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IMPORTANT

Authorized, defensive use only. Point this server only at assets you own or are explicitly authorized to assess. It performs passive, non-intrusive reconnaissance — it reads public records (Certificate Transparency logs, DNS, RDAP/WHOIS) and each target's own published surface (one TLS handshake and one HTTP GET per host). It does not port-scan, exploit, brute-force, fuzz, or probe for vulnerabilities; that capability is excluded from the surface by design, not gated behind a flag. Output is descriptive — what exists and what the security posture is — never an exploitation plan. Every outbound connection passes an SSRF guard that refuses private, loopback, link-local, and cloud-metadata targets.


Overview

Passive external attack-surface mapping (EASM) over Certificate Transparency logs, DNS, TLS, HTTP, and RDAP/WHOIS registries, with optional Shodan host intelligence. Discover subdomains, resolve DNS records, and inspect TLS and HTTP security posture across a domain's live hosts. Runs as a stdio process or a local Streamable HTTP server.

Tools

Tool

Description

attacksurface_map_domain

Flagship workflow. Maps a domain's external surface end to end: CT-log subdomain discovery → DNS liveness → (standard+) DNS records, TLS posture, HTTP headers/tech → optional RDAP/WHOIS → (thorough + key) per-IP Shodan enrichment. Returns a structured surface map and a defensive assessment of observable facts.

attacksurface_enumerate_subdomains

Passive subdomain discovery from Certificate Transparency logs (crt.sh → Certspotter → TLS-SAN fallback chain), with DNS resolution to mark which names are live. Per-source provenance; no DNS brute-forcing.

attacksurface_resolve_dns

Resolve and enumerate DNS records (A/AAAA/CNAME/MX/NS/TXT/CAA) for one or more hosts across multiple public resolvers, with optional reverse DNS (PTR). Per-resolver values surface propagation gaps.

attacksurface_inspect_tls

Inspect TLS/SSL posture via a real read-only handshake: protocol, cipher, leaf certificate and chain depth, SANs, validity window, days-to-expiry, issuer, validation status. Reports invalid/expired/self-signed certs instead of failing.

attacksurface_probe_http

Passive HTTP(S) probe: one GET following redirects. Returns status, redirect chain, headers, a security-header audit (HSTS/CSP/X-Frame-Options/cookie flags/CORS reflection), and an evidence-bound technology fingerprint.

attacksurface_lookup_registration

Registration and ownership lookup via RDAP (JSON; WHOIS fallback). A domain returns registrar, status, lifecycle events, nameservers, DNSSEC; an IP/CIDR returns netblock, allocation CIDRs, origin ASN, country.

attacksurface_lookup_host

Infrastructure intelligence for a single IP (open ports, banners, software versions, ASN, geo) or a faceted internet-wide search, via Shodan. Requires SHODAN_API_KEY — returns a typed source_unavailable error when unset; the rest of the server is unaffected.

attacksurface_recon_guidance

Offline synthesis over findings gathered so far. Returns a prioritized defensive review plan plus pre-filled follow-up calls (which certs to renew, which hosts to inspect, which software versions to check for CVEs against an external NVD/OSV server). No external calls.

Resources

Resource

Description

attacksurface://surface/{domain}

Read-once snapshot of a domain's mapped external surface (subdomains, live hosts, per-host TLS/HTTP posture summary), equivalent to a standard-depth attacksurface_map_domain call.

All resource data is also reachable via tools — tool-only clients lose nothing, since attacksurface_map_domain covers the same ground.

Related MCP server: External Reconnaissance MCP Server

Capability reference

attacksurface_map_domain tool

  • depth: quick discovers subdomains and liveness; standard adds DNS records, TLS, and HTTP posture; thorough adds per-IP Shodan data when a key is present, otherwise a note.

  • Returns a structured surface map and defensive assessment of observable facts. Failed sources or unreachable hosts become notes; subdomain resolution is capped by ATTACKSURFACE_MAX_SUBDOMAINS (default 200), with truncation disclosed.

  • includeRegistration adds RDAP/WHOIS data for the apex at standard or thorough depth.


attacksurface_enumerate_subdomains tool

  • Discovers names through crt.sh → Certspotter → the apex TLS certificate SANs, then resolves DNS liveness. includeUnresolved: false keeps only live hosts.

  • Returns each name's source provenance and per-source status; no DNS brute-forcing or target-resolver probing.


attacksurface_resolve_dns tool

  • Accepts up to 50 hosts and queries A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, and CAA across public resolvers (default 8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1, 9.9.9.9); reverse DNS (PTR) is optional.

  • Returns per-resolver answers to expose propagation gaps. Private or loopback resolver IPs produce blocked_resolver; an individual host failure becomes a per-host error.

