trustscoreagent-mcp
OfficialUse this free, no-API-key MCP server to check, rate, and discover AI microservices in the TrustScoreAgent reputation registry.
Check reputation (
check_reputation): Get a service's trust score, confidence, ratings count, and per-dimension breakdown (availability, latency, conformity); supports URL/domain/DID and optionalpay_toto verify an x402 payee against the registry's observed payee (match/mismatch/rotating/no_data).Submit ratings (
submit_rating): Report a call's outcome using status code, latency, optional schema validity, quality score, response size, and receipt; returns acceptance, new score, rating ID, rating weight (verified/unverified), and agent identity (signed/unsigned).List services (
list_services): Find rated services sorted by score, ratings count, or last rated; filter by minimum score/ratings and x402-only; paginate with limit/offset and view per-service score, confidence, dimensions, and receipt support.
TrustScoreAgent
Free, open reputation registry for AI microservices. Agents check trust scores before calling any service.
Status: Phase 1 (early). The API, scoring (Beta + EigenTrust), receipt verification, Merkle audit trail and MCP server are implemented and tested, but the public dataset is still small (seeded by a transparent probe of public APIs and x402 endpoints), and parts of the design (x402 payments, mandatory agent signatures) are Phase 2. We publish early and openly on purpose: the trust layer for the agentic economy should exist, be auditable, and be adoptable before it becomes critical. See the trust model in SECURITY.md.
What is this?
AI agents increasingly rely on paid microservices. TrustScoreAgent lets any agent:
Check the reputation of a service before calling it
Rate a service after calling it
Discover which services are reliable
No account needed. No API key. Identify services by URL, domain, or DID.
Related MCP server: AgentVeil Protocol
Quick start
# Check a service's trust score (any format works)
curl "https://api.trustscoreagent.com/v1/score?service=api.example.com"
curl "https://api.trustscoreagent.com/v1/score?service=https://api.example.com/v1/translate"
# Unknown services return a neutral score (0.5), no errors
curl "https://api.trustscoreagent.com/v1/score?service=never-seen-before.com"
# Rate a service after calling it
curl -X POST "https://api.trustscoreagent.com/v1/rate" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Agent-DID: my-agent.example.com" \
-d '{
"service": "api.example.com",
"metrics": {
"status_code": 200,
"latency_ms": 143,
"schema_valid": true
}
}'
# List top-rated services
curl "https://api.trustscoreagent.com/v1/services?sort_by=score&min_ratings=10"Local development
# Start PostgreSQL and Redis
docker compose up -d
# Run the API
dotnet run --project src/TrustScore.Api
# Run tests
dotnet test
# Swagger UI
open http://localhost:5000/swaggerArchitecture
C# / .NET 8: ASP.NET Core Minimal API
PostgreSQL: Ratings and service scores
Redis: Score caching, rate limiting, nonce tracking
Beta Reputation System: Bayesian scoring (per-dimension: availability, latency, conformity)
EigenTrust: Anti-Sybil agent trust scoring
Merkle Tree: Audit log with inclusion and consistency proofs (RFC 6962 tree; each leaf commits to what the rating reported)
Ed25519 Receipt Verification: Cryptographic proof of service interaction
MCP Server: Integration with Claude, Cursor, and MCP-compatible agents
API Reference
Core (free, always)
Endpoint | Description |
| Trust score for a service (0.5 neutral for unknown) |
| Submit a rating after calling a service |
| List rated services (pagination, sorting, filtering) |
| Check your agent's trust score |
| Latest Merkle tree root |
| Inclusion proof for a rating, with the fields it commits to |
| History of anchored roots |
| Proof that a later root extends an earlier one |
| OpenTimestamps proof that the root is committed in Bitcoin |
| How much the registry is used (aggregate counts) |
Premium (free for now, x402 micropayments later)
Endpoint | Description |
| Daily aggregated score history |
| Latency percentiles, quality distribution |
| Up to 100 scores in one request |
Service identification
All endpoints accept services in any format (they are normalized internally):
api.example.com(domain)https://api.example.com/v1/translate(URL)did:web:api.example.com(DID)
All three resolve to the same service.
MCP Server
TrustScoreAgent is available as an MCP server for Claude, Cursor, and other agents.
