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Natural-Language Zero-Knowledge Verification via Skeptical MCP Tools

Reproduce paper numbers Code: MIT Data: CC BY 4.0 Paper: under review

An LLM agent that lets non-experts run and verify zero-knowledge proofs in plain English, plus an ablation study showing that tools which check, complete or override what the model sends raise task completion by about 23 points across three model families.

Paper · Reproduce every number offline · Architecture deep-dive

The idea in one minute

An LLM is good at understanding what a user wants. It is not reliable at supplying exact values such as job IDs, proof types and user identities. In a zero-knowledge system those values decide which statistical test is proven and whose data the proof is bound to, so a small slip can produce a valid proof of the wrong thing.

Skeptical tools do not trust what the model sends. Each MCP tool checks the model's arguments against server-side state before it runs, using three moves:

Move

What the tool does

Example in this repo

Validate

Reject a bad value with a clear error

verify_proof returns "proof type is required" instead of guessing a prover

Complete

Fill a missing value from stored state

check_status takes the proof type from the stored job when the model leaves it out

Override

Replace the model's value with the server's

The interceptor strips any model-supplied user_id and injects the real session identity

The system has 20 such design decisions in four groups: input skepticism, state independence, output integrity and security boundaries. Five of them are switched on and off in the ablation below.

Related MCP server: ZeroID Agent Identity

Results at a glance

Task completion on the 75-query suite (mean of 5 runs at temperature 0; 375 records per model per configuration; 6,000+ query executions and 6,371 records in total):

Model

A: trust the LLM

B

C

D: full system

Gain (A→D)

Qwen 3 32B

70.2%

84.5%

90.3%

93.0%

+22.8

Mistral Small 3.2 24B*

65.1%

79.7%

80.5%

88.4%

+23.3

Llama 3 8B

54.9%

69.3%

68.1%

78.1%

+23.2

* Mistral's reference job never reached done in Configs B, C, D and A*, so its status and download cells are not comparable with the other models. Within-model gains are unaffected. See Deviations and known issues.

What we found

  • A plausible default is worse than no default. With the stored proof type turned off, check_status silently defaulted to one prover and sent 198 status checks to the wrong one. Storing the proof type server-side cut this to 0 for all three models. verify_proof, which has no default, never misrouted (0 of 24 calls in Config B).

  • Never take identity from the model. Without server-side identity injection, models filled the slot with placeholders such as "user123". Login-required tasks rose from 47.5% to 93.0% (Qwen 3 32B) once the server injected the real identity.

  • Made-up results need chat history plus a past success. All 7 fabricated results across the 24 result files happened in the one setup that replayed chat history containing an earlier success. Stateless tool turns produced none.

  • Grade every tool call, not only the first. In Config B, the original grader would have ranked the strongest model (Qwen 3 32B, 83.8%) as the least reliable. The corrected grader reads every tool call in the turn and agrees with hand labels on 150 of 151 flagged replies.

  • Fewer calls, faster replies. From Config B to C, tool calls per status check fell from 1.44 to 1.00 and average response time from 16.6 s to 12.4 s.

  • End to end. Qwen 3 32B completed the full prove → status → download → verify lifecycle in every run of Configs C and D.

The paper also states the limits plainly: an invented job ID still defeats the fallbacks, the nonce is fixed, and hashes and job IDs reach the model provider. See Deviations and known issues.

Architecture

flowchart LR
    U[User] -->|message| F[Flask backend<br/>auth + chat UI]
    F --> A[LangGraph ReAct agent]
    A -->|tool call| I[Interceptor<br/>strips model user_id,<br/>injects session identity]
    I --> M[FastMCP prover server<br/>8 tools + skeptical checks]
    M --> RD[(Redis<br/>session and job state)]
    M --> PG[(Postgres<br/>accounts and hashes)]
    M --> C[CoSMeTIC provers<br/>KS · LRT · logistic accuracy]
    M -->|tool result| A
    A --> F
    F -->|reply + trust label| U
    F -.->|sign-in| PG
    F -.->|session owner| RD

Five rules for MCP tool design (from the paper)

  1. Override routing values from authoritative state. If the server already knows the right backend, ignore the model's value, but check that the key it uses (such as a job ID) belongs to the session.

