entraadm-mcp
Read-only MCP server for Microsoft Entra ID sign-in/audit triage, plus Azure VM backup status and Microsoft 365 service health.
Probe health: check Graph reachability, sign-in log access, and ARM visibility.
Inspect a user: account enabled/sync state, licenses, sign-in activity, and MFA registration.
Analyze sign-ins for one user: recent events with AADSTS error translations, filterable by success/failure.
Aggregate tenant-wide sign-in failures: top error codes, users, apps, IPs, and password-spray suspects.
Aggregate tenant-wide successful sign-ins by IP: shared IPs, legacy-auth successes, breach leads.
List every sign-in from a specific source IP: who succeeded, who was tried, when.
Read directory audit logs: who changed what, filterable by category or user.
List visible Azure subscriptions and check Azure VM backup status/policies.
Check Microsoft 365 service health: open incidents and advisories.
Run a one-call daily brief: M365 health, sign-in failure stats, directory audits combined.
Use app-only or azure-cli auth; missing permissions degrade gracefully; all tools are read-only.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@entraadm-mcpwhy did alice's sign-in fail this morning?"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
entraadm-mcp
English | 日本語
MCP server for Microsoft Entra ID sign-in and audit-log triage, plus the two Azure-side questions a morning patrol asks with the same credential: are our Azure VMs backed up, and is Microsoft 365 itself degraded right now. Read-only.
Why this instead of the official Microsoft MCP Server for Enterprise
Microsoft ships an official MCP Server for Enterprise for Entra ID data. It is a good fit for an interactive admin at a keyboard, and is not a fit for an unattended triage bot:
Delegated auth only. The official server does not support app-only (client credentials) auth, so it cannot run headless behind a service account. entraadm-mcp is built for that case: app-only in production, with a delegated (
az login) fallback for local development.A general-purpose Graph query tool, not a fixed tool set. The official server exposes one tool that lets the model construct arbitrary
GET/schema-discovery calls against Microsoft Graph. That is flexible for a human, and awkward to put behind an allow-list for an automated triage profile. entraadm-mcp exposes thirteen fixed, read-only tools instead.No AADSTS translation. Sign-in failures come back as raw error codes; triage still needs a lookup table. entraadm-mcp annotates every sign-in failure with what the code actually means.
No cross-request aggregation. Microsoft Graph itself cannot filter sign-ins on
status/errorCodeserver-side, and has no built-in password-spray view.signin_failure_statsaggregates client-side and flags IPs with failed sign-ins against many distinct users — the pattern Entra's per-account smart lockout does not catch on its own.
Related MCP server: Microsoft Graph MCP Server
Tools
Tool | What it answers |
| Is Graph reachable, and can this credential read sign-in logs? |
| Is this account enabled, synced from on-prem, and what are its licenses? |
| Why did this user's sign-in fail (or succeed), with the AADSTS code translated? |
| Tenant-wide failure aggregation: top error codes, users, apps, source IPs, and password-spray suspects |
| Tenant-wide success aggregation by source IP: IPs shared by several accounts, legacy-auth (SMTP/IMAP) successes — the view that finds a breach |
| Every sign-in from one source IP: who got in from it, who was tried, and when |
| Who changed what in the directory (block/unblock, attribute edits), and when? |
| Is MFA actually registered for this account? |
| Which Azure subscriptions can this credential see? (ARM) |
| Which Azure VMs are backed up by Azure Backup, did the last backup succeed, and is any recovery point stale? (ARM) |
| What schedule and retention do the Azure VM backup policies have? (ARM) |
| Is a Microsoft 365 service degraded, and which incidents and advisories are open? |
| One-call summary combining |
Every tool is read-only. Write operations (unblocking an account, resetting a password, revoking a session) are out of scope for this server.
The three Azure Resource Manager tools live in an Entra-named server on
purpose: they use the same app registration and the same azure-identity
credential object (a second token scope, https://management.azure.com/.default),
run in the same deployment and are covered by the same health_check. A
separate server for two tools would double the operational surface. They
are governance reads, not resource management; a subscription the credential
has no Reader role on simply does not appear in list_subscriptions.
Auth model
Two auth modes, selected by which environment variables are set:
Mode | When | Env vars |
app-only | All three set |
|
azure-cli | None set | (uses the current |
Setting one or two of the three app-only variables is a configuration error and the server refuses to start, rather than silently falling back to a different auth mode than intended.
Required Graph permissions
Tool(s) | Permission | Notes |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| App-only only; not available under delegated ( |
|
| Under delegated auth the signed-in user also needs an Entra role that may read service health (for example Service Support Administrator or Global Reader) |
Required Azure RBAC
Tool(s) | Role | Notes |
| none | Lists whatever the credential can see; an empty list means no role has been granted anywhere yet |
| Reader on each subscription |
|
Azure RBAC is optional: health_check reports ARM reachability and the number
of visible subscriptions as an informational arm probe that never changes
status, so a deployment used only for Entra triage stays healthy.
A missing permission never crashes a tool. It degrades that tool (or that
one field) to {"error": "...", "missing_permission": "..."} with a
human-readable explanation of what role or permission is needed, so
health_check and every other tool stay usable even before full permissions
are granted.
Setup
uv tool install entraadm-mcp
# or
pip install entraadm-mcpConfiguration
Set the three app-only variables for production/unattended use:
export ENTRAADM_TENANT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
export ENTRAADM_CLIENT_ID=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
export ENTRAADM_CLIENT_SECRET=your-client-secretOr leave all three unset and run az login first for local development.
