Solana Enterprise Payment Gateway

High-Throughput HTTP 402 Payment Channel Middleware

Language / runtime note. The Maven build targets Java 21 bytecode (<java.version>21</java.version>), the Spring Boot 3.4 baseline. Container images build and run on Eclipse Temurin JDK 25 (eclipse-temurin:25-jdk / 25-jre-alpine). Both are stated explicitly because the host toolchain is JDK 25 while the source level remains Java 21.

An institutional-grade, zero-Web3-SDK middleware that meters HTTP APIs with the x402 protocol and RFC 9110 §15.5.3 402 Payment Required semantics. It validates Ed25519-signed, off-chain payment vouchers in-memory in under 5ms on the request hot path, persists every verification to an append-only PostgreSQL audit ledger, and sweeps cumulative channel balances on-chain in batched settlement transactions — all without any Node.js sidecar, Python bridge, or generic Web3 Java wrapper.

AI Agent Integration (Model Context Protocol)

Autonomous AI agents can screen Solana addresses and settle compliance micro-payments through our published Model Context Protocol (MCP) server. The server is a zero-dependency x402 compliance tool: it speaks the RFC 9110 402 Payment Required challenge-and-response protocol natively, signs Ed25519 channel vouchers in-memory (Node.js built-in crypto, no Web3 SDK), and negotiates settlement on every call.

Direct Execution

npx -y @msantagiulianab/x402-mcp-server

Configuration

The server reads two environment variables:

Claude Desktop

Add an entry to claude_desktop_config.json.

macOS / Linux

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "solana-x402-compliance": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@msantagiulianab/x402-mcp-server"],
      "env": {
        "X402_GATEWAY_URL": "https://msb-solana-enterprise-payment-gateway.duckdns.org",
        "X402_CHANNEL_ID": "chan_smoke_test_001"
      }
    }
  }
}

Windows

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "solana-x402-compliance": {
      "command": "cmd",
      "args": ["/c", "npx", "-y", "@msantagiulianab/x402-mcp-server"],
      "env": {
        "X402_GATEWAY_URL": "https://msb-solana-enterprise-payment-gateway.duckdns.org",
        "X402_CHANNEL_ID": "chan_smoke_test_001"
      }
    }
  }
}

VS Code Cline

Add the server to cline_mcp_settings.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "solana-x402-compliance": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@msantagiulianab/x402-mcp-server"],
      "env": {
        "X402_GATEWAY_URL": "https://msb-solana-enterprise-payment-gateway.duckdns.org",
        "X402_CHANNEL_ID": "chan_smoke_test_001"
      }
    }
  }
}

Verified Dual Compliance Screening Outcomes

The screen_solana_address tool returns one of two verified outcomes:

Related MCP server: solana-forensics

Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server

This repository contains the official open-source MCP server implementation located at /agent-tools/mcp-server.

• Implementation: TypeScript (agent-tools/mcp-server/src)

• NPM Package: @msantagiulianab/x402-mcp-server

• Executable: npx -y @msantagiulianab/x402-mcp-server

Table of Contents

1. Executive Architecture & Core Thesis

2. System Components

3. Complete Protocol Sequence Diagram

4. Cryptographic & Voucher Wire Specification

5. HTTP Wire Headers & JSON Schemas

6. Database Schema & State Transitions

7. Quickstart & Verification

8. Configuration Parameters

9. Production Extension & Customization Guide

10. Project Layout

11. Testing

12. Security & Compliance Posture

1. Executive Architecture & Core Thesis

Problem

Base-layer blockchain latency and per-transaction fees are fundamentally incompatible with high-throughput, micro-metered HTTP APIs. Use cases such as:

• AI inference billed per token or per call,

• RWA (real-world asset) valuation feeds billed per oracle read,

• Compliance / sanctions screening billed per address,

…each issue millions of sub-cent requests per day. Settling every call directly on Solana would impose block-confirmation latency (hundreds of milliseconds to seconds) and a per-transaction fee that dwarfs the price of a single metered call. The economics do not close, and the user experience collapses.

