaper check when the concern is specifically prompt-injection / persona-hijack risk; use dcl_evaluate_strict instead when you also want safety- and default-policy phrases covered in the same call.
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  • dcl_evaluate_safety

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    PRE-ACTION Baseline Safety Check ($0.01). Runs the "safety" policy: flags 2 forbidden disclaimers ("I cannot be held responsible", "no guarantees") and additionally REQUIRES the substring "AI" to appear somewhere in the response — missing it costs 0.2 confidence even with no forbidden phrase present. Minimum confidence is 0.75. Returns NO_COMMIT if confidence drops below 0.75, with `reason` naming the forbidden phrase found or the missing required pattern. Use this when you specifically need to confirm an AI-disclosure marker is present and the two disclaimer phrases are absent — not as a general-purpose safety net; for broader coverage use dcl_evaluate_fast or dcl_evaluate_strict instead.
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  • dcl_evaluate_quality

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    PRE-ACTION Content Quality & Drift Check ($0.03). Runs the "content_quality" policy: flags 12 absolutist or unverifiable-claim phrases (e.g. "guaranteed returns", "100% accurate", "studies show", "without a doubt") with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold — the highest bar of any single-policy tool. Returns NO_COMMIT if any phrase matches or confidence falls below 0.85, with `reason` listing the matched phrase(s). Use this to catch overconfident or unsubstantiated claims in generated content — a different concern from jailbreak or safety phrasing — e.g. before publishing agent-written copy or reports.
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  • dcl_pipeline_start

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    SESSION Management ($0.05). Generates a new `pipeline_id` and returns session metadata (scope, expiry, initial drift_mode) for organizing a series of related checks under one identifier. Note: this call does not currently link the returned pipeline_id to later evaluate_* calls — there is no server-side session state that ties subsequent audits back to it; it is an identifier/timestamp issuer, not an active tracking session. Use this to obtain a shared reference ID for your own client-side grouping of a multi-step audit sequence; do not rely on it to automatically aggregate drift across calls.
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  • dcl_evaluate_signal

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    POST-ACTION Market Signal Fabrication Screen ($0.03). Pattern-based heuristic on the output text alone (no source price feed) — flags guaranteed-price-prediction language ("will definitely hit $X"), absolute-certainty claims ("100% certain", "cannot go down"), a fabricated-price flag when a specific dollar figure co-occurs with a guaranteed-outcome claim, and an invented-token flag when a "$TICKER" cashtag doesn't match a small set of well-known symbols (false positives are possible for legitimate lesser-known tickers — this is a heuristic pre-check, not ground truth). For a full claim-by-claim check against an actual price-feed snapshot, use the local grounding workflow instead of this live tool. Verdict/confidence collapsing follows the same rule as dcl_evaluate_mev: any critical finding or 2+ major findings is a hard NO_COMMIT; exactly one major finding is a softer NO_COMMIT at ~0.55 confidence.
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  • read_url

    agent-web — URL to LLM-ready markdown: a polite, robots-respecting web page reader (free)

    Fetch one publicly reachable URL and return clean, LLM-ready markdown (title + page description + word count + markdown). HTML pages are extracted to markdown — including HTML tables, which become GitHub-flavored Markdown tables; URLs pointing straight at a Markdown or plain-text document (raw READMEs, llms.txt, docs) are passed through verbatim. Polite by design: honors the origin's robots.txt for our user-agent, identifies honestly, read-only GET, never bypasses anti-bot/CAPTCHA/paywalls. Free. JavaScript-rendered pages are not supported yet.
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  • dcl_evaluate_wallet

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    POST-ACTION Wallet Secret Guardian ($0.02). Scans for BIP-39 seed phrases (12 or 24 consecutive wordlist words), raw hex or WIF-format private keys, Ethereum/Bitcoin wallet addresses, and API keys/bearer tokens appearing near wallet/custody/signing terminology. Any finding results in NO_COMMIT — wallet secrets have no safe threshold, unlike other DCL evaluators. Returns a `sanitized_output` with all matches redacted (null if nothing was found) and a masked `redacted_sample` per finding — the real value is never returned or stored server-side.
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  • dcl_evaluate_output_sanitizer

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    FINAL-GATE Output Sanitizer ($0.02). Post-processing checkpoint that strips secrets/credentials, PII, crypto material (seed phrases, private keys, wallet addresses), internal network details (private IPs, MAC addresses, .internal/.local/.corp hostnames), and unsafe shell/SQL/path-traversal fragments from a raw model response — plus a narrow, high-precision safety net for direct self-harm-instruction-seeking and targeted-harassment phrasing (not a general toxicity classifier). Returns a single `sanitized_output` with every match replaced by `[REDACTED]`; use that instead of the original whenever verdict is NO_COMMIT. Run this as the LAST gate before a response reaches its destination — after `dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_crypto`/other input-side checks have already run, and immediately before `dcl_commit` seals the final decision. Internally re-uses the same detection tables as `dcl_evaluate_secrets`/`dcl_evaluate_pii` for the secrets/PII categories, so results stay consistent with those tools.
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  • dcl_evaluate_mev

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    POST-ACTION MEV & Market-Abuse Compliance Screen ($0.03). Text-level screen (not a mempool/transaction analyzer) for front-running/sandwich-attack language, wash trading/layering/spoofing, KYC/AML red flags (mixers, structuring, obscuring fund origin), and pump-and-dump/rug-pull language. Any critical-severity finding, or two or more major-severity findings, returns NO_COMMIT; a single major-severity finding is also returned as NO_COMMIT but with a distinctly higher `confidence` (~0.55 vs ~0.05-0.2 for harder violations) so downstream callers can tell a soft single flag apart from a hard multi-finding block. Each finding includes an illustrative `regulatory_reference` tag (MiFID II, FCA, or an EU AI Act article).
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  • chat_completion

    LMX Cloud LLM Inference

    Call LMX Cloud OpenAI-compatible chat completions. Prefers a pre-funded API key (Bearer / api_key); when omitted and x402 is enabled, requires a USDC pay-per-call payment. Optional image_url / images enable vision input (OpenAI content-parts format) — use a vision model such as llama-3.2-90b-vision, qwen-3.6-35b, or qwen-3.5-35b.
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  • dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_crypto

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    PRE-ACTION Crypto Jailbreak & Injection Detection ($0.02). Crypto-specialized instruction-override/jailbreak/injection screen: standard role-switch and instruction-override patterns, plus crypto-specific drain-wallet injection (e.g. "transfer all funds to...", fake "test transaction" requesting full balance) and unlimited-approval injection (e.g. type(uint256).max, "approve unlimited allowance", skip-slippage-confirmation framing). Any match returns NO_COMMIT with `reason` and `findings` naming the matched category/categories; run this FIRST in the DCL crypto pipeline, before wallet/trade/MEV checks, since it screens the input itself rather than a decision built on top of it.
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  • dcl_evaluate_trade

    DCL Trust Oracle — AI/LLM Output Audit (x402 MCP)

    PRE-ACTION Trade Decision Verifier ($0.02). Screens trade-decision language for guaranteed-return claims, zero-risk/"can't lose" framing, and unqualified "buy/sell X now" directives — any match is NO_COMMIT. If no unsafe language is found, COMMIT additionally requires the word "risk" to appear anywhere in the text as a minimum disclosure marker; its absence alone triggers NO_COMMIT with `reason` noting the missing disclosure. Produces an immutable `trade_receipt` (tx_hash/chain_hash/chain_depth) distinct from the top-level audit hash, for downstream systems that specifically need a trade-shaped receipt object.
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