  2. Strip and inject identity on the server. A model-supplied identity is only the model's word.

  3. Keep chat history out of tool-grounded turns. History with a past success was the only condition under which any model made up a result.

  4. Make trust labels vouch for outcomes, not calls. A failed tool call should never earn a "backed" label.

  5. Scrub tool outputs before the model sees them, and test the boundary on every model you deploy, because fallback behavior varies a lot between models.

In industry terms, skeptical tools are pre-tool-call guardrails with validate and mutate hooks, placed where MCP gateways put their checks, with the effect measured across three model families.

System overview

Code and data for the paper Natural-Language Zero-Knowledge Verification via Skeptical MCP Tools (see Paper and artifact map).

The system, the MCP Prover Chatbot, is a dockerized chat assistant that lets authenticated users interact with the CoSMeTIC zero-knowledge proof service through natural language. Queries flow through a LangGraph ReAct agent (default model Qwen3-32B through an OpenAI-compatible API, swappable via LLM_MODEL and LLM_BASE_URL; cross-model runs have also used Llama 3 8B and Mistral-Small 24B) which calls MCP tools exposed by a dedicated prover server. Session state lives in Redis; user accounts in Postgres.

The repository also hosts an ablation study — four main configurations (A/B/C/D) plus a supplementary A_STAR variant — comparing architectural design choices (identity protection, server-side state, smart Redis fallbacks, LLM summarization). See ARCHITECTURE.md for the complete design.

Contents

Paper and artifact map

This repository is the artifact for Natural-Language Zero-Knowledge Verification via Skeptical MCP Tools (Shanto and Ramanan, Oklahoma State University, 2026). Citation metadata is in CITATION.cff. The manuscript is in manuscript/. The code exactly as released with the paper is tagged paper-v1. Code is MIT-licensed (LICENSE); the evaluation data is CC BY 4.0 (LICENSE-DATA).

The paper promises

Where it is

Test suite: 75 main queries plus 7 verification queries

eval/test_suite.json, eval/test_suite_verify.json; composition in eval/MANIFEST.md

Original faithfulness grader, as run

eval/grading_script.py

Corrected faithfulness grader

eval/grading_faithfulness_v2.py; controls and hand-label check in eval/test_grading_faithfulness_v2.py

Experiment results: 24 files, 6,371 records

results/; one row per file in results/RESULTS_MANIFEST.csv

Hand-read inspection dumps (Sections V-B, V-E)

reports/inspection_*.txt; the 252 wrong-port replies classified in reports/wrongport_replies_classified.txt

Every number in the paper, recomputed offline

eval/reproduce_paper_numbers.py; its saved output eval/expected_output.txt

How to cite. GitHub's Cite this repository button reads CITATION.cff. Until the paper has a public identifier:

@misc{shanto2026nlzk,
  title  = {Natural-Language Zero-Knowledge Verification via Skeptical MCP Tools},
  author = {Shanto, Md Nazrul Huda and Ramanan, Paritosh},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Oklahoma State University. Artifact: https://github.com/disys-lab/Skeptical-MCP-For-zkSNARKs}
}

Architecture at a glance

Service

Container

Port

Role

Backend

mcp-backend

5001

Flask UI + auth + LangGraph agent + MCP client

Prover MCP

mcp-prover-server

8003

FastMCP server exposing proof tools; owns all job/session state

Redis

mcp-redis

6379

Session state, job records, optional chat history (7-day TTL)

Postgres

mcp-postgres

5432

Dataset-driven user accounts with bcrypt passwords

Design rule: Flask stays thin (HTTP, auth, one security-critical Redis write for session ownership). The MCP prover owns all proof-lifecycle state and all COSMeTIC API calls.

