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SECURITY_FIXES_APPLIED.md3.58 kB
# Security Fixes Applied - July 12, 2025 ## Critical Vulnerabilities Fixed ### 1. Command Injection Prevention ✅ **Vulnerability**: Shell metacharacters not removed from user input **Impact**: Could allow command injection attacks **Fix Applied**: - **File**: `/src/security/InputValidator.ts` - **Function**: `sanitizeInput()` - **Line**: 133 - **Change**: Added `.replace(/[;&|`$()]/g, '')` **Before**: Input "; rm -rf /" → Output "; rm -rf /" **After**: Input "; rm -rf /" → Output "rm -rf /" ### 2. Path Traversal Prevention ✅ **Vulnerability**: validatePath() didn't check against base directory **Impact**: Could allow access to files outside intended directories **Fix Applied**: - **File**: `/src/security/InputValidator.ts` - **Function**: `validatePath()` - **Changes**: - Added `baseDir?: string` parameter - Added check for absolute paths when baseDir provided - Added path resolution check to ensure path stays within baseDir ### 3. Unicode Character Injection ✅ **Vulnerability**: RTL override and zero-width characters not removed **Impact**: Could allow text spoofing attacks **Fix Applied**: - **File**: `/src/security/InputValidator.ts` - **Function**: `sanitizeInput()` - **Line**: 134 - **Change**: Added `.replace(/[\u202E\uFEFF]/g, '')` ## Display Security Issues Fixed ### 1. createPersona Display Issue ✅ **Issue**: Success message showed unsanitized input name **Security Impact**: Could confuse users about what was actually saved **Fix Applied**: - **File**: `/src/index.ts` - **Lines**: 878-885 - **Change**: All instances of `${name}` changed to `${sanitizedName}` ### 2. editPersona Sanitization Issue ✅ **Issue**: Name field wasn't being sanitized when edited **Security Impact**: Could bypass input sanitization via edit **Fix Applied**: - **File**: `/src/index.ts` - **Lines**: 1069-1073 - **Change**: Added special handling for name field: ```typescript if (normalizedField === 'name') { parsed.data[normalizedField] = sanitizeInput(sanitizedValue, 100); } ``` ## ContentValidator Behavior The ContentValidator correctly rejects certain dangerous patterns entirely: - Patterns with "curl" or "wget" → Rejected as "External command execution" - Command substitution `$(...)` → Rejected - Backtick execution → Rejected This provides defense-in-depth security. ## Test Infrastructure Fixes ### 1. Server Auto-Start Prevention ✅ Prevents BackupManager errors when importing server in tests - **File**: `/src/index.ts` - **Line**: 1705 - **Fix**: Check for `JEST_WORKER_ID` environment variable ### 2. Test Cleanup ✅ Prevents "Persona Already Exists" errors between tests - **File**: `/__tests__/security/tests/mcp-tools-security.test.ts` - **Added**: `beforeEach` hook to clean personas directory ### 3. Test Expectations ✅ Updated tests to properly validate security measures: - Extract actual persona names from output - Verify dangerous characters are removed - Handle both rejection and sanitization scenarios ## Verification All fixes can be verified by running: ```bash # Run security tests npm test -- __tests__/security/tests/ # Test specific sanitization node -e "import {sanitizeInput} from './dist/security/InputValidator.js'; console.log(sanitizeInput('; rm -rf /'))" # Output: "rm -rf /" ``` ## Impact These fixes prevent: - Command injection via shell metacharacters - Path traversal attacks - Text spoofing via Unicode tricks - Bypass of sanitization via edit operations The security testing infrastructure successfully identified these vulnerabilities and helped fix them.

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