secret-vault-mcp
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@secret-vault-mcpget my github entry and show the password"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
secret-vault-mcp
Local, encrypted password vault exposed as a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server. Secrets live on disk in AES-256-GCM ciphertext, unlocked by a master password derived via PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (600,000 iterations). The master password is never written, never logged, and never transmitted.
Designed to be consumed by any MCP client (opencode, Claude Desktop, Cursor, etc.) via stdio transport.
Why
Local-first: no network, no cloud, no telemetry.
Strong crypto: AES-256-GCM with fresh 12-byte nonce per write; PBKDF2 with OWASP-recommended 600k iterations.
MCP-native: all 8 vault operations are first-class tools the LLM can call.
Auditable: ~87% test coverage, small surface, no exotic dependencies.
Related MCP server: Secret Vault MCP Server
Tools
Tool | Description | Inputs |
| Add a new entry |
|
| Fetch an entry; password revealed only when |
|
| List all entries without exposing passwords | — |
| Update one or more fields of an existing entry |
|
| Remove an entry by name |
|
| Generate a strong random password |
|
| Case-insensitive substring search across |
|
| Vault metadata: entry count, last access timestamp, version | — |
All tools return JSON. Errors are returned as {"error": "..."} without stack traces or internal state.
Examples
Once registered in your MCP client, the 8 tools are available to the LLM. You invoke them with natural language — the client translates into MCP tools/call.
In opencode / Claude Desktop / Cursor (natural language):
# Store a secret
> add a secret called github with username felipe and password xK9!mP2qR8vN4wL7
# List everything (no passwords exposed)
> show me all my saved credentials
# Retrieve one (without exposing the password)
> get the github entry
# Retrieve and reveal
> get the github entry and show me the password
# Generate a strong password
> generate a 40-character password with symbols, no ambiguous characters
# Search across all fields
> find any entry that mentions "opencode"
# Update (rotate a password)
> rotate the password for the github entry to a new generated one
# Delete
> delete the entry called old-mailbox
# Status
> how many entries are in the vault and when was it last accessed?Equivalent raw tool calls (what the client sends over JSON-RPC):
{ "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "add_secret",
"arguments": { "name": "github", "username": "felipe", "password": "xK9!mP2qR8vN4wL7" } } }
{ "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "list_secrets" } }
{ "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "get_secret",
"arguments": { "name": "github", "reveal_password": true } } }
{ "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "generate_password",
"arguments": { "length": 40, "symbols": true, "exclude_ambiguous": true } } }
{ "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "search_secrets",
"arguments": { "query": "opencode" } } }
{ "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "update_secret",
"arguments": { "name": "github", "password": "<new-generated>" } } }
{ "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "delete_secret",
"arguments": { "name": "old-mailbox" } } }
{ "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "vault_status" } }Calling from a Python script (using the official mcp client):
import asyncio, os
from mcp import ClientSession, StdioServerParameters
from mcp.client.stdio import stdio_client
async def main():
params = StdioServerParameters(
command="/home/felipe/infra/secret-vault-mcp/.venv/bin/python3",
args=["-u", "/home/felipe/infra/secret-vault-mcp/server.py"],
env={**os.environ, "VAULT_MASTER_PASSWORD": "your-long-passphrase"},
)
async with stdio_client(params) as (read, write):
async with ClientSession(read, write) as session:
await session.initialize()
await session.call_tool("add_secret", {
"name": "github", "username": "felipe", "password": "xK9!mP2qR8vN4wL7",
"url": "https://github.com",
})
result = await session.call_tool("get_secret", {
"name": "github", "reveal_password": True,
})
print(result.content[0].text)
asyncio.run(main())Typical workflows:
# Onboarding: create a few entries
> store these credentials: github/felipe/<gen-32>, aws-root/admin/<gen-40>, redis-local/redis/<gen-24>
# Daily use: look up a password to paste into another tool
> get the aws-root entry and reveal the password
# Rotation: replace a weak/old password
> generate a 32-character password, then update the github entry with it
# Audit: what do I have stored?
> list all entries and group them by URL domain
# Cleanup: remove obsolete entries
> delete entries named "test-1", "test-2", and "demo"Security Model
Cipher: AES-256-GCM, 12-byte random nonce per encryption operation.
KDF: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, 600,000 iterations, 16-byte random salt.
Storage layout (XDG Base Directory):
vault.enc— ciphertext, mode0600vault.salt— salt, mode0600vault.lock—flockfor inter-process serialization
Concurrency:
flock(inter-process) +threading.RLock(intra-process re-entrant).Atomic writes: temp file +
os.replace— no partial writes.Master password: required at server start via
VAULT_MASTER_PASSWORD; never logged, never printed, never cached to disk.Passwords in responses:
list_secretsalways returnspassword="".get_secretreturnspassword=""unlessreveal_password=true.
⚠️ Threat model: protects against at-rest disclosure of the vault files (e.g. disk theft, backup leakage). Does not protect against a compromised runtime or a malicious MCP client that calls
reveal_password=trueon your behalf. Treat the master password as the root of trust.
Setup
cd ~/infra/secret-vault-mcp
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
cp .env.example .env
# edit .env and set VAULT_MASTER_PASSWORDRun
# via the MCP stdio transport (used by opencode/Claude Desktop/Cursor)
python server.py
# or with the master password inline
VAULT_MASTER_PASSWORD="my-long-passphrase" python server.pyTests
pytest # 47 tests
pytest --cov=auth --cov=client --cov=models --cov=serverCurrent coverage: ~87% (target ≥80%).
File Layout (Runtime)
$XDG_DATA_HOME/secret-vault-mcp/ (default: ~/.local/share/secret-vault-mcp/)
├── vault.enc # AES-256-GCM ciphertext
├── vault.salt # 16-byte salt (0600)
└── vault.lock # flock fileOverride the directory with XDG_DATA_HOME.
Project Layout
secret-vault-mcp/
├── auth.py # VaultConfig + constants (KDF, cipher, paths)
├── client.py # VaultClient (encrypt/decrypt, CRUD, lock, search, generate)
├── models.py # Pydantic models (SecretEntry, SecretUpdate, VaultState)
├── server.py # FastMCP server + tool definitions
├── tests/
│ ├── conftest.py
│ ├── test_auth.py
│ ├── test_client.py
│ └── test_server.py
├── pyproject.toml
├── .env.example
├── .gitignore
├── LICENSE
├── .github/workflows/ci.yml
└── README.mdRegister in opencode
Add the following to ~/.config/opencode/opencode.jsonc:
{
"mcp": {
"secret-vault": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "/home/felipe/infra/secret-vault-mcp/.venv/bin/python3",
"args": ["-u", "/home/felipe/infra/secret-vault-mcp/server.py"],
"env": {
"VAULT_MASTER_PASSWORD": "your-long-passphrase-here"
},
"enabled": true
}
}
}🔐 Keep
VAULT_MASTER_PASSWORDout of version control. Consider using a secret loader (1Password CLI,pass, system keyring) to inject it at startup.
CI
GitHub Actions runs ruff + pytest on every push/PR and creates a GitHub release on push to main using ncipollo/release-action.
License
MIT © 2026 Felipe Moura (@n8nfelipe)
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