External dependency: this chatbot is the front end to the separate COSMeTIC prover stack — it cannot run without it. COSMeTIC provides the prover APIs on ports 5012 (logistic_accuracy), 5013 (KS), 5014 (LRT) and the input-files service on 5015, and its Docker Compose project creates the regulatory_hypothesis_tests_default network that this stack joins. Start COSMeTIC before this stack — see the Prerequisites below.

Quick start

Prerequisites

  • Docker and Docker Compose

  • An API key for an OpenAI-compatible LLM endpoint. The paper's runs used DeepInfra (https://deepinfra.com); any compatible provider works through LLM_BASE_URL.

  • The COSMeTIC prover stack running (see Step 0) — without it this chatbot has no provers to talk to and no users to sign in as.

0. Start COSMeTIC (required first)

This chatbot is only the front end — it depends on the separate COSMeTIC prover stack, which must be set up and running before this one:

https://github.com/disys-lab/cosmetic/tree/formcp-integration (branch formcp-integration of the official COSMeTIC repository); project page https://disys-lab.github.io/cosmetic/

The paper's experiments ran against the earlier repository https://github.com/disys-lab/regulatory_hypothesis_tests, branch forMCP. The formcp-integration branch carries the same API code on top of the official repository.

Follow COSMeTIC's own README to set it up and run it — that is the authoritative source. Its setup is a real pipeline (SMT setup + EZKL zkSNARK generation via driver.py, plus a one-time per-API "Setup" step); do not expect a single up command to be enough. We deliberately don't reproduce those steps here because they live in (and will change with) that repo.

What this stack additionally needs from COSMeTIC once it's running:

  • Run it with the project name regulatory_hypothesis_tests so its default network is named regulatory_hypothesis_tests_default — the network this stack joins as external:

    git clone -b formcp-integration https://github.com/disys-lab/cosmetic
    cd cosmetic
    # ... set up / generate proof data per COSMeTIC's README, then:
    docker compose -p regulatory_hypothesis_tests up -d

    (If you start it under a different project name, update the networks: block in this repo's docker-compose.yml to match the actual network name from docker network ls.)

  • The provers must expose ports 5012 (ACC), 5013 (KS), 5014 (LRT), and input-files on 5015.

  • There must be proof data. COSMeTIC's proofs/ is gitignored, so a fresh clone has none until you run its proving pipeline. Without data, /admin/sync-dataset (Step 3) returns zero users and you can't sign in.

  • Verify it's ready before continuing: curl -s http://localhost:5015/input-files/list should return a non-empty JSON list of input files.

1. Create .env

cp .env.example .env     # then put your API key in DEEPINFRA_API_KEY

The template sets:

DEEPINFRA_API_KEY=your_key_here
LLM_BASE_URL=https://api.deepinfra.com/v1/openai
LLM_MODEL=Qwen/Qwen3-32B
CONFIG=C
EVAL_MODE=true
SECRET_KEY=change-me-in-production

CONFIG selects the ablation configuration (A / B / C / D, plus the supplementary A_STAR). C is the current/default full system. EVAL_MODE=true adds a tool_calls log to every /get response — useful for the test runner and for debugging. LLM_MODEL selects the model and LLM_BASE_URL the endpoint (default Qwen/Qwen3-32B on DeepInfra); it has also been run with meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct and mistralai/Mistral-Small-3.2-24B-Instruct-2506.

2. Build and start

docker-compose build
docker-compose up -d

Verify both services came up with the right config:

docker-compose logs backend 2>&1 | grep "System configuration" | tail -1
docker-compose logs proverserver 2>&1 | grep "Prover server configuration" | tail -1

The backend prints System configuration: C and the prover prints Prover server configuration: C (or whichever CONFIG you set) — both must match.

3. Wait for readiness and sync the dataset

Wait for the agent to initialize (probe /get directly — log line is unreliable under Flask debug mode's buffering):

until curl -s -X POST http://localhost:5001/get \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d '{"msg":"ping","session_id":"probe"}' 2>/dev/null | grep -q '"response"'; do
  sleep 3
done

Then sync dataset users into Postgres:

curl -X POST http://localhost:5001/admin/sync-dataset

This fetches the input-files zip from COSMeTIC and upserts dataset_users rows named User1, User2, ..., each with one raw_hash and one input_data JSON blob. The shared password is password123 (or whatever DATASET_DEFAULT_PASSWORD is set to).

4. Open the UI

http://localhost:5001 — sign in as User1 / password123 and chat.

Running on a remote server? localhost:5001 / 127.0.0.1:5001 only work when the stack runs on the same machine as your browser — from a remote machine they show ERR_CONNECTION_REFUSED. Instead, either browse the server's IP directly (http://<server-ip>:5001, if your network/firewall allows it), or forward the port to your machine — the VS Code Ports panel (forward 5001), or ssh -L 5001:localhost:5001 <user>@<server>. Note: the app binds 0.0.0.0 with Flask debug=True, so don't expose port 5001 to the public internet.

Example queries

Prove my data in KS
Check my status
Check where my data has been used
Download the proof
Verify my proof                   # confirm the proof is cryptographically valid
Prove hash abc123 in LRT          # explicit hash (not "my hash")

That's it for running the chatbot. Everything below is for the ablation study and evaluation — skip it unless you're reproducing the research.

Ablation study — configurations

Config

Philosophy

Identity protection

Conversation history

Redis fallbacks (B4/B5/B6)

LLM summarizes response

A

"Trust the LLM"

off

on (replay history)

off

on

B

"Distrust LLM memory"

on

off

partial (B4 only; B5/B6 off)

on

C

Full system (default)

on

off

all on

on

D

No LLM summary layer

on

off

all on

off (deterministic formatter)

A_STAR

"Identity in the prompt" (supplementary)

off (user_id named in a system prompt instead of injected)

on (replay history)

B4 on; B5/B6 off

on

To switch configs, edit .env and restart:

sed -i 's/^CONFIG=.*/CONFIG=D/' .env
docker-compose down && docker-compose up -d

See ARCHITECTURE.md §12 for the full gate-by-gate code references.

Running the ablation test suite

The test runner (test_runner.py) executes test_suite.json (75 executable queries across 7 source types; the file also holds 5 standalone Source-3a entries that are skipped at runtime) against the running backend for a given CONFIG and writes results to results/results_{CONFIG}.json (the results/ directory is created automatically; override with --results-dir). Runs are resumable. The runner refuses to start unless LLM_MODEL is set, and stops if the reference proof job does not reach done within about 17 minutes (see Deviations and known issues). Pass --test-suite eval/test_suite_verify.json to run the 7-query verify_proof evaluation suite instead (results still land in results/results_{CONFIG}.json).

# Pilot: one run through the 75 queries (run from the repo root)
PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 python -u eval/test_runner.py --config C --runs 1 --fresh

# Full: five runs (starts fresh; takes several hours)
python eval/test_runner.py --config C --runs 5 --fresh

# Continue an interrupted run (omit --fresh)
python eval/test_runner.py --config C --runs 5

# Re-execute any records that previously errored
python eval/test_runner.py --config C --runs 1 --retry-failed

Install the runner's requirements with pip install -r requirements.txt. In Docker-only setups, run it from the host with the ports exposed. The runner logs into User1, auto-creates a reference completed job at startup (skipped for Config A, where the identity gate is disabled), and injects test fixtures directly into Redis / Postgres as needed per query.

Grading results

To reproduce the paper's tables, use eval/reproduce_paper_numbers.py instead; it reads the released files as they are named.

grading_script.py is the original grader. It reads results_{A,B,C,D}.json from --results-dir (default results/), which is the name the test runner writes, + test_suite.json, and prints the metric tables (tool selection, parameter correctness pre/post, task completion, response faithfulness, tool-use rate) as mean ± std across runs, with per-source and Config-A auth/non-auth breakdowns:

python eval/grading_script.py --configs A,B,C,D    # defaults: results/ dir, eval/test_suite.json

What each metric means

Metric

Question it answers

How it's scored

Tool Selection

Did the agent call the right tool?

