"A server or tool for integrating COMSOL with MCP protocol" matching MCP tools:

• tronsave_loginA

  TronSave MCP ServerA

  Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.

  ConnectorNo auth

• tronsave_loginA

  Tronsave MCP TestnetA

  Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.

  ConnectorNo auth

• tronsave_loginA

  mcpA

  Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.

  ConnectorNo auth

• zaira_get_docsA

  Zaira Labs GuideA

  Retrieve reference documentation for the Zaira Guide API and MCP server on demand. Topics: - getting_started — how to connect via MCP or REST, first queries - endpoints — full REST endpoint reference with parameters - mcp_tools — MCP tool reference with when-to-use guidance and a routing matrix - schema — the tool entry schema - errors — error taxonomy for REST (RFC 9457) and MCP (JSON-RPC) Call with no topic to get an index of available topics. Returns: the requested topic as a Markdown-KV block. With no topic, returns an index listing all available topics with short descriptions; call again with the relevant topic for the full content. Examples (topic selection): - "How do I call the REST API?" → {topic: "getting_started"} - "What parameters does /tools accept?" → {topic: "endpoints"} - "What fields are in a tool entry?" → {topic: "schema"} - "What error shapes do I handle, and what are the recovery steps?" → {topic: "errors"} - "Which MCP tool fits my task?" → {topic: "mcp_tools"} Edge cases: - No topic argument is valid — you get the index. This is the deferred-loading path; don't load every topic at once. - Topic must match the enum exactly (lowercase, underscore). "getting-started" with a hyphen is rejected as an unknown parameter. Risk: read-only, closed-world, idempotent — no state change possible.

  ConnectorNo auth

• check_mcp_serverA

  MCP Surface LintA

  Statically audit an MCP tool surface from a public HTTPS URL or tools/list snapshot. Returns deterministic scores and findings without invoking any target tool or making LLM calls. When the user asks to check another installed MCP server, read that server's complete tool definitions from client context and pass them as snapshot (MCP `name` or Cursor-style `tool` both work; do not use file paths or $ref). If those definitions are unavailable, ask the user for its public endpoint or tools/list JSON instead of inventing an audit.

  ConnectorNo auth

• defi_protocolsA

  MCPFax Macro & Market IntelligenceA

  Rank DeFi protocols by total value locked from DefiLlama, filtered by chain, category or name substring, with each protocol's slug, category, chain list, TVL in USD, 1d/7d TVL change and market cap. Use it to size a protocol, find the biggest venues on a chain, or resolve the slug the protocol-detail tool needs. A protocol DefiLlama publishes no TVL for keeps a null figure, never a zero. Read live at request time and held for 5 minutes. Costs $0.008 USDC per call via x402 on Base; an unpaid call returns the payment challenge instead of data, and a call that returns no data is never settled so it costs nothing. Equivalent HTTP route: GET /defi/protocols.

  ConnectorNo auth

• cti_get_cross_server_routesA

  website-searchA

  Get Lenny Zeltser's CTI cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `cti_load_context`. This server never requests your campaign or threat-intel notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—templates and guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.

  ConnectorNo auth

• verifyA

  mcpA

  Checks x402 protocol conformance for a target service URL: a live 402 probe (well-formed challenge, non-empty accepts, atomic-unit amounts) plus price coherence against the target's own well-known. PAID ($0.10 USDC via x402). This MCP server holds no wallet, so calling this tool returns the upstream payment requirements rather than a result — pay them with your own x402 client, or call the endpoint directly. A signed, permanently published attestation of the same check is available at /midas-ops/attest ($0.50). Does NOT measure output quality, uptime history, or on-chain transaction volume — see the returned scope_note.

  ConnectorNo auth

• designesy_agent_jsonA

  DesignesyA

  Get the Designesy agent discovery document (/.well-known/agent.json) — the org identity, authority, ingest protocol, package index, machine-export list, permission policy, and citation templates. Use this when you are integrating with or enumerating Designesy as a machine agent and need the canonical discovery/manifest endpoint rather than one specific contract. When NOT to use: for the package list, use designesy_catalog (lighter); for the contract, use designesy_contract. Read-only — no side effects. Returns the /.well-known/agent.json object: { identity, authority, ingest_protocol, package_index, permission_policy, citation_templates }. No parameters.

  ConnectorNo auth

• register_serverA

  PayGate MCPA

  Start charging for an MCP server the user owns. Use when they want to monetize, sell, charge for, get paid for, put a price on, or make money from a server, API or tool. Buyers pay their wallet DIRECTLY on-chain — PayGate never holds the money, so there is no payout to wait for, no balance to withdraw and no commission taken. Their server is never modified and needs no payment code. Tools are imported automatically, so it must be publicly reachable over HTTPS and answer tools/list. Returns a proxy URL and a secret api_key shown only once; save it, every other seller tool needs it.

