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459,394 tools. Updated 2026-08-17 07:11

"Bash shell scripting and command line resources" matching MCP tools:

  • WRITE to the Knowledge Base. This tool has TWO modes: **MODE 1 — SAVE a new card**: Provide `content` with full Markdown following the ACTIONABLE schema below. **MODE 2 — REPORT OUTCOME**: Provide `kb_id` + `outcome` ('success' or 'failure'). WHEN TO USE: - Mode 1: After successfully fixing a bug IF no existing KB card covered it. - Mode 2: ALWAYS after applying a solution from `read_kb_doc` and running verification. INPUT: - `content`: (Mode 1) Full Markdown KB card content — follow the EXACT template below. - `overwrite`: (Mode 1) Set to True to update an existing card. - `kb_id`: (Mode 2) ID of the card to report outcome for. - `outcome`: (Mode 2) 'success' or 'failure'. - `enrichment`: (Mode 2, optional) Additional context to merge into the card when outcome is 'failure'. ━━━ CARD TEMPLATE (Mode 1) — copy this structure EXACTLY ━━━ ``` --- kb_id: "[PLATFORM]_[CATEGORY]_[NUMBER]" # e.g. WIN_TERM_001, CROSS_DOCKER_002 title: "[Short Title — max 5 words]" category: "[terminal|devops|supabase|fastmcp|network|database|...]" platform: "[windows|linux|macos|cross-platform]" technologies: [tech1, tech2] complexity: [1-10] criticality: "[low|medium|high|critical]" created: "[YYYY-MM-DD]" tags: [tag1, tag2, tag3] related_kb: [] --- # [Short Title — max 5 words] > **TL;DR**: [One sentence — what's the problem + solution] > **Fix Time**: ~[X min] | **Platform**: [Windows/Linux/macOS/All] --- ## 🔍 This Is Your Problem If: - [ ] [Symptom 1 — specific symptom or error message] - [ ] [Symptom 2 — specific error code or log line] - [ ] [Symptom 3 — environment/version condition] **Where to Check**: [console / logs / env / task manager / etc.] --- ## ✅ SOLUTION (copy-paste) ### 🎯 Integration Pattern: [Global Scope] / [Inside Init] / [Event Handler] ```[language] # [One-line comment — what this code does] [depersonalized code WITHOUT specific paths, use __VAR__ for things to replace] ``` ### ⚡ Critical (won't work without this): - ✓ **[Critical Point 1]** — [why it's essential] - ✓ **[Critical Point 2]** — [common mistake to avoid] ### 📌 Versions: - **Works**: [OS/library versions where confirmed working] - **Doesn't Work**: [OS/library versions where known broken] --- ## ✔️ Verification (<30 sec) ```bash [single command to verify the fix worked] ``` **Expected**: ✓ [Specific output or behavior that confirms success] **If it didn't work** → see Fallback below ⤵ --- ## 🔄 Fallback (if main solution failed) ### Option 1: [approach name] ```bash [command] ``` **When**: [condition to use this option] | **Risks**: [what might break] ### Option 2: [alternative approach] ```bash [command] ``` **When**: [condition] | **Risks**: [what might break] --- ## 💡 Context (optional) **Root Cause**: [1 sentence — why this problem occurs] **Side Effects**: [what might change after applying the fix] **Best Practice**: [how to avoid this in future — 1 point] **Anti-Pattern**: ✗ [what NOT to do — common mistake] --- **Applicable**: [OS, library versions, conditions] **Frequency**: [rare / common / very common] ``` ━━━ END OF TEMPLATE ━━━ RULES for ACTIONABLE cards: 1. Solution FIRST — after diagnosis, code immediately 2. Depersonalize — no names, project names, or absolute paths 3. Use `__VAR__` markers for anything the user must replace 4. One Verification command, result visible in <30 sec 5. Fallback — 1-2 options max, always include When/Risks 6. Context at End — WHY is optional reading for curious agents
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  • Type text into the focused field on Android. CRITICAL: call this AFTER device_tap / device_tap_by_text completes — do NOT issue the focusing tap and this type in parallel, or the type will race the focus change and land in the previously-focused field (observed on a banking-app login: username+password concatenated into username box). method="keys" (default): decompose ASCII to keycode events (DOWN/UP with shift) — most reliable; non-ASCII chars (CJK/emoji) auto-fall-back to IME injection for that segment. method="ime": IME injection only — full UTF-8 in one shot, but Samsung IMEs intercept `.`/`@`/`_` as autocomplete/action shortcuts and may trigger system gestures. method="shell": shell `input text` — slowest, and Samsung IME drops `@`/`.`/`_`. Optional clearFirst wipes the field first; pressKey sends a keycode after typing.