# Add to Claude Code
claude mcp add trustscoreagent -- npx -y @trustscoreagent/mcp-serverBefore paying an x402 endpoint, check_reputation with the pay_to of the 402 you received
says whether that payee is the one the registry has seen there. See docs/mcp.md
for full setup instructions. Also listed on the
official MCP Registry
(io.github.trustscoreagent/mcp-server), npm,
Smithery and
Glama; each GitHub release attaches an
.mcpb bundle for Claude Desktop.
x402 plugin
@trustscoreagent/x402 plugs into the x402 client SDK (@x402/core, used by
@x402/fetch and @x402/axios). Before each payment it checks the payee against the one the
registry saw on that endpoint and stops the payment on a mismatch, before anything is signed.
const guard = trustScoreGuard();
guard.attach(client, http);
const fetchWithPayment = wrapFetchWithPayment(guard.wrapFetch(fetch), http);The score alone never blocks unless you set minScore, an unreachable registry never blocks
unless you set failClosed, and rating after payment is opt-in (rate: true). It runs in your
agent: requests never go through TrustScoreAgent. See x402-plugin/README.md.
Framework integrations
Drop-in tools for agent frameworks (no account or API key needed):
LangChain:
from trustscoreagent_langchain import get_trustscoreagent_toolsCrewAI:
from trustscoreagent_crewai import get_trustscoreagent_tools
Each exposes trustscore_check_reputation, trustscore_submit_rating, and
trustscore_list_services. See integrations/.
Documentation
MCP Server Setup: Claude, Cursor, Windsurf
x402 plugin: check the payee before paying
Audit Log Specification, with an independent verifier in
tools/verify-proof
Contributing
Contributions are welcome: see CONTRIBUTING.md and our Code of Conduct. To report a vulnerability, follow SECURITY.md.
Project status & trust model
TrustScoreAgent is Phase 1 (early). What that means in practice:
Baseline data is real and auditable. Initial scores come from a transparent operated probe (
did:web:trustscoreagent.com:probe) that measures the availability, latency and conformity of a curated list of public, free APIs, and of the x402 endpoints agents pay the most (picked daily from the public Bazaar catalog and probed without paying, see docs/x402-probe.md): real, Merkle-audited measurements, not fabricated numbers. For those x402 endpoints the score also says which payee address and price they ask for, and when either last changed. Community and receipt-verified ratings accumulate on top. (The earlier fictitious*.example.comseeds have been removed.)Single operator. Neutrality currently rests on open-source scoring code and a verifiable Merkle audit trail, not on decentralization. Federation is a later phase.
Agent identity can be proven, but is not yet mandatory. Agents identified by a
did:keysign each rating with their Ed25519 key (X-Agent-Signature), which binds the rating to the holder of that key. Unsigned ratings still count at half weight so existing clients keep working, which means a rating is only as attributable as its signature. Verified service receipts remain the strongest signal.
See SECURITY.md for the full trust model and how to report vulnerabilities.
License
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.
Available Tools
3 toolscheck_reputationARead-only
Check what other agents measured about a service before you call it, and especially before you pay for it or hand it anything you cannot take back. Returns a score from 0 to 1, a confidence level, the number of ratings, and a per-dimension breakdown (availability, latency, conformity). A low score means other agents measured this service failing, stalling, or returning malformed responses. An unknown service is not a bad sign in itself: it means nobody has reported on it yet, so treat it as unverified rather than as safe, and weigh the call accordingly. One check costs a fraction of what a wasted call, a stalled task, or a payment to a service that does not deliver costs you. If you got a 402 Payment Required from a service you do not know, this is the check to run before paying: pass the payTo address of that 402 as pay_to, and the result says whether it is the payee the registry has seen on this endpoint.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| pay_to | No | Optional: the payTo address of the x402 Payment Required you received, to compare with the payee the registry has seen on this endpoint | |
| service_did | Yes | The service to check. Accepts any format: URL (https://api.example.com), domain (api.example.com), or DID (did:web:api.example.com). All resolve to the same service. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| x402 | No | For a paid x402 endpoint the registry probes: the payment terms last seen and their stability |
| known | Yes | False when nobody has rated this service yet |
| score | Yes | |
| service | Yes | Canonical service id |
| provider | No | For an unknown endpoint whose domain has rated endpoints: the domain's aggregate, a hint about the operator, not a measurement of this endpoint |
| confidence | Yes | |
| dimensions | No | |
| last_rated | No | |
| trust_level | Yes | |
| pay_to_check | No | When pay_to was given: match (a payee the registry saw on this endpoint), mismatch (not one: stop and check before paying), rotating (the endpoint issues a new payee per request, so no comparison is possible), no_data (no payment terms recorded) |
| ratings_count | Yes | |
| recent_incidents | No | null while incidents are not tracked |
