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apex-dev

Package audit

package_audit
Read-onlyIdempotent

npm and PyPI package security and supply-chain audit: checks registry existence (catches hallucinated packages), deprecation, install scripts, age, and Google OSV.dev CVEs/GHSAs with SAFE/CAUTION/RISKY verdict. $0.001 per call over x402 (USDC on Arc, Base or Solana, or XNT on X1). Call once without payment for terms, then call again with payment.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "name": "<name>"
    },
    "name": "package_audit"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesPackage name on npm or PyPI (e.g. lodash, requests).
paymentNosigned x402 payment payload (PAYMENT-SIGNATURE).
versionNoOptional exact version to audit against OSV.dev.
ecosystemNoRegistry: npm (default) or pypi.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/openWorld/non-destructive, yet the description still adds real value: cost ($0.001 per call), accepted payment rails (USDC on Arc/Base/Solana, XNT on X1), and the two-call payment handshake. It does not describe failure modes (invalid package name, unpaid call rejection) or the shape of the returned report, so it stops short of 5.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense but front-loaded: the audit scope comes first, then pricing and the call protocol. Every clause carries information, though the single long first sentence packs checks, verdict scale, and hallucination-catching together and could be split for scanability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the burden of describing results, and it does name the SAFE/CAUTION/RISKY verdict scale, but it doesn't say what fields the report contains. Pricing, payment rails, and the two-call flow are covered, so the remaining gap is the return payload detail.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3; the description earns an extra point because it explains the semantics of the `payment` parameter as a two-step handshake rather than a static field, which the schema text alone does not convey. It adds nothing about `ecosystem` or `version` beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific resource (npm and PyPI packages) and enumerates exactly what is checked: registry existence and hallucination detection, deprecation, install scripts, age, and OSV.dev CVEs/GHSAs, ending in a SAFE/CAUTION/RISKY verdict. That is far more specific than siblings like cve_lookup or tech_stack_detect, so an agent can pick this tool for a full supply-chain audit without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete invocation guidance for the paid flow: 'Call once without `payment` for terms, then call again with `payment`.' It also implicitly scopes usage to package auditing. It stops short of naming alternatives or exclusions (e.g. when to use cve_lookup for a single CVE instead), so it is clear context rather than full when/when-not guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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