Optional:
# Default page cap for the log-scanning tools (1-50, default 50).
export ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT=50
# Wall-clock budget per tool call in seconds (default 45; 0 disables). A hosted MCP
# client cuts a call off at about 60 s, so a scan stops at the budget and returns
# what it has with capped=true.
export ENTRAADM_DEADLINE=45
# Your own address ranges (NAT egress, offices, labs). Spray suspects inside them are
# listed separately as internal_spray_suspects, labelled with the site.
export ENTRAADM_SITES_INI=/path/to/sites.iniENTRAADM_SITES_INI uses the same format as keycloak-mcp's KEYCLOAK_SITES_INI,
so one file can serve both (see sites.ini.example). Lookups are
longest-prefix. A file that is set but cannot be read makes health_check report
degraded, and every IP is then treated as external. An invalid CIDR is reported the
same way, but the valid ranges are still used.
Usage
Claude Code (plugin)
/plugin marketplace add shigechika/entraadm-mcp
/plugin install entraadm-mcp@entraadm-mcpClaude Code (manual)
Add to .mcp.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"entraadm-mcp": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["entraadm-mcp"],
"env": {
"ENTRAADM_TENANT_ID": "${ENTRAADM_TENANT_ID:-}",
"ENTRAADM_CLIENT_ID": "${ENTRAADM_CLIENT_ID:-}",
"ENTRAADM_CLIENT_SECRET": "${ENTRAADM_CLIENT_SECRET:-}"
}
}
}
}Direct execution
entraadm-mcpCLI options
Option | Effect |
| Print the version and exit |
| Resolve auth, probe Graph reachability and sign-in log access, print a report (plus an informational ARM line), exit 0 (or 1 on config error) |
Notes
Coverage contract. Every result that walks a paged Graph collection carries a
cappedboolean when its window was not fully scanned — a partial scan is never reported as if it were exhaustive.found: falseis not an error.get_userandget_user_auth_methodsanswer a nonexistent account with{"found": false, ...}, not anerrorkey — a typo'd userPrincipalName should never look like this server being broken.Retention. Entra ID P1 retains sign-in and directory audit logs for 30 days. A window beyond that returns an empty result, not an error.
Development
uv sync --dev
uv run pytest -v
uv run ruff check .
uv run ruff format --check .Live smoke test
uv run python scripts/smoke_test.pyRead-only, no payloads printed (tool names/statuses/row counts only), and bounded (small explicit windows/page caps) — nothing here writes to the tenant or scans more than a day of logs.
Releasing
This repository uses release-please
driven by Conventional Commits. Merge
a feat:/fix: PR to main, and release-please opens (or updates) a
release PR; merging that PR tags a release and triggers the publish pipeline
(PyPI, MCP Registry).
License
MIT
Available Tools
13 toolsdaily_briefA
One-call morning-patrol summary: M365 service health, sign-in failures, spray suspects, admin actions.
Combines m365_service_health, signin_failure_stats and
directory_audits into one result with a compact summary on top,
matching the shape of this fleet's other daily_brief tools. A
permission failure in one section degrades only that section's
contribution to summary -- the other sections still return in full.
Azure VM backup is deliberately not a section here: its ARM fan-out is
the one scan that could exhaust the shared budget, so call
vm_backup_status separately.
Runs both sections synchronously in one tool call, unlike the sibling
gwsadm-mcp's job+poll daily_brief. If this proves too slow for a
tenant's sign-in volume against the client's tool-call timeout, port
that job+poll pattern here (tracked in this repo's CLAUDE.md Roadmap).
Args: hours: How far back to look, clamped to [1, 720] (30 days). max_pages: Page budget passed to both sections (default: ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT). samples: Reserved for a future drill-down sample size; currently unused.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| hours | No | ||
| samples | No | ||
| max_pages | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and largely meets it: it discloses that sections run synchronously in one call, that a permission failure degrades only that section's summary contribution while others still return in full, and that the page budget is shared across sections. It does not state permission scopes or explicitly declare the operation read-only, leaving a small gap.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose before the correct usage routing and the arg list, and every paragraph addresses a decision the caller makes. It carries some low-value internal detail ('tracked in this repo's CLAUDE.md Roadmap') that an agent cannot act on, but the surrounding sentences about slowness and timeouts are genuinely actionable.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a three-param, annotation-free read tool with no output schema, the description covers invocation, cost, failure modes, and exclusions thoroughly. The one residual gap is that the return shape is only characterized as a 'compact summary' matching other fleet daily_brief tools, so result structure must be discovered empirically.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it does: hours is documented with its clamp range [1, 720] and meaning; max_pages is described as a budget passed to both sections with its default source; samples is flagged as reserved and currently unused, which directly prevents an agent from misusing it.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States exactly what the tool returns: 'One-call morning-patrol summary: M365 service health, sign-in failures, spray suspects, admin actions.' It then names the three sibling tools it aggregates (m365_service_health, signin_failure_stats, directory_audits) and explicitly excludes vm_backup_status, so an agent can distinguish it from every sibling without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit when-to-use (morning patrol, one-call aggregation), when-not-to-use-and-why (backup excluded because ARM fan-out would exhaust the shared budget; call vm_backup_status separately), and names the alternative implementation pattern (gwsadm-mcp job+poll) with the condition under which it would be preferred.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
directory_auditsA
Who did what to the directory, and when -- the operator-side counterpart to signin_logs.
Every admin action against a user object (block/unblock, password reset,
role assignment, attribute edits) appears here, naming the actor
(initiated_by) and the affected object(s) (target_resources).
This is the record a manual "unblock and reset" intervention -- like the
one that closed the 2026-08-21 case this server exists to shorten --
leaves behind; it is how a later triage can tell "already handled by a
human" from "still open".
user, when given, matches audits where that account is either the
initiator or a target resource. Graph's directoryAudits endpoint only
supports server-side $filter on the initiator
(initiatedBy/user/userPrincipalName), not on targetResources, so
this fetches the full time window and matches both sides client-side --
a window with many unrelated admin actions can need a larger
max_pages budget than signin_logs/signin_failure_stats to
find one specific user's audits; capped=true warns when that budget
ran out before the window was fully scanned.
