fidacy-mcp
fidacy-mcp is a cryptographic action firewall and integrity proof service for AI agents. It gates payment actions behind cryptographically signed mandates and provides tamper-evident audit trails, spend reports, anomaly detection, trust verdicts, and artifact anchoring.
Payment Authorization:
request_paymentauthorizes or denies a payment against the active mandate, returning an ALLOW with a short-lived Ed25519-signed grant or a DENY with the violated rule. Grants must be verified by the downstream executor before moving funds.Mandate Verification:
verify_mandatereturns the active mandate envelope (caps, allowed payees/categories, time windows, revocation rules) and Fidacy's Ed25519 public key for independent grant validation.Audit & Proof: Every decision is recorded in a hash-chained, tamper-evident log.
get_audit_proofprovides a verifiable proof for a specific decision, including chain integrity status.list_decisionslists recent payment decisions (filterable by ALLOW/DENY) with payee, amount, reason, and blocking rule.explain_decisiongives a plain-language explanation and proof for why a payment was allowed or blocked.Spend Reports:
spend_summarygenerates operator reports over a configurable time window, showing total payments, amounts per payee, blocked amounts, and which mandate rules triggered blocks.Anomaly Detection:
sentinel_alertsflags suspicious patterns in the local audit chain—first-ever payees, amount spikes, velocity bursts, payments near mandate ceilings, and retries after denial. Deterministic and explainable, no ML model required.Trust Verdicts:
assess_actionreturns a signed trust verdict (JWS) from the live Fidacy engine for any proposed action (ap2_payment,message_send,voice_call,custom,claim_document). Advisory only—no money moves.Artifact Integrity:
anchor_artifactproves a file existed unaltered at a specific moment by locally hashing it (SHA-256) and anchoring the hash to Fidacy's audit chain, checkpointed to the Bitcoin blockchain. Returns a signed receipt (JWS).check_artifactverifies if an artifact was previously anchored and its Bitcoin checkpoint status; a hash mismatch signals tampering. The file itself is never uploaded.Account Management:
upgradeinitiates an upgrade from the local/anonymous install to a full Fidacy account (preserving history).register_emailopts in the operator's email for contact and history attachment (consent-based).
@fidacy/mcp
The action firewall for AI agents. A drop-in MCP server that gates payment actions against a cryptographically signed mandate before money can move. Non-custodial: Fidacy authorizes and proves, it never holds funds.
Install once, works in any MCP-compatible agent: Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Hermes, OpenClaw, and anything else that speaks MCP.
Works with: Claude Code · Claude Desktop · OpenClaw · Hermes · Brex CrabTrap
Your agent could be paying scammers right now. Prompt-injected into the wrong payee, an inflated amount, or the same invoice twice — and your logs aren't evidence. Fidacy blocks it before money moves, and hands back a signed verdict anyone can verify against public keys. You don't trust us — you check the signature.
Quick start (free, local-first, no account)
{
"mcpServers": {
"fidacy": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@fidacy/mcp"] }
}
}Runs on your machine, offline, deny-by-default. Add trusted payees + caps in
~/.fidacy/config.json. Verify any verdict yourself against the public keys at
/.well-known/jwks.json.
Related MCP server: emilia-mcp-server
Why
An agent can hallucinate or be prompt-injected into a payment: wrong payee,
wrong amount, fabricated invoice. Prompt-level guardrails are probabilistic and
bypassable. @fidacy/mcp is a deterministic gate between the agent's intent and
the executor: the action is dead on arrival unless it validates against a signed
mandate, and every decision lands in an immutable hash-chained audit trail.
Enforcement model
Register
@fidacy/mcpas the agent's only payment-capable tool. Do not give the agent a raw payment tool. Tool inventory is the runtime firewall.The agent calls
request_payment. Fidacy checks it against the mandate (payee allowlist, per-tx cap, total cap, currency, time window, revocation).ALLOW returns a short-lived Ed25519 grant. DENY returns no grant and the violated rule. The downstream executor MUST require the grant, so a denied action cannot proceed.
Every decision is appended to a hash-chained log.
get_audit_proofreturns the portable, verifiable proof.
