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468,137 tools. Updated 2026-08-22 14:28

"A server for IT system operations and maintenance based on MCP" matching MCP tools:

  • Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.
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  • Heuristic pattern scan of MCP tool description text for prompt-injection tells — instructions addressed at the reading model, data-exfiltration hints, attempts to override your system prompt or hide content. Run it on descriptions from third-party MCP servers before you act on what they say. Returns risk 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' and the matched findings with excerpts. This is a heuristic aid, NOT a security boundary: a 'low' verdict is not evidence that a tool is safe, and an injection phrased to avoid the patterns will score low. Do not treat any result here as clearance to trust an untrusted tool — keep your own judgement and human review in the loop. Read-only: it analyses only the text you pass in and fetches nothing. Requires a Kamy API key.
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  • Analyze text for writing style issues: weasel words, passive voice, duplicate words, long sentences, nominalizations, hedging, filler adverbs, and research-cited AI tells. Read-only and stateless — text is analyzed in memory on the hosted server and never stored. Returns a plain-text report with each issue's line and column, the matched text, surrounding context, and the reason for AI tells; texts over 100,000 characters return an error message. This hosted server has no filesystem access — the wsc-mcp npm package adds a check_file tool for local files. It only reports issues — to auto-remove duplicate words, follow up with fix_duplicates.
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  • Get Lenny Zeltser's CTI cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `cti_load_context`. This server never requests your campaign or threat-intel notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—templates and guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.
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  • Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.
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  • Validates a JWT agent token and caches the identity on this MCP session so later calls work without resending it. Use only when your client cannot send an Authorization: Bearer header; prefer session_request_id-based auth via create_auth_session. Not needed after get_auth_session returned 'active'.
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Matching MCP Servers

Matching MCP Connectors

  • ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) MCP — Italy's national statistics

  • dati.gov.it MCP — Italy's national open-data portal (CKAN API).

  • Start charging for an MCP server the user owns. Use when they want to monetize, sell, charge for, get paid for, put a price on, or make money from a server, API or tool. Buyers pay their wallet DIRECTLY on-chain — PayGate never holds the money, so there is no payout to wait for, no balance to withdraw and no commission taken. Their server is never modified and needs no payment code. Tools are imported automatically, so it must be publicly reachable over HTTPS and answer tools/list. Returns a proxy URL and a secret api_key shown only once; save it, every other seller tool needs it.
    Connector
  • Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, and dangerous auto-run flags. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} returns {"posture_score": 0-100, "verdict": "...", "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "fix": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
    Connector
  • Heuristic pattern scan of MCP tool description text for prompt-injection tells — instructions addressed at the reading model, data-exfiltration hints, attempts to override your system prompt or hide content. Run it on descriptions from third-party MCP servers before you act on what they say. Returns risk 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' and the matched findings with excerpts. This is a heuristic aid, NOT a security boundary: a 'low' verdict is not evidence that a tool is safe, and an injection phrased to avoid the patterns will score low. Do not treat any result here as clearance to trust an untrusted tool — keep your own judgement and human review in the loop. Read-only: it analyses only the text you pass in and fetches nothing. Requires a Kamy API key.
    Connector
  • No arguments. Returns how many MCP servers have been read at source level, and the share of them with each category of finding (credential access, network egress, install-time execution, prompt-injection surface). Use this to judge whether checking a specific server is worth it before you look one up. It reports aggregate counts only - no per-server findings, and no verdict about any individual server.
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  • Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns `{ sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt }` — pass `sessionId` as the `mcp-session-id` header on every subsequent MCP request. `walletAddress` is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with `signature_timestamp` formatted as `<signature>_<timestamp>`, where `<signature>` must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call `tronsave_get_sign_message` to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass `apiKey` (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.
    Connector
  • List available tickers, optionally filtered by asset class. The full universe is very large, so the MCP server caps the returned list and marks it ``truncated_by_mcp`` — pass asset_class to narrow it, or use search_tickers to resolve a specific asset by name.
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  • Describe this MCP server: what it wraps, the fact that it is completely free with no API key, no signup and no auth, the fair-use rate limit, the full tool list, and links to hackmyip.com and its API docs. Call this when the user asks what this server can do, whether it costs anything, or where the data comes from.
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  • Attack another player, pirate, empire NPC, creature, or station (target_id accepts a player ID, username, pirate ID, empire NPC ID, or wildlife creature ID. Target must be in the same system. Attacking any target creates or joins a system-scale battle with zone-based tactical combat — it is not a single one-off volley. Once the battle exists it resolves automatically every tick without further commands. Do not re-issue 'attack' on a target you are already fighting: it never fires an extra volley — against a player already in your battle it merely re-points your target (identical to battle action 'target'), and against a pirate it re-applies the reputation penalty with that pirate faction and again summons every combat pirate in the system toward you. Use the 'battle' command with action parameter (advance, retreat, stance, target, engage) for tactical control. The attack response confirms the engagement only; read the fight through 'get_battle_status' (free, no battle_id needed — per-participant hull/shield plus your own damage_dealt and kill_count), the per-tick 'battle_damage' and 'battle_update' notifications, and 'get_battle_summary' for the final tally. Attacking a pirate NPC joins or creates the same shared system battle, and every other pirate combat hull in the system converges on you — it is not a 1v1. Killing one emits a 'pirate_destroyed' notification with credits_earned. Attacking an empire NPC triggers a battle and applies criminal status. Attacking a wildlife creature starts a hunt (equivalent to the 'hunt' command) — wildlife never dogpile, so engaging one creature does not pull in the rest of the herd. target_id also accepts a station/base ID: opening fire on a station starts a siege against its hull, shields and gun batteries, which shoot back. Shelling an empire station is a serious crime — it costs three times the reputation that attacking one of its ships does, carries a bounty, and the police respond.)
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  • Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE. Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, and dangerous auto-run flags. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} returns {"posture_score": 0-100, "verdict": "...", "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "fix": "..."}], "note": "..."}. Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": "<what is wrong and how to fix it>"}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.
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  • Cognitive Credit Swarms discovery endpoint. Returns full system description, how-it-works, verdict definitions, pricing, all endpoint URLs, and MCP tool list. Written for AI agents to parse. Free — this is the doorbell. Use this first to understand the CCS system before calling ccs_validate.
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  • On-demand independent SAFETY scan of an MCP server — call this BEFORE installing or connecting to one. Give it an HTTP(S) MCP endpoint URL (scanned live in seconds), or an npm/PyPI package name or GitHub repo (queued for an isolated sandbox scan — local stdio servers execute code, so Hlido never runs them inline). Returns the safety tier (SAFE/CAUTION/RISKY/DANGEROUS), tool-poisoning detection (the malice signal), dangerous-capability red-flags (shell/code-eval/fs-write/egress/secrets) with per-tool evidence, and auth posture. Tier = blast radius if hijacked, not maintainer trustworthiness. A server Hlido hasn't scanned returns not_scanned — never assumed safe. Register of already-scanned servers: https://hlido.eu/mcp/
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  • Get Lenny Zeltser's IR cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `ir_load_context`. This server never requests your incident notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.
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  • Get Lenny Zeltser's Malware cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `malware_load_context`. This server never requests your sample, analysis notes, or indicators and instructs your AI to keep them local—guidelines and the report template flow to your AI for local analysis.
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  • Initializes a Blockscout MCP session: returns server reference data, the `blockscout-analysis` skill pointer, and the URI resolution rule. Call this tool exactly once per session, before any other tool, and reuse its payload for the rest of the session; do not call it again.
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