Read-only (AuditLog.Read.All application permission, or -- for azure-cli auth -- the Reports Reader directory role). Entra ID retains directory audit logs for 30 days, same as sign-in logs.
Time-bounded: the scan stops after ENTRAADM_DEADLINE seconds (default 45)
and returns what it has with capped=true. Over several days the log is
dominated by device-registration noise ("Update device"), so pass
category (for example UserManagement, RoleManagement,
GroupManagement, ApplicationManagement) to have Graph filter
server-side; that keeps a multi-day window inside the budget.
Args: category: Only this Graph audit category (letters only; default: all). user: Restrict to audits naming this userPrincipalName as actor or target (default: all). hours: How far back to look, clamped to [1, 720] (30 days). top: Maximum records to return, clamped to [1, 500]. max_pages: Page budget (default: ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| top | No | ||
| user | No | ||
| hours | No | ||
| category | No | ||
| max_pages | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations present, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so: read-only, required AuditLog.Read.All application permission or Reports Reader role for azure-cli auth, 30-day Entra ID retention, a 45s ENTRAADM_DEADLINE scan cap returning partial results with capped=true, and the important client-side vs. server-side filter distinction (only initiatedBy supports $filter). This is well beyond what any structured field supplies.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the core 'who did what to the directory, and when' framing, and the Args block is dense and useful. It is longer than strictly necessary, though -- the aside about the 2026-08-21 case this server exists to shorten adds narrative color rather than invocation-relevant information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema, no annotations, and a scan-heavy tool with a page budget and timeout, so the description has to be self-sufficient -- and it is. It covers return-relevant fields (initiated_by, target_resources, capped), permissions, retention window, and the operational tradeoff of narrowing by category, leaving no gap an agent would need filled before calling it.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate fully and it does: every one of the 5 args is documented with meaning plus constraints (hours clamped to [1,720], top clamped to [1,500], category letters-only, max_pages default reference, user matches either actor or target). The user param's dual actor/target semantics in particular is only knowable from the prose.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Names a specific resource (directory audits) and states exactly what it captures: admin actions against user objects (block/unblock, password reset, role assignment, attribute edits), with actor and target fields. It explicitly positions itself as the 'operator-side counterpart to signin_logs,' so an agent can separate it from the sibling sign-in tools without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives explicit routing guidance: use this for admin/intervention history rather than sign-in events, and pass category (e.g. UserManagement) to keep multi-day windows within budget. It also names the sibling tools it shares a page budget model with and states the condition under which a larger max_pages is needed (many unrelated admin actions in-window).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_userA
One account's identity/lifecycle state -- the first thing to check on any triage report.
account_enabled=false means the account itself is the whole story;
stop there. A stale last_password_change_date_time alongside a fresh
"wrong password" complaint (AADSTS50126 in signin_logs) is the most
common on-the-ground pattern: the password changed or expired somewhere,
and a cached credential on one device is now stale.
on_premises_sync_enabled=true means this account is synced from an
on-premises directory (Entra Connect) -- Entra is a downstream copy of
its password via Password Hash Sync, not the source of truth.
licenses names are resolved from the tenant's SKU catalog
(/subscribedSkus, page budget from ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT);
licenses_capped: true appears only when that scan was cut short
before resolving one of this account's own licenses -- when present,
one or more licenses entries is a raw skuId rather than a friendly
name.
sign_in_activity needs an additional Graph read (AuditLog.Read.All
application permission, or -- for azure-cli auth -- the Reports Reader
directory role) beyond what the rest of this tool needs. If that
permission is missing, every other field above still returns and
sign_in_activity alone degrades to {"error": ..., "missing_permission": "AuditLog.Read.All"}.
A nonexistent account is a normal answer, not a tool failure: the result
is {"found": false, "user_principal_name": upn} rather than an
error key, so a typo'd UPN in a triage report cannot be mistaken for
this tool being broken.
Read-only (User.Read.All application permission, or an equivalent delegated read). Requires an exact userPrincipalName, not a display name or partial match.
Args: upn: The account's userPrincipalName, e.g. "user@example.edu".
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| upn | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and excels. It discloses the meaning of key fields (account_enabled, on_premises_sync_enabled, licenses_capped), the graceful degradation of sign_in_activity without the required permission, and that a nonexistent account returns {'found': false} rather than an error. It also states the read-only nature and exact UPN requirement. No contradictions.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Though long, the description is densely packed with prerequisite triage knowledge—field semantics, permission nuances, and edge cases—and every sentence adds value. It is structured with clear paragraphs and code-formatting for fields, making it scannable. The front-loaded purpose statement ensures the agent quickly knows what the tool does.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with no output schema, the description covers the essential return fields (account_enabled, last_password_change_date_time, on_premises_sync_enabled, licenses, licenses_capped, sign_in_activity), their meanings, and expected edge behavior. It also describes permission requirements and the graceful degradation path. Nothing an agent needs to call it and interpret results is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage for the only parameter, upn, is 0%, but the description fully compensates: 'Args: upn: The account's userPrincipalName, e.g. "user@example.edu".' It also stresses the need for an exact match, not display name. This gives the agent everything needed to format the argument correctly.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'One account's identity/lifecycle state -- the first thing to check on any triage report.' This is a specific verb+resource (get identity/lifecycle state) and explicitly positions it as the initial step, distinguishing it from sibling tools that focus on sign-in logs, auth methods, or audits. The purpose is unmistakable and actionable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear context: 'first thing to check' and instructs to 'stop there' if account_enabled=false. It also explains a common pattern for stale passwords. However, it never explicitly names alternative tools or states when not to use this tool (e.g., 'for auth methods, use get_user_auth_methods'). The order is implied but not contrasted with siblings.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_user_auth_methodsA
Registered authentication methods for one account -- is MFA actually set up?
mfa_registered answers "would this account survive a password-spray
hit": True iff at least one non-password method is registered
(Authenticator app, phone, FIDO2 security key, Windows Hello, a
temporary access pass, software OATH token, or a platform
credential/passkey). password itself is excluded from that count --
every account has one, so its presence alone says nothing about MFA
coverage.
A nonexistent account is a normal answer, not a tool failure: the result
is {"found": false, "user_principal_name": upn} rather than an
error key, matching get_user's contract.
Read-only (UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All application permission). This endpoint is app-only only: it is not exposed to delegated (azure-cli) auth under this tenant's current role assignment, so it degrades to a permission error under azure-cli auth even when other tools work.
Args: upn: The account's userPrincipalName.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| upn | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It explicitly states the read-only permission, the app-only limitation that leads to permission errors under azure-cli, the behavior for nonexistent accounts (returns a specific structure instead of an error), and the precise semantics of mfa_registered. It does not detail the full response structure for existing accounts, which is a minor gap, but the key behaviors are well covered.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-structured with a clear opening statement, a code-formatted explanation of the key field, a note on nonexistent accounts, and a security/permission caveat. It is informative but not bloated; each paragraph serves a distinct purpose. It could be slightly more concise, but the structure aids readability.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description fully covers the MFA-checking purpose and the nonexistent-account case, but it does not specify the full response format for an existing account beyond the mfa_registered boolean. Since there is no output schema, an agent may not know if the response includes a list of methods, their types, or other fields. This is a notable gap for a tool that returns a data structure, though it may be sufficient for the primary use case of checking MFA.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema provides only the parameter name 'upn' with no description (0% coverage). The description compensates by stating 'Args: upn: The account's userPrincipalName.' This adds the meaning and domain context, making it clear what value to provide. While it doesn't elaborate on format or constraints, the parameter is simple and the explanation is sufficient.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a clear, specific purpose: retrieving registered authentication methods for an account and determining whether MFA is actually set up. It explains the key field (mfa_registered) and distinguishes itself from sibling tools that deal with sign-in logs or audits. The verb and resource are unambiguous, and the contrast with other tools is implicit but effective.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context on when to use this tool (to check MFA coverage) and includes a practical caveat about app-only auth under azure-cli. It references get_user's contract for nonexistent accounts, offering a form of alternative comparison. However, it does not explicitly name siblings like signin_logs or signin_failure_stats as alternatives, leaving some usage inference to the agent.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
health_checkA
Fleet-standard health probe: service/version/status plus two independent Graph probes.
graph confirms Microsoft Graph is reachable at all (GET /users
with $top=1 -- needs only User.Read.All, the minimum permission
every deployment of this server needs anyway). signin_probe additionally confirms the current
credential can read sign-in logs -- the permission every other tool here
except get_user depends on. Both probes always run, independently of
each other: a tenant that has AuditLog.Read.All but not (yet) the
baseline User.Read.All would otherwise have this report "Graph
unreachable" -- a fabricated diagnosis, since Graph plainly is
reachable if the other probe succeeds. status is derived from the
two outcomes: healthy when both succeed, degraded when exactly
one does (Graph is reachable but some permission is missing), error
only when neither does.
Read-only. Always returns the same keys regardless of outcome (detail
is null on success, a translated message on failure), so a caller never
has to branch on which keys are present.
sites reports the optional ENTRAADM_SITES_INI table
(configured, ranges, error). A configured file that fails to
load is an error here and leaves status no better than
degraded: without it every internal IP would be reported as an
external spray suspect.
arm is a third, informational probe (Azure Resource Manager
reachable, and how many subscriptions this credential can see). It
never moves status: Azure RBAC is optional for this server, and a
deployment used only for Entra triage must not sit at degraded
forever because nobody granted it a Reader role. It runs last under its
own short budget (_ARM_PROBE_SECONDS) so an unresponsive ARM cannot
push this whole call past the client's tool-call timeout. The budget
bounds the request, not the first token acquisition (azure-identity is
synchronous; in azure-cli mode it shells out to az), which is the
same limit every tool here has.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: it declares read-only, enumerates the probes and required permissions, states both probes always run independently, defines the healthy/degraded/error derivation, guarantees a stable key set with detail null on success, and explains the ARM probe's isolation and timeout budget. This is unusually complete disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The core is well front-loaded, but the definition runs five dense paragraphs for a zero-argument probe. Passages about `_ARM_PROBE_SECONDS`, azure-identity's synchronous token acquisition, and azure-cli shelling out are implementation trivia that do not help an agent select or invoke the tool, so not every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description must (and does) explain the return shape: the service/version/status keys, the sites and arm sub-objects, the three status values, and the guarantee that detail is null on success. Nothing an agent needs to call and interpret this tool correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool takes zero parameters, so the baseline of 4 applies; there are no arguments whose meaning needs supplementing. The description instead spends its effort on return-key semantics, which belongs to contextual completeness rather than parameter semantics.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Opens with a specific verb+resource+scope: 'Fleet-standard health probe: service/version/status plus two independent Graph probes.' It is unmistakably about this server's own readiness, which separates it from the sibling m365_service_health (tenant service status) and from the data tools it gates. An agent knows what this returns without opening anything else.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It provides strong interpretative context — what each probe proves about permissions, and why a missing baseline permission would fabricate a 'Graph unreachable' diagnosis — which implicitly tells the agent when this tool is the right diagnostic. However, it never states when to call it versus m365_service_health or daily_brief, and offers no explicit exclusions, so it stops short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_subscriptionsA
The Azure subscriptions this credential can see, as ARM lists them.
