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priorseal_prepare_controlled_execution

Read-onlyIdempotent

Prepare the Seal stage of one Verified Action together with deployment capabilities and a safe handoff plan for Witness, Match, and Review. A human-controlled principal must still sign; this never accepts an authorization, signs, submits, or executes a transaction.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "input": "<input>"
    },
    "name": "priorseal_prepare_controlled_execution"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
inputYesThe complete Verified Action preparation request.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
dataYes
riskYes
toolYes
schemaYes
statusYes
nextActionYes
requiresHumanSignatureYes
mayBroadcastTransactionYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true and destructiveHint=false, so safety is covered structurally; the description consistently reinforces that by spelling out the four things it will not do (accept, sign, submit, execute). It adds useful boundary context about the human signer requirement, but says nothing about how long a prepared handoff remains valid or what happens on repeated calls beyond idempotency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, no filler, and the capability statement is front-loaded ahead of the constraint. The density of protocol terms makes it slower to parse than it needs to be, but nothing is redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Output schema and annotations relieve the description of explaining returns and safety, and the non-execution guarantee is stated. What is missing for a multi-stage protocol tool with an opaque nested request is the shape of the preparation input and the meaning of the Witness/Match/Review handoff stages, which an agent needs to assemble a valid call.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single nested 'input' object whose schema description is circular ('The complete Verified Action preparation request'), and the tool description adds no information about what that request must contain. Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline of 3 applies, but the schema text itself is not genuinely informative.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose3/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The verb is specific (prepare) and the outputs are named (Seal stage, deployment capabilities, handoff plan for Witness, Match, Review), so the resource is identifiable. However, the phrasing is dense protocol jargon that only makes sense if the agent already knows the Verified Action vocabulary, and nothing distinguishes this from siblings like priorseal_prepare_authorization or priorseal_observe_execution.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The second sentence establishes a clear negative scope: it never accepts an authorization, signs, submits, or executes, and a human principal must still sign. That implicitly routes the agent to accept/sign tools for those steps. It stops short of naming the sibling to use next, so it is strong context rather than explicit when/when-not/alternative guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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