  • Canonical records come from the first configured resolver. Resolver failures (including SERVFAIL) remain in queryError and hostError alongside any successful records; absent records are error-free.


attacksurface_inspect_tls tool

  • Accepts up to 50 hosts; port defaults to 443 and handshake timeout to 8000ms (1000–30000ms).

  • Returns negotiated protocol, cipher, leaf certificate and chain depth, SANs, issuer, validity window, days to expiry, and validation status. Invalid, expired, and self-signed certificates are reported; one host failure becomes a per-host error.

  • Unparseable validity bounds retain their raw values and add findings. daysUntilExpiry is null only when expiry cannot be parsed; a malformed start date does not erase a known expiry.


attacksurface_probe_http tool

  • Accepts one HTTP(S) URL; timeout defaults to 10000ms (1000–30000ms). Follows up to ten redirects with an SSRF check at every hop; a refused target produces blocked_target. Another redirect at the limit returns finalStatus: 0 and a transportError.

  • Returns status, redirect chain, headers, security-header findings (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, cookie flags, CORS reflection), and technology detections with their triggering evidence.

  • Cloudflare server banners identify a CDN; AWS ELB banners identify edge infrastructure (other). Neither banner alone establishes WAF protection.


attacksurface_lookup_registration tool

  • Accepts a domain, IP, or CIDR; type (auto / domain / ip) controls interpretation. Uses RDAP first, then WHOIS port 43 when needed.

  • Domain results include registrar, EPP statuses, lifecycle events, nameservers, and DNSSEC; IP/CIDR results include netblock, allocation CIDRs, ASN, and country. Sparse or redacted fields stay unknown.


attacksurface_lookup_host tool

  • mode: "host" (default) looks up one IP; mode: "search" accepts an internet-wide query with optional facets and may consume Shodan query credits. Requires SHODAN_API_KEY.

  • Both modes reject blank targets. Host mode accepts bare IPv4/IPv6 addresses and returns invalid_target for other syntax before contacting Shodan; search queries are preserved verbatim.

  • Returns ports, banners, software versions, hostnames, ASN, and geography from Shodan's last scan. Missing credentials produce source_unavailable; no host data produces no_data. The server performs no port scans.


attacksurface_recon_guidance tool

  • Takes prior findings (hosts, certificates, missing headers, software versions, ports); topic (triage / posture / coverage) selects the plan's emphasis.

  • Returns markdown guidance, structured priority items, and pre-filled follow-up calls, including external NVD/OSV lookups. Runs offline and produces a defensive remediation or visibility plan.


attacksurface://surface/{domain} resource

  • Takes a domain and returns an application/json snapshot equivalent to a standard-depth attacksurface_map_domain call.

  • Includes subdomain and live-host counts plus per-host TLS/HTTP posture. Caps host detail at 50 live hosts, discloses omissions, and points to attacksurface_map_domain for the full set.

Features

Built on @cyanheads/mcp-ts-core: stdio and Streamable HTTP transports, pluggable auth (none / jwt / oauth), swappable storage (in-memory, filesystem, Supabase, Cloudflare KV/R2/D1), structured logging with optional OpenTelemetry tracing.

Attack-surface-specific:

  • Passive and non-intrusive by mandate — public records plus each target's own single published response; active scanning, exploitation, and brute-forcing are excluded from the surface, not toggled by a flag

  • Keyless core — CT subdomain enumeration, DNS, TLS, HTTP/tech, and RDAP/WHOIS all work with zero API keys; Shodan is strictly additive depth

  • SSRF guard on every outbound connection — rejects private, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata, and reserved IPv4/IPv6 ranges before connecting (opt out for trusted internal assessment via ATTACKSURFACE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_TARGETS)

  • Multi-source aggregation with fallback chains — CT discovery falls through crt.sh → Certspotter → TLS-SAN; registration falls through RDAP → WHOIS

Agent-friendly output:

  • Provenance on every result — source labels (source: crt.sh | certspotter | tls-san, source: rdap | whois) and per-source status so agents can assess completeness and trust

  • Graceful partial failure — multi-target and multi-source tools return per-item/per-source error fields and operational notes instead of failing the whole call; only malformed input throws

  • Discriminated, typed contracts — typed error reasons (source_unavailable, blocked_target, all_sources_failed) and union output (kind: domain | ip) let callers branch on data, not string parsing

  • No fabricated signal — technology detections carry their triggering evidence; absent CT/DNS/RDAP fields are reported as unknown, never inferred

Getting started

Add the following to your MCP client configuration file. Every tool except attacksurface_lookup_host works with no configuration — the keyless core boots on an empty environment.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "attack-surface-mcp-server": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "bunx",
      "args": ["@cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server@latest"],
      "env": {
        "MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE": "stdio",
        "MCP_LOG_LEVEL": "info"
      }
    }
  }
}

Or with npx (no Bun required):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "attack-surface-mcp-server": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server@latest"],
      "env": {
        "MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE": "stdio",
        "MCP_LOG_LEVEL": "info"
      }
    }
  }
}

Or with Docker:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "attack-surface-mcp-server": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "docker",
      "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "-e", "MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE=stdio", "ghcr.io/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server:latest"]
    }
  }
}

To enable Shodan host intelligence (attacksurface_lookup_host), add SHODAN_API_KEY to the env block.

