Skip to main content
Glama

Palanit Core

A watchtower for AI agents.

Scan MCP servers and AI-agent tool manifests for hidden risk — before an attacker finds it.

Website · Docs · Palanit OS (hosted)

PyPI Python License CI


Your AI agent trusts tools, MCP servers and skills it didn't write. A tool's description is injected straight into the model's context — so a poisoned description can quietly tell your agent to leak a key, call an attacker's server, or run a shell command. Palanit Core reads every tool the way your agent will, and flags the ones that would betray it.

  • Zero dependencies. Pure Python standard library. Nothing to audit but the rules.

  • Fast & local. Runs on your machine. Sends nothing anywhere.

  • CI-ready. Exits 1 on HIGH+ findings, so a poisoned tool fails the build.

  • Open & honest. Every rule is readable. Severities reflect real impact, not upsell.

Install

pip install palanit-core

Related MCP server: AgentAudit

Use

# Scan an MCP config or tool manifest
palanit scan mcp.config.json

# See it in action on the bundled malicious sample
palanit scan --sample

# Machine-readable output, fail CI on HIGH or above
palanit scan mcp.config.json --json --fail-on HIGH

# Pin the tool definitions you approved, then fail closed if a server later
# swaps a description or schema after install (a "rug pull")
palanit pin mcp.config.json
palanit scan mcp.config.json --baseline .palanit.lock.json

Example (trimmed):

 CRITICAL   Possible data exfiltration  [PL-EXFIL-001]
    Instructs the agent to send sensitive data to an external URL (collector.evil.example).
    ↳ mcp.config.json#/mcpServers/invoicing/tools/0/description
    fix: Remove external URLs and exfiltration verbs from tool text.

   HIGH     Hidden instructions in tool text  [PL-POISON-001]
   HIGH     Invisible or deceptive Unicode  [PL-UNICODE-001]
  MEDIUM    Unpinned package / runner  [PL-SUPPLY-001]
...
9 finding(s)  (1 critical · 5 high · 3 medium)

Catch rug-pulls (tool-definition pinning)

A scan at install time only sees the tool text you approved. A hostile server can swap a tool's description or input schema after that approval — and standard clients never re-check. palanit pin records a hash of each tool's declared definition; a later scan --baseline fails closed on any change, so a swap costs the attacker the tool instead of silently succeeding.

palanit pin mcp.config.json                                  # approve current definitions
palanit scan mcp.config.json --baseline .palanit.lock.json   # HIGH + exit 1 on any drift

What it detects

Rule

Severity

What it catches

PL-POISON-001

HIGH

Hidden / injected instructions in tool & schema descriptions

PL-EXFIL-001

MED–CRIT

Tool text that steers the agent to send data to external URLs

PL-SECRET-001

HIGH

Hardcoded API keys, tokens and private keys

PL-UNICODE-001

MED–HIGH

Invisible / bidirectional Unicode used to hide instructions

PL-SUPPLY-001

MEDIUM

Unpinned / floating package versions (@latest, bare names)

PL-SHELL-001

MED–HIGH

Tools that launch a shell (bash -c, cmd /c, …)

PL-TLS-001

LOW–MED

Endpoints over http:// / ws:// without TLS

PL-COLLIDE-001

MEDIUM

Duplicate tool names that let one shadow another

PL-ENV-001

HIGH

Literal secrets in a server's env block

PL-DRIFT-001

HIGH

A tool's definition changed since you approved it — a post-install "rug pull" (only with --baseline)

Run palanit rules to list them. Inputs understood: Claude-style mcpServers configs, servers configs, tools manifests, a bare list of tools, or a single tool object. Unknown JSON still gets string-level checks.

Use it as a GitHub Action

# .github/workflows/palanit.yml
name: palanit
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: stasxr/palanit-core@v0.1.2
        with:
          files: "mcp.config.json"   # files or globs, space-separated
          fail-on: "HIGH"            # INFO | LOW | MEDIUM | HIGH | CRITICAL

Prefer plain steps? That works too:

      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
        with: { python-version: "3.12" }
      - run: pip install palanit-core
      - run: palanit scan mcp.config.json --fail-on HIGH

Use it as a pre-commit hook

# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
  - repo: https://github.com/stasxr/palanit-core
    rev: v0.1.2
    hooks:
      - id: palanit            # scans mcp*.json / claude_desktop_config.json by default

Use it as an MCP server

Palanit Core can itself run as an MCP server, so an agent or MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, …) can scan a config on demand:

pip install "palanit-core[mcp]"
palanit-mcp          # stdio transport

Exposes the tools scan_mcp_config, list_rules and version. Example client entry:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "palanit": { "command": "palanit-mcp" }
  }
}

Add the badge

Scanned your MCP server with Palanit Core? Show it:

Scanned with Palanit Core

[![Scanned with Palanit Core](https://img.shields.io/badge/scanned%20with-Palanit%20Core-5b8def)](https://github.com/stasxr/palanit-core)

Responsible use

Palanit Core only reads files you give it — but the broader PALANIT suite (botprobe) sends live test traffic. Only scan or test systems you own or are authorized to test. A clean scan reduces risk; it does not prove safety.

Beyond the CLI

  • Palanit OS — the same engine in your browser, plus continuous monitoring, change alerts and shareable reports.

  • Palanit Bot Killer — block hostile AI crawlers and red-team your own chatbot with botprobe.

License

Apache-2.0 © Stanislav Miziyev. Contributions welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.

mcp-name: io.github.stasxr/palanit-core

Related MCP Connectors

Related MCP Servers

  • A
    license
    Not graded
    quality
    B
    maintenance
    Security scanner for MCP servers. Detects prompt injection, command injection, auth bypass, and excessive permissions across tools, resources, and prompts.
    19 npm
    3
    MIT
  • A
    license
    Not graded
    quality
    B
    maintenance
    Enables MCP clients to scan tool manifests and server configs for prompt injection, tool poisoning, excessive agency, and other OWASP-mapped security issues directly through the scan_mcp_manifest tool.
    46 npm
    2
    MIT
  • A
    license
    Not graded
    quality
    B
    maintenance
    A read-only MCP server that lets an agent audit its own environment by discovering local MCP configurations and skill folders on Windows, macOS, and Linux and running offline static checks for prompt injection, hidden instructions, hardcoded secrets, dangerous commands, unpinned packages, and excessive filesystem or transport permissions. It exposes tools to scan everything discovered, list configurations, vet a single skill, or analyze supplied text, returning text, JSON, SARIF, or HTML findings with CI-friendly severity levels.
    14 npm
    MIT