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mcp-shield ๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ

The security runtime for MCP servers. Every tool call inspected. Every attack blocked. Every decision logged.

Python PyPI Tests Status


What is MCP?

Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open standard that lets AI assistants (Claude, Cursor, Copilot) connect to external tools and services โ€” file systems, APIs, databases, browsers โ€” through MCP servers.

Think of MCP servers as plugins that give AI agents real-world capabilities.


The Problem

MCP servers run as trusted processes on your machine with broad access:

Access

Risk

๐Ÿ—‚๏ธ Filesystem

Read /etc/passwd, steal SSH keys

๐ŸŒ Network

SSRF to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata endpoint)

๐Ÿ”‘ Environment variables

Steal API keys, tokens, secrets

โš™๏ธ Shell

Execute arbitrary commands

A malicious or compromised MCP server can silently exfiltrate your secrets, pivot to internal infrastructure, or execute code โ€” and you'd never know.

This is not theoretical. A real SSRF vulnerability was found in an MCP OAuth HTTP transport implementation that allowed exactly this class of attack.


How mcp-shield Fixes This

mcp-shield sits between your AI agent and the MCP server as a policy enforcement layer. Before any tool executes, mcp-shield evaluates it. If it's not explicitly allowed โ€” it's blocked.

AI Agent
   โ”‚
   โ–ผ
mcp-shield /inspect
   โ”‚
   โ”œโ”€โ”€ Tool allowlist check      โ†’  "read_secrets" not in allowlist  โ†’ ๐Ÿšซ BLOCK
   โ”œโ”€โ”€ Blocked pattern check     โ†’  "ssrf_fetch" is dangerous        โ†’ ๐Ÿšซ BLOCK
   โ”œโ”€โ”€ Argument scanning         โ†’  "169.254.169.254" in args        โ†’ ๐Ÿšซ BLOCK
   โ”‚   (recursive, nested dicts)
   โ””โ”€โ”€ Passed all checks         โ†’  โœ… ALLOW โ†’ MCP Server executes
                                          โ”‚
                                          โ–ผ
                                     Audit Log (SQLite)
                              timestamp | server | tool | decision | reason

Install

pip install mcpshield-runtime

Or clone and run locally:

git clone https://github.com/srisowmya2000/mcp-shield
cd mcp-shield
python3 -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate
pip install fastapi uvicorn pydantic pydantic-settings mcp httpx pyyaml rich
uvicorn runtime.api.main:app --reload

Open:


Live Demo

# Start mcp-shield
uvicorn runtime.api.main:app --reload

# ๐Ÿšซ Attempt secret theft โ†’ BLOCKED
curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/inspect \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"server_name":"evil","policy":"default","tool_call":{"tool_name":"read_secrets","arguments":{}}}'
# โ†’ {"decision":"BLOCK","reason":"Tool 'read_secrets' is not in the allowed_tools list","blocked":true}

# ๐Ÿšซ Attempt SSRF to AWS metadata endpoint โ†’ BLOCKED
curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/inspect \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"server_name":"evil","policy":"default","tool_call":{"tool_name":"ssrf_fetch","arguments":{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}}}'
# โ†’ {"decision":"BLOCK","reason":"Argument contains blocked pattern: '169.254.169.254'","blocked":true}

# โœ… Safe tool โ†’ ALLOWED
curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/inspect \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"server_name":"safe","policy":"default","tool_call":{"tool_name":"safe_tool","arguments":{"name":"Sri"}}}'
# โ†’ {"decision":"ALLOW","reason":"Passed all policy checks","blocked":false}

CLI

# Inspect a tool call
python3 -m runtime.cli inspect read_secrets
# โ†’ ๐Ÿšซ BLOCKED โ€” Tool 'read_secrets' is not in the allowed_tools list

python3 -m runtime.cli inspect safe_tool
# โ†’ โœ… ALLOWED โ€” Passed all policy checks

# Score a server's risk level
python3 -m runtime.cli risk "read_secrets,ssrf_fetch,safe_tool"
# โ†’ ๐Ÿ”ด HIGH RISK (score: 80)
# โ†’ High-risk tools: ['read_secrets', 'ssrf_fetch']
# โ†’ Do not run without strict policy. Use isolated network.

# View live audit log
python3 -m runtime.cli audit

# View stats
python3 -m runtime.cli stats
# โ†’ Total: 6 | โœ… Allowed: 2 | ๐Ÿšซ Blocked: 4 (67% block rate)

Policies

Drop a YAML file in policies/ and reference it by name in any /inspect call.

# policies/default.yaml
allowed_tools:
  - safe_tool
  - list_files
  - get_time

block_network: true
block_env_access: true

blocked_arg_patterns:
  - "169.254.169.254"   # AWS metadata SSRF
  - "169.254.170.2"     # ECS metadata SSRF
  - "localhost"
  - "127.0.0.1"
  - "/etc/passwd"
  - "/etc/shadow"
  - "file://"
  - "gopher://"

max_memory_mb: 256
execution_timeout_seconds: 30

Switch policy per server:

POST /inspect  โ†’  { "policy": "strict", ... }

Two policies included: default and strict (zero-trust).