| service_supports_receipts | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations only mark this as a read-only, open-world call; the description goes well beyond that by explaining the 0–1 score, the confidence level, the per-dimension breakdown, how to interpret a low score, and the critical caveat that an unknown service means 'unverified' rather than 'safe'. That interpretation guidance is exactly what an agent needs and cannot get from the annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Reasonably long but front-loaded with purpose, returns, and interpretation in that order. The cost-framing sentence is persuasive rather than strictly definitional, but it does inform the agent's decision threshold, so it mostly earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only check with a full output schema, the description covers everything needed: what is returned, how to read each element, the unknown-service case, and the concrete 402 follow-up path. No gaps remain for correct invocation or interpretation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is already 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real value: it explains the 402-driven workflow for pay_to (comparing the 402 payTo against the registry's observed payee) and confirms service_did format-agnostic resolution, which goes beyond the schema text.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('Check what other agents measured about a service') and immediately frames the decision it supports. It is clearly distinguishable from the write-side sibling submit_rating and the enumeration sibling list_services without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives strong triggering conditions: run it before calling an unfamiliar service, especially before paying or handing over anything irreversible, and specifically after a 402 Payment Required. It does not explicitly name when to skip it or cite the sibling tools as alternatives, so it falls short of the full when/when-not/alternatives bar.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_servicesARead-only
List services that have been rated, sorted by trust score, with their per-dimension breakdown. Use it to pick a service that others have already measured rather than gambling on an unknown one, or to find an alternative when the service you were going to use scores badly. Filter on min_score and min_ratings together: a high score backed by one rating is an opinion, the same score backed by many is evidence. Set x402 to true to list only the paid x402 endpoints whose payment terms (payee, price) the registry records. The result gives the total matching the filters; page through it with offset.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| x402 | No | true: only paid x402 endpoints with recorded payment terms; false: only the others | |
| limit | No | Number of results (default 20, max 100) | |
| offset | No | Number of results to skip, to page through the total (default 0) | |
| sort_by | No | Sort field (default: score) | |
| min_score | No | Minimum trust score filter (0.0-1.0) | |
| min_ratings | No | Minimum number of ratings filter |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| count | Yes | |
| total | No | |
| offset | No | |
| services | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=true, so safety is covered. The description still adds real behavior: results are ordered by trust score, include a per-dimension breakdown, return a total matching the filters, and are paged with offset. It stops short of noting auth needs, rate limits, or how many dimensions appear, which keeps it below a 5.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with purpose, then usage, then filter semantics, then pagination – a logical progression where each sentence carries a distinct instruction. The 'opinion vs evidence' framing is slightly expansive but still earns its place as filter rationale.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the description still supplies the total-count/paging behavior an agent needs. With six optional parameters and the filtering strategy explained, an agent has everything required to call this correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description goes beyond the schema by explaining the min_score/min_ratings interplay (score without rating volume is an opinion) and the precise meaning of x402=true (paid endpoints whose payee/price terms the registry records). That is genuine semantic added value over the field-level descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ('List services that have been rated'), plus the ordering ('sorted by trust score') and the payload shape ('per-dimension breakdown'). This clearly separates it from check_reputation (single-service lookup) and submit_rating (a write), so an agent can route without opening any schema.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Explicitly names two use cases (pick an already-measured service; find an alternative when a candidate scores badly) and gives operational advice on combining min_score with min_ratings. It also states exactly when to set x402=true. Nothing about selection is left to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
submit_ratingA
Report what actually happened after you called a service, using metrics you already have from the call: status code, latency, and whether the response matched the shape you expected. This is not a donation to a commons. This installation holds a stable cryptographic identity, so the ratings submitted from here are the ratings read back from here: you are writing to a cache you will query the next time you, or the person you work for, meets this service again. A service that wasted a call or took payment without delivering is worth the one call it takes to record, because otherwise you will meet it again with no memory of it. Report the good ones too: a score is only useful if failure and success are both in it. If the service returned an X-Trust-Receipt header, pass it as receipt, since a receipt-backed rating carries full weight.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| receipt | No | JWT receipt from the service's X-Trust-Receipt header (optional) | |
