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MCProbe

A stdio MCP server that audits other MCP servers over the live protocol. It connects to any MCP target (stdio or HTTP), lints every tool's schema for agent-usability, then actually calls the tools with deliberately broken inputs to see how the server handles them, and returns a 0–100 conformance score with a per-dimension breakdown rendered as Markdown.

The behavioral pass is the part that matters. Static schema audits tell you that a tool exists and looks reasonable. MCProbe then picks up a phone and dials each tool with missing_required, wrong_type, out_of_enum, and extra_garbage inputs — the same mistakes a language model will make on a bad day — and classifies the response. A server that returns a clean isError: true rejected the input correctly. A server that says "OK" to garbage (silently accepted it) or crashes the JSON-RPC transport both failed to reject it — and the Error Handling score is the fraction of bad inputs the server rejected cleanly.

Problem statement

The Model Context Protocol is new. Servers proliferate. Most ship with tool schemas that an agent can call, but few ship with tool schemas that an agent can call correctly: parameters are untyped, descriptions are missing, names are not snake_case, and a quick look at the code reveals that the handler is doing Number(x) / Number(y) with no guard at all.

The convention in the wider ecosystem is to ship a static schema audit that flags the obvious smells and then declare the server ready. The smells are real, but a static audit cannot tell you whether the server behaves: it cannot tell you that divide("x", "y") silently returns NaN, or that an extra unknown key is just stripped and ignored.

MCProbe does both, on a single connection:

  1. Static lint. Twelve rules over every tool's schema: missing or thin descriptions, duplicate or unusual names, an empty or non-object schema, untyped or undocumented parameters, and a server-wide rule for "I said I had tools but I have none."

  2. Behavioral fuzz. For each tool, the generator produces one valid case and at least three malformed variants, calls the target over the live JSON-RPC transport, and classifies the outcome as ok (the tool shrugged), toolError (graceful rejection), or protocolCrash (worst case). A malformed case that comes back without isError: true is flagged as silentlyAccepted — exactly the failure mode the linter cannot see.

  3. Scoring. The findings and the fuzz results are combined into a 0–100 score on four dimensions, mapped to an A–F grade, and rendered as a Markdown report the host (or a human) can read.

Related MCP server: mcp-audit

Hosted version — mcprobe.org

Don't want to install anything? mcprobe.org is the hosted version of this engine — paste an MCP server's URL in your browser and get the same graded report, no Node or setup required.

  • Free — 2 audits/day with a soft report (score, grade, dimension scores, finding counts).

  • Pro ($9.90 once, lifetime) — the full report (per-dimension reasons, every finding, the fuzz table, recommended fixes), 30 audits/day, saved history, the public gallery, Markdown export, and shareable links.

  • Local (stdio) servers — a Pro feature: run mcprobe push --stdio "…" --token <key> to audit a server on your machine and send the report to your account (see the CLI).

This engine stays MIT-licensed and free — the hosted app only adds accounts, persistence, the gallery, and those conveniences. Run it yourself for nothing, or pay once for the hosted experience.

Install

npm install
npm run build     # tsc -p tsconfig.json && tsc -p examples/demo-target/tsconfig.json

The build emits:

  • dist/index.js — the probe (run this as a stdio MCP server).

  • examples/demo-target/dist/index.js — a deliberately flawed MCP server used by the tests and the demo.

To launch the probe as a stdio MCP server so any host can talk to it:

npm start

No port, no daemon, no config file. The probe speaks JSON-RPC on stdin/stdout and writes operator logs to stderr.

Quickstart — audit any MCP server

Two ways to point MCProbe at a target. You only ever register MCProbe; it dials the target itself, so the target needs no setup.

Option 1 — from an MCP client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, any host)

Add MCProbe to your client's MCP config (use the absolute path to the built dist/index.js):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "mcprobe": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/mcprobe/dist/index.js"]
    }
  }
}

To let the host audit local stdio servers too, allow the exact command lines in the probe's own env (see Security for why this is opt-in):

"mcprobe": {
  "command": "node",
  "args": ["/absolute/path/to/mcprobe/dist/index.js"],
  "env": {
    "MCPROBE_ALLOW_STDIO": "node /absolute/path/to/my-server/dist/index.js",
    "MCPROBE_PASS_ENV": "MY_SERVER_API_KEY",
    "MY_SERVER_API_KEY": "..."
  }
}

Then ask in plain English:

Use mcprobe to audit https://docs.base.org/mcp over http — connect, then run a full report with fuzz and show me the score.