Read-only (GET /subscriptions; needs no RBAC beyond being able to see a
subscription at all). The discovery anchor for vm_backup_status and
vm_backup_policies: both accept a subscription id or display name from
this list. An empty list with auth working means no Reader role has
been granted anywhere yet. capped marks a listing cut short by the page
budget.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_pages | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so: it declares the operation read-only, states the RBAC requirement (no role beyond being able to see a subscription), explains what an empty result implies, and defines the `capped` truncation flag. This is exactly the beyond-schema context annotations would otherwise supply.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose is front-loaded in one clean sentence, followed by progressively finer behavioral detail in short blocks. The parenthetical ARM/RBAC aside and backtick formatting add usable precision, though the phrasing is slightly literary ('as ARM lists them') for an agent-facing description.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a no-annotation, single-parameter, no-output-schema tool this covers the essentials: read-only nature, auth/RBAC expectations, empty-result meaning, and truncation signal. It stops short of describing the returned item shape beyond noting id and display name are usable as inputs.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the single `max_pages` parameter is entirely undocumented in the schema. The description alludes to a 'page budget' and a `capped` truncation flag, which lets an agent infer that paging is bounded, but it never names the parameter, its default (null), or what value would avoid truncation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The first sentence names the exact resource (Azure subscriptions), the scope (those this credential can see), and the underlying operation (`GET /subscriptions`, i.e. an ARM list). It further distinguishes itself from siblings by identifying itself as the discovery anchor for `vm_backup_status` and `vm_backup_policies`, so an agent can place it without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly states the when-to-use path: this is the source of subscription ids or display names that the two backup sibling tools accept. It also gives a diagnostic trigger — an empty list while `auth` works means no Reader role has been granted anywhere. Both an entry point and an alternative-selection rule are present.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
m365_service_healthA
Microsoft 365 service status per service, and the open incidents and advisories.
Two Graph reads (ServiceHealth.Read.All): healthOverviews (one row
per service with its current status) and the unresolved
serviceAnnouncement/issues, newest first. A sign-in failure spike reads
very differently while Entra or Exchange has an open incident, which is
why daily_brief carries this section too. Each section degrades on its
own ({"error", "missing_permission"}); summary is computed from
whatever came back. capped means either collection was cut short by
the page budget, so the counts are lower bounds. The message center
(messages) needs a different permission and is not read.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_pages | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it names the required Graph permission, discloses per-section degradation with a concrete error shape ({"error", "missing_permission"}), explains that summary is derived from whatever returned, defines 'capped' as lower-bound counts due to the page budget, and notes the message center is out of scope.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence, with operational detail following. The heavy use of backticked fragments and parentheticals makes it dense, but nearly every clause adds information rather than restating structured fields.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read tool with no annotations and no output schema, it adequately describes the return shape (one row per service, unresolved issues newest-first) and failure modes. It could go further on how degraded sections appear alongside computed summaries, but the essentials are present.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% for the single max_pages parameter, so the description must compensate. It introduces the 'page budget' concept and the 'capped' consequence, which implies what max_pages controls, but it never names or defines the parameter's units or default behavior.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific resource and scope: M365 service status per service plus open incidents and advisories, and names the two Graph collections it reads (healthOverviews and serviceAnnouncement/issues). It also draws a boundary against a sibling (daily_brief carries this section) and against the message center, which it explicitly does not read.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Provides clear diagnostic context for when this matters ('a sign-in failure spike reads very differently while Entra or Exchange has an open incident') and links to the daily_brief consumer. It stops short of explicit when-to-use/when-not-to-use routing against the other sibling tools, so no full 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
signin_by_ipA
Every sign-in from one source IP: who got in from it, who was tried, and when.
The follow-up to a spray_suspects or shared_ips hit: Graph can
filter sign-ins on ipAddress server-side, so this is one cheap
query, not a log walk. users summarises the IP per account
(successes, failures, first/last seen, up to 50 accounts) over every row
fetched; events lists the newest top entries that match
result ("all" by default, or "success" / "failure"), each carrying
the account name and the same AADSTS annotation as signin_logs.
capped=true means the page budget or the deadline ran out before the
window was fully read; events_truncated=true means more matching
rows were read than top returns (the users summary still counts
them).
Read-only (AuditLog.Read.All application permission, or -- for azure-cli auth -- the Reports Reader directory role).
Args: ip: The source IPv4 or IPv6 address, exactly as the sign-in log shows it. hours: How far back to look, clamped to [1, 720] (30 days). result: "all" (default), "success", or "failure" -- which events to list. top: Maximum events to return, clamped to [1, 500]. max_pages: Page budget (default: ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| ip | Yes | ||
| top | No | ||
| hours | No | ||
| result | No | all | |
| max_pages | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly: it declares read-only status, states the exact permission/role required (AuditLog.Read.All application permission or Reports Reader role), and explains operational signals (capped, events_truncated) beyond anything in structured fields.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose and behavior before the Args block. The prose is dense and slightly wordy in places (e.g., the elaborated users/events description), but each sentence conveys usable information rather than filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no annotations and no output schema, the description still explains return structure (users summary with up to 50 accounts, events with AADSTS annotations, capped/events_truncated flags), permissions, and all parameter semantics. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it documents all five parameters: ip format, hours clamp [1,720], result enum values, top clamp [1,500], and max_pages default. This is exactly the compensation required when the schema is silent.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence states a specific verb+resource+scope: 'Every sign-in from one source IP: who got in from it, who was tried, and when.' It also implicitly separates itself from signin_logs by framing the results as IP-scoped, and names upstream triggers (spray_suspects, shared_ips).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Clearly positions itself as 'the follow-up to a spray_suspects or shared_ips hit' and explains that Graph filters on ipAddress server-side, making it a cheap query rather than a log walk. It does not explicitly name signin_logs as the alternative to use for non-IP-scoped queries, so the when-not is only implied.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
signin_failure_statsA
Tenant-wide sign-in failure aggregation -- the Entra ID counterpart to the RADIUS failure patrol.
Time-bounded (ENTRAADM_DEADLINE, default 45 s): on a wide window or a busy day the scan
stops early and capped=true marks the counts as a lower bound; narrow hours for a
full count.
Aggregates failed sign-ins across the whole tenant into four views: top
AADSTS error codes (with the same meaning annotations as
signin_logs), top failing users, top applications, and top source
IPs. spray_suspects flags any IP with failed sign-ins against 5 or
more distinct users -- Entra's smart lockout is per-account, so a
low-and-slow password spray from one IP across many accounts does not
trip it the way a brute force against one account does; this is the
observation a per-account view cannot make on its own. This mirrors the
KeyCloak-side spray detection this fleet already relies on; neither the
official Microsoft MCP Server for Enterprise nor Graph itself offers this
aggregation.
When ENTRAADM_SITES_INI names the tenant's own address ranges, IPs inside
them get site (and site_name) in top_ips, and suspects inside
them move from spray_suspects to internal_spray_suspects: a NAT
egress or a room of shared workstations fails for many users every day,
and would otherwise bury an outside source. Internal suspects are kept,
not dropped, because an internal host can be compromised too. sites
reports whether the file loaded; an invalid CIDR is reported in
sites.error while the valid ranges are still used, and a file that
cannot be read leaves every IP in spray_suspects.
Read-only (AuditLog.Read.All application permission, or -- for azure-cli
auth -- the Reports Reader directory role). Graph cannot filter sign-ins
on status/errorCode server-side, so this walks up to max_pages of the
full sign-in log for the window and aggregates client-side --
capped=true means the page budget ran out before the window was
fully scanned, so the counts below are a sample of the window, not a
census of it.
Args: hours: How far back to look, clamped to [1, 720] (30 days). max_pages: Page budget (default: ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| hours | No | ||
| max_pages | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With zero annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so thoroughly: read-only status, required AuditLog.Read.All permission or Reports Reader role, the ENTRAADM_DEADLINE time budget, the meaning of capped=true, client-side aggregation due to Graph's lack of server-side status filtering, and site/CIDR error handling.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The purpose and time-bound caveat are front-loaded, and most detail is load-bearing for a tool with no annotations. Some sentences stray into marketing/backstory (the KeyCloak fleet comparison and 'neither the official Microsoft MCP Server... nor Graph itself offers this'), which could be trimmed without loss.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no annotations and no output schema, the description fully specifies the returned views, the capped/lower-bound semantics, permission requirements, and site-file failure modes. An agent has everything needed to call and interpret the tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, and it does: 'hours' is documented with its [1, 720] clamp and 'max_pages' with its ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT default and its role in triggering capped counts. This adds meaning the bare schema (titles and defaults only) does not provide.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Tenant-wide sign-in failure aggregation') and enumerates the four output views (AADSTS error codes, failing users, applications, source IPs). It clearly distinguishes itself from siblings by naming its counterpart ('RADIUS failure patrol') and contrasting with per-account views like signin_logs and signin_by_ip.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives concrete usage context: narrow 'hours' for a full count, capped counts are a lower bound, and it is the aggregation a per-account view cannot produce. However, it never explicitly routes the agent between signin_failure_stats, signin_logs, and signin_success_stats, leaving that inference to the reader.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
signin_logsA
One user's recent sign-in events, AADSTS-annotated.
The most direct answer to "why can't this person log in": each entry's
error_code_meaning translates the raw AADSTS code (e.g. 50126 ->
"invalid credentials (wrong password)") so triage rarely needs a second
lookup. result filters client-side after the Graph fetch (Graph
cannot filter sign-ins on status/errorCode server-side): "failure" (the
default) keeps only failed attempts, "success" keeps only clean ones,
"all" keeps everything.
Because the filter is client-side, this walks pages until it has
collected top matching entries or exhausts max_pages -- a mostly-
successful user can otherwise mean paging through hundreds of rows to
find a handful of failures. capped=true means the page budget ran out
(or top was reached) before the whole window was scanned; a low match
count alongside capped=true is evidence of "no more found within the
budget", not "no more exist".
Read-only (AuditLog.Read.All application permission, or -- for azure-cli
auth -- the Reports Reader directory role). Entra ID P1 retains sign-in
logs for 30 days; hours beyond that returns an empty result, not an
error.
Args: user: The account's userPrincipalName. hours: How far back to look, clamped to [1, 720] (30 days). result: "failure" (default), "success", or "all". top: Maximum matching entries to return, clamped to [1, 500]. max_pages: Page budget for the client-side filter walk (default: ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| top | No | ||
| user | Yes | ||
| hours | No | ||
| result | No | failure | |
| max_pages | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden and excels. It discloses read-only permissions (AuditLog.Read.All or Reports Reader), retention limits (30 days), clamping behavior, client-side filtering, page-walking mechanics, and the meaning of capped=true. It even clarifies that low match counts with capped=true indicate a budget limit, not absence of data. This is a model of transparency.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is well-structured, front-loading the core purpose, then providing necessary nuance about filtering and paging, then permissions, then a clean parameter list. Every sentence contributes to correct usage; there is no filler or redundancy. It is long but appropriately so for a tool with complex client-side behavior.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the complexity (client-side filtering, pagination, permission requirements, retention window, edge cases) and the absence of an output schema, the description is remarkably complete. It covers all scenarios an agent needs to invoke the tool correctly and interpret results, including the capped flag and empty results. Nothing critical is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, but the description compensates thoroughly. It explains each parameter in detail: user's userPrincipalName, hours clamped to [1,720], result options with default 'failure', top clamped to [1,500], and max_pages with default. It also explains the functional meaning of result (client-side filter) and the cap semantics, providing far more than the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description explicitly states the tool returns 'one user's recent sign-in events' and frames it as 'the most direct answer to why can't this person log in'. It identifies the AADSTS annotation as a key value-add, distinguishing it from sibling tools like signin_failure_stats that likely provide aggregated statistics. The purpose is specific and immediately actionable.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives explicit usage context: it is positioned as the go-to for individual login troubleshooting, and it explains important behavioral caveats like client-side filtering that require adjusting expectations. It implies when not to use it (e.g., for stats, use signin_failure_stats) and details what happens when the page budget is exhausted (capped=true). Alternatives are not explicitly named but clearly indicated by context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
signin_success_statsA
Tenant-wide successful sign-in aggregation by source IP -- the view that finds a breach.
signin_failure_stats shows who is being attacked; this shows whether
anyone got in. The breach signature is one source IP signing in
successfully as several different accounts, most often over a legacy
protocol (clientAppUsed such as "Authenticated SMTP" or "IMAP4",
which carry no MFA). shared_ips lists the IPs with successes for
min_distinct_users or more distinct accounts, most-shared first (up
to 50 IPs, shared_ips_capped when more qualified; account names up
to 25 per IP), with the client apps and the countries seen.
legacy_auth_users lists the accounts that succeeded over a legacy
protocol at all, with how many IPs and countries they came from.
A campus NAT, a VDI farm or a shared proxy also puts many accounts
behind one IP, so a shared IP is a lead, not a verdict: the caller
excludes its own egress ranges and reads the client apps and countries
before calling anything a breach. Graph cannot filter sign-ins on
status/errorCode server-side, so like signin_failure_stats this
walks the sign-in log for the window and aggregates client-side. The
walk covers interactive sign-ins only (Graph's default listing): every
legacy-protocol authentication is logged as interactive, so none is
missed, but non-interactive token refreshes are not counted;
capped=true means the page budget or the deadline (ENTRAADM_DEADLINE,
default 45 s) ran out first and the counts are a lower bound -- narrow
hours for a full count.
Read-only (AuditLog.Read.All application permission, or -- for azure-cli auth -- the Reports Reader directory role).
Args:
hours: How far back to look, clamped to [1, 720] (30 days).
max_pages: Page budget (default: ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT).
min_distinct_users: Distinct accounts an IP needs to appear in
shared_ips (default 2, clamped to >= 2).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| hours | No | ||
| max_pages | No | ||
| min_distinct_users | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden and does so: read-only, required permission (AuditLog.Read.All / Reports Reader role), client-side aggregation because Graph cannot filter on status/errorCode server-side, interactive-sign-ins-only scope with the reasoning that legacy auth is logged as interactive, and lower-bound semantics when the page budget or ENTRAADM_DEADLINE expires. This is exactly the context annotations would otherwise supply.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose and the failure/success contrast are front-loaded, and the dense middle does real work. It is longer than strictly necessary — the breach-signature narrative and the NAT/VDI caveat could be tightened — but almost every sentence carries operational information rather than padding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema exists, so the description must explain return values directly, and it does: shared_ips (up to 50, ordering, per-IP account/client-app/country detail, shared_ips_capped) and legacy_auth_users with IP/country counts. Combined with the permission, scope, and cap caveats, an agent has everything needed to call and interpret this tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate and it does for all three params: hours clamped to [1,720], max_pages defaulting to ENTRAADM_MAX_PAGES_DEFAULT (page budget), and min_distinct_users defaulting to 2 with a clamp of >=2. No parameter is left to inference.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a precise verb+resource+scope (tenant-wide successful sign-in aggregation by source IP) and explicitly contrasts itself with the sibling signin_failure_stats ('shows who is being attacked; this shows whether anyone got in'). An agent can distinguish it from every sibling without opening a schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicit routing to signin_failure_stats, plus genuine interpretation guidance: shared IPs are 'a lead, not a verdict' because NAT/VDI/proxy produce the same signature, and it tells the caller to exclude its own egress ranges before concluding a breach. It also names the condition that invalidates results (capped=true) and the remedy (narrow hours).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
vm_backup_policiesA
Schedule and retention of the Azure VM backup policies in each Recovery Services vault.
Read-only; needs the Reader role on the subscription. Per policy:
policy_type (V1 = SimpleSchedulePolicy, V2 =
SimpleSchedulePolicyV2 with an hourly / daily / weekly schedule),
schedule (frequency, run times in UTC, weekdays, or the hourly window),
retention (LongTermRetentionPolicy: daily / weekly / monthly /
yearly blocks with their day selection and duration), instant_rp_days,
timezone and protected_item_count (ARM's own count). A schedule or
retention type this server does not know is returned as
{"type": <name>, "unparsed": true}, never dropped.
subscription is an id or display name from list_subscriptions
(None = every visible subscription); an unknown or ambiguous name
returns found: false. Coverage flags as in vm_backup_status:
skipped_vaults per subscription, skipped subscriptions when the
budget ran out, capped overall.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_pages | No | ||
| subscription | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it declares read-only access, the Reader role prerequisite, the unknown-type fallback ({"type": <name>, "unparsed": true}, never dropped), the found: false behavior for unknown/ambiguous subscription names, and the skipped/capped coverage semantics. It stops short of describing pagination behavior or result volume.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Purpose and safety profile are front-loaded in the first two lines, and the remaining dense blocks each document a distinct behavior (output shape, fallback, parameter semantics, coverage flags) with no filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description must describe returns, and it does so thoroughly: per-policy fields, the unparsed fallback, and the coverage flags. The only real gap is the unexplained max_pages control, which matters for a paginated multi-subscription read.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It fully explains subscription (id or display name from list_subscriptions, None = all, ambiguous name yields found: false), but max_pages is never mentioned except obliquely through the 'budget ran out' coverage flag, leaving one of two parameters undocumented.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names the specific resource (Azure VM backup policies in each Recovery Services vault) and the exact payload (schedule and retention), so an agent knows precisely what it retrieves. It lacks an explicit verb (List/Get) and its differentiation from siblings is only implicit via a reference to vm_backup_status.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It states the read-only nature and the required Reader role, and clarifies that subscription comes from list_subscriptions with None meaning all visible subscriptions. However, it never explicitly says when to prefer this tool over vm_backup_status or the other backup/log siblings, leaving routing to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
vm_backup_statusA
Which Azure VMs are backed up by Azure Backup, and whether the last backup succeeded.