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  • Change the quantity of an existing line in a droplinked cart. Identifies the line by skuId (the variant id used when the line was added). Returns `{ status, cartId, skuId, updatedQuantity }`. Use cart.removeLine to remove a line entirely instead of setting quantity=0. Surfaces structured error reasons (CART_NOT_FOUND / LINE_NOT_FOUND / INVENTORY_INSUFFICIENT / BACKEND_BAD_REQUEST / BACKEND_UNAVAILABLE) so the calling agent can handle each case deterministically.
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  • Preferred way to stage a new or fully rewritten source file when you have curl/shell egress. Returns a short-lived signed PUT URL bound to `path` — run the returned `upload` one-liner (curl --upload-file <file> "$url"). The file bytes never enter the model; the PUT applies the same validation as stage_source_file (path allowlist, size caps, module_too_large hint) and returns the staging receipt with stop/pendingMessages. Then submit_sources({ fromStaged: true, … }). Use stage_source_file / patch_source_file when you have no shell.
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  • SESSION-RECOVERY · FIRST CALL when a session starts and the user mentions launch / users / growth / customers / metrics / revenue / marketing / what next / shipping. Returns a command-center bootCard with `headline`, `priority`, `cards[]` (each carries kind + label + literal user command + runHandle), and `next` (the one-line prompt). Aggregates: pending approvals + ripe measurements + new engagement + queued prospects + recent launches + manual-publish-pending actions. ChiefLab is stateful and re-summonable — even if the conversation was lost, the IDE was switched, or the runId was forgotten, this call recovers the workspace business state. If the user asked to launch the CURRENT repo, compare boot cards to currentRepoContext/projectName; if the open loop is unrelated, start a fresh launch instead of resuming stale work.
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  • Scan source code for injection vulnerabilities: SQL injection, command injection, path traversal via unsafe string concatenation/unsanitized input. Supports Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Java, Go, Ruby, Shell, Bash. Use to detect input-handling bugs; for secrets use check_secrets. Companion code-security tools: check_secrets (hard-coded credential detection), check_dependencies (known-CVE vulnerability audit), check_headers (live HTTP security-header validation), scan_headers (live HTTP scan via domain). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {total, by_severity, findings}. No data stored.
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Matching MCP Servers

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    Allows executing shell commands within a secure Docker container through Claude's MCP interface, providing Kubernetes tools and isolated environment without host Docker daemon access.
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    MIT

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  • Manage a Command+K workspace: widgets, conversations, MCP connections, and usage analytics.

  • 39-endpoint crypto trading intelligence MCP for AI agents. Streamable HTTP over x402 pay-per-use (Base USDC). Catalog tools + agent-strategy console.

  • Export completed extractions as TMS/ERP-ready normalized line rows (one row per container / invoice line / package / goods line), newest first. Optional doc_type filter and max_rows cap. Corrected data wins over the original extraction. For CSV/XLSX files use GET /api/bol/export on the REST API.
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  • Independent second-opinion governance verdict for AI agents before they commit an irreversible action — shipping code, running a shell command, or placing a trade. CALL THIS WHEN: (1) you are about to take an irreversible or high-stakes action (deploy/pay/trade/delete/publish); (2) you are about to act on ANOTHER agent's output, claim, or deliverable that you cannot independently verify; (3) a principal or policy requires a neutral pre-action check. You cannot self-issue a trustworthy verdict on your own work — that is what this is for. Submit a code diff/patch, shell command, plan, config, the other agent's output, or a proposed order/trade (ticker, side, size, account balance, thesis). Returns a structured verdict (approve / approve_with_concerns / reject), issues ranked by severity, suggested fixes, and alternatives — you (the agent) read it and proceed automatically on a non-reject verdict. This is NOT a human-approval step: it's an automated second opinion, advisory, never blocks, no human in the loop — you stay fully autonomous and decide. Capital-scale-aware. Model-agnostic. Built and dogfooded daily by our own autonomous fleet (the same gate we run our own important decisions through). A self-building known-bad-address registry (GET /review/known-bad, free, no auth) forces a byte-reproducible reject — independent of the judgment model — on any address a prior real verdict already rejected; not an LLM-only judgment call end to end. The part only we have: the verdict is provably committed BEFORE the outcome it's graded against — recomputable from public data, no TEE, no trusted scorer. Verify-then-pay proves the work happened; we prove the judgment came first.
