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json-chamber-mcp

json-chamber-mcp

json-chamber-mcp

Audited checks License: BUSL-1.1

Chamber MCP — seal / open JSON. Slid Phi Labs.

Cloak (seal new JSON) needs a live license. Open of an already-sealed blob is both keys, no extra payment. Ciphertext does not expire.

Install / run

npx -y json-chamber-mcp
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "json-chamber": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "json-chamber-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "CHAMBER_MASTER_SECRET": "your-high-entropy-secret"
      }
    }
  }
}

Related MCP server: Trust OS MCP Server

Discovery

Surface

URL

Official registry id

io.github.ceedot-rock/json-chamber-mcp

Lab well-known

https://www.slidphilabs.com/.well-known/mcp.json

Lab llms.txt

https://www.slidphilabs.com/llms.txt

npm

json-chamber-mcp 1.2.0

Server schema

server.json

Product

https://www.slidphilabs.com/chamber

Hosted lab MCP (PCC + catalog): POST https://www.slidphilabs.com/mcp · Smithery: https://smithery.ai/servers/slidphi/lab

Pricing

SKU

What

Price

Chamber try

cloak new JSON

24 hours free

Chamber month

cloak license

$9

Chamber year

cloak license

$99

Open

already-sealed blob

keys only

Prices live on https://www.slidphilabs.com/chamber

License recovery

Cloak needs a live license: either the 24-hour trial from first run or a signed purchased license (license.json with purchased: true, HMAC-signed under your CHAMBER_MASTER_SECRET). A purchase never comes from an API key or key value — no key substring unlocks cloak.

~/.chamber is created mode 0700 and license.json / KILLED are mode 0600, so other local processes cannot kill or corrupt your license. A master secret must be configured (CHAMBER_MASTER_SECRET, or JSON_CHAMBER_MASTER / TRU8_MASTER_SECRET); without one the gate fails closed — cloak stays off and no license file is written. There is no default or demo secret.

If cloak reports dead (KILLED marker present, e.g. the trial expired or a license signature mismatch was detected):

  1. Purchase revives automatically. Installing a valid signed purchased license.json clears the KILLED marker on the next check — no manual step needed.

  2. Manual recovery. Delete the marker (and, to restart a fresh 24-hour trial, the license file too):

    rm ~/.chamber/KILLED ~/.chamber/license.json

    The next chamber_status / chamber_cloak starts a new trial. A tamper kill (signature mismatch) stays in force for trial licenses until a purchase lands or the marker is deleted by hand — replacing the license file alone does not clear it.

Tools

Tool

Purpose

chamber_status

cloak try remaining / dead / purchased

chamber_info

pointer to live prices

chamber_cloak

seal JSON / text (licensed)

chamber_open

open sealed blob (keys only)

chamber_hop_gate

admit/reject hop (gate only)

chamber_hop_reject_log

live sanitized reject log

chamber_lease_export

export as ciphertext + key lease (#25)

chamber_lease_decrypt

decrypt via revocation service (#25)

chamber_lease_revoke

revoke a lease — all copies go dark (#25)

chamber_lease_renew / chamber_lease_status

lease renewal / status (#25)

chamber_transparency_seal

seal + append content hash to log (#31)

chamber_transparency_open

verified read, refused unless proven (#31)

chamber_transparency_status / chamber_transparency_verify

log head / proof check (#31)

Batch 4 features (2026-11-18)

  • #33 Erasure receipts — library API (src/erasure.ts): CopyRegistry + InMemoryCopyLocation. Deleting a record returns a signed receipt enumerating every registered copy location (primary, fragment, backup, snapshot, cache, index, derived) with a probe-verified removal attestation from each, or a signed retention-lock statement with the exact expiry date. A location that does not answer, or whose removal an independent probe contradicts, is an open item and the receipt is marked incomplete. Chamber MCP holds no copy store of its own, so there is deliberately no MCP tool for this — the host application registers its real locations.

  • #25 Key-lease revocation — src/key-lease.ts + MCP tools chamber_lease_*. Exports leave as ciphertext + a short-lived lease; the recipient never holds the key (the DEK is wrapped under a key that lives only in the revocation service). Revocation is one act (chamber_lease_revoke); every copy goes dark at lease expiry. Leases are in-memory: a server restart drops all leases, which fails closed.