Joins every VM of a subscription (Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines)
with the Azure-VM protected items of its Recovery Services vaults, on the
VM's ARM id (case-insensitively; ARM casing differs between the two
services). Read-only; needs the Reader role on the subscription.
Per VM:
protected:truewhen a protected item exists withprotectionStateProtectedorIRPending(first backup not done yet,notesays so);falsewhen there is none, or it isProtectionStopped/ProtectionPaused/ProtectionError(data may be retained, backups are not running -- the state is shown);null(unknown) when no item was found but the vault scan was incomplete (capped, a skipped vault, an unreadable or unreached subscription -- in the global join, any subscription's) -- a partial scan never produces a false "unprotected".backup_ok:trueforlastBackupStatusCompleted/CompletedWithWarnings,falseforFailed,nullbefore any backup ran or while one is running (InProgress,Warning, an unknown value). An item whoseprotectionStateis missing isprotected: nullwith a note. When two vaults hold an item for one VM, the one still backing up wins (duplicate_itemscounts them).stale: no recovery point (lastRecoveryPoint, the proof of a successful backup) withinstale_hours. The default 36 h suits daily policies; raise it for weekly ones (policy_nameis in the row).
subscription is an id or display name from list_subscriptions;
None scans every visible subscription and joins globally, so a VM
backed up to a vault in another subscription is matched. With one
subscription named, only its vaults are scanned (coverage says so).
An unknown or ambiguous name returns found: false.
orphans are protected items whose VM no longer exists (backup data
retained for a deleted VM), reported only when that VM's subscription was
listed completely. One subscription's permission error is reported on its
own entry; the others still return. When the wall-clock budget runs out,
the remaining subscriptions are listed under skipped and capped is
set.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| max_pages | No | ||
| stale_hours | No | ||
| subscription | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so richly: read-only, requires the Reader role on the subscription, explains that a partial scan never yields a false 'unprotected', how duplicate vault items are resolved, how orphans are only reported on fully-listed subscriptions, and how permission errors and the wall-clock budget (capped/skipped) surface.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded one-line summary followed by scannable bullet groups for each per-VM field. It is long, but for a join with this much conditional output semantics, nearly every sentence adds needed precision, so only minor trimming is possible.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema, yet the description effectively documents the return contract (protected, backup_ok, stale, orphans, skipped, capped, found). For a complex cross-service join with no annotations, an agent has everything needed to call and interpret it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It thoroughly explains subscription (id or display name, None scans all) and stale_hours (default 36 for daily policies, raise for weekly). max_pages is only obliquely implied through the capped/skipped discussion and is never named, leaving one of three parameters under-specified.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening line gives a specific verb and resource ('Which Azure VMs are backed up by Azure Backup, and whether the last backup succeeded') and the body names the exact Azure resource types it joins. It is plainly distinguishable from the sibling vm_backup_policies, which handles policies rather than per-VM status.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives useful usage context – pass a subscription id/name from list_subscriptions, pass None to scan everything, raise stale_hours from 36 for weekly policies. However, it never explicitly states when to choose this over vm_backup_policies or the other siblings, leaving the routing to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
4 tool updates
v1.3.0- Added
list_subscriptions - Added
m365_service_health - Added
vm_backup_policies - Added
vm_backup_status
3 tool updates
v1.1.0- Changed
directory_audits1 field changed- added
Input schema / properties / categoryAdded value: +{ + "anyOf": [ + { + "type": "string" + }, + { + "type": "null" + } + ], + "default": null, + "title": "Category" +}
- Added
signin_by_ip - Added
signin_success_stats
7 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
daily_brief - First observed
directory_audits - First observed
get_user - First observed
get_user_auth_methods - First observed
health_check - First observed
signin_failure_stats - First observed
signin_logs
TDQS
Scored across 13 tools
The four sign-in tools (signin_logs, signin_by_ip, signin_failure_stats, signin_success_stats) share a data source but are clearly scoped by user vs IP vs failures vs successes, and get_user vs get_user_auth_methods are cleanly separated. daily_brief deliberately overlaps by composing m365_service_health, signin_failure_stats, and directory_audits, but is explicitly framed as a one-call aggregator rather than a peer.
Names are uniformly snake_case and descriptive nouns/actions, with a consistent 'signin_' family and 'vm_' family. The only minor inconsistency is verb prefixes: get_user/get_user_auth_methods and list_subscriptions use verbs while signin_logs, directory_audits, m365_service_health, and daily_brief are bare noun phrases.
Thirteen tools is well within the sweet spot for a focused triage/diagnostic server, and each tool covers a distinct query or aggregation. No obvious filler or redundant tool bloats the set.
The surface covers the core triage lifecycle: identity/lifecycle state, MFA registration, per-user and per-IP sign-in detail, tenant-wide failure and success aggregation, admin audit history, M365 service health, and Azure VM backup status/policies. Gaps exist for role/group membership lookup, device compliance, and Identity Protection risk detections, but these are minor for a read-only triage-oriented server and the aggregate tools let agents work around most of them.
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