Features

Feature

Description

๐Ÿ”’ Policy Engine

YAML allowlists + blocked patterns, per-server policies

๐Ÿ” Argument Scanning

Recursively scans nested args for SSRF, path traversal, dangerous patterns

๐Ÿ“‹ Audit Logger

Every decision logged to SQLite โ€” timestamp, server, tool, reason

๐Ÿณ Docker Sandbox

Hardened containers: --cap-drop=ALL, --network=none, --read-only

๐Ÿ”ฅ Firecracker Backend

microVM isolation โ€” each server gets its own Linux kernel (Linux/KVM only)

๐Ÿ“Š Risk Scorer

Scores MCP servers LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH based on tool capabilities

๐Ÿ–ฅ๏ธ Live Dashboard

Real-time web UI at /dashboard โ€” live block/allow feed, flash animations

โšก CLI

mcpshield inspect, audit, stats, risk with rich colored output


API Reference

Endpoint

Method

Description

/health

GET

Service health check

/inspect

POST

Evaluate tool call โ†’ ALLOW / BLOCK

/audit

GET

Recent audit log entries

/audit/stats

GET

Total / allowed / blocked counts

/risk/score

POST

Score server risk by tool list

/sandbox/launch

POST

Launch MCP server in hardened Docker container

/sandbox/stop/{name}

POST

Stop a running sandbox

/sandbox/list

GET

List running sandboxes

/dashboard

GET

Live real-time decision dashboard

/docs

GET

Interactive Swagger API docs


Docker Sandbox

Every MCP server launched via mcp-shield runs with:

--cap-drop=ALL          no Linux capabilities
--no-new-privileges     no privilege escalation
--read-only             immutable filesystem
--network=none          no network access
--memory=256m           memory limit
--cpus=0.5              CPU limit
--pids-limit=64         process limit
--tmpfs=/tmp            ephemeral tmp only

Firecracker microVM Backend

For stronger isolation, mcp-shield supports Firecracker microVMs โ€” each MCP server gets its own Linux kernel. A kernel exploit inside the VM cannot reach the host.

Docker:       shared kernel โ†’ kernel exploit = host at risk
Firecracker:  own kernel    โ†’ kernel exploit = contained in VM

Requires Linux with KVM. See docs/firecracker-setup.md.


Architecture

mcp-shield/
โ”œโ”€โ”€ runtime/
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ api/
โ”‚   โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ main.py              # FastAPI โ€” all endpoints
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ policy_engine.py         # YAML policy loader + evaluator
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ audit_logger.py          # SQLite decision log
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ risk_scorer.py           # LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH risk scoring
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ cli.py                   # Typer CLI
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ models.py                # Pydantic schemas
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ sandbox/
โ”‚       โ”œโ”€โ”€ base.py              # Abstract backend interface
โ”‚       โ”œโ”€โ”€ docker_backend.py    # Hardened Docker sandbox
โ”‚       โ””โ”€โ”€ firecracker_backend.py  # microVM backend (Linux/KVM)
โ”œโ”€โ”€ policies/
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ default.yaml
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ strict.yaml
โ”œโ”€โ”€ examples/
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ malicious_mcp_server/    # Demo attacker (SSRF + secret theft + exec)
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ safe_mcp_server/         # Demo benign server
โ”œโ”€โ”€ docs/
โ”‚   โ”œโ”€โ”€ threat-model.md          # Attack scenarios + limitations
โ”‚   โ””โ”€โ”€ firecracker-setup.md     # Firecracker setup guide
โ””โ”€โ”€ tests/                       # 12 tests โ€” all passing

Tests

pip install pytest
pytest tests/ -v
# 12 passed in 0.11s

Covers: tool allowlist blocking, SSRF argument detection, nested arg scanning, strict policy enforcement, edge cases, unknown policy handling.


Threat Model

See docs/threat-model.md for:

  • Attack scenarios (SSRF, secret theft, command execution, path traversal)

  • What mcp-shield blocks vs what it doesn't

  • Defense in depth recommendations


Roadmap

  • Policy engine (allowlist + pattern scanning)

  • Audit logger (SQLite)

  • FastAPI REST surface

  • Docker sandbox backend (hardened)

  • Demo malicious MCP server

  • Risk scorer (LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH)

  • CLI (mcpshield inspect, audit, stats, risk)

  • Real-time dashboard

  • Firecracker microVM backend

  • PyPI package (pip install mcpshield-runtime)

  • Threat model documentation

  • Prompt injection detection

  • Per-tool argument schema validation

  • Webhook alerts on BLOCK events


License

MIT โ€” see LICENSE


Author

Sri Sowmya Nemani โ€” Security researcher & engineer. Bug bounty | MCP security | AI agent security

GitHub ยท PyPI

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