SentinelMCP
Exports structured audit logs of every gated tool call to Datadog / SIEM in the Pro edition, giving security teams a searchable trail of identity, policy, and budget decisions.
Delivers budget-breach and run-rate spike notifications into PagerDuty (Pro edition), turning a runaway or anomalous agent into an on-call incident instead of a silent overrun.
Sends budget-breach and spike-detection alerts to a Slack channel via webhooks (Pro edition), so teams learn about runaway agent spend from a chat alert rather than the invoice.
This server does not currently have a deployable release on Glama. Follow the repository's setup instructions to install and configure it for your MCP client, including any required credentials and local dependencies.
The 2-minute problem
MCP made it trivial to wire an LLM agent up to real tools — databases, payment APIs, internal services. It did not ship a policy layer. If you've run an MCP server in production, you've probably already hit one of these:
Runaway loops. An agent gets stuck retrying a failing call, or a bad prompt sends it into a call-and-recall spiral. Nothing in the MCP spec stops it. You find out from the bill, not an alert.
Token budgets that don't exist until they explode. Nothing in a typical agent loop stops it from calling the same expensive tool hundreds of times in an hour. The common failure mode: a $40/day budget quietly becomes a $40k/month bill, and the first signal anyone gets is the invoice.
DNS-rebinding and confused-deputy risk. The Streamable HTTP transport spec requires Origin validation for exactly this reason — a malicious page can rebind DNS to reach a local MCP server your browser would otherwise block. Most self-hosted servers don't implement it. Stack a compromised or injected tool result on top, and "just add an MCP server" is a bigger attack surface than most teams have budgeted time to secure.
SentinelMCP won't stop a model from being tricked — no proxy can. What it does is make sure a tricked or runaway agent can't reach a tool it isn't allowed to call, blow through a budget nobody approved, or keep running once the numbers look wrong — without a human getting a say.
Related MCP server: MCP Trust Gateway
Key features
Zero-trust security
Origin validation on every request — the DNS-rebinding mitigation the Streamable HTTP spec requires and most self-hosted servers skip. Loopback-only by default; explicit allowlist for anything else, override not extend.
ID-JAG identity enforcement — real JWKS-backed JWT verification, asymmetric algorithms only (no HMAC-downgrade path), including the
resourceclaim binding that closes the confused-deputy hole: a token issued for one MCP server can't be replayed against another.
Token economics
Structural token estimation — walks the actual JSON-RPC payload instead of
length / 4, pricing natural-language content and JSON structure at different, calibrated rates. Input measured exactly; output projected from a per-tool rolling average and trued up against the real response after every call.7-day sliding-window budgets per team, enforced against a fixed-memory circular buffer (168 hourly buckets) — bounded, no per-request log to prune, no unbounded growth under load.
Spike detection independent of the hard cap — a sudden burst against a team's own recent baseline gets caught even while the cumulative total is nowhere near the limit. Catches the exponential-growth pattern before the raw budget does.
Human-in-the-loop, not hard failure
A budget breach doesn't 500 the call. It returns
InputRequiredResult— a normal JSON-RPC success — carrying the projected overrun, the run-rate spike, and an HMAC-signed, request-boundresumeToken.POST /mcp/resumewith{ resumeToken, decision: "APPROVE" | "DENY", originalRequest }lets a human clear it. The token is bound to the exact call via a canonical-JSON hash of the request — approve this wire transfer, not whatever an agent decides to substitute next.Delivery is transport-aware: the pause notice reaches the client over whichever channel the original call used.
Protocol support
Streamable HTTP — the current MCP standard (spec 2025-03-26+), and the primary path.
Legacy HTTP+SSE (spec 2024-11-05) for backward compatibility with clients that haven't migrated. Not the default; don't build new integrations against it.
