gutsy-mcp
gutsy-mcp
A local gut check for coding agents. Before Claude Code, Codex, Cursor or Copilot runs
rm -rf, force-pushes, deploys or sends something, it calls gut_check and gets back
calibrated probabilities that the action is intended and safe, plus a recommendation:
proceed, confirm (ask the user first) or block.
Runs on your CPU with gutsy (0.8B, 775 MB GGUF). No API calls, no per-call cost, deterministic, and your code never leaves the machine.
What it is and isn't
It's a fast second opinion that adds friction where it's warranted. It is not a security boundary: the agent decides whether to call it and writes the context it sees, and a 0.8B model is weak at ambiguity and multi-step rules (see the model card). Keep your normal permission settings on. Default thresholds aren't tuned for your workflow; log the probabilities and adjust them.
Related MCP server: airlock
1. Start the gutsy runtime
git clone https://github.com/kouhxp/gutsy
pip install -e gutsy/gutsy-inference
hf download kouhxp/gutsy --include "gutsy-0.8b-v04*" --local-dir gutsy/gutsy-inference/models
cd gutsy/gutsy-inference && cp models.example.json models.json
gutsy-inference check && gutsy-inference serve # http://127.0.0.1:8765Or set GUTSY_INFERENCE_DIR=/path/to/gutsy/gutsy-inference and gutsy-mcp starts it on
first use.
2. Add the MCP server
Claude Code:
claude mcp add gutsy -- uvx gutsy-mcpCursor (.cursor/mcp.json) / Claude Desktop:
{ "mcpServers": { "gutsy": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["gutsy-mcp"] } } }VS Code (.vscode/mcp.json):
{ "servers": { "gutsy": { "type": "stdio", "command": "uvx", "args": ["gutsy-mcp"] } } }Codex (~/.codex/config.toml):
[mcp_servers.gutsy]
command = "uvx"
args = ["gutsy-mcp"]Then tell the agent when to use it (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, .cursor/rules):
Before deleting files, rewriting git history, force-pushing, touching databases, deploying, publishing or sending anything, call
gut_check. If it doesn't returnproceed, stop and ask me.
3. Optional: enforce it with a Claude Code hook
An MCP tool only runs if the agent remembers to call it. The hook runs on every risky-looking Bash command regardless. It can only ask or deny, never auto-approve.
uv tool install gutsy-mcp # puts gutsy-hook on PATH.claude/settings.json:
{
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{ "matcher": "Bash", "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "gutsy-hook", "timeout": 60 }] }
]
}
}block becomes a confirmation prompt by default; set GUTSY_HOOK_ALLOW_DENY=1 to deny outright.
Tool
gut_check(action, context="", user_request="") returns:
{
"recommendation": "confirm",
"reason": "Not confident enough to proceed without the user.",
"p_intended": 0.41,
"p_reversible": 0.08,
"verdict_probabilities": {"proceed": 0.22, "confirm": 0.61, "block": 0.17},
"reject": 0.04,
"confidence": 0.42
}env var | default | |
|
| runtime URL |
| lets gutsy-mcp start the runtime | |
| runtime default | model name from |
|
| |
|
| |
| if you run |
License: Apache 2.0.
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
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