Skip to main content
Glama

Flux intel

flux_intel

X1 wallet threat intelligence report: scam, drainer, and blacklist signals for one wallet. $0.003 per call over x402 (USDC on Arc, Base or Solana, or XNT on X1). Call once without payment for the terms, sign them with your own wallet, call again with payment.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "wallet": "<wallet>"
    },
    "name": "flux_intel"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
walletYesSolana/X1 base58 wallet address
paymentNoa signed x402 payment (the base64 payload you would put in PAYMENT-SIGNATURE). Pass it and the purchase completes inside this tool call.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations supplied, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It does disclose the cost ($0.003 per call), the x402 payment protocol, accepted currencies (USDC on Arc/Base/Solana, XNT on X1), and the two-step purchase flow — meaningful context. It omits what happens on an invalid or replayed payment, whether the wallet is charged when the lookup fails, rate limits, and the shape of the returned signals.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three front-loaded sentences with no filler: purpose first, then price and rails, then the payment procedure. The pricing/currency enumeration is the densest part but is decision-relevant for an agent that must judge cost before calling.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description must convey the return content, and it only names the signal categories (scam, drainer, blacklist) without saying how they are structured or scored. The payment mechanics are well covered, but for a no-annotation paid tool the description could say more about failure and charge behavior.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so a baseline of 3 applies, but the description adds genuine meaning by explaining the two-phase contract around `payment` — the first call returns terms, the second with a signed payload completes the purchase inside the same call. That sequencing is not obvious from the schema's one-line parameter note.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific resource and verb: an 'X1 wallet threat intelligence report' returning 'scam, drainer, and blacklist signals for one wallet.' An agent immediately knows this is a per-wallet threat lookup, not a bulk or generic intel call.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit procedural guidance for the paid call: 'Call once without `payment` for the terms, sign them with your own wallet, call again with `payment`.' It also states the price and accepted payment rails. It does not compare against sibling tools such as threat_intel or threat_intel_bulk, so an agent must infer when the bulk variant is preferable.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources