Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) MCP Server. Real-time cryptographic validation of DNS root-to-leaf trust chains, RRSIG expiration audits, and automated DNS spoofing defense for AI agents.
Chain of Trust Verification: Recursive validation spanning ICANN Root, TLD, and authoritative zone keys.
Record Auditing: Automated inspection of DNSKEY, DS, and RRSIG signature parameters.
Model Context Protocol (MCP): Native integration for AI coding assistants and autonomous agent workflows.
Related MCP server: domain-checker
npx dnssecAdd to your claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"dnssec": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "dnssec"]
}
}
}verify_dnssec_chain: Validates cryptographic chain of trust and detects spoofing/tampering.
audit_dnssec_records: Checks cipher strength, key tags, and signature expiration dates.
MIT © tudadada
Inspects and audits DNSKEY, DS, and RRSIG signature expiration and cipher strength.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | Yes | The target domain to inspect cryptographic records |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. 'Inspects and audits' reasonably implies a read-only operationhebdomadically, and it adds specifics about what is checked (expiration and cipher strength). However, it does not disclose output/return behavior, how results are reported, or whether it performs any side effects. The description is adequate but not rich.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, tightly worded sentence with no filler. The verb and object are front-loaded, and every phrase contributes specific information. This is an efficient definition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a one-parameter read-only audit, the core invocation details are present and the schema covers the parameter. But with no output schema and no behavioral details about report format or recommendations, an agent does not know what to expect from the call. It is minimally complete but leaves meaningful gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100 percent, and the domain parameter is already described as 'the target domain to inspect cryptographic records.' The tool description adds no further parameter meaning such as format constraints, defaults, or edge cases, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Inspects and audits') and identifies the exact resource types (DNSKEY, DS, RRSIG) plus the audit dimensions (signature expiration, cipher strength). It is clear enough to distinguish this from verify_dnssec_chain, though it does not explicitly contrast itself with the sibling.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is given for when to use this tool versus verify_dnssec_chainfocused on audit vs verification. There are no exclusions, prerequisites, or alternative routing, so an agent must infer usage from the name and description alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Performs recursive cryptographic chain of trust validation (Root -> TLD -> Domain) for DNSSEC.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | Yes | The fully-qualified domain name to validate (e.g. example.com) |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It adds the recursive, root-to-TLD-to-domain traversal behavior, which goes beyond the name, but it does not disclose whether live DNS queries are made, what happens on validation failure, what the return payload looks like, or any side effects or timeouts.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The single sentence is economical, front-loaded with the action verb, and contains no filler. It earns its place by conveying the recursive scope and traversal path, though it is arguably too sparse given the absence of annotations and output schema.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has no annotations and no output schema, so the description must compensate, but it only explains the validation mechanism. It omits return format, failure behavior, when to choose this over audit_dnssec_records, and whether network queries are performed, leaving an agent without enough context to call it confidently.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already fully documents the single 'domain' parameter with an example. The description adds nothing about parameter semantics beyond the schema, so the baseline of 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific verb ('performs') and resource ('cryptographic chain of trust validation') with an explicit traversal path (Root -> TLD -> Domain). This recursive validation scope clearly distinguishes it from the sibling audit_dnssec_records, which presumably audits records rather than validating the trust chain.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus audit_dnssec_records, nor any mention of prerequisites, exclusions, or context (e.g., when DNSSEC validation is appropriate versus auditing record configuration). An agent must infer use cases entirely from the name and the one-line description.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v1.0.0audit_dnssec_recordsverify_dnssec_chainScored across 2 tools
The two tools have clearly distinct purposes: one validates the full chain of trust, the other audits specific record types and their properties. There is no meaningful overlap or ambiguity between them.
Both tools follow a consistent verb_noun pattern (verify_dnssec_chain, audit_dnssec_records), making the naming predictable and easy to reason about.
Two tools is on the thin side for a general 'dnssec' server, though both are substantive and serve a focused read-only verification/audit purpose. The count feels borderline but justifiable.
The tools cover DNSKEY/DS/RRSIG auditing and chain validation, but the server lacks other common DNSSEC operations like signing, key generation, or record retrieval. Notable gaps exist for broader DNSSEC management, though the read-only validation workflow is reasonably covered.
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