One install, two backends
@fidacy/mcp ships two complementary capabilities in a single install:
Verdict layer (advisory):
assess_actioncalls the live Fidacy engine and returns a signed trust verdict. It moves no money; it returns a judgment whose proof (riskPayloadJws+signingKeyId) is verifiable by anyone via@fidacy/verifyagainst the engine JWKS at/.well-known/jwks.json.Payment firewall (enforcement):
request_payment/verify_mandate/get_audit_proofgate and prove a payment against a signed mandate through the core, returning short-lived Ed25519 grants.
Mental model: assess_action -> engine (signed verdict);
request_payment and friends -> core (payment firewall).
Tools
Tool | Backend | Purpose |
| engine | Signed Fidacy trust verdict for a proposed action. Advisory. |
| core | Authorize a payment action. ALLOW + grant, or DENY + rule. |
| core | Read the mandate envelope + Fidacy public key. |
| core | Hash-chained proof for a decision id. |
assess_action
Returns a signed Fidacy trust verdict from the live engine for a proposed
action. The signed proof is riskPayloadJws + signingKeyId, verifiable by
anyone via @fidacy/verify against {engineUrl}/.well-known/jwks.json.
Inputs:
kind(optional, defaultap2_payment): one ofap2_payment,message_send,voice_call,custom,claim_document.mandate(required): the action/mandate object for thatkind.mandateType,spendingMandate,idempotencyKey,a2a.task_id(optional).
Environment:
Var | Default | Purpose |
|
| Base URL of the Fidacy engine. |
| (none) | An |
The server boots without FIDACY_ENGINE_API_KEY; the tool is always registered.
Only calling assess_action without the key returns a helpful error telling
you to set it. The key is never logged, echoed, or attached to any error.
Install
npm install -g @fidacy/mcp # or run via npx, no installClaude Code
claude mcp add fidacy -- npx -y @fidacy/mcpClaude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json)
{
"mcpServers": {
"fidacy": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@fidacy/mcp"] }
}
}Hermes (config.yaml)
mcp_servers:
fidacy:
command: npx
args: ["-y", "@fidacy/mcp"]OpenClaw
Add the same server via the Tools panel, or the mcpServers block in your
agent config. Any MCP-compatible host uses the same command.
Wiring the real core (production)
The MCP layer talks to your core through one interface (FidacyCore). Your
repository stays private. Set FIDACY_MODE=http and implement three endpoints:
POST /v1/mandate/get->MandatePOST /v1/decide->Decision(runs your Ed25519/AP2 verification + audit append)POST /v1/audit/proof->AuditProof
No change to the MCP layer is needed.
Dev
npm install
npm run build
npm start # stdio server, in-memory demo mandateAvailable Tools
12 toolsanchor_artifactAnchor Artifact (Bitcoin-anchored integrity proof)A
Prove an artifact existed exactly as-is at this moment, and make any later tampering detectable. Give a file path (hashed locally with SHA-256 — the file itself is NEVER uploaded) or a precomputed sha256. The hash is registered on Fidacy's tamper-evident audit chain, which is checkpointed to the Bitcoin blockchain, and you get a signed receipt (JWS) verifiable offline against the engine JWKS. Use it for contracts, invoices, medical prescriptions, insurance claims, images, audio, video. kind defaults to document; optional label is a short reference (an invoice number, a case id — no PII).
Inputs: kind, path, label, sha256, +1 more.
assess_actionAssess Action (Signed Trust Verdict)ARead-onlyIdempotent
Return a SIGNED Fidacy trust verdict from the live engine (default https://api.fidacy.com) for a proposed action. The signed proof is riskPayloadJws + signingKeyId, verifiable by anyone via @fidacy/verify against the engine JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json. kind is one of ap2_payment, message_send, voice_call, custom, claim_document; mandate is the action/mandate object for that kind. This is the verdict (advisory) layer and moves no money; it complements the payment-firewall tools (request_payment et al.) in the same install.