Quickstart
git clone https://github.com/your-org/sentinelmcp.git
cd sentinelmcp
npm install
cp .env.example .envSix required values in .env — everything else ships with a sane default:
Variable | What it is |
| The real MCP server SentinelMCP forwards allowed calls to |
| Your IdP's JWKS endpoint (Okta, Auth0, Azure AD, …) |
| Expected |
| Expected |
| This gateway's resource identifier — the anti-confused-deputy binding |
| 32+ random chars signing resume tokens — |
npm run build && npm start # production
# or, for local iteration:
npm run dev # tsx watchConfirm it's alive:
curl http://localhost:8080/healthzHow it fits
flowchart LR
Client(["MCP Client<br/>Claude Desktop · Cursor · custom agent"])
subgraph Sentinel["SentinelMCP — stateless gateway"]
direction TB
Origin["Origin Guard<br/>DNS-rebinding check"]
Policy["Policy Gate<br/>tool denylist"]
Identity["Identity Gate<br/>ID-JAG · JWKS verify"]
Budget["Budget Gate<br/>sliding window + spike detect"]
Origin --> Policy --> Identity --> Budget
end
Upstream["Upstream MCP Server(s)"]
Resume["POST /mcp/resume<br/>HMAC-signed resumeToken"]
Client -->|"POST /mcp"| Origin
Budget -->|"allowed → forward"| Upstream
Upstream -->|"result"| Client
Budget -.->|"denied → paused<br/>InputRequiredResult"| Client
Client -.->|"human decides,<br/>out of band"| Resume
Resume -->|"APPROVE<br/>budget bypassed only —<br/>identity + policy still enforced"| UpstreamSentinelMCP sits in front of one or more upstream MCP servers as a reverse proxy. Every gate runs on every request; a denial short-circuits before the call ever reaches your tools. Only the budget gate can be bypassed, and only by an explicit, signed, single-call human approval — identity and policy are re-checked even on resume.
Two of the five subsystems keep state in memory (SSE session tracking and
the budget ledger) — the request/response path itself is stateless and
horizontally scalable behind a plain load balancer. See
docs/ENGINEERING.md for exactly which pieces, and
what that means for running more than one replica.
Quality
63 tests, 19 suites —
npm test. Unit coverage for the token estimator, the sliding-window budget algorithm (spike detection included, verified with an injectable clock rather than waiting real days), and the HMAC token service (round-trip, tampering, forged secrets, canonical-hash binding). Integration coverage runs the full request pipeline throughfastify.inject()against a real, ephemeral-port mock identity provider and mock upstream — no stubbed JWT verification, no mocked crypto.Strict TypeScript —
strict,noUncheckedIndexedAccess,noImplicitOverride. Noanyin the source tree.Zero test-framework dependencies — built on Node's own
node:test.CI runs typecheck, the full suite, and a production build on every push, against Node 20 and 22.
The full engineering log — what's verified, every bug found during
development and how it was fixed, and every known limitation stated
plainly rather than glossed over — lives in
docs/ENGINEERING.md.
SentinelMCP Pro & Enterprise Support
SentinelMCP's core gateway is free and MIT-licensed. For teams running multiple replicas in production or requiring compliance audit trails, SentinelMCP Pro unlocks enterprise capabilities via a single SENTINEL_LICENSE_KEY environment variable:
Feature | Community (MIT) | SentinelMCP Pro ($199/mo) |
Origin Guard, Policy Gate & ID-JAG Verification | Included | Included |
168-Bucket Sliding Window & Spike Detection | Single Instance | Multi-Replica / Cluster Ready |
Structured SIEM / Datadog Audit Log Export | — | Included |
Slack / PagerDuty Budget Breach Webhooks | — | Included |
Priority Security Patches & Architecture Support | Community Issues | Direct Engineering Support |
👉 Purchase a SentinelMCP Pro License Key via Polar.sh
License
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Security & DLP proxy for MCP: tool-poisoning scans, PII redaction on tool args/results. Beta.
Security firewall for AI agents — scans MCP calls for injection, secrets, and risks.
Find, vet, and run MCP tools through a secure audited gateway with prompt-injection risk scoring
MCP gateway: one connection for your AI apps, with tool policies, PII redaction and audit logs.
Related MCP Servers
AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenancePolicy enforcement gateway for MCP tool calls, evaluating every tool invocation against declarative YAML policies (allow/deny/escalate-to-human), generating cryptographic hash-chained audit receipts, and including built-in content safety scanning.2MIT- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables trust, reputation, and economic accountability for MCP by proxying between clients and servers, enriching every tool invocation with trust evaluation, KYA tiers, spending limits, and delegation chains.MIT
- AlicenseBqualityBmaintenanceA governance proxy for AI tools — every MCP/agent tool call is policy-gated, secret-redacted, and written to a hash-chained, offline-verifiable audit trail.13MIT

evav-gatewayofficial
AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceGoverned MCP gateway that lets AI agents call tools with policy enforcement, prompt-injection screening, a kill-switch, and tamper-evident signed audit logs.Apache 2.0