  ConnectorNo auth

• register_serverA

  PayGate MCP — Monetization Gateway for AI AgentsA

  Start charging for an MCP server the user owns. Use when they want to monetize, sell, charge for, get paid for, put a price on, or make money from a server, API or tool. Buyers pay their wallet DIRECTLY on-chain — PayGate never holds the money, so there is no payout to wait for, no balance to withdraw and no commission taken. Their server is never modified and needs no payment code. Tools are imported automatically, so it must be publicly reachable over HTTPS and answer tools/list. Returns a proxy URL and a secret api_key shown only once; save it, every other seller tool needs it.

  ConnectorNo auth

• check_connectionA

  FundingLandscapeA

  Verify MCP server connectivity. Returns success immediately with no database calls. Use this FIRST if experiencing tool errors - a successful response confirms the server is reachable. It does not confirm account, search, or paid-feature authentication, which can still return "Auth required" separately. Does not count toward your monthly searches.

  ConnectorNo auth

• get_session_usageA

  RoutebaseA

  Return usage metrics for the current MCP session: total tool calls, error count, aggregate duration and response size, per-tool call counts, and session timestamps. Metrics are in-memory and reset when the server restarts or the session goes idle. Use this for what this session has spent; for which toolsets exist at all use list_toolsets.

  ConnectorAPI key

• siteborne_get_service_healthA

  SITEBORNE Utility NetworkA

  Report MCP server readiness and production-enable status for each SITEBORNE service. Use when: an agent must check protocol availability, tool count, or whether a service is currently production-enabled before selecting a paid tool. Do not use when: a quote is needed (use siteborne_get_quote) or company, web, document, or agent-output evidence work is required (use the corresponding SITEBORNE service tool). Behavior: read-only and credential-independent; it does not perform paid evidence work, create quotes, verify payment, call providers, write service state, create Workflows, or settle. Economics: free of charge; it never issues a payment challenge. Failure: it depends on no provider, so it does not fail because a provider is unavailable. Returns: the server and protocol versions plus truthful local, production, and external-publication status for all four evidence services.

  ConnectorNo auth

• audit_mcp_configA

  Moltline Agent Governance & MCP AuditorA

  Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, and dangerous auto-run flags. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} returns {"posture_score": 0-100, "verdict": "...", "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "fix": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

  ConnectorNo auth

• audit_mcp_configA

  Moltline Agent GovernanceA

  Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, and dangerous auto-run flags. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} returns {"posture_score": 0-100, "verdict": "...", "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "fix": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

  ConnectorNo auth

• account_how_to_sign_inA

  ClusterHackA

  Explains how to connect an account to this MCP server — read this instead of guessing at a login/registration tool, because there isn't one. ClusterHack's own credential endpoints (register, login, JWT issuance, password reset) are the website's login form, not MCP tools: an MCP client authenticates by OAuth 2.1 (the same flow a human approves in a browser tab) and must never see or handle a ClusterHack password directly. This tool works with no account at all, and just explains the steps and links.

  ConnectorNo auth

• aw_check_endpointA

  Agent WatchA

  Probe an MCP or HTTP-402 endpoint now and get its trust verdict. Performs a real MCP initialize handshake (not a ping), measures p50/p95 latency, counts tools, hashes the tool schema (for drift detection), and checks RFC 9728 auth metadata. Returns: alive (bool), name, tool_count, latency_p50_ms, tool_schema_hash, auth_metadata_present, and error detail when dead. Use before wiring any new MCP server into your client. Args: url: the MCP or HTTP-402 endpoint URL to probe (e.g. https://host/mcp/) timeout: probe timeout in seconds (default 30)

  ConnectorNo auth

• strale_pingA

  Strale - 290+ API capabilities for AI agentsA

  Checks that the Strale API is reachable and the MCP server is running. Call this before a series of capability executions to verify connectivity, or when troubleshooting connection issues. Returns server status, version, tool count, capability count, solution count, and a timestamp. No API key required.

  ConnectorNo auth

• scan_mcpA

  Hlido Agent ReviewsA

  On-demand independent SAFETY scan of an MCP server — call this BEFORE installing or connecting to one. Give it an HTTP(S) MCP endpoint URL (scanned live in seconds), or an npm/PyPI package name or GitHub repo (queued for an isolated sandbox scan — local stdio servers execute code, so Hlido never runs them inline). Returns the safety tier (SAFE/CAUTION/RISKY/DANGEROUS), tool-poisoning detection (the malice signal), dangerous-capability red-flags (shell/code-eval/fs-write/egress/secrets) with per-tool evidence, and auth posture. Tier = blast radius if hijacked, not maintainer trustworthiness. A server Hlido hasn't scanned returns not_scanned — never assumed safe. Register of already-scanned servers: https://hlido.eu/mcp/

  ConnectorNo auth

• ir_get_cross_server_routesA

  website-searchA

  Get Lenny Zeltser's IR cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `ir_load_context`. This server never requests your incident notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.

  ConnectorNo auth