scopeguard-mcp

An MCP stdio server that gives bug-hunting AI agents an enforceable authorized-scope guardrail: every target is checked against a declarative allow/deny list before a finding can be recorded, and evidence is stripped of secrets on the way in.

Problem

Agent-driven bug hunting fails in a predictable way: the agent happily turns toward a host the operator never authorized, or it pastes a live credential from a captured response straight into a finding (and from there into an LLM prompt). Human review catches that after the fact — if at all.

scopeguard-mcp puts the check in the middle of the loop, as MCP tools the agent must call:

1. check_target answers "am I allowed to touch this?" before any request.

2. add_finding re-checks the same scope itself and refuses out-of-scope records, so a rule skipped by the agent still holds.

3. redact removes tokens, keys, JWTs, card numbers and e-mail addresses from evidence before it leaves the workstation.

Related MCP server: sentrik

Key features

• Declarative scope — JSON allow/deny list with host (wildcard *.a.b), url (scheme + path prefix) and cidr rules. Deny always wins; loopback is always allowed so the local lab works out of the box.

• No network activity, ever — the scope decision is pure string/IP matching. No DNS lookups, no connections, so a check can never become a side channel to an unauthorized host.

• CVSS v3.1 Base scoring — verified against FIRST's published example vectors (9.8, 8.8, 7.8, 8.1, 7.5, 6.1, 0.0).

• Evidence redaction — GitHub/Slack/AWS tokens, PEM private keys, JWTs, bearer headers, api_key=... assignments, URL credentials, Luhn-valid card numbers and e-mail addresses.

• Append-only JSONL ledger — each finding stores the scope verdict that allowed it, with sequential IDs and corrupt-line tolerance.

• Zero dependencies — Python 3.10+ standard library only, including the JSON-RPC layer.

Example session

-> {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-03-26",...}}
<- {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","capabilities":{"tools":{}},"serverInfo":{"name":"scopeguard-mcp",...}}}
-> {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":4,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"check_target","arguments":{"target":"https://prod.staging.example.test"}}}
<- {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":4,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"{\"allowed\": false, \"reason\": \"explicitly denied by deny rule host:prod.staging.example.test\"}"}],"isError":false}}
-> {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":9,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"add_finding","arguments":{"target":"https://victim.example.org",...}}}
<- {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":9,"result":{"content":[{"type":"text","text":"refused (out of scope): no matching allow rule..."}],"isError":true}}

The full captured run is in results/demo_transcript.txt.

Architecture

MCP client (Claude Code / opencode / Cursor)
        │  newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0 over stdin/stdout
        ▼
server.py  ── initialize / tools/list / tools/call / ping
        ├─ scope.py     allow|deny verdicts (pure, no I/O)
        ├─ redact.py    secret + PII scrubbing
        ├─ cvss.py      CVSS:3.1 Base score
        └─ findings.py  append-only JSONL ledger

Protocol revision is pinned to 2025-03-26 (the initialize handshake era); 2024-11-05 clients are negotiated with. See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

Requirements

• Python 3.10 or newer

• No third-party runtime dependencies

• An MCP-capable client for interactive use (tests and demo only need Python)

Installation

git clone https://github.com/Wsh7Ash/scopeguard-mcp
cd scopeguard-mcp
pip install -e .            # installs the scopeguard-mcp console script

For a throwaway run without installing:

PYTHONPATH=src python -m scopeguard_mcp

Quick start

# 1. Show the active scope (loopback-only by default)
PYTHONPATH=src python -m scopeguard_mcp --print-scope

# 2. Run the scripted end-to-end session
PYTHONPATH=src python examples/demo_session.py

# 3. Run the test suite
PYTHONPATH=src python -m pytest -q

Usage examples

Register with an MCP client

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "scopeguard": {
      "command": "scopeguard-mcp",
      "args": ["--scope", "examples/scope.json", "--ledger", ".findings.jsonl"]
    }
  }
}

Authorize a staging host

Edit the scope document — see examples/scope.json:

{
  "name": "local-lab",
  "allow": [{ "type": "host", "value": "*.staging.example.test" }],
  "deny": [{ "type": "host", "value": "prod.staging.example.test" }]
}

Record a finding

tools/call add_finding
  title:    Debug endpoint reflects Authorization header
  target:   http://127.0.0.1:8080/debug
  evidence: Authorization: Bearer ghp_... echoed in HTML
  severity: high
  cvss:     CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
→ stored with id 1, evidence redacted, cvss_score 8.2

Configuration

Scope document fields: name, description, allow[], deny[], each rule being {"type": "host|url|cidr", "value": "..."}.

Testing

PYTHONPATH=src python -m pytest -q      # 43 tests

Coverage: CVSS fixtures from FIRST, scope matching (wildcards, path prefixes, CIDR, deny precedence), redaction patterns, ledger behaviour, and a subprocess-level MCP protocol test that exercises the real handshake, tool calls, tool errors and JSON-RPC error codes.

Project structure

scopeguard-mcp/
├─ src/scopeguard_mcp/
│  ├─ server.py     JSON-RPC dispatch + tool registry
│  ├─ scope.py      allow/deny evaluation (no I/O)
│  ├─ redact.py     secret/PII scrubbing
│  ├─ cvss.py       CVSS v3.1 Base score
│  ├─ findings.py   JSONL ledger
│  └─ __main__.py   CLI
├─ tests/           unit + protocol tests
├─ docs/            ARCHITECTURE.md, USAGE.md, PROJECT_SPEC.md
├─ examples/        scope.json, demo_session.py
├─ results/         demo_transcript.txt
└─ SECURITY.md

Limitations

• Base metric group only: Temporal and Environmental scores are not computed.

• No DNS resolution by design, so cidr rules only match IP-literal targets.

• The ledger is a local file with no locking; two concurrent writers could interleave lines (corrupt lines are skipped on read).

• Redaction is pattern-based. It catches common token shapes, not every bespoke secret; treat it as a safety net, not a guarantee.

• It guards scope, not behaviour: nothing here stops an authorized agent from making a destructive request to an authorized host.

Roadmap

• Optional tools/list pagination (nextCursor).

• Ledger export to SARIF for CI consumption.

• Scope rule unit tests as a CLI subcommand (--check-rule).

Security notes

Defensive tooling for targets you own or are explicitly authorized to test. See SECURITY.md for authorized-use wording, threat model and reporting.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.