| latency_ms | Yes | Response time in milliseconds (round sub-millisecond responses up to 1) | |
| service_did | Yes | The service you called. URL, domain, or DID (e.g., api.example.com) | |
| status_code | Yes | HTTP status code returned by the service (e.g., 200, 500) | |
| schema_valid | No | Whether the response matched the expected format (optional) | |
| quality_score | No | Subjective quality rating from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent) (optional) | |
| response_size_bytes | No | Size of the response in bytes (optional) |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| service | Yes | |
| accepted | Yes | |
| new_score | No | |
| rating_id | No | Pass to GET /v1/audit/proof/{rating_id} to verify the rating is in the audit log |
| rating_weight | No | verified (valid receipt) or unverified |
| agent_identity | No | signed or unsigned |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations declare this is a non-read-only, non-idempotent, open-world write; the description adds genuinely new context beyond them — that ratings persist under a stable installation identity and are read back on future encounters, and that receipt-backed ratings carry 'full weight.' It omits whether duplicate submissions overwrite prior ratings, which matters given idempotentHint=false, but the added context is substantial.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The instruction is front-loaded with the concrete action first, and the receipt rule lands last where it is actionable. Some middle sentences are persuasive rhetoric ('This is not a donation to a commons,' 'you will meet it again with no memory of it') that restates the same persistence point twice rather than adding operational detail.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With an output schema present, return values need no explanation, and the schema fully documents all seven parameters. For a write tool this rich, the description covers what to submit, when to submit it, and the receipt path, leaving nothing essential an agent needs to call it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description meaningfully enriches several params: status_code/latency/schema_valid are framed as 'metrics you already have from the call,' and receipt is explained via its source header (X-Trust-Receipt) and its effect ('carries full weight'). It does not touch response_size_bytes or quality_score, so a small gap remains.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The opening sentence states a specific verb ('Report') and resource (the outcome of a service call), and enumerates the exact data to supply: status code, latency, response-shape match. It implicitly distinguishes itself from check_reputation by framing submission as writing to the cache that is later read back. It never names a sibling outright, so it stops short of the top score.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear triggering context ('after you called a service') and an explicit inclusion rule ('Report the good ones too: a score is only useful if failure and success are both in it'), plus a conditional instruction for the receipt header. It does not name an alternative tool or a when-not-to-use condition beyond refuting the 'donation to a commons' misconception.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
v0.2.8- Changed
list_services4 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / offsetAdded value: +{ + "description": "Number of results to skip, to page through the total (default 0)", + "minimum": 0, + "type": "number" +} - added
Input schema / properties / x402Added value: +{ + "description": "true: only paid x402 endpoints with recorded payment terms; false: only the others", + "type": "boolean" +} - added
Output schema / properties / offsetAdded value: +{ + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" +} - added
Output schema / properties / totalAdded value: +{ + "minimum": 0, + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] +}
1 tool update
v0.2.6- Changed
check_reputation4 fields changed- added
Input schema / properties / pay_toAdded value: +{ + "description": "Optional: the payTo address of the x402 Payment Required you received, to compare with the payee the registry has seen on this endpoint", + "type": "string" +} - added
Output schema / properties / pay_to_checkAdded value: +{ + "description": "When pay_to was given: match (a payee the registry saw on this endpoint), mismatch (not one: stop and check before paying), rotating (the endpoint issues a new payee per request, so no comparison is possible), no_data (no payment terms recorded)", + "enum": [ + "match", + "mismatch", + "rotating", + "no_data", + null + ], + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / providerAdded value: +{ + "description": "For an unknown endpoint whose domain has rated endpoints: the domain's aggregate, a hint about the operator, not a measurement of this endpoint", + "properties": { + "confidence": { + "type": "number" + }, + "endpoints_rated": { + "type": "integer" + }, + "last_rated": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "ratings_count": { + "type": "integer" + }, + "score": { + "type": "number" + }, + "service": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "type": [ + "object", + "null" + ] +} - added
