rnv-mcp-identity
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@rnv-mcp-identityverify agent identity and authorize scope read"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
rnv-mcp-identity
An identity and authorization layer for MCP servers. On every tool call it asks one question, is this caller who it claims to be, and is this action within what it's allowed to do?, and answers with exactly one of three outcomes:
allow: identity resolved, verified, and the action is in scope.
deny: verified, but out of scope; or an identity was presented and failed verification.
unknown: identity could not be established at all. The call is refused.
An unknown caller never acts. That rule is the whole project: resolve or refuse, never guess.
Status: reference implementation, complete at v0.1.0, Apache-2.0. Built under AIII, the Artificial Intelligence Identification Initiative: a build record, not a standards bid. It composes on existing standards (the MCP authorization model, WIMSE workload identity, RFC 7800 key confirmation, RFC 7638 thumbprints, EAT attestation) rather than replacing them.
Live demo: Identity Gate on Hugging Face Spaces, running this engine on the released v0.1.0.
What's here
src/rnv_mcp_identity/— the library: a framework-agnostic decision engine (L1 identity, L2 verification, L3 authorization) plus a FastMCP middleware adapter. The core has no runtime dependencies.examples/— a runnable FastMCP server guarded by the layer, an in-process test, and an HTTP client. Start here to watch it allow one call and refuse three.docs/SPEC.md— the normative spec: the decision sequence, the capability and policy model, the threat model, and the v0 wire format.docs/AAIF-READINESS.md— the foundation-readiness assessment, retired: the evaluation, the conclusion, and why the submission was not pursued.
Related MCP server: enterprise-auth-mcp-server
Quickstart
pip install -e ".[dev,verify,fastmcp]"
python -m pytest -q # the full suite
python -m pytest -q tests/test_demo_inprocess.py # just the guarded-server demoRun the demo over real HTTP:
python examples/demo_server.py # terminal 1
python examples/demo_client_http.py # terminal 2The wire format (v0)
The identity token rides in the mcp-agent-identity header and a holder-of-key
proof in mcp-agent-proof. The proof binds to the exact token, so a stolen token
alone can't act. The reference client in examples/ is the normative example; see
docs/SPEC.md section 10.
Docs
docs/SPEC.md— the specificationdocs/ROADMAP.md— where this is goingdocs/PRIOR-ART.md— what it builds on, and the gap it fillsdocs/GOVERNANCE.md— how decisions are madeCONTRIBUTING.md— how to helpSECURITY.md— how to report vulnerabilitiesdocs/AAIF-READINESS.md— foundation-readiness assessment
License
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.
A note on affiliation
This project aspires to become a foundation-hosted project and is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or accepted into the AAIF or the Linux Foundation. See docs/AAIF-READINESS.md for an honest account of where it stands.
Verifying a release
Each GitHub release carries the build artifacts, a SHA256SUMS manifest, a
Sigstore signature over that manifest (SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json), and a
CycloneDX SBOM (sbom.cdx.json).
Check integrity (hashes):
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMSVerify authenticity and the signer's identity (keyless Sigstore):
pip install sigstore
python -m sigstore verify identity \
--cert-identity "https://github.com/RNVizion/rnv-mcp-identity/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v0.1.0" \
--cert-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
--bundle SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json \
SHA256SUMSA valid result proves the manifest was produced by this repository's release
workflow under GitHub's OIDC, not by a third party. Replace the tag in
--cert-identity with the release you are verifying.
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
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