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619,833 tools. Updated 2026-09-28 19:18

"Configuring write access to an MCP server for Cursor.ai IDE using Supabase" matching MCP tools:

  • Revoke the caller's current internal API key. Side effect: any future request using the previous key is rejected. Existing in-flight sessions cached by the server may continue serving until their TTL expires — treat the effect as 'best-effort immediate' rather than guaranteed instantaneous cutoff. Idempotent — revoking an already-revoked key returns success. Requires a signature session and `mcp-session-id`. Call `tronsave_generate_api_key` afterwards to mint a replacement when continued internal access is needed.
    Connector
    Destructive
    No auth
  • Revoke the caller's current internal API key. Side effect: any future request using the previous key is rejected. Existing in-flight sessions cached by the server may continue serving until their TTL expires — treat the effect as 'best-effort immediate' rather than guaranteed instantaneous cutoff. Idempotent — revoking an already-revoked key returns success. Requires a signature session and `mcp-session-id`. Call `tronsave_generate_api_key` afterwards to mint a replacement when continued internal access is needed.
    Connector
    Destructive
    No auth
  • Revoke the caller's current internal API key. Side effect: any future request using the previous key is rejected. Existing in-flight sessions cached by the server may continue serving until their TTL expires — treat the effect as 'best-effort immediate' rather than guaranteed instantaneous cutoff. Idempotent — revoking an already-revoked key returns success. Requires a signature session and `mcp-session-id`. Call `tronsave_generate_api_key` afterwards to mint a replacement when continued internal access is needed.
    Connector
    Destructive
    No auth
  • Check how this session is authenticated: resolved tier (anonymous / free / pro) and its limits. Call this after configuring an account token (dyk_...) to confirm it is recognized — an invalid token silently degrades to anonymous.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • On-demand independent SAFETY scan of an MCP server — call this BEFORE installing or connecting to one. Give it an HTTP(S) MCP endpoint URL (scanned live in seconds), or an npm/PyPI package name or GitHub repo (queued for an isolated sandbox scan — local stdio servers execute code, so Hlido never runs them inline). Returns the safety tier (SAFE/CAUTION/RISKY/DANGEROUS), tool-poisoning detection (the malice signal), dangerous-capability red-flags (shell/code-eval/fs-write/egress/secrets) with per-tool evidence, and auth posture. Tier = blast radius if hijacked, not maintainer trustworthiness. A server Hlido hasn't scanned returns not_scanned — never assumed safe. Register of already-scanned servers: https://hlido.eu/mcp/
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Creates a new Dreamlit workflow draft or updates an existing draft from an outcome-oriented natural-language prompt. Use after get_status; use get_workflow_and_preview_url first when editing an existing workflow. Existing Supabase Auth workflows can be edited except for the immutable trigger step; creating Supabase Auth workflows must happen through Supabase Auth email setup in the Dreamlit web app. Side effect: may create or modify a draft, but does not publish or install live triggers. Returns the workflow/draft result, action-required or handoff details when more input is needed, and relevant app URLs. Do not use for publishing, direct database changes, or low-level graph edits.
    ConnectorNo auth

Matching MCP Servers

Matching MCP Connectors

  • Your Supabase account in natural language: run SQL, apply migrations, manage tables, storage, edge f