Output schema / properties / x402Added value: +{ + "description": "For a paid x402 endpoint the registry probes: the payment terms last seen and their stability", + "properties": { + "accepts": { + "items": { + "properties": { + "amount": { + "type": "string" + }, + "asset": { + "type": "string" + }, + "network": { + "type": "string" + }, + "pay_to": { + "type": "string" + }, + "scheme": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, + "type": "array" + }, + "last_seen": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "observations": { + "type": "integer" + }, + "pay_to_changed_at": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "pay_to_changes": { + "type": "integer" + }, + "pay_to_rotates": { + "type": "boolean" + }, + "price_changed_at": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "price_changes": { + "type": "integer" + }, + "price_varies": { + "type": "boolean" + } + }, + "type": [ + "object", + "null" + ] +}
3 tool updates
v0.2.4- Changed
check_reputation1 field changed- changed
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{ + "properties": { + "confidence": { + "maximum": 1, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "number" + }, + "dimensions": { + "properties": { + "availability": { + "type": "number" + }, + "conformity": { + "type": "number" + }, + "latency": { + "type": "number" + } + }, + "type": [ + "object", + "null" + ] + }, + "known": { + "description": "False when nobody has rated this service yet", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "last_rated": { + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "ratings_count": { + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "recent_incidents": { + "description": "null while incidents are not tracked", + "type": [ + "integer", + "null" + ] + }, + "score": { + "maximum": 1, + "minimum": 0, + "type": "number" + }, + "service": { + "description": "Canonical service id", + "type": "string" + }, + "service_supports_receipts": { + "type": "boolean" + }, + "trust_level": { + "enum": [ + "HIGH", + "MODERATE", + "LOW", + "UNKNOWN" + ], + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "service", + "known", + "score", + "trust_level", + "confidence", + "ratings_count" + ], + "type": "object" +}
- Changed
list_services1 field changed- changed
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{ + "properties": { + "count": { + "minimum": 0, + "type": "integer" + }, + "services": { + "items": { + "properties": { + "confidence": { + "type": [ + "number", + "null" + ] + }, + "dimensions": { + "properties": { + "availability": { + "type": "number" + }, + "conformity": { + "type": "number" + }, + "latency": { + "type": "number" + } + }, + "type": [ + "object", + "null" + ] + }, + "ratings_count": { + "type": "integer" + }, + "score": { + "type": "number" + }, + "service": { + "type": "string" + }, + "service_supports_receipts": { + "type": "boolean" + }, + "trust_level": { + "enum": [ + "HIGH", + "MODERATE", + "LOW", + "UNKNOWN" + ], + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "service", + "score", + "trust_level", + "ratings_count" + ], + "type": "object" + }, + "type": "array" + } + }, + "required": [ + "count", + "services" + ], + "type": "object" +}
- Changed
submit_rating1 field changed- changed
Output schema / (root)Previous value: -nullNew value: +{ + "properties": { + "accepted": { + "type": "boolean" + }, + "agent_identity": { + "description": "signed or unsigned", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "new_score": { + "type": [ + "number", + "null" + ] + }, + "rating_id": { + "description": "Pass to GET /v1/audit/proof/{rating_id} to verify the rating is in the audit log", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "rating_weight": { + "description": "verified (valid receipt) or unverified", + "type": [ + "string", + "null" + ] + }, + "service": { + "type": "string" + } + }, + "required": [ + "service", + "accepted" + ], + "type": "object" +}
3 tool updates
v0.1.0- First observed
check_reputation - First observed
list_services - First observed
submit_rating
TDQS
Scored across 3 tools
Each tool targets a distinct action: list_services for discovery and comparison across multiple services, check_reputation for vetting a single known service, and submit_rating for reporting outcomes. There is no overlap in intent, and the detailed descriptions clearly delineate when to use each.
All three tools follow a consistent verb_noun snake_case pattern: list_services, check_reputation, submit_rating. The naming is predictable and immediately conveys the action and resource.
Three tools are well-scoped and each earns its place in the reputation workflow: discover, check, and report. This falls within the typical 3-15 range for a focused server and avoids unnecessary bloat.
The core lifecycle of discovering services, checking reputation, and submitting ratings is covered. However, there is no way to update or delete a submitted rating, and no tool to retrieve raw individual ratings (only aggregates), which are minor gaps that agents can work around but limit full lifecycle coverage.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
Trust infrastructure for AI agents: read a verifiable Trust Rating, claim an identity, earn a badge.
Trust infrastructure for AI agents. Portable reputation (JTS 0-5), agent discovery, vouching.
Agent reputation registry: check, register, and endorse AI agents
AI-agent trust infrastructure for discovery, authority, execution, verification, and receipts.
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