The host calls probe_connect then probe_report for you. MCProbe also advertises server instructions, so the model is told the flow on connect — no need to memorise the tool names.

Option 2 — the mcprobe CLI (no host)

Get the project and build it, then audit any server straight from the terminal:

git clone https://github.com/alitiknazoglu/mcprobe
cd mcprobe && npm install && npm run build

# audit an HTTP server
node dist/index.js audit https://docs.base.org/mcp --fuzz

# audit a LOCAL stdio server (no URL — the `npx some-server` style)
node dist/index.js audit --stdio "npx @acme/my-mcp-server" --fuzz

# audit a server that requires credentials
node dist/index.js audit https://api.acme.com/mcp --bearer sk_live_xxx --fuzz
node dist/index.js audit https://api.acme.com/mcp --header "X-API-Key: xxx"

--bearer/--header authenticate you to the server being audited, and are sent on every request to it — so only point them at a server you trust. Set MCPROBE_TARGET_TOKEN instead of --bearer to keep the key out of your shell history. (Don't confuse these with push --token, which authenticates you to MCProbe; passing that as --bearer would hand your MCProbe key to a third party.) A stdio server takes its credentials through its own environment instead — and it does not inherit your shell's environment (so MCPROBE_TOKEN and CI secrets never reach it). Forward what it needs with --pass-env NAME (repeatable) or set it with --env NAME=VALUE:

node dist/index.js audit --stdio "node ./server.js" --pass-env MY_API_KEY --fuzz

(After npm install -g . or npm link, the command is just mcprobe audit ….)

It prints the full Markdown report to stdout — add --json for a machine-readable report (what the GitHub Action and other tooling consume). --fuzz also calls each tool for real — once with a plausible valid input and several times with malformed input — to score Error Handling & Liveness. By default it only touches tools the target annotates readOnlyHint: true or destructiveHint: false; the MCP spec presumes every other tool destructive. --fuzz-unannotated adds tools with no safety annotations, and --fuzz-destructive adds everything. Only use those two against a server you own, on test data — a send_payment or delete_post tool will run. Omit --fuzz for a read-only static audit (metadata + schema quality only).

Save an audit to your account. push runs the same audit and uploads the report to an ingest endpoint (default https://mcprobe.org/api/ingest) with a bearer token:

node dist/index.js push --stdio "npx @acme/my-mcp-server" --fuzz --token mcp_xxx

The token comes from your mcprobe.org profile; --to <url> (or MCPROBE_API) points it at a different endpoint, which must be https:// (plain http:// is accepted only for localhost). The upload describes the target without its secrets: values after flags like --api-key/--token, TOKEN=... pairs, key-shaped strings and URL credentials are replaced with ***. Run mcprobe help for all flags.

--stdio is split like a shell command line, so quote arguments that contain spaces: --stdio "node '/path with spaces/server.js'".

Audit in CI (GitHub Action)

Gate your MCP server on every push — audit it and fail the build if its conformance grade drops. Free and self-contained (it runs the open-source engine on your own runner; no account required):

# .github/workflows/mcprobe.yml
name: MCP audit
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
  audit:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: alitiknazoglu/mcprobe@v1
        with:
          url: https://your-server.example.com/mcp
          fuzz: true          # behavioral testing — really calls read-only/non-destructive tools (default false)
          # fuzz-unannotated: true  # also call tools with no safety annotations
          min-score: "75"     # fail the job below this (A≥90 B≥75 C≥60 D≥40); omit to report only

The step prints the score to the job summary and exposes score / grade outputs. It also writes a full mcprobe-report.json you can upload as an artifact. Leave off min-score to report without ever failing the build.

Upload runs to your dashboard (Pro): add one line — a token: (your mcprobe.org Pro key, stored as a GitHub secret). The audit stays the same; the run is also uploaded to your history/dashboard on mcprobe.org.