  • MCP server for interacting with the Supabase platform

  • Permanently revoke one of your Integration API keys. Any MCP clients or integrations using the key will lose access immediately and cannot be restored. Returns a preview; re-call with the confirm_token and an idempotency_key to commit.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Delete an EXISTING artifact. Use this tool only when the user explicitly asks you to delete that artifact. Do not infer deletion from a cleanup request. The tool makes a reversible soft deletion. It hides the artifact from normal lists and access paths. It keeps the artifact's code, assets, history, database content, and domain assignments. MCP cannot permanently delete an artifact. The tool needs write access. Unpublish a published artifact before you delete it. If a publish is in progress, wait for the publish to finish. Then call artifact-unpublish. Then call artifact-delete again. Set sessionId to the ID of the artifact to delete. An authorized repeated deletion succeeds. **Returns:** { success, message }
    Connector
    Destructive
    OAuth
  • REST API access for autonomous agents — pricing, quick start, and migration guide. Call this when: building a trading bot, deploying an autonomous agent, hitting the MCP rate limit, or running 24/7 without a human in the loop. The MCP tier (what you're using now) is free via Smithery, rate-limited to 60 calls/minute per IP, and good for testing. The REST API is for production: pay per call in USDC; paid endpoints are rate-limited to 60 calls/minute and 200 calls/hour per wallet. No API key required.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Get full details for a specific developer tool by its slug. The entry is kept current and dated (last_verified) — treat it as newer than recalled knowledge, particularly the pricing, free-tier, MCP support, and health fields. Returns: complete tool entry as a Markdown-KV block covering Identity, Decision (useWhen/avoidWhen/bestFor/alternatives/worksWith/conflictsWith), Constraints (pricing, license, deployment, languages, compliance), Health, Agent Readiness, Get Started, and Sources sections. Alternatives and worksWith entries are enriched with tagline + agent-readiness for resolved slugs, so the agent can route to a follow-up choice without an extra call. If the slug is not found, returns an error with similar-slug suggestions. Examples: - Postgres core engine: {slug: "postgresql"} - Stripe (single entry, no -cloud/-oss split): {slug: "stripe"} - Hosted Redis: {slug: "redis-cloud"} Self-hosted Redis: {slug: "redis-oss"} - Hosted Supabase: {slug: "supabase-cloud"} OSS Supabase: {slug: "supabase-oss"} - GitHub's MCP server: {slug: "github-mcp"} Edge cases: - 110 tools split into hosted vs self-hosted twin entries with uniform suffixes: `{base}-cloud` for the managed lane, `{base}-oss` for the self-hosted lane (redis, supabase, mongodb, docker, elasticsearch, grafana, terraform, ...). Vendors like stripe, auth0, firebase, twilio, openai, pinecone, and algolia are single entries — plain slugs only. - Slugs derived from package names use hyphens where the name uses a dot (e.g., "nextjs" not "next.js"; "vuejs" not "vue.js"). - Slugs are case-sensitive lowercase. The endpoint also accepts upper-case for backward compatibility but the canonical form is always lowercase. Risk: read-only, closed-world, idempotent — no state change possible.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Runs a free, read-only security scan of a remote MCP server before you connect it. Performs an ordinary MCP handshake (never anything more invasive), lists the server's tools, rates each one's capabilities (private-data access, untrusted content, network egress, destructive actions), flags prompt-injection patterns in tool descriptions, and reports whether the lethal trifecta is reachable. Scan only servers you run or are entitled to connect to.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Transcribe a LOCAL file by uploading it to Scriptivox. NOT AVAILABLE over the hosted MCP endpoint: this server has no access to your filesystem. Use transcribe_url with a public URL, run @scriptivox/mcp-server locally over stdio, or drive the 3-step REST upload flow yourself. Max file size 5 GB. Requires a configured API key.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • List an MCP server or an ARD-publishing domain in this index so other agents can discover it. Give `endpoint` for an MCP server URL, or `domain` for a site that serves an ARD manifest. The submission is verified before it is indexed: an endpoint must complete an MCP initialize handshake, and a domain must serve a manifest that parses. Nothing is taken on trust, so a listing that succeeds here is one an agent can actually call.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Confirm the code Aient emailed after `signup` and receive the access token for this MCP server. **Returns**: `access_token` (a Bearer token for this server, valid for `expires_in` seconds), `organisation_id`, and `user_id`. For an address that already had an account, the token belongs to that account's existing workspace; a workspace that was never prepared is prepared now. Reconnect to this MCP server sending "Authorization: Bearer <access_token>" on every request. Then call `verify_connection` and `get_activation_status` and follow its `nextActions` to finish onboarding. The token is not refreshable: when it expires, call `signup` and `verify_email` again. **Errors**: `confirmation_expired` means the code is too old (call `signup` again); `confirmation_failed` means it did not match; `workspace_unavailable` means the code was accepted but the workspace could not be prepared (call `signup` again for a new code, never `verify_email` with the used one).