  • #31 Transparency-log-verified reads — src/transparency-log.ts + MCP tools chamber_transparency_*. OPTIONAL mode, default OFF: plain chamber_cloak / chamber_open never consult the log. chamber_transparency_seal appends the SHA-256 content hash to an append-only Merkle log (Ed25519-signed tree head) and returns a signed inclusion promise; chamber_transparency_open recomputes the hash and requires an inclusion proof against the signed tree head — absent hash or forked log = read refused. Measured added read latency ≈ 1–4 ms (Ed25519 sign+verify), flat in log size. Log + keypair persist under ~/.chamber/transparency-log*.json.

Hop-gate (ScanChunk / Rider SoT)

Admission layer in front of seal/open. Seal/open APIs are unchanged. No SettleHop / x402.

Wire is exact text (Agent-Rider agent-rider-c / PR #22), not JSON:

CUNI ScanChunk
url=https://example.com/
etag="abc"
hash=sha256:…
agent_id=agt_1

Fields (allowlist): url · etag · hash · agent_id. Gate result wire is a single exact-text code string (not a JSON body).

Code

Meaning

admit

hop allowed

reject.schema

Chamber-local only (Rider does not emit)

reject.extra

unknown keys or wrong kind — fail-closed; do not bind; never rehydrate

reject.hash

empty / invalid hash

reject.replay

hash already seen

reject.agent

agent allowlist fail

reject.empty

empty / missing required fields (url, hash, agent_id)

Live reject.log is TSV ISO\tcode\tpreview (mirrors agent-rider-c/reject.log); preview truncates ~120 and flattens newlines. Extra-key values never rehydrate as next machine input.

PCC ≠ payment — PCC is the compression/storefront face; hop-gate codes are admission control, not billing.

MCP tools: chamber_hop_gate, chamber_hop_reject_log.

Available Tools

7 tools
benefit_checkC

Entropy + bias gate for $1900 tier. Always available. No TRU8.

Inputs: data (required), encoding.

chamber_cloakC

Seal JSON/text with φ-split + AES-256-GCM. Requires live license.

Inputs: data (required), is_json.

chamber_hop_gateA

Evaluate Chamber hop-gate (exact-text code). Gate only — does not seal/open/SettleHop. Wire: CUNI ScanChunk + url/etag/hash/agent_id. Result: single code string. PCC ≠ payment.

Inputs: hop (required), allowed_agents.

chamber_hop_reject_logC

Live hop-gate reject.log as TSV ISO\tcode\tpreview (Rider SoT). Extra values never rehydrate.

Inputs: limit.

chamber_infoC

Package info, cloak license ($9/mo · $99/yr), open is keys-only.

Inputs: no named parameters.

chamber_openB

Open a sealed chamber blob. Keys only — no license, no clock.

Inputs: sealed (required).

chamber_statusB

License status: eval remaining hours, purchased, or dead.

Inputs: no named parameters.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    B3/5.0

    Scored across 7 tools

    Disambiguation4/5

    The tools have distinct roles: status/info for licensing, cloak/open for sealing/unsealing, and two separate gate checks (hop_gate vs benefit_check) plus a log. There's minor overlap between status and info (both about license state), but they serve different details. Overall, an agent can tell them apart with clarity.

    Naming Consistency3/5

    Most tools follow a 'chamber_' prefix with a noun or verb (status, info, cloak, open, hop_gate, hop_reject_log), but 'benefit_check' breaks the pattern. The verbs are inconsistent (some are nouns like status, others are imperatives like cloak), though the naming is still readable and mostly predictable.

    Tool Count5/5

    With 7 tools, the server is well-scoped for its purpose: managing sealed JSON chambers, checking license status, and evaluating gates. Each tool has a clear function, and the count is appropriate for the domain without being overwhelming or too sparse.

    Completeness4/5

    The core lifecycle is covered: sealing (chamber_cloak), opening (chamber_open), status (chamber_status), and license info (chamber_info). Gate evaluation and logging are also included. A minor gap is no tool to list or manage multiple chambers, but for the given purpose, the surface is largely complete.

    Maintenance

    ActivityNo data
    ResponsivenessOutdated data

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