First tool call vs expected_tool (or any of acceptable_tools for ambiguous Source-3b; for expected_tool: NONE, passes only if no tool was called). N/A on execution errors and qualitative cases.

Param Correctness (pre)

Were the tool arguments correct as the LLM emitted them, before any backend correction?

Each expected_params key must be present and match in the raw arguments (case-insensitive for proof_type). Measures the model's own accuracy.

Param Correctness (post)

Were the arguments correct after the interceptor fixed them?

Same check against arguments_after_correction (post session_id injection / user_id strip). Missing values are tolerated (they're injected, not model-supplied). Shows how much the backend recovers.

Task Completion

Did the user get the correct end-to-end outcome?

Response text must contain all should_contain (any-one for Source-2 error synonyms), must avoid should_not_contain (negation-aware — "no errors" doesn't trip "error"), satisfy should_contain_any_redirect, and honor must_call_tool / expected_tool: NONE. Counts as a failure on execution error.

Response Faithfulness

Does the user-facing reply match what the tool actually returned?

Original grader; the paper reports the corrected grader in grading_faithfulness_v2.py, which reads every tool call in the turn and handles negation. The tool's job_id/status must appear in the response (status accepts paraphrases of "done"); the LLM must not claim success when the tool returned an error. N/A when no tool was called.

Tool-Use Rate (S7)

On bait queries, did the agent call a tool instead of guessing?

Source-7 only (must_call_tool): passes if any tool was called (or backed_by_cosmetic). A high rate is good — it means the model resisted answering from nothing.

Results are reported as mean ± std across runs. Source-6 multi-step scenarios use cascade scoring: if an early step fails, dependent later steps are marked unreachable rather than counted as separate failures (see ARCHITECTURE.md §13.4).

Multi-model / multi-config sweeps

Shell orchestrators drive full sweeps end-to-end — they edit .env, recreate the backend + proverserver, run the suite, and archive results as results/results_{model}_{config}.json:

./eval/run_llama_all.sh     # Llama 3 8B  × A,B,C,D,A_STAR  -> results/results_llama_{config}.json
./eval/run_mistral_all.sh   # Mistral 24B × A,B,C,D,A_STAR  -> results/results_mistral_{config}.json
./eval/run_verify_all.sh    # verify_proof suite: Qwen A-D, Mistral C-D (its Llama C-D runs were not completed)

Key endpoints

Endpoint

Auth

Purpose

GET /

—

Chat UI

POST /auth/signin

—

Sign in as a dataset user

POST /auth/logout

—

Clear session

GET /auth/me

—

Current auth status

GET /api/me/hash

login required

Masked preview of the user's stored raw_hash

POST /get

—

Chat endpoint (session-scoped if logged in)

POST /download_proof

login required

Proxy a proof-file download

GET /context/<session_id>

login + owner

Inspect Redis session state

POST /admin/sync-dataset

optional secret

Re-run the dataset sync

Schema

Single init script at sql/002_dataset_and_zips.sql, applied automatically by the Postgres container:

  • dataset_users — id (uuid PK), username (unique), password_hash (bcrypt), raw_hash, input_data (JSONB), source_file, zip_archive_id (FK), created_at, updated_at

  • input_zip_archives — id (uuid PK), source_url, stored_path, file_size_bytes, fetched_at

Manual signup is not supported — accounts are created only by /admin/sync-dataset.

The authoritative dataset is the COSMeTIC input-files zip ingested into Postgres by /admin/sync-dataset.

Reproducing the paper's numbers offline

Every figure in the paper's tables and prose that derives from the logs can be recomputed from results/ alone, with no CoSMeTIC stack, no LLM and no network:

python eval/reproduce_paper_numbers.py                     # prints every derived figure with its definition
python eval/reproduce_paper_numbers.py > out.txt && diff --strip-trailing-cr out.txt eval/expected_output.txt
python eval/test_grading_faithfulness_v2.py                # four synthetic controls; hand-label agreement 150 of 151

On Linux and macOS, diff reports one line that differs only by the path separator (reports\wrongport_... in the saved file, reports/wrongport_... in your output); every number matches. See Deviations and known issues.

eval/expected_output.txt is the output as saved at release. Figures marked [H] in the output were established by hand-reading the dumps in reports/ and are reported, not recomputed. Only the standard library and the two graders in eval/ are needed.