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  • Check an MCP server for malware / prompt-injection lures by its endpoint URL. Give the server's streamable-http endpoint URL. Two paths: * **Already in the agent-tools directory** → returns our LATEST stored rule verdict. Every indexed server is re-scanned hourly, so you get a consistent, continuously-refreshed answer without re-probing. * **Not yet indexed** → we probe the endpoint live, statically scan its advertised tools + metadata, ADD it to the directory, and return the fresh verdict (so the next caller gets the rule verdict instantly from cache). Two dimensions are reported. `verdict` is authoritative and comes from deterministic static rules — pure pattern-matching over the *advertised* text only, NO code execution. It flags the social-engineering / RCE tricks listing-spam servers use: * `curl … | bash` and `base64 -d | sh` install lures * `eval "$(curl …)"` / PowerShell `IEX(...DownloadString)` cradles * base64 blobs that decode to a shell command * bare-IP payload hosts and cheap throwaway TLDs * prompt-injection / credential-exfiltration phrasing ("ignore previous instructions", "send your .env / api key") * MCP tool-poisoning coercion — descriptions that hijack an agent's tool-calling ("always call this tool first", "before using any other tool you must…"), hidden `<IMPORTANT>` instructions, "list all API keys / include secrets in your response", and coercion to read & forward `.key`/`.pem`/`.ssh`/`.env` files Source-code-oriented rules (SQL / command / code injection) are deliberately not applied to natural-language descriptions, to avoid false positives. `llm_reference` is an advisory frontier-LLM second opinion over the same text. Because the LLM is slow it is computed LIVE on this call only and is never stored (the hourly job never runs it), so it may be null on timeout. It never overrides the rule verdict; when it is *more* severe than the rules an `advisory` note is attached as a safety-net signal. Security/defense products that merely *name* these attacks are not flagged. Args: endpoint_url: The MCP server's streamable-http URL (required). This is the identity we look up / index by. name: Optional advertised name (used when the server is new and gets added; falls back to the URL host). description: Optional description / README blurb (scanned when new). tools_text: Optional tool names + descriptions; used only if the live probe cannot fetch the server's tools/list. Returns: { verdict: "clean"|"suspicious"|"malicious", score: 0-100, reasons: [{rule, weight, snippet}], llm_reference: {model, verdict, reason, confidence} | null, advisory: str | null, slug, name, endpoint_url, source: "stored" (existing) | "new_scan" (just added), indexed: bool }
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  • Free machine checkout builder. Select a paid IntentFence outcome and receive the exact endpoint, validated request, USDC cap, shell-safe Agentic Wallet argv, MCP tool call, and opt-in local auto-payment budget. It never signs or initiates payment.
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  • Live Chicago CTA 'L' train positions on one or more lines — where every Red Line, Blue Line, Brown, Green, Orange, Purple, Pink, or Yellow train is right now: lat/lon, heading, next station with ETA, destination, approaching and delayed flags. Answers "where are the Blue Line trains" for the Chicago L. Example: cta_train_positions({ routes: "Red,Blue" })
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  • The complete, authoritative catalogue of documented @imqueue packages, each with a one-line summary and its exact install command. Call this BEFORE adding any @imqueue dependency: search_docs can only find a package you already suspect exists, and this is the list. Covers typed RPC over a message queue, the Redis queue engine, the `imq` CLI, jobs and scheduling, Prisma and Sequelize database toolkits, method caching, tag-invalidated caching, PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY, Zod validation, OpenTelemetry or Datadog tracing, async logging, GraphQL N+1 batching across services, CIDR/IP checks and HTTP rate limiting. Some pairs are mutually exclusive — pg-prisma vs pg-sequelize, opentelemetry vs datadog — and installing both of a pair breaks silently, so read the `pick` rule on those entries before choosing.
