"CyberChef MCP server by noorneitzen, a pentesting tool" matching MCP tools:

• tronsave_loginA

  TronSave MCP ServerA

  Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.

  ConnectorNo auth

• tronsave_loginA

  Tronsave MCP TestnetA

  Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.

  ConnectorNo auth

• tronsave_loginA

  mcpA

  Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.

  ConnectorNo auth

• cti_get_cross_server_routesA

  website-searchA

  Get Lenny Zeltser's CTI cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `cti_load_context`. This server never requests your campaign or threat-intel notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—templates and guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.

  ConnectorNo auth

• pingA

  Nordic Financial MCPA

  Connectivity check that confirms the Nordic MCP server process is responding. Use this at the start of a session to verify the server is reachable before making other calls. Do not use as a proxy for database health — the server can respond while the Qdrant vector database is temporarily unavailable. To confirm data availability, call search_filings directly. Returns: A greeting string: "Hello {name}! Nordic MCP server is running."

  ConnectorNo auth

• check_mcp_serverA

  MCP Surface LintA

  Statically audit an MCP tool surface from a public HTTPS URL or tools/list snapshot. Returns deterministic scores and findings without invoking any target tool or making LLM calls. When the user asks to check another installed MCP server, read that server's complete tool definitions from client context and pass them as snapshot (MCP `name` or Cursor-style `tool` both work; do not use file paths or $ref). If those definitions are unavailable, ask the user for its public endpoint or tools/list JSON instead of inventing an audit.

  ConnectorNo auth

• check_connectionA

  FundingLandscapeA

  Verify MCP server connectivity. Returns success immediately with no database calls. Use this FIRST if experiencing tool errors - a successful response confirms the server is reachable. It does not confirm account, search, or paid-feature authentication, which can still return "Auth required" separately. Does not count toward your monthly searches.

  ConnectorNo auth

• list_onchain_indicatorsA

  gavelA

  This tool has moved. Cross-venue credit data is served by the Bitcoin Credit Stack MCP at https://mcp.bitcoincreditstack.com/mcp, where this tool is called `list_onchain_indicators`. Calling it here returns a structured 'moved' error naming the host. This shim is temporary and will be removed.

  ConnectorNo auth

• get_mvrvA

  gavelA

  This tool has moved. Cross-venue credit data is served by the Bitcoin Credit Stack MCP at https://mcp.bitcoincreditstack.com/mcp, where this tool is called `get_mvrv`. Calling it here returns a structured 'moved' error naming the host. This shim is temporary and will be removed.

  ConnectorNo auth

• feedbackA

  Marketing Intelligence & OptimizationA

  Save user feedback to the MultipleWords feedback API (POST /api/feedback). Call this only when a marketing_intelligence or marketing_intelligence_get_engine result has feedback_prompt.ready=true (the server asks after every 3 MCP runs — not per tool — and keeps asking until saved). Ask the user to pick a reaction and show the emojis: 😍 excellent, 😊 good, 😐 average, 😞 bad. Pass `reaction` (excellent|good|average|bad, or the emoji) and optional `feedback` comment text. If the user does not add a comment, omit `feedback` — the server stores the MCP name marketing_analysis. Do not send the analysis, test notes, or the user's question as the comment. Ask on the 3rd, 6th, 9th, … MCP run. Do not invent a reaction. Do not send user_name, email, is_login, or app_id — those are injected server-side from the authenticated session. When showing the saved reaction, include the matching emoji. When to call this tool: - User picks a reaction on the 3rd, 6th, 9th, … time this MCP is used - Collect a short comment plus 😍 😊 😐 😞 after an analysis - Save how the marketing analysis felt (excellent/good/average/bad) When NOT to call this tool: - Calling feedback before this MCP has been used 3 times - Asking after every tool call instead of every 3rd MCP run - Inventing a reaction the user did not choose - Passing user_name, email, is_login, or app_id (server injects them)

  ConnectorOAuth

• about_apexA

  Apex by LeadShark — discoveryA

  Read-only: returns what Apex by LeadShark is, tier pricing, and the URL of the real authenticated MCP server. Call this first — this endpoint is a discovery stub with no LinkedIn powers.

  ConnectorNo auth

• list_tickersA

  Backtest360A

  List available tickers, optionally filtered by asset class. The full universe is very large, so the MCP server caps the returned list and marks it ``truncated_by_mcp`` — pass asset_class to narrow it, or use search_tickers to resolve a specific asset by name.

  ConnectorNo auth

• pingA

  eDiscovery Decoder News/CalcA

  Health check: confirm the eDiscovery Decoder News/Calc MCP server is reachable before a demo or when troubleshooting a connection. Returns server name and version. No inputs.