For Streamable HTTP, set the transport and start the server:

MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE=http MCP_HTTP_PORT=3010 bun run start:http
# Server listens at http://localhost:3010/mcp

Prerequisites

Installation

  1. Clone the repository:

git clone https://github.com/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server.git
  1. Navigate into the directory:

cd attack-surface-mcp-server
  1. Install dependencies:

bun install
  1. Configure environment (optional):

cp .env.example .env
# edit .env only if you want Shodan, a Certspotter key, or non-default behavior

Configuration

All variables are optional — the server boots and delivers its keyless core with an empty environment.

Variable

Description

Default

SHODAN_API_KEY

Enables attacksurface_lookup_host. Absent → that tool returns source_unavailable; every other tool keeps working.

—

CERTSPOTTER_API_KEY

Raises Certspotter rate limits for the CT-log subdomain fallback. Absent → free unauthenticated tier (rate-limited but functional).

—

ATTACKSURFACE_DEFAULT_RESOLVERS

Comma-separated default DNS resolver IPs for attacksurface_resolve_dns.

8.8.8.8,1.1.1.1,9.9.9.9

ATTACKSURFACE_HTTP_USER_AGENT

Default User-Agent for attacksurface_probe_http (overridable per call).

attack-surface-mcp-server/passive-recon (+https://github.com/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server)

ATTACKSURFACE_MAX_SUBDOMAINS

Cap on subdomains resolved during a map_domain run — bounds fan-out cost.

200

ATTACKSURFACE_RDAP_BOOTSTRAP_URL

RDAP bootstrap base URL; override for a private/mirrored RDAP.

https://rdap.org

ATTACKSURFACE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_TARGETS

Set true to disable the SSRF guard for internal-network assessment. Leave false on any public deployment — it is the safety boundary that keeps the server from being pointed at internal infrastructure.

false

MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE

Transport: stdio or http.

stdio

MCP_HTTP_PORT

Port for HTTP server.

3010

MCP_SESSION_MODE

HTTP session mode: stateless, stateful, or auto. The server declares stateless; a value set here overrides it. Ignored under stdio.

stateless

MCP_AUTH_MODE

Auth mode: none, jwt, or oauth.

none

MCP_LOG_LEVEL

Log level (RFC 5424).

info

OTEL_ENABLED

Enable OpenTelemetry instrumentation.

false

See .env.example for the full list of optional overrides.

Running the server

Local development

  • Build and run:

    # One-time build
    bun run rebuild
    
    # Run the built server
    bun run start:stdio
    # or
    bun run start:http
  • Run checks and tests:

    bun run devcheck   # Lint, format, typecheck, security
    bun run test       # Vitest test suite
    bun run lint:mcp   # Validate MCP definitions against spec

Docker

docker build -t attack-surface-mcp-server .
docker run --rm -e MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE=http -p 3010:3010 attack-surface-mcp-server

The Dockerfile defaults to HTTP transport, stateless session mode, and logs to /var/log/attack-surface-mcp-server. OpenTelemetry peer dependencies are installed by default — build with --build-arg OTEL_ENABLED=false to omit them.

Project structure

Directory

Purpose

src/index.ts

createApp() entry point — registers tools/resources and inits the six services.

src/config

Server-specific environment variable parsing and validation with Zod.

src/mcp-server/tools

Tool definitions (*.tool.ts).

src/mcp-server/resources

Resource definitions (*.resource.ts).

src/services

Domain service integrations (ct, dns, tls, http, registration, shodan).

src/utils

SSRF guard and input validation.

tests/

Unit and integration tests mirroring src/.

Development guide

See CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md for development guidelines and architectural rules. The short version:

  • Handlers throw, framework catches — no try/catch in tool logic

  • Use ctx.log for request-scoped logging, ctx.state for tenant-scoped storage

  • Register new tools and resources via the barrels in src/mcp-server/*/definitions/index.ts

  • Every outbound connection to a user-supplied target must pass the SSRF guard (assertSafeDomain / assertSafeUrl / assertSafeResolverIp) before connecting

  • Wrap external API calls: validate raw → normalize to domain type → return output schema; never fabricate missing fields

Contributing

Issues are welcome. Run checks and tests before submitting:

bun run devcheck
bun run test

License

Apache-2.0 — see LICENSE for details.

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