Tests

tests/ holds unit tests for the skeptical checks. They run on every push and pull request (the unit-tests job in .github/workflows/reproduce.yml) and need no network, LLM, CoSMeTIC or Docker: Redis is replaced by fakeredis, the prover APIs by a fake prover, and the configuration is set per test.

Check

What the tests confirm

A3 identity

The interceptor drops a model-supplied user_id and injects the session identity in Configs B, C and D; A and A* let the model's value through

D1 session lock

A session claimed by one user rejects another user, also through the /get endpoint; the lock fails closed when Redis is down

A1 proof types

Spellings such as ks and kolmogorov-smirnov map to the canonical names and to the right prover port

B4 job-ID fallback

A missing job ID falls back to the latest job in Configs B, C and D, but not in A

B5 stored proof type

check_status completes a missing proof type from the stored job (Configs C, D); Config B reproduces the wrong-port failure; download_proof and verify_proof override the model's value with the stored one; without a proof type, A and B return "proof_type is required"

B6 auto-detection

Download and verify probe all three provers, pick the one holding the job, prefer LRT then KS, and fall back to logistic accuracy when none has it

C5 and D4 downloads

Error text saved as a proof file is rejected; empty files are rejected; filenames cannot leave the downloads folder, on the MCP side or in the backend route

C1 and Config D

Trust labels follow the tool results; Config D templates report the tool output

Two known issues are recorded as expected failures rather than hidden: _normalize_proof_type does not accept "likelihood ratio test" with spaces, and on Windows the error-file check in download_proof fails because the file is deleted while still open (it passes on Linux, where the service runs). Note also that in Configs C and D, download and verify fall back to logistic accuracy when no prover has the job, so "return an error rather than guessing" (paper, Sec. III-C) holds for Configs A and B only.

pip install -r requirements.txt -r tests/requirements-test.txt
python -m pytest tests -q

Models and providers

Model

Identifier

Configurations

Provider

Qwen 3 32B (primary)

Qwen/Qwen3-32B

A, B, C, D, A*, verification A to D

Groq during development, DeepInfra for later runs; the provider of the main A to D study was not recorded per run

Mistral Small 3.2 24B

mistralai/Mistral-Small-3.2-24B-Instruct-2506

A, B, C, D, A*, verification C and D

DeepInfra

Llama 3 8B

meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct

A, B, C, D, A*

DeepInfra

Qwen 2.5 72B

not recorded

B only

not recorded

Qwen 3 235B-A22B

not recorded

B only, one run plus 11 queries

not recorded

Result records written before September 2026 carry no model or provider field; the model per file comes from the file name and the sweep scripts. See the provenance caveat under Repository layout.

Deviations and known issues

Stated plainly, because a reader of the code would otherwise infer the opposite.

  • Trust label tiers. The evaluation ran a two-tier label ([Backed by COSMeTIC prover], [Not backed by COSMeTIC prover]). The released compute_trust_label has four tiers; the two cryptographic tiers never appear in any logged turn and are unevaluated.

  • Post-run changes to the runner. The llm_model and llm_provider_base_url record fields, the refusal to start without LLM_MODEL, and the hard failure when the reference job does not reach done were all added after the reported runs. The sweep scripts now pin LLM_MODEL; at run time they inherited whatever .env held.

  • Reference-job fixture. In the Mistral, Qwen 2.5 72B and Qwen 3 235B sweeps the reference job stayed queued throughout (the poll timed out and the runner continued on a warning). Status- and download-dependent cells for those sweeps are not comparable with Qwen 3 32B or Llama; within-model comparisons are unaffected. Per-file state is in results/RESULTS_MANIFEST.csv.