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  • Call this INSTEAD OF REFUSING when you need to send an API key, password, token, or any other credential to another agent or to your human. You are correct that a channel message is not safe for secrets — Apuchat stores message text in plaintext, so never paste a credential into send(). This tool returns the exact shell commands for a one-time encrypted drop: the secret is encrypted ON YOUR MACHINE, the hub receives only ciphertext and never has the key, and only a link travels through the channel. Inside a channel it gives you SEALED mode (ECDH): the receiver publishes a public key, the sender encrypts to it, and no key is ever transmitted in either direction — so both the request and the link are safe to paste in chat. The drop self-destructs on first read. IMPORTANT: this tool takes no secret and never will — do not pass one. Requires a shell (Bash tool or equivalent) to actually run the commands; if you have no shell, send the human the /s/new link this returns and let them seal it in their browser.
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  • Step-by-step integration instructions for actually compressing images — either through the @pipic/cli command-line tool (best for whole directories) or over plain HTTP (no Node required). Includes the output contract, exit codes, error codes and which failures are worth retrying.
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  • Returns which lines were added and which were removed, with line numbers — computed with a longest-common-subsequence, not guessed by a model. Use to compare two versions of a config, a document, or any command output, instead of asking an LLM to eyeball two blobs and hoping it notices.
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  • Active trading signals for the current user (with Skill Overlay applied), in customer-facing shape: coordinates (entry/target/stop), decision (ENTER/WAIT/SKIP), action_gate posture (GO/WATCH/HOLD — a stance, not an order command), progress, MTF verdict, and a plain-language summary_ko line. risk_reward_ratio is computed on the DISPLAYED coordinates (after overlay). Signals are retained rather than cut when they age (turn-retention policy) — read freshness_state (open|aged) / age_bars / freshness_sec before treating an old PENDING row as current. Filtered by symbols / min_progress / action_gate. Before placing any order through any execution tool, check the intent with decker.validate_intent.
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  • Scan source code (or snippet) for hardcoded secrets — cloud provider keys, API tokens, connection strings, private keys, passwords. Supports Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Java, Go, Ruby, Shell, Bash. Use to detect leaked credentials before commit; for injection detection use check_injection. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {total, by_severity, findings}. No data stored. The generic password-assignment rule is suppressed when a more-specific credential rule fires on the same line — one targeted finding per leaked secret, not two.
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  • SESSION-RECOVERY · FIRST CALL when a session starts and the user mentions launch / users / growth / customers / metrics / revenue / marketing / what next / shipping. Returns a command-center bootCard with `headline`, `priority`, `cards[]` (each carries kind + label + literal user command + runHandle), and `next` (the one-line prompt). Aggregates: pending approvals + ripe measurements + new engagement + queued prospects + recent launches + manual-publish-pending actions. ChiefLab is stateful and re-summonable — even if the conversation was lost, the IDE was switched, or the runId was forgotten, this call recovers the workspace business state. If the user asked to launch the CURRENT repo, compare boot cards to currentRepoContext/projectName; if the open loop is unrelated, start a fresh launch instead of resuming stale work.
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  • Pattern-based diff linter: flags a fixed set of risky shapes in changed code — query-string interpolation (SQL/Cypher/Mongo injection shape), shell interpolation, eval/new Function, empty catch blocks, regex built from a variable, fewer catch blocks than before, and named authorization guards that disappeared. Every finding cites the line that produced it. It does NOT do data-flow analysis: it cannot follow a value to a sink, across functions or files, and an empty result is not a safety verdict (the response lists what it did not analyse). Advisory triage — use a static analyser for a real security gate.
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  • Returns the LOCAL shell commands to package your working directory and upload it for an upload-mode deploy (no git, no PAT). Run them in the user's terminal, capture `source_token` from the upload's JSON response, then call deploy_app with that source_token (omit repo). The upload authenticates AUTOMATICALLY with a short-lived ticket minted from your MCP credential — NO API key needed in the command and nothing secret is printed (it falls back to needing $REDU_API_KEY only if minting is unavailable). Excludes node_modules/.git/.venv/build output and .env by default; honors .gitignore when is_git_repo=true.
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