Solution

The gateway decouples the metering decision from the settlement transaction using the x402 HTTP challenge-and-response protocol:

1. Monotonic unidirectional off-chain state channels. A client presents a signed voucher whose cumulativeAmountAtomic only ever increases for a channel. The gateway trusts the voucher only insofar as (a) it is signed by the channel owner, (b) its nonce is strictly monotonic, and (c) its cumulative spend does not exceed the verified on-chain escrow deposit.

2. RFC 9110 402 Payment Required filter. A Spring OncePerRequestFilter issues a PAYMENT-REQUIRED challenge to unauthenticated callers and accepts a PAYMENT-SIGNATURE voucher on retry, attaching a PAYMENT-RESPONSE receipt on success.

3. < 5ms hot path. Voucher verification is pure in-memory Ed25519 crypto plus a short-TTL cache of the escrow balance. No synchronous Solana RPC call is ever made on the HTTP request path.

4. Batched on-chain settlement. An administrative endpoint sweeps a channel's highest-nonce verified cumulative amount to the treasury in a single signed transaction, recorded atomically in the audit ledger.

The result is deterministic, single-digit-millisecond payment gating with fail-closed rejection, a complete audit trail, and on-chain finality only where it matters: at settlement.

Zero-Dependency Philosophy

The gateway deliberately avoids all generic Web3 SDK baggage:

There is no @solana/web3.js, no solana4j/p4j, and no runtime invocation of an external process. Wire transactions are serialized byte-by-byte from first principles, and the JVM-native crypto stack is the only third-party cryptographic primitive.

2. System Components

The gateway follows a strict layered separation:

HTTP Request
   │
   ▼
X402PaymentFilter (OncePerRequestFilter)          ── 402 challenge / 403 reject / pass-through
   │
   ├──▶ ChannelVoucherVerifier (service)          ── in-memory nonce watermark + Ed25519 + ceiling check
   │        └──▶ EscrowBalanceProvider            ── SolanaEscrowVerifier (short-TTL cache)
   │
   ├──▶ PaymentAuditService (service)             ── append VERIFIED record
   │        └──▶ PaymentAuditRepository (JPA)     ── append-only PostgreSQL ledger
   │
   └──▶ downstream @RestController               ── compliance screening, (your) metered APIs

Settlement (admin, off hot path):
   POST /api/v1/settlement/channels/{id}/sweep
   │
   ▼
ChannelSettlementService (service)
   ├──▶ SolanaRpcClient                          ── getLatestBlockhash / sendTransaction (JSON-RPC 2.0)
   ├──▶ SolanaWireTransactionBuilder             ── serialize + sign (in-process)
   └──▶ PaymentAuditRepository                   ── VERIFIED → SETTLED (markSettled)

3. Complete Protocol Sequence Diagram

The full x402 challenge-and-response lifecycle across the client, the gateway (filter / verifier / ledger / settlement), and the Solana RPC node:

 Client                Gateway (Spring Boot)                                Solana RPC        PostgreSQL
   │                           │                                              │                 │
   │ 1. POST /api/v1/...       │                                              │                 │
   │    (no payment headers)   │                                              │                 │
   │ ─────────────────────────▶│                                              │                 │
   │                           │ X402PaymentFilter.shouldNotFilter()          │                 │
   │                           │  · /api/v1/*  → protected                    │                 │
   │                           │  · /api/v1/settlement/* → skip (admin)       │                 │
   │                           │                                              │                 │
   │ 2. HTTP 402 + PAYMENT-REQUIRED (Base64 challenge JSON)                  │                 │
   │ ◀─────────────────────────│                                              │                 │
   │                           │                                              │                 │
   │ 3. POST /api/v1/...       │                                              │                 │
   │    + PAYMENT-SIGNATURE    │                                              │                 │
   │    (Base64 voucher JSON)  │                                              │                 │
   │ ─────────────────────────▶│                                              │                 │
   │                           │ 4. Base64-decode → PaymentVoucher record     │                 │
   │                           │ 5. ChannelVoucherVerifier.verifyVoucher()    │                 │
   │                           │    a. Base58 payer key valid?                │                 │
   │                           │    b. nonce > lastSeenNonce[channel]?        │                 │
   │                           │    c. cumulative ≤ escrow ceiling?           │                 │
   │                           │       (short-TTL cache; NO RPC on hot path)  │                 │
   │                           │    d. Ed25519 verify(canonical bytes)        │                 │
   │                           │    ── any failure → 403 Forbidden (fail-     │                 │
   │                           │       closed) and audit log                  │                 │
   │                           │ 6. PaymentAuditService.recordVerifiedVoucher │                 │
   │                           │ ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────▶  append
   │                           │                                              │              VERIFIED row
   │ 7. HTTP 200 + PAYMENT-RESPONSE (Base64 receipt JSON)                    │                 │
   │ ◀─────────────────────────│                                              │                 │
   │                           │                                              │                 │
   │  [later] POST /api/v1/settlement/channels/{id}/sweep                    │                 │
   │ ─────────────────────────▶│                                              │                 │
   │                           │ 8. ChannelSettlementService.settleChannel()  │                 │
   │                           │    a. load latest VERIFIED record            │                 │
   │                           │    b. getLatestBlockhash() ──────────────────▶│                 │
   │                           │ ◀─────────────────────────────── blockhash   │                 │
   │                           │    c. SolanaWireTransactionBuilder            │                 │
   │                           │       .serializeAndSign() (in-process)       │                 │
   │                           │    d. sendTransaction(wireTx) ───────────────▶│                 │
   │                           │ ◀─────────────────────────────── txSignature │                 │
   │                           │ 9. record.markSettled(txSignature)           │                 │
   │                           │ ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────▶  SETTLED row
   │ 10. HTTP 200 { txSignature, settledAmountAtomic, ... }                  │                 │
   │ ◀─────────────────────────│                                              │                 │

Key invariant: steps 4–6 never touch the network. The only RPC interactions are the off-path settlement sweep (step 8), keeping the request hot path deterministic and sub-5ms.

4. Cryptographic & Voucher Wire Specification

Canonical byte layout

A voucher is signed over a deterministic, domain-separated byte string (see PaymentVoucher#getCanonicalPayload()):

"X402_CHANNEL_V1:" || u16le(channelId.length) || channelId || i64le(cumulativeAmountAtomic) || i64le(nonce)

The domain tag provides cross-protocol disambiguation (a signature over these bytes can never be replayed against another message scheme). Both integer fields are little-endian to match the JVM ByteOrder.LITTLE_ENDIAN buffer and the JavaScript reference signer in smoke-test.sh, which mirrors the layout exactly (writeUInt16LE + writeBigInt64LE).

Ed25519 over Base58 public keys

• The payer public key is a Base58-encoded 32-byte Ed25519 public key.

• The signature is a Base58-encoded 64-byte Ed25519 signature.

• Verification is org.bouncycastle.crypto.signers.Ed25519Signer initialized in verify mode with Ed25519PublicKeyParameters(pubkeyBytes, 0).

• SolanaAddressValidator.isValid() rejects anything that does not decode to exactly 32 bytes — a structural guard that runs before the crypto check.

Monotonic nonce guarantees & anti-replay mechanics

1. Strict monotonicity (in-memory). ChannelVoucherVerifier maintains a ConcurrentHashMap<String, Long> of the highest nonce seen per channel. Any voucher whose nonce <= lastSeenNonce[channel] is rejected before any cryptographic work, returning 403 Forbidden.

2. Constraint-level replay defense (database). The audit ledger enforces a UNIQUE (channel_id, nonce) index (uk_payment_audit_ledger_channel_nonce), so a replayed nonce can never be persisted even if the in-memory watermark is bypassed (e.g. after a restart with an empty map).

3. Monotonic cumulative amount. Because cumulativeAmountAtomic only grows across a channel's voucher sequence, the gateway never needs per-call payment state — it trusts the latest cumulative value as the running spend ceiling.