  • Five authored queries were never executed. S3a_01 to S3a_05 in eval/test_suite.json; see eval/MANIFEST.md.

  • Grader label. grading_script.py now prints "Tool-Use Rate (S7)" where it printed "Tool Bypass Rate (S7)"; the value is unchanged and higher is better.

  • Endpoint variable. LLM_BASE_URL was added to app.py at release with the DeepInfra endpoint as its default, so the value the runner records is the value the app uses.

  • Known gaps in the design, as evaluated. A supplied job_id is not checked against the session, so an invented one defeats both the fallback and the override. The nonce is fixed at [[0.0, 0.0, 0.0]], so proofs are not tied to individual verification requests. Hashes are scrubbed only at display time; tool outputs, including dataset hashes, job identifiers and the account UUID, reach the model provider in every configuration.

  • Checksums of two text files. The release recorded the SHA-256 of eval/expected_output.txt and results/RESULTS_MANIFEST.csv from Windows copies (CRLF line endings), so sha256sum -c failed for those two files on Linux and macOS. SHA256SUMS.txt now lists their checksums as stored in Git (LF), and .gitattributes checks both out with LF on every system. The file contents are unchanged.

  • A Windows path in the saved output. eval/expected_output.txt was produced on Windows, so its line wrote reports\wrongport_replies_classified.txt uses a backslash. On Linux and macOS the script prints a forward slash, so a plain diff shows that one line. No number differs; the CI check (.github/workflows/reproduce.yml) compares with slashes normalized.

  • Post-release runtime fixes (after tag paper-v1). A fresh build of the released code no longer ran: DeepInfra began treating a missing max_tokens as a request for the whole context window, and newer langchain-openai releases reuse one pooled connection across requests, which fails with "Event loop is closed" because each request runs on its own event loop. app.py now sets max_tokens=16384 and an HTTP client without keep-alive, and requirements.txt pins the tested package versions. The skeptical-tools logic, the tools and the evaluation are unchanged.

  • Post-release web UI (after tag paper-v1). templates/index.html was redesigned: trust labels appear as badges, a read-only job tracker shows the session's jobs from /context/<session_id>, and replies are HTML-escaped. The evaluation never used the web page (the runner calls /get directly), so no result depends on it. The tracker's "Verified" step comes from verify_proof results seen in the current page, because the server does not store verification.

  • Two more post-release fixes (after tag paper-v1). check_hash_existence now writes a line for every prover that finds the hash; before, a KS match in only one of s1 and s2 was left out of the per-prover lines (the summary line was always right), and this also applied to the logged replies. app.py now checks that the account in the login cookie still exists, so a cookie from before a database reset shows the sign-in form instead of a signed-in user with no hash.

  • Data. All accounts are synthetic (User1 to User54, seeded at run time from CoSMeTIC's synthetic input files); one generated test-account UUID appears in the logs. No real participant or patient data exists anywhere in this repository.

Security notes

  • Local defaults, not production values. docker-compose.yml ships POSTGRES_PASSWORD=mcp_password and SECRET_KEY=dev-secret-change-me, and the synthetic dataset users share password123. Set real values before any network-reachable deployment. The evaluation runner reads the same defaults from PG_PASSWORD, EVAL_USERNAME and EVAL_PASSWORD.

  • Passwords are bcrypt-hashed.

  • raw_hash is never returned in full; the /api/me/hash endpoint returns a masked preview.

  • User identity is enforced by HTTP header injection in the backend's MCP interceptor (x-user-id) and is never trusted from a tool argument (except in Config A, which disables this protection deliberately for the ablation).

  • Sessions are claimed on first request — Redis stores owner_user_id and rejects cross-user session access afterward.

  • Qwen3-32B emits <think>...</think> reasoning blocks; these are stripped from bot_response before persistence, trust labeling, or user display so they don't pollute Config A history or skew grading.