      - uses: alitiknazoglu/mcprobe@v1
        with:
          url: https://your-server.example.com/mcp
          min-score: "75"
          token: ${{ secrets.MCPROBE_TOKEN }}   # ← only new line; uploads to your dashboard

The audit itself is always free and local; the hosted tracking (history, gallery, badge) is the Pro tier — see Hosted version.

Agent skill

This repo ships an agent skill so your coding agent knows how to drive MCProbe on its own — just say "audit this MCP server" and it runs the right probe_* tools or mcprobe CLI command and explains the score. To install it, copy the folder into your agent's skills directory:

# Claude Code (project- or user-level)
cp -r .agents/skills/mcp-audit /path/to/your/project/.claude/skills/

# Other agents that use the open skills format (Codex, Opencode, Cursor, …)
cp -r .agents/skills/mcp-audit /path/to/your/project/.agents/skills/

It's a single SKILL.md — the same file works in either location.

Security

MCProbe connects to servers you point it at and, with --fuzz, calls their tools. Treat both directions as untrusted.

probe_connect is driven by an agent, so it is gated. Whoever drives the MCP server — usually an LLM, possibly acting on a prompt injection in a page or a tool result — chooses the command, its arguments, its environment and the URL. Ungated, that is arbitrary code execution and an SSRF primitive. So:

Env (set in the probe's MCP config)

Effect

MCPROBE_ALLOW_STDIO unset

probe_connect refuses transport: "stdio".

MCPROBE_ALLOW_STDIO="node /abs/server.js; npx -y @acme/srv"

Only these exact command lines (command + args, ;-separated). The agent may not set code-loading env vars (PATH, NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_*, PYTHONPATH, ...).

MCPROBE_ALLOW_STDIO="*"

Any command, any env. Only for a probe no untrusted text can reach.

MCPROBE_PASS_ENV="A,B"

Forward these variables from the probe's env to spawned targets (so the agent never handles the secret).

MCPROBE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=1

Allow http targets on loopback / private networks (local dev servers). Off by default. Link-local and cloud-metadata addresses (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10, metadata.google.internal) are always refused. Hostnames are resolved and every address checked; each request is re-checked and redirects are refused.

Allowlisting an interpreter with an open-ended argument (npx -y <anything>) is only as safe as that exact line — the allowlist is matched on the full command line, so prefer an absolute path to the server's entry point.

The CLI and the mcprobe/audit library are not gated: there, the person running the command is the operator.

Spawned targets get a minimal environment. A stdio target sees only PATH, HOME, USER, SHELL, TERM (the MCP SDK's default set) plus what you pass explicitly (--env, --pass-env, env/passEnv in the library, MCPROBE_PASS_ENV for the server). Your MCPROBE_TOKEN, MCPROBE_TARGET_TOKEN and CI secrets never reach it.

The six probe_* tools

MCProbe registers four core tools and two optional helpers. The core four cover the full lint → fuzz → score pipeline; the two helpers cover the everyday ergonomics of managing connections.

Tool

Purpose

Returns

probe_connect

Open a connection to a target.

{ connectionId, name, version, capabilities, counts, defaultConnectionId }

probe_lint

Run the 12 lint rules over the target's cached tool summaries.

{ connectionId, server, findings, summary }

probe_fuzz

Generate valid + malformed inputs per tool, call each, classify the outcome. Only fuzzes tools annotated read-only / non-destructive by default.

{ connectionId, server, results, coverage, summary }

probe_report

Run lint (and fuzz when requested), score, render Markdown.

{ connectionId, server, overall, grade, dimensions, coverage, findings, fuzz, markdown }

probe_list

(optional) Enumerate the target's tools.

{ connectionId, server, tools }

probe_disconnect

(optional) Close one connection (by id) or every connection.

{ removed, remaining, defaultConnectionId }

All tools default to the most recently opened connection when connectionId is omitted, so a single-target audit is a three-call sequence: probe_connect → probe_report → probe_disconnect.

Every tool also declares MCP annotations so a host can reason about side effects before calling: probe_lint and probe_list are readOnlyHint: true, while probe_fuzz is destructiveHint: true (it invokes the target's tools), and the tools that reach a target (probe_connect, probe_fuzz, probe_report) set openWorldHint: true. MCProbe audits other servers for agent-usability, so it declares these hints on its own tools too.

probe_connect

Two transports: stdio (spawns a child process) and http (speaks the streamable HTTP transport, with SSE fallback). For stdio, command is required; for http, url is required. The target's initialize handshake is run synchronously, the server's identity and capabilities are cached, and a stable connectionId is returned.

Both transports are gated by the operator — see Security: stdio needs MCPROBE_ALLOW_STDIO, and loopback/private URLs need MCPROBE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS=1.

probe_lint

A pure pass over the connection's cached tool summaries — no extra round-trip. Each finding carries a stable code, a severity (error, warning, info), a human-readable message, a location ({ tool, param? }), and a hint with a concrete fix.

The twelve rules are:

Code

Severity

What it catches

tool.missing_description

error

A tool with no description at all.

tool.thin_description

warning

A description under 12 characters.

tool.duplicate_name

error

Two tools registered with the same name.

tool.unusual_name

warning

A name that is not snake_case or kebab-case.

tool.no_input_schema

warning

An empty or missing inputSchema.

tool.no_annotations

info

A tool that declares no MCP annotations (readOnlyHint, destructiveHint, etc.).

schema.invalid

error

A schema that fails to compile (Ajv).

schema.root_not_object

warning

A root type that is not object.

schema.no_required

info

Properties declared but no required array.

param.untyped

warning

A property with no type/enum/const/oneOf.

param.missing_description

warning

A property with no description.

server.no_tools

warning

The server claims tools but registers none.

probe_fuzz

For every tool (capped at maxTools, default 10), the generator emits one valid case and at least three malformed variants:

  • missing_required:<field> — drop each required field in turn.

  • wrong_type:<field> — replace each typed field with a value of a different primitive type.

  • out_of_enum:<field> — for enum or const fields, send a value the schema forbids.

  • extra_garbage — append a sentinel key to the valid args.

Each case is sent to the target over the live JSON-RPC transport. The classifier assigns one of three outcomes:

Outcome

Meaning

ok

The target returned a result with isError: false. For a malformed case this is silentlyAccepted: true; for a valid case with no usable content it is emptySuccess: true, and a valid success that breaks the tool's declared outputSchema is outputSchemaViolation: true.

toolError

The target returned a result with isError: true (graceful rejection).

protocolCrash

The call rejected or the transport closed.

Hallucinated success (emptySuccess). A valid call that returns success but with an empty / contentless result — e.g. a write tool that answers 200 with an empty body and never persists anything. The agent reads "done" while nothing happened. MCProbe flags this on the critical line, drops Liveness credit for that call (it isn't a real success), and recommends returning a confirmation payload. This is the "the agent said done, nothing happened" bug. (A tool that returns valid structuredContent but empty text content is not flagged — the structured payload is a real result.)

Output-schema conformance (outputSchemaViolation). When a tool declares an outputSchema (MCP structured output), MCProbe checks that a valid call actually honors it — the success must return structuredContent that validates against the declared schema. A tool that advertises an output contract and then returns no structured content, or a payload that doesn't match, is flagged (and reported as an output-schema violation rather than a misleading "protocol crash"). Not credited in Liveness — a success that breaks its own contract isn't a real success.

Dry-run safety. Fuzzing really calls the target's tools — including a "valid" call that does whatever the tool does. So by default only tools annotated readOnlyHint: true or destructiveHint: false are fuzzed. Per the MCP spec, a tool without those hints is presumed destructive: it is skipped unless you pass fuzzUnannotated: true (and MCProbe logs a warning naming each such tool it calls). Tools annotated destructiveHint: true additionally need fuzzDestructive: true. probe_fuzz (and the report) return a coverage summary listing how many tools were fuzzed and which were skipped (as destructive, as unannotated, or over the maxTools cap).

probe_report

The convenience entry point. Calls probe_lint (always) and probe_fuzz (when fuzz: true), scores the result on the four dimensions described below, and returns the structured ConformanceReport and a rendered Markdown string. The Markdown is the canonical payload; downstream tools that need the numbers can pull them out of the structured fields.

Scoring model — four dimensions

The overall 0–100 score is the mean of the measured dimensions. Dimensions that were not measured (e.g. the two behavioral ones when fuzz: false, or when every tool was skipped) are reported as "not measured" and excluded from the average rather than penalized with a fake value. This is what lets a static audit of a clean server still score 100/100.

The two static dimensions are subtractive (start at 10, lose points per finding). The two behavioral dimensions are normalized rates, so a score is comparable across servers of different sizes — and the fuzz cases are partitioned by kind (malformed → Error Handling, valid → Liveness) so no outcome is ever counted twice.

Letter grades: A ≥ 90, B ≥ 75, C ≥ 60, D ≥ 40, F < 40.

Dimension

Always measured?

What it captures

Metadata & Documentation

yes

Server identity (name, version), advertised capabilities, presence of instructions (+1 bonus).

Schema Quality

yes

Rate over tools: findings are weighted (1 per error, 0.5 per warning, 0.25 per info), summed per tool and capped at 2 each, then averaged across every tool the server advertises. A server isn't penalized for having more tools — 50 tools with one minor nit each score the same as 5.

Error Handling

only with fuzz: true

Rate over malformed cases: 10 × (gracefully-rejected / total malformed). A silent accept (garbage let through) or a protocol crash both count as failed rejections.

Liveness & Performance

only with fuzz: true

Rate over valid cases: 10 × (successful / total valid), minus 0.5 per 100ms that the valid-call p50 latency exceeds a 200ms target.

The per-dimension reasons and counts are emitted in the Markdown report so the score is auditable by a human. When fuzzing runs, the report header also shows two extra lines:

  • a Coverage line (how many tools were fuzzed, and which were skipped as destructive, as unannotated, or over the maxTools cap); and

  • a critical-issues callout — a flag, not a second score — hoisting the dangerous findings to the top, e.g. ⚠ Critical: 4 tool(s) silently accept malformed input (…); 1 protocol crash(es), or ✓ No critical behavioral issues when there are none. The normalized scores are unchanged; this just makes the scary stuff visible above the fold.

The report ends with a Recommended fixes section: a prioritized to-do list (worst severity first) that turns each finding into a concrete action — the fix hint plus the exact tools/parameters it affects — followed by behavioral fixes for tools that silently accept input or crash. So the report is a prescription, not just a diagnosis. A clean server gets "Nothing to fix — this server passes every check."

30-second demo

The probe ships with a deliberately flawed demo target at examples/demo-target/ and a smoke script that runs the full probe_report pipeline against it. From a clean clone:

npm install
npm run build
node scripts/smoke-report.mjs

The script spawns the probe as a stdio MCP server, opens a connection to the demo target, calls probe_report with fuzz: true, and prints the Markdown report to stdout. The demo target is wired to fail loudly: greet has no description, divide returns NaN on bad input, set_mode has a thin description, and well_behaved is the only tool with a clean, validated schema. The report will show a low overall score with concrete findings, a coverage line, a critical-issues callout, and a fuzz table that classifies the broken cases.

For an interactive tour, the official MCP inspector works as a host against the built probe:

npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector node dist/index.js

The inspector UI lists the six probe_* tools; calling them manually is a good way to see the request/response shape.

External server example

For a full probe_connect → probe_report → probe_disconnect walkthrough as an AI agent would run it (natural-language request, the JSON tool calls, and the rendered report), see examples/agent-usage.md.

The probe is not coupled to the demo target. To audit any other MCP server, swap the command/args in probe_connect (and allow that command line in the probe's MCPROBE_ALLOW_STDIO):

// tool call: probe_connect
{
  "transport": "stdio",
  "command": "npx",
  "args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem@latest", "/tmp"]
}

The probe runs the initialize handshake against the spawned process, caches its tools, and is ready for probe_lint / probe_fuzz / probe_report. The same pattern works for HTTP targets: pass transport: "http" and a url instead.

A real transcript of this audit (run against @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem@latest and saved to examples/transcripts/external-server.md) is included in the repository. The script that produced it is scripts/external-audit.mjs. A self-audit (a second copy of the probe scoring the first) lives at examples/transcripts/self-audit.md.

Use as a library

Besides the MCP server, MCProbe exposes its audit pipeline as functions for embedding in your own backend:

import { auditUrl, auditStdio, softenReport, renderReport } from "mcprobe/audit";

// HTTP server (URL in, report out — never spawns a process):
const report = await auditUrl("https://example.com/mcp", { fuzz: false });

// A server that requires credentials — headers ride along on every request
// (connect *and* tool calls), so the whole audit works, fuzzing included:
const gated = await auditUrl("https://api.acme.com/mcp", {
  fuzz: true,
  headers: { Authorization: "Bearer sk_live_xxx" },
});

// Local stdio server (spawns the subprocess — only run commands you trust):
const local = await auditStdio("npx", { args: ["@acme/my-mcp-server"], fuzz: true });

console.log(report.overall, report.grade);  // structured ConformanceReport
console.log(renderReport(report));          // or the Markdown
const teaser = softenReport(report);        // a trimmed view (scores, no detail)

Both default to a static, read-only audit (fuzz: false); pass fuzz: true to also run the behavioral fuzzer (only tools annotated read-only / non-destructive, unless fuzzUnannotated or fuzzDestructive is set). auditUrl is HTTP-only and side-effect-free, ideal for a hosted backend; auditStdio launches a local subprocess, so use it only for servers you trust (CLIs, your own machine). softenReport is handy for a free/preview tier — it keeps the scores and counts but withholds the reasons, full findings, fuzz table, and recommended fixes.

This is exactly how the hosted app at mcprobe.org is built on top of the engine.

Architecture

MCProbe plays two roles at once: it is a stdio MCP server to its host, and an MCP client to whatever it is auditing. The split mirrors the source layout.

+-------------------------------------------------+
| any MCP client over stdio:                      |
| Claude Code, an IDE, an agent, or a node script |
+-------------------------------------------------+
                          |
                          |  stdio JSON-RPC  (stdin / stdout)
                          v
+--------------------------------------------------+
|  MCProbe  -  one stdio MCP server                |
|                                                  |
|  src/index.ts       registers the probe_* tools  |
|      |  then calls the pure modules:             |
|      +--> src/schema-lint   (12 lint rules)      |
|      +--> src/fuzz          (case generator)     |
|      +--> src/conformance   (4-dimension score)  |
|      +--> src/report        (markdown renderer)  |
|      |                                           |
|      v                                           |
|  src/target-client  (outbound MCP client)        |
+--------------------------------------------------+
                          |
                          |  stdio / http JSON-RPC
                          v
              +---------------------+
              |  target MCP server  |
              +---------------------+

The top box is whatever drives MCProbe over stdio — a full host like Claude Code, or a plain node script (the scripts/*.mjs drivers and the Quickstart's audit.mjs are exactly this; no host required). It talks only to MCProbe; MCProbe's src/target-client then dials the audited server over stdio or http. The probe sits in the middle — a server to its caller, a client to its target.

Module

Role

I/O?

src/types.ts

Shared Finding, FuzzResult, DimensionScore, ConformanceReport types.

none

src/connect-policy.ts

Operator gate for probe_connect: stdio allowlist (MCPROBE_ALLOW_STDIO), SSRF guard for URLs.

DNS lookups only

src/target-client.ts

Outbound MCP client, ConnectionRegistry, callTool wrapper that catches transport errors.

yes — spawns / dials

src/schema-lint.ts

The 12 lint rules. Pure: no I/O, deterministic ordering.

none

src/fuzz.ts

Case generator + runner + summarizeFuzz histogram. Generator is pure; runner threads through a caller-supplied call fn so it stays unit-testable.

none on the generator; the runner calls the target

src/conformance.ts

Per-dimension scoring + rollup. Pure.

none

src/report.ts

Pure Markdown renderer. Same input → same output every run.

none

src/index.ts

McpServer, registers the six probe_* tools, routes them to the pure modules.

yes — owns the stdio transport

The four pure modules (schema-lint, fuzz generator, conformance, report) are deliberately side-effect-free so the vitest suite can exercise them in milliseconds without spawning a target. The integration test in tests/demo-target.test.ts is the only piece that touches a live process; it is the smallest test that proves the build artifact loads over the real protocol.

Limitations

  • The three runtime dependencies are frozen. @modelcontextprotocol/sdk, ajv, zod. The probe deliberately does not depend on any CLI framework, HTTP server, or transport library beyond what the SDK already exposes. Adding a runtime dependency is an explicit change to the spec.

  • The probe is a stdio MCP server, full stop. It does not expose an HTTP endpoint. Run it as a subprocess of your host.

  • Only static credentials are supported. A server behind an API key or bearer token can be audited with --bearer / --header (or the headers option in the library). A server that requires a full OAuth login flow — an authorization-code/PKCE dance with dynamic client registration — cannot be audited yet, because MCProbe has no way to complete that flow on your behalf.

  • The fuzzer is shallow, not adversarial. It exercises the surface documented by the tool's inputSchema; it does not attempt to discover server-side bugs that are out of band of the tool contract. The point of MCProbe is conformance, not general-purpose server fuzzing.

  • The scoring is dimension-local. A perfect score on one dimension does not rescue a failure on another. The static dimensions are subtractive; the behavioral dimensions are normalized rates. The four dimensions are weighted equally when measured.

  • Dry-run fuzzes only tools declared safe. By default a fuzz run exercises only tools annotated readOnlyHint: true or destructiveHint: false; the rest show up in the coverage summary as skipped. Annotations are the only signal MCProbe has, so a server that wrongly marks a destructive tool read-only will still have it called. Pass fuzzUnannotated: true to include unannotated tools and fuzzDestructive: true to fuzz everything.

  • Behavioral scores need a real protocol round-trip. When fuzz: false is passed to probe_report, the Error Handling and Liveness & Performance dimensions are reported as "not measured" and excluded from the rollup. A "lint-only" audit can still score 100/100 on a clean server, but it cannot tell you whether the server would survive a bad input.

  • Tooling is four cores + two helpers, no more. The spec pins the surface area. Adding a probe_* tool is an explicit change to the spec.

  • The optional helpers are still required at startup. The McpServer is constructed with the tools capability only; it does not advertise resources or prompts. The probe itself is an audit tool, not a content server.

Available Tools

6 tools
probe_connectA

Open a connection to an MCP target server (stdio or HTTP) and return a connectionId plus the server's name, version, capabilities, and counts.

Inputs: transport (required), env, url, args, +1 more.

probe_disconnectA
Idempotent

Close a single connection (by id) or all connections if id is omitted.

Inputs: id.

probe_fuzzA
Destructive

Generate one valid and several malformed inputs per target tool, call each, and record the outcome (ok, toolError, protocolCrash), whether malformed inputs were silently accepted, and call latency. Tools annotated destructiveHint:true are skipped by default (set fuzzDestructive to include them). Returns a coverage summary of which tools were fuzzed vs skipped.

Inputs: maxTools, connectionId, fuzzDestructive.

probe_lintA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Run the lint rules over the target's tool schemas and return a list of findings with stable codes, severities, locations, and fix hints.

Inputs: connectionId.

probe_listA
Read-onlyIdempotent

Enumerate the target's tools (name, description, input schema) using the default or a specific connection.

Inputs: connectionId.

probe_reportA

Run introspect + lint (and fuzz when requested) against the target, score the result on four dimensions, and return a Markdown report with the overall score, letter grade, per-dimension breakdown, findings, and fuzz table.

Inputs: fuzz, maxTools, connectionId, fuzzDestructive.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

    TDQS

    A4.3/5.0

    Scored across 6 tools

    Disambiguation5/5

    Each tool has a distinct purpose: connect, lint, fuzz, report, list, disconnect. No overlap or ambiguity in their functions.

    Naming Consistency5/5

    All tools follow the consistent verb_noun pattern with 'probe_' prefix (e.g., probe_connect, probe_lint), ensuring predictability.

    Tool Count5/5

    Six tools cover the necessary operations for probing MCP servers (connect, list, lint, fuzz, report, disconnect) without being excessive or insufficient.

    Completeness5/5

    The tool set covers the full lifecycle: connection, introspection (list, report), linting, fuzzing, and disconnection. No obvious gaps for the stated domain.

    Maintenance

    ActivityMaintained
    ResponsivenessLimited data

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