4. Fail-closed ceiling. If the cumulative amount exceeds the verified escrow deposit ceiling (EscrowBalanceProvider), the voucher is rejected. A missing, depleted, or unreadable escrow account yields a ceiling of 0, never a positive balance.

Voucher JSON payload

{
  "channelId": "chan_demo_solana_001",
  "payerPubkey": "7xKXtg2CW87d97TXJSDpbD5jBkheTqA83TZRuJosgAsU",
  "cumulativeAmountAtomic": 5000,
  "nonce": 10,
  "signature": "<Base58 64-byte Ed25519 signature>"
}

5. HTTP Wire Headers & JSON Schemas

All x402 headers are Base64-encoded JSON. The gateway accepts and emits both a canonical and an X--prefixed alias for forward compatibility.

Challenge (PAYMENT-REQUIRED)

{
  "x402Version": 2,
  "scheme": "channel",
  "network": "solana:devnet",
  "escrowAddress": "7xKXtg2CW87d97TXJSDpbD5jBkheTqA83TZRuJosgAsU",
  "asset": "USDC",
  "priceAtomicUnits": 5000,
  "unit": "per-call",
  "message": "Payment required via Solana payment channel or gasless voucher"
}

Receipt (PAYMENT-RESPONSE)

{
  "channelId": "chan_demo_solana_001",
  "settledAmountAtomic": 5000,
  "nonce": 10,
  "timestamp": 1750000000000,
  "status": "VERIFIED"
}

Example curl flows

# 0) Machine-readable x402 discovery document (unauthenticated)
curl -i http://localhost:8080/.well-known/x402.json
# → HTTP/1.1 200 { "x402Version": 2, "name": "...", "services": [ ... ] }

# 1) Unauthenticated request → 402 challenge
curl -i -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/compliance/screen-address \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"address":"4Nd1mBQtrMJVYVfKf2PJy9NZGibCcTRxpETqdrBHu19Y"}'
# → HTTP/1.1 402, PAYMENT-REQUIRED: <Base64 challenge JSON>

# 2) Replay with a signed voucher header → 200 + receipt
curl -i -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/compliance/screen-address \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "PAYMENT-SIGNATURE: <Base64 voucher JSON>" \
  -d '{"address":"4Nd1mBQtrMJVYVfKf2PJy9NZGibCcTRxpETqdrBHu19Y"}'
# → HTTP/1.1 200, PAYMENT-RESPONSE: <Base64 receipt JSON>

# 3) Administrative on-chain settlement sweep
curl -i -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/settlement/channels/chan_smoke_test_001/sweep
# → HTTP/1.1 200 { "channelId": "...", "settledAmountAtomic": 5000, "txSignature": "...", ... }

6. Database Schema & State Transitions

The schema is owned exclusively by versioned Flyway migrations (src/main/resources/db/migration). Production runs with spring.jpa.hibernate.ddl-auto: validate, so Hibernate never emits DDL — it only verifies that the JPA entity maps onto the migrated schema.

payment_audit_ledger (V1 → V2)

Indexes

• V1 — V1__init_payment_audit_ledger.sql creates the table, the unique anti-replay index, and the two lookup indexes.

• V2 — V2__add_settlement_tx_signature.sql adds the nullable tx_signature column so previously-appended VERIFIED rows remain valid until swept.

Append-only contract

The table is append-only by contract: the application never issues UPDATE or DELETE against it, the PaymentAuditRepository declares no mutation methods beyond save (insert), and the JPA entity exposes no mutators other than the single legal state transition below.

Channel state lifecycle

        voucher verified & appended
   ┌──────────────────────────────────▶  VERIFIED
   │                                        │
   │                                        │  ChannelSettlementService.settleChannel()
   │                                        │  → record.markSettled(txSignature)
   │                                        ▼
   └────────────────────────────────────  SETTLED

PaymentAuditRecord.markSettled(txSignature) enforces the only legal transition:

• VERIFIED → SETTLED — allowed only once a non-blank txSignature is supplied.