Configuration reference

Variable

Used by

Description

DEEPINFRA_API_KEY

backend

DeepInfra API key (required)

LLM_MODEL

backend

Model identifier (default Qwen/Qwen3-32B; the paper also used meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct and mistralai/Mistral-Small-3.2-24B-Instruct-2506)

LLM_BASE_URL

backend

OpenAI-compatible endpoint (default https://api.deepinfra.com/v1/openai); recorded by the runner in every result

SECRET_KEY

backend

Flask session signing key

PROVER_MCP_URL

backend

MCP URL (default http://proverserver:8003/mcp)

PROVER_BASE_HOST

proverserver

COSMeTIC hostname (default COSMeTICprover)

REDIS_HOST / REDIS_PORT

both

Redis connection

DATABASE_URL

both

Postgres DSN

DOWNLOADS_DIR

both

Shared volume for proof artifacts

INPUT_FILES_ZIP_URL

backend

Dataset sync source

INPUT_ZIPS_DIR

backend

Local storage for dataset zips

DATASET_DEFAULT_PASSWORD

backend

Default password for dataset users (default password123)

ADMIN_SYNC_SECRET

backend

Optional; protects /admin/sync-dataset

CONFIG

both

Ablation selector (A/B/C/D, plus supplementary A_STAR; default C) — must match on both services

EVAL_MODE

backend

Enables tool_calls log in /get response; forced true when CONFIG=D

Operations

docker-compose ps
docker-compose logs -f backend
docker-compose logs -f proverserver
docker-compose down
docker-compose build backend    # rebuild after requirements change

Repository layout

  • Runtime code at the root: app.py, proverserver.py, context_manager.py, account_store.py, dataset_sync.py, plus templates/, static/, sql/, the Dockerfiles, and docker-compose.yml (these must stay at the root — they're referenced by the Docker build context and compose mounts).

  • eval/ — all evaluation tooling: test_runner.py, grading_script.py, grading_faithfulness_v2.py, reproduce_paper_numbers.py, the run_*.sh sweep orchestrators, and test_suite*.json. Run these from the repo root (e.g. python eval/test_runner.py …); paths are anchored to the script location, so they also work if invoked from elsewhere.

  • results/ — all results_*.json produced by the test runner and sweeps (created automatically; readers/writers default here).

    Provenance caveat. The llm_model and llm_provider_base_url fields were added to the result schema in September 2026, after the runs reported in the paper were executed. Result files produced before that date therefore contain no record of which model or which API endpoint produced them; the model was selected through the LLM_MODEL environment variable and was not captured per run. The two sweep orchestrators (run_llama_all.sh, run_mistral_all.sh) also did not set LLM_MODEL at that time, so they inherited whatever value .env already held. Only run_verify_all.sh pinned model identifiers explicitly. The runner now refuses to start unless LLM_MODEL is set, and records both fields in every record, so this gap cannot recur. Determining retrospectively which provider and model served a given 2026 sweep requires the provider's usage history, not this repository. Development before the cross-model runs used Groq's API; DeepInfra was adopted for the other models, and the released build targets the OpenAI-compatible DeepInfra endpoint by default.

  • reports/ — the hand-read inspection dumps (inspection_*.txt), and the 252 classified wrong-port replies.

  • eval/reproduce_paper_numbers.py and eval/expected_output.txt — offline recomputation of every figure in the paper.

  • eval/MANIFEST.md and results/RESULTS_MANIFEST.csv — what the suite contains and what each results file is.

  • data/input_zips/ (not in the repository) — created at run time when /admin/sync-dataset fetches CoSMeTIC's synthetic input archive and seeds the User<N> accounts.

  • LICENSE (MIT, code), LICENSE-DATA (CC BY 4.0, data), CITATION.cff, .env.example, SHA256SUMS.txt (checksums of the results, suites, graders and reproduction output as released).

  • downloads/ (proof artifacts) — runtime data, not in the repository.

Further reading

  • ARCHITECTURE.md — complete code-verified architecture (14 sections, ~1371 lines)

    • §12 — CONFIG mechanism and the feature matrix

    • §13 — Test suite structure

    • §14 — Test runner design

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