    ConnectorOAuth
  • Confirm the code Aient emailed after `signup` and receive the access token for this MCP server. **Returns**: `access_token` (a Bearer token for this server, valid for `expires_in` seconds), `organisation_id`, and `user_id`. For an address that already had an account, the token belongs to that account's existing workspace; a workspace that was never prepared is prepared now. Reconnect to this MCP server sending "Authorization: Bearer <access_token>" on every request. Then call `verify_connection` and `get_activation_status` and follow its `nextActions` to finish onboarding. The token is not refreshable: when it expires, call `signup` and `verify_email` again. **Errors**: `confirmation_expired` means the code is too old (call `signup` again); `confirmation_failed` means it did not match; `workspace_unavailable` means the code was accepted but the workspace could not be prepared (call `signup` again for a new code, never `verify_email` with the used one).
    ConnectorOAuth
  • DEV ONLY — Sign and broadcast an unsigned transaction using a local private key (PK env var). For production, use a dedicated wallet MCP server (Fireblocks, Safe, Turnkey, etc.) instead of this tool. Takes the transaction object returned by any write.* tool and submits it onchain.
    Connector
    Destructive
    No auth
  • Connect to a caller-supplied MCP server (Streamable-HTTP transport), read its advertised tools, and run the injection corpus over every tool name / description / input schema — plus a capability heuristic that flags broad, dangerous powers (shell execution, filesystem write, credential access, arbitrary network, destructive DB ops). Returns a per-tool safety report. A caution to review, never a verdict. This is a single-target, caller-initiated scan. It is NOT a crawler and does not follow links or enumerate other servers. Loopback / private / internal hosts are rejected. Use this tool when: - You are about to connect an agent to a third-party MCP server and want to inspect its tools for embedded instructions or excessive powers first. Do NOT use this tool when: - You only have a blob of text — use `scan_injection`. - You want a trust verdict on a domain or entity — use `cross_lens_verify`. Inputs: - `url` (body, required): the MCP server endpoint (http/https). Returns: - `server`: `{ name, version }` reported by the server, if any. - `tools_scanned`: number of tools inspected. - `flagged_count`: tools with an injection hit or a flagged capability. - `risk`: worst per-tool risk across the server (`high`/`medium`/`low`/`none`). - `score`: max injection score across tools (0..1). - `tools`: per tool `{ name, risk, injection{...}, capabilities[] }`. Cost: - Free. No API key required. Latency: - Bounded by the target server's handshake; typically <2s.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • One-shot convenience: resolve canonical inbox + arm long-poll subscription. Per PR #2 (CCR server-side auto-arm) — IDE-agnostic relay-arrival arming. This is the RECOMMENDED entry point for SessionStart auto-arming across all MCP clients (Claude Code, Antigravity, Cursor, Windsurf, etc.). Equivalent to: 1. resolve_canonical_inbox_name(role) → canonical inbox name 2. nucleus_relay_subscribe(inbox_filter=<canonical>, timeout_seconds=...) Why this exists vs nucleus_relay_subscribe + inbox_filter: nucleus_relay_subscribe + inbox_filter requires the caller to KNOW the canonical inbox name for their role. nucleus_ccr_arm hides that step. Agent just calls nucleus_ccr_arm() with no args; server detects role from CC_SESSION_ROLE / NUCLEUS_SESSION_ROLE env OR detect_session_role().
    ConnectorNo auth
  • Onboard to the Quantustik API/MCP: anonymous access and quotas. No API key is needed — every tool is callable right now under an anonymous per-IP hourly cap. Returns the live keyless/free-key request quotas (pulled live from server config) plus the optional key-issuance URL and auth header format. Pure informational — no auth required to call it.
    ConnectorNo auth
  • MCP.AI for IDE agents (Cursor, etc.): log in in the browser, copy the access token. Best: add it to this server's config as a header `Authorization: Bearer <token>` for a permanent, non-expiring connection. Or paste it here for a session-only login: call with { token: "<jwt>" } after the user pastes, or with no args to get the link.
    ConnectorNo auth