• Any other transition (e.g. SETTLED → SETTLED, or null → SETTLED) throws IllegalStateException.

The ChannelSettlementService sweeps the highest-nonce VERIFIED record for a channel (findTopByChannelIdOrderByNonceDesc) — because cumulative amounts are monotonic, the latest record already represents the full outstanding balance, and settling it atomically closes the channel.

7. Quickstart & Verification

Prerequisites

• Docker + Docker Compose (for the full stack)

• JDK 25 (host toolchain; the project compiles to Java 21 bytecode)

• Maven Wrapper (./mvnw) — no system Maven required

• For the smoke test only: curl, node (≥ 12), and optionally jq

1. Launch the full stack

docker compose up -d --build

This builds the multi-stage Dockerfile (Temurin 25 builder → Temurin 25 JRE runtime, non-root appuser) and starts:

The application waits for the database healthcheck, then applies the Flyway migrations (V1, V2) on startup.

2. Automated end-to-end smoke test

./smoke-test.sh

The script exercises the complete protocol in five stages and exits non-zero on any failure:

Fresh stack only. The voucher uses the fixed nonce 1 and the ledger is append-only, so a second run against the same app process fails closed (403 / already-settled). Reset cleanly with docker compose down -v && docker compose up -d --build.

3. Local development & testing

./mvnw clean test

Runs the full 47-test JUnit 5 suite against an in-memory H2 database in PostgreSQL mode (src/test/resources/application-test.yml) with Flyway applying the same V1/V2 migrations. RPC mock mode is enabled so the suite is deterministic and never dials an external Solana node.

./mvnw spring-boot:run          # run locally (expects localhost PostgreSQL)

8. Configuration Parameters

All values live in src/main/resources/application.yml. Spring Boot's relaxed binding maps uppercase/underscore environment variables onto these keys; explicit ${ENV:default} placeholders are listed where they exist.

Security. solana.gateway.mock-private-key is a deterministic mock seed used only for offline/local settlement. In production, replace it with a secret-manager-backed key (e.g. KMS/HSM or an environment-injected secret) and never commit a funded key.

9. Production Extension & Customization Guide

This gateway is a template middleware, not a fixed product. The sections below show how to adapt it to any metered API domain — new endpoints, dynamic pricing, token settlement, and custom escrow programs.

(a) Securing New Endpoints

The X402PaymentFilter protects everything under /api/v1/ except the administrative settlement paths. To place a new metered resource behind x402, simply map a controller under /api/v1/:

@RestController
@RequestMapping("/api/v1/ai")
public class InferenceController {
    @PostMapping("/infer")
    public Map<String, Object> infer(@RequestBody InferenceRequest request) {
        return inferenceEngine.run(request);
    }
}

@RestController
@RequestMapping("/api/v1/rwa")
public class OracleController {
    @GetMapping("/oracle/{asset}")
    public Map<String, Object> valuation(@PathVariable String asset) {
        return valuationFeed.price(asset);
    }
}

Both /api/v1/ai/infer and /api/v1/rwa/oracle are now automatically gated: a request without a PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header receives 402, and a valid voucher is required to reach the controller.

To tune which paths are protected or excluded, override X402PaymentFilter#shouldNotFilter(HttpServletRequest):

@Override
protected boolean shouldNotFilter(HttpServletRequest request) {
    String path = request.getRequestURI();
    if (path.startsWith("/api/v1/settlement/")) return true;   // admin, unpaid
    if (path.startsWith("/api/v1/public/"))    return true;      // free endpoints
    return !path.startsWith("/api/v1/");
}

(b) Custom Pricing & Metering

By default the filter charges a single static price (x402.price-atomic-units: 5000) for every call. For request-shape or user-tier pricing, replace the @Value-injected unitPriceAtomic with a pricing service:

@Service
public class RequestPricingService {
    public long priceFor(HttpServletRequest request) {
        return switch (request.getRequestURI()) {
            case "/api/v1/ai/infer"      -> 5000;   // 0.005 USDC per inference
            case "/api/v1/rwa/oracle"    -> 10000;  // 0.010 USDC per oracle read
            default                      -> 5000;   // fallback per-call price
        };
    }
}

Then inject RequestPricingService into X402PaymentFilter and compute the per-request price at the top of doFilterInternal, passing it into both the 402 challenge and the verifier call:

long price = pricingService.priceFor(request);
boolean authorized = voucherVerifier.verifyVoucher(voucher, price);

For tiered billing (free tier, standard, enterprise), look up the payer's tier from voucher.payerPubkey() (or an internal customer registry) and multiply the base price accordingly. The voucher itself remains monotonic and cumulative — the client simply signs cumulativeAmountAtomic += price on each call.

(c) Token Adaptation (SOL → SPL / Token-2022)

SolanaWireTransactionBuilder ships with two instruction factories. Native SOL settlement uses the System program (0x02 discriminator):

byte[] source = payer.getPublicKeyBytes();
byte[] treasury = Base58.decode(treasuryPubkey);
SolanaInstruction transfer = SolanaWireTransactionBuilder.systemTransfer(source, treasury, amount);

To settle in SPL Tokens (e.g. USDC) instead of native SOL, switch the instruction in ChannelSettlementService.settleChannel() to the legacy SPL Token transfer (0x03 discriminator, program id TokenkegQfeZyiNwAJbNbGKPFXCWuBvf9Ss623VQ5DA):

// USDC is a 6-decimal SPL token, so scale the raw amount by 10^6.
long amountRaw = amountAtomic * 1_000_000L;
SolanaInstruction transfer = SolanaWireTransactionBuilder.tokenTransfer(
        sourceTokenAccount,      // gateway's associated token account
        treasuryTokenAccount,     // treasury's associated token account
        authority,                // token authority (signer)
        amountRaw);

Notes:

• Associated Token Accounts (ATAs) must be resolved (or derived via getAssociatedTokenAddress) before settling; the builder itself only serializes the instruction.

• Token-2022 uses the program id TokenzQdBNbLqP5VEhdkAS6EPFLC1PHnBqCXEpPxuEb and, for mint/transfer-fee tokens, the transferChecked instruction (which carries the mint + decimals). Add a new factory alongside tokenTransfer rather than reusing the legacy 0x03 discriminator.

• Update x402.asset / x402.price-atomic-units and the challenge to advertise the correct asset and decimal-scaled price.

(d) Custom Escrow Verification

Escrow balance resolution is behind the EscrowBalanceProvider interface, so the verifier never depends on a concrete address or account layout:

public interface EscrowBalanceProvider {
    long getVerifiedDepositCeiling(String channelId);
}

The stock SolanaEscrowVerifier resolves a single settlement escrow (x402.escrow-pubkey) and caches the lamport balance for a short TTL. To wire a custom smart contract, PDA program, or per-channel escrow, either:

1. Override address resolution. Replace SolanaEscrowVerifier#resolveEscrowAddress with PDA derivation (e.g. findProgramAddress(seeds, programId)) so each channel resolves to its own escrow account; or

2. Provide your own bean. Implement EscrowBalanceProvider, parse the account's data field for a custom balance layout (not just lamports), and expose it as the primary @Component. The filter/verifier chain is unchanged.

The critical contract — fail closed — must be preserved: a missing, depleted, or unreadable escrow must yield a ceiling of 0, never a positive balance.

@Component
public class CustomProgramEscrowVerifier implements EscrowBalanceProvider {
    private final SolanaRpcClient rpc;

    public CustomProgramEscrowVerifier(SolanaRpcClient rpc) { this.rpc = rpc; }

    @Override
    public long getVerifiedDepositCeiling(String channelId) {
        String escrow = deriveEscrowPda(channelId);          // program-owned PDA
        return rpc.getAccountInfo(escrow)
                .map(AccountInfoResponse::value)
                .map(AccountInfoValue::data)
                .map(data -> decodeDepositCeiling(data))      // custom layout
                .orElse(0L);                                  // fail closed
    }
}

10. Project Layout

.
├── pom.xml                                  # Java 21 target, Spring Boot 3.4.3, BouncyCastle 1.78.1
├── Dockerfile                               # multi-stage: Temurin 25 builder → 25-jre-alpine runtime
├── docker-compose.yml                       # PostgreSQL 16 + gateway app
├── smoke-test.sh                            # 5-stage end-to-end x402 verification
├── mvnw / mvnw.cmd / .mvn/wrapper/          # Maven wrapper (no system Maven needed)
└── src
    ├── main
    │   ├── java/com/msb/solana/gateway
    │   │   ├── SolanaPaymentGatewayApplication.java
    │   │   ├── compliance/        AddressRiskEvaluator, ThreatIntelligenceRegistry, ScreeningVerdict, ScreeningResult, ScreeningFlag
    │   │   ├── config/            SolanaRpcConfig.java (JDK HttpClient bean)
    │   │   ├── controller/        ComplianceScreeningController, SettlementController, X402DiscoveryController
    │   │   ├── entity/            PaymentAuditRecord, PaymentAuditStatus
    │   │   ├── filter/            X402PaymentFilter.java
    │   │   ├── model/             PaymentRequiredChallenge, PaymentVoucher,
    │   │   │                      PaymentSettlementReceipt, SettlementResult, X402DiscoveryResponse
    │   │   ├── repository/        PaymentAuditRepository.java
    │   │   ├── rpc/               SolanaRpcClient.java (+ model/* JSON-RPC DTOs)
    │   │   ├── serialization/     Base58, CompactU16, AccountMeta, SolanaInstruction,
    │   │   │                      SolanaKeypair, SolanaKeypairService,
    │   │   │                      SolanaWireTransactionBuilder, Ed25519SignatureVerifier,
    │   │   │                      SolanaAddressValidator
    │   │   └── service/           ChannelVoucherVerifier, ChannelSettlementService,
    │   │                          PaymentAuditService, SolanaEscrowVerifier,
    │   │                          EscrowBalanceProvider
    │   └── resources/
    │       ├── application.yml
    │       └── db/migration/      V1__init_payment_audit_ledger.sql,
    │                              V2__add_settlement_tx_signature.sql
    └── test
        ├── java/...              11 test classes (47 tests)
        └── resources/application-test.yml   # H2 (PostgreSQL mode) + mock RPC

11. Testing

The suite runs 47 tests across 11 classes with JUnit 5, Mockito, and MockMvc:

The MockMvc integration tests verify the five mandated protocol outcomes:

1. Unauthenticated request → 402 with a correct Base64 PAYMENT-REQUIRED header.

2. Valid voucher → 200 + downstream payload + PAYMENT-RESPONSE header.

3. Tampered signature → 403 Forbidden (fail-closed).

4. Replayed/stale nonce → 403 Forbidden with audit logging.

5. Insufficient channel balance → fail-closed rejection.

The project targets >95% coverage for the cryptographic (serialization) and filter components.

12. Security & Compliance Posture

• Fail-closed by default. Missing header → 402; tampered signature, replayed nonce, or exceeded ceiling → 403. Malformed header → 400. No code path grants access on an unreadable RPC node or escrow.

• Append-only audit trail. Every verification is persisted exactly once; the schema and repository forbid mutation, and the UNIQUE(channel_id, nonce) index makes replay impossible at the database layer.

• No private keys persisted or logged. SolanaKeypair holds the signing key in-memory only; the public-key accessor returns a defensive copy. Logs record channel IDs, nonces, amounts, and tx signatures — never key material.

• Non-root container. The runtime image runs as an unprivileged appuser with -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError and container-aware heap sizing.

• Schema drift rejection. hibernate.ddl-auto: validate ensures the JPA model can never silently diverge from the versioned Flyway schema.

• Deterministic mock mode. solana.rpc.mock-mode: true (tests and the local compose stack) produces stable, replayable signatures without funded accounts; production sets it to false to exercise live devnet/mainnet settlement.