Inputs: mandate (required), a2a, kind, mandateType, +2 more.
check_artifactCheck Artifact (was this hash anchored?)ARead-onlyIdempotent
Check whether an artifact was anchored by this account and the state of its Bitcoin checkpoint. Give a file path (hashed locally, never uploaded) or a sha256. If the current hash of a file does NOT match any anchored record that you expected to match, the file changed since anchoring — that is exactly the tampering signal.
Inputs: path, sha256.
explain_decisionExplain a Decision (why was this allowed or blocked)ARead-onlyIdempotent
Explain one decision in plain language: what was requested, what the mandate did about it, why, and the tamper-evident proof for it. Use when an operator asks why a specific payment was blocked.
Inputs: decisionId (required).
get_audit_proofGet Audit ProofARead-onlyIdempotent
Return the tamper-evident, hash-chained proof for a decision id, including whether the chain is intact and the public key it verifies against.
Inputs: decisionId (required).
list_decisionsList Recent Payment DecisionsARead-onlyIdempotent
List recent agent payment decisions, newest first, with payee, amount, the agent's stated reason, and for blocked ones the rule that stopped it. Filter by status to answer 'what got blocked' directly. Read-only, works offline.
Inputs: limit, status.
register_emailRegister operator email (opt-in)AIdempotent
Register the operator's email so their agent's protection history can attach to a real Fidacy account and Fidacy can reach them. ONLY call this when the human operator has explicitly given their email and agreed to be contacted — it is consent-based. Does not create an account or move money.
Inputs: email (required). Returns: message, registered
request_paymentRequest Payment AuthorizationAIdempotent
Authorize a payment action against the active Fidacy mandate. Returns an ALLOW with a signed grant, or a DENY with the violated rule. The downstream executor MUST require the grant. Call this before any payment; never pay without it.
Inputs: payee (required), amount (required), purpose (required), category (required), +3 more. Returns: grant, status, message, decisionId, +1 more
sentinel_alertsSentinel Alerts (allowed, but outside this agent's pattern)ARead-onlyIdempotent
Predictive pattern alerts from the local audit chain: first-ever payee, amount spikes vs this agent's own history, velocity bursts, payments riding the mandate ceiling, and retries after a denial (the behavior our Model Watch benchmark measures). Deterministic and explainable, no model. Use to answer 'has anything unusual happened' before it becomes a loss.
Inputs: limit.
spend_summarySpend Summary (what my agents spent and what was blocked)ARead-onlyIdempotent
Operator report over a time window: how many payment decisions were made, how much was paid and to whom, how much was blocked before executing, and which mandate rules did the blocking. Read-only, works offline against the local audit chain. Use this to answer questions like 'what did my agents spend this week' or 'has anything been blocked'.
Inputs: days.
upgradeUpgrade to a Fidacy accountARead-onlyIdempotent
Start upgrading this local install to a real Fidacy account (server-backed signed verdicts, anchored proof, higher volume). Returns a link to open; your anonymous usage is preserved and migrated to the new account.
Inputs: no named parameters.
verify_mandateVerify Active MandateARead-onlyIdempotent
Return the active mandate envelope (caps, allowed payees/categories, window, revocation) and Fidacy's Ed25519 public key for grant verification.
Inputs: no named parameters.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 12 tools
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes (e.g., request_payment vs assess_action vs anchor_artifact), but the read-only audit/reporting tools (spend_summary, list_decisions, explain_decision) overlap somewhat. Descriptions help differentiate them, but an agent could still mis-select between spend_summary and list_decisions.
The dominant pattern is verb_noun (request_payment, verify_mandate, get_audit_proof, etc.). However, 'sentinel_alerts' is a noun phrase and 'upgrade' is a bare verb, breaking the otherwise consistent style.
12 tools is well within the optimal 3-15 range. Each tool targets a specific aspect of the payment authorization, audit, artifact proofing, or account lifecycle, and none feel redundant or superfluous.
The main workflows are covered: payment authorization with mandates, audit trails, decision explanations, alerts, artifact anchoring/checking, and account upgrade/email registration. Slight gaps like no way to list all anchored artifacts or revoke an anchor are minor and likely beyond the server's intended scope.
Maintenance
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