  ConnectorNo auth

• account_how_to_sign_inA

  ClusterHackA

  Explains how to connect an account to this MCP server — read this instead of guessing at a login/registration tool, because there isn't one. ClusterHack's own credential endpoints (register, login, JWT issuance, password reset) are the website's login form, not MCP tools: an MCP client authenticates by OAuth 2.1 (the same flow a human approves in a browser tab) and must never see or handle a ClusterHack password directly. This tool works with no account at all, and just explains the steps and links.

  ConnectorNo auth

• mcp_discovery_checkA

  AI-operated. Email authentication reader: six free tools, no key, no signup.A

  Operated by an AI, not a person. Point this at any public https MCP endpoint and it reports what an unauthenticated indexer would record about it: the result of an MCP initialize call, the result of tools/list including every tool name and whether each carries a description, and the HTTP status of the nine discovery documents that named crawlers actually request from MCP hosts (.well-known/mcp.json, mcp.json, .well-known/mcp/server-card.json, .well-known/agent-card.json, .well-known/agent.json, .well-known/pricing, agents.txt, robots.txt, llms.txt). Use it to find out why a server is listed badly or not at all, or to check your own before you publish it. Free, no key, no account. It reads only those fixed paths, calls no tool on the target, follows no links and stores no result; it makes eleven requests in one pass and identifies itself as omnia-mcp-check. It refuses non-https addresses, IP literals, private and local names, and *.workers.dev hosts, which this operator cannot read honestly from inside Cloudflare.

  ConnectorNo auth

• aw_check_endpointA

  Agent WatchA

  Probe an MCP or HTTP-402 endpoint now and get its trust verdict. Performs a real MCP initialize handshake (not a ping), measures p50/p95 latency, counts tools, hashes the tool schema (for drift detection), and checks RFC 9728 auth metadata. Returns: alive (bool), name, tool_count, latency_p50_ms, tool_schema_hash, auth_metadata_present, and error detail when dead. Use before wiring any new MCP server into your client. Args: url: the MCP or HTTP-402 endpoint URL to probe (e.g. https://host/mcp/) timeout: probe timeout in seconds (default 30)

  ConnectorNo auth

• request_checkA

  MCP CheckupA

  Ask for a one-off public observation of the MCP server at a full endpoint URL — this is the only tool here that contacts a third-party server, and it contacts exactly the host you name. `target` must begin with "http://" or "https://"; to look a server up by "provider/name", by domain, or by name, use check_mcps instead, which never probes anything. The result is not signed, is not stored as a run, and creates no report page, so `report_url` is always null — it is what we observed at that moment and nothing more. On-demand checks are recorded as tracking requests; inclusion in the tracked directory is not guaranteed and this tool never promises it. On-demand checks are metered per caller per day, per site per day, and per host by a cooldown — calling again for the same host inside its cooldown sends nothing to that server and returns status "denied" with the category that refused it, never a remaining count. A refused call comes back as status "denied", and a `target` that is not a usable endpoint URL as status "rejected"; neither of those is a tool error. A `target` that is empty or longer than 2048 characters is the one exception: the input schema rejects it, and you get a tool error. This tool does not assess whether a server is 'safe' or 'trustworthy' and returns no score; items not verified are listed explicitly with reasons.

  ConnectorNo auth

• __unlock_blockchain_analysis__A

  blockscout-mcp-serverA

  Initializes a Blockscout MCP session: returns server reference data, the `blockscout-analysis` skill pointer, and the URI resolution rule. Call this tool exactly once per session, before any other tool, and reuse its payload for the rest of the session; do not call it again.

  ConnectorOAuth

• strale_pingA

  Strale - 290+ API capabilities for AI agentsA

  Checks that the Strale API is reachable and the MCP server is running. Call this before a series of capability executions to verify connectivity, or when troubleshooting connection issues. Returns server status, version, tool count, capability count, solution count, and a timestamp. No API key required.

  ConnectorNo auth

• scan_mcpA

  Hlido Agent ReviewsA

  On-demand independent SAFETY scan of an MCP server — call this BEFORE installing or connecting to one. Give it an HTTP(S) MCP endpoint URL (scanned live in seconds), or an npm/PyPI package name or GitHub repo (queued for an isolated sandbox scan — local stdio servers execute code, so Hlido never runs them inline). Returns the safety tier (SAFE/CAUTION/RISKY/DANGEROUS), tool-poisoning detection (the malice signal), dangerous-capability red-flags (shell/code-eval/fs-write/egress/secrets) with per-tool evidence, and auth posture. Tier = blast radius if hijacked, not maintainer trustworthiness. A server Hlido hasn't scanned returns not_scanned — never assumed safe. Register of already-scanned servers: https://hlido.eu/mcp/

  ConnectorNo auth

• ir_get_cross_server_routesA

  website-searchA

  Get Lenny Zeltser's IR cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `ir_load_context`. This server never requests your incident notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.

  ConnectorNo auth