dnnsec
dnnsec
Deep Neural Network Security (DNNSEC) MCP Server. Designed for enterprise AI systems to verify neural model weight integrity, audit adversarial robustness, and safeguard autonomous agent infrastructure.
Features
Model Integrity Verification: Cryptographic validation of neural weights and checkpoint artifacts.
Adversarial Robustness Screening: Automated resilience check against FGSM/PGD perturbations.
Model Context Protocol (MCP): Native integration with Claude Desktop, Cursor, and autonomous agent frameworks.
Related MCP server: mcp-witness
Quick Start
Running directly via npx
npx dnnsecClaude Desktop Integration
Add to your claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"dnnsec": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "dnnsec"]
}
}
}Tools Included
verify_model_integrity: Audits weights checksums and model authenticity.check_adversarial_robustness: Evaluates resilience to input perturbation attacks.
License
MIT © tudadada
Available Tools
2 toolscheck_adversarial_robustnessB
Performs adversarial attack vulnerability screening for neural architecture.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | Target neural model identifier | |
| threat_level | No | Verification rigour level |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure, but it only says the tool 'performs screening.' It does not disclose whether this runs attacks against the model, whether it mutates state, what permissions are required, what the result looks like, or any runtime or cost caveats.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One sentence that front-loads the action and target, with no filler or repetition of schema details. It is as concise as the information allows.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a two-parameter screening tool, the core inputs are well covered by the schema and the purpose is clear. Still, the absence of an output schema and annotations means the description should at least state what the screening returns or what it does beyond the high-level action, and this is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema covers both parameters with meaningful descriptions (model_id as target identifier, threat_level as verification rigour), so the baseline is 3. The tool description adds general context but no parameter-specific meaning beyond what the schema already provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific action ('adversarial attack vulnerability screening') and a clear target ('neural architecture'), so an agent can tell what the tool does. It does not explicitly differentiate it from the sibling verify_model_integrity, though the adversarial-attack framing makes the distinction largely inferable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'adversarial attack vulnerability screening' implies this tool should be used when adversarial robustness of a neural model needs assessment. However, the description never states when not to use it or how it relates to verify_model_integrity, leaving that routing decision to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
verify_model_integrityB
Verifies neural network model weights and adversarial robustness checksums.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| model_id | Yes | Target neural model identifier or path |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries full responsibility for behavioral disclosure. It only states the action without describing side effects, permissions, rate limits, or the nature of the verification (e.g., read-only, error behavior). This is a significant gap for a tool with zero annotation coverage.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, concise sentence that front-loads the verb and resource. No unnecessary words or redundancy. It is appropriately sized for a simple tool.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description should at least hint at what the verification returns (e.g., success/failure, report). It does not. Additionally, given the sibling tool, some context on what this tool covers beyond adversarial robustness (i.e., weights) would help, but it is not provided. The description is too minimal for full contextual completeness.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the parameter 'model_id' is already described as 'Target neural model identifier or path'. The description adds no additional parameter meaning. Baseline of 3 is appropriate since the schema handles parameter semantics.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('verifies') and identifies the resource ('neural network model weights and adversarial robustness checksums'). It is clear but does not explicitly differentiate from the sibling tool 'check_adversarial_robustness', though the mention of 'weights' hints at a broader scope.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus the sibling. The description implies usage for integrity verification, but no alternative or exclusion is mentioned. The context is left to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
2 tool updates
v1.0.0- First observed
check_adversarial_robustness - First observed
verify_model_integrity
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
The two tools have overlapping purposes: both verify model integrity and check adversarial robustness, making it unclear when to use one versus the other. An agent would struggle to decide which tool handles a given security assessment request.
Both tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern (verify_model_integrity, check_adversarial_robustness), though the verbs 'verify' and 'check' are near-synonyms, which slightly reduces clarity.
With only two tools, the server feels thin for a domain as broad as neural network security. The count is at the extreme low end, offering minimal coverage for the stated purpose.
The tool surface is severely limited: it covers verification and robustness screening but lacks common operations like model hardening, attack generation, report generation, or remediation. The domain is not fully covered.
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