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waqi-mcp

waqi-mcp

by Bilazann

Waqi — an MCP proxy that redacts PII before the model sees it

Waqi is a hosted MCP proxy that connects AI assistants (Claude, ChatGPT, and any MCP-capable client) to business tools — Stripe, Xero, Zoho, Slack, Jira, Asana, Monday, Notion, Shopify, Twilio and more — with PII redaction applied to every tool response, mid-pipeline, before it reaches the model.

Nobody types card numbers at an AI. The leak happens when the AI reads: ask "how much did we make this week?" and the charge list that comes back carries customer emails, card metadata, and phone numbers straight into a third-party context window. Waqi sits between your MCP client and your tools and strips that out — while the answer still comes back intact.

Try it right now, no signup: the live demo runs the real detection ruleset in your browser. Nothing you paste leaves the page — check the network tab.

How it works

flowchart LR
    A[Claude / ChatGPT /\nany MCP client] -->|one MCP URL\nper team member| B[Waqi proxy]
    B --> C[Stripe · Xero · Zoho · Slack\nJira · Asana · Monday · Notion …]
    C -->|raw response\nwith PII| B
    B -->|"detect → redact →\npseudonymise → log"| A

Every tool response goes through the same pipeline:

  • Structured detection — cards (Luhn-validated), IBANs (mod-97, including spaced print format), emails, phone numbers, government IDs, bank details, secrets, IP addresses. Checksum-gated so order references that merely look like card numbers don't get shredded.

  • Deterministic pseudonyms — the same value always maps to the same placeholder ([EMAIL:f4b1]), so the model can still reason "the same customer failed three times" without ever seeing who. Salted HMAC; not reversible.

  • Secrets are the exception — API keys and tokens are hard-redacted ([REDACTED:SECRET]), never pseudonymised.

  • Field-level walls — any listed free-text field (Slack message text, Jira summaries, …) can be hidden from the model entirely, one click per field.

  • Per-call audit log — who asked, which tool, what was stripped. The evidence trail for "what exactly did the model see?"

Honest scope note: structured detection catches identifiers with recognisable shape. Names written in prose are a different problem — that's local NER on our roadmap, and deliberately never a cloud LLM call (sending your data to a model to protect it from models would be absurd).

Related MCP server: PII Redaction MCP Server

Quickstart

Waqi is hosted — there's no server for you to run. Each team member gets a private MCP URL from the dashboard.

Claude (claude.ai or desktop): Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector → paste your Waqi URL. Done.

ChatGPT (paid plans): Settings → Connectors → enable Developer mode → Create → paste your Waqi URL, authentication "None" (the link carries your access).

stdio-only clients: this repo ships a thin bridge:

npx waqi-mcp https://waqi.bilazann.com/api/mcp/<your-token>

or in an MCP client config:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "waqi": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["waqi-mcp", "https://waqi.bilazann.com/api/mcp/<your-token>"]
    }
  }
}

Per-connector setup guides (which read-only key or OAuth scopes each tool needs): bilazann.com/waqi/docs.

Security model

  • Read-only by design. Connections use read-only OAuth scopes (Xero, Zoho, Slack, Jira, Asana, Monday) or restricted read-only keys (Stripe, Shopify, Twilio). Waqi cannot move money, edit records, or send messages.

  • Credentials are encrypted with AES-256-GCM before storage and decrypted only for the moment of your own request. Your passwords never touch Waqi — OAuth happens on the provider's site.

  • Your MCP URL is a bearer secret. Treat it like a password; regenerate it from the dashboard any time (old link dies instantly, only for you, not your teammates).

  • Full details: security & trust · DPA · SECURITY.md

What's in this repo

The stdio bridge (bin/waqi-mcp.js), setup docs, and this README. The hosted service — connectors, detection engine, audit pipeline — is closed source; the in-browser demo runs the real structured ruleset so you can verify detection behaviour yourself.

Pricing

From £99/month, VAT included, per team — bilazann.com/waqi. The demo is free forever.

Feedback

Issues and questions welcome here, or info@bilazann.com. Especially interested in: detection false positives/negatives (the demo is the fastest way